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Abstract of the thesis 
Between Concord and Discord, Juan Luis Vives (1492/1493 – 1540) on Language, 
Rhetoric, and Politics 
 
This thesis presents a new interpretation of the political dimension of Juan Luis Vives’s thought 
by looking at Vives’s reception and appropriation of classical rhetoric in the context of northern 
humanism. This thesis argues that rather than theorizing politics in the language of law, Vives’s 
main contribution to political thought occurred at the intersection of reflections on cognition, 
rhetoric, and ethical languages of virtuous government. This is to challenge the existing 
scholarship in two ways. First, it questions a prevalent interpretation of Vives as merely a 
theoretician of an overarching political concord and peace by showing Vives’s deep interest in 
the possibilities of political action in a postlapsarian world of discord. Secondly, the thesis 
shows that while Vives, and northern humanism more generally, produced little systematic 
reflection on some of the basic political and legal concepts, Vives’s theorization of cognitive, 
ethical, linguistic, and educational viewpoints was a way to frame the ultimate conditions and 
possibilities of political action in a non-utopian world. In the tumultuous 1520s and 1530s, 
when the religious unity of Christendom and the political concord between different European 
states were increasingly threatened, Vives argues that language and politics are inseparably 
entangled on three different levels. First, political, and ethical languages are conceptualized 
essentially rhetorically; they are meant to be transformative and they have to lead to 
constructive political action. Secondly and closely connected to the first point, the 
transformative potential of political discourses must be realized in different practices of 
counselling linking politics intrinsically to humanist concerns of active life in the service of 
community. Thirdly, since active life is realized in princely contexts unfavourable to open 
debate, the use of language and rhetoric has to be appropriated to this new environment. In this 
process, the place of rhetoric in educational schemes, the internal theory of rhetoric, and the 
relationship between language and cognition are problematized in the context of wider debates 
on education, good government, and human freedom central to the northern humanist tradition 
in the early 16th century. In conceptualizing politics, language, and cognition, largely together 
Vives’s thought points to broader 16th- and 17th-century developments in European political 
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Vives, Rhetoric, and Politics 
 
 
“Nobody needs language when dealing with himself; language has been given to man because 
of other men. For one cannot think of a more suitable instrument for human communication – 
language enables one to open to others what one has enclosed in one’s soul and cognition.”1 
 




In reflecting on human sociability in his De concordia & discordia in humano genere, Vives 
greatly emphasized the importance of language as an expression of the caring nature of man. 
Drawing on classical and Christian sources, Vives eloquently pointed out that man was a social 
creature, amply endowed with qualities to succeed in the life of concord and peace for which 
he was created. Reason, religion, free will, and man’s bodily composition all testified to a 
fundamentally benevolent disposition towards others.2 However, the greatest of all gifts given 
to mankind was the ability to speak, to communicate transparently that which was hidden in 
one’s mind to others.3 Thoroughly in the spirit of De concordia, the existing scholarship on 
Vives has largely underlined the fundamentally constructive nature of language in Vives’s 
political and social thought.  
 The aim of this study is to provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between language, rhetoric, man’s sociability, and politics in Vives, by looking at 
how the constructive ideal presented in De concordia is problematized in his political and 
rhetorical writings. While it is true that Vives never ceases to evoke the constructive possibilities 
                                                          
1 Vives: DC, B5: “Nec ullus secum ipso sermone indiget, hominibus hominum causa tributus est sermo: quo non 
aliud excogitari poterat instrumentum communicationi hominum aptius: ut quisque alteri, sive quid ipse animo et 
cogitatione clausum teneat, aperire....” I have translated sermo as language. The more precise translation of 
sermo would be spoken language, but in Vives’s work it is often employed in a more general sense. In De 
concordia it explicitly includes written language. 
2 I have at times used masculine nouns and pronouns in contexts where the gender referred to can be interpreted 
as unclear or variable. I have taken this liberty to emphasize the masculine nature of the public world this study 
analyses. 




of language to bring about social and political concord, the optimistic picture of language as 
the simple communication of benevolence and truth needs to be reassessed. There are a number 
of reasons for this. The first deals with the fact that De concordia puts forward its positive image 
of man as a speculum of a reality that is at odds with all the ideals propounded by Vives. Printed 
in 1529, Vives’s De concordia appears at a moment in which the unity of Catholic Church is 
threatened by the Reformation, and when the warfare between the main European powers still 
raged. Thus, what is suggested in De concordia is not only a general theory of sociability, where 
language held a central place, but also an evocation of a critical discourse commenting on a 
reality in which language did not perform its social function. In this sense, De concordia 
presupposes the breakdown of the sociability it is proposing.  
 Secondly, this breakdown of concord is not merely an every-day fact; it also leads 
to a problematization of the dynamics of concord in Vives’s own work. Vives’s understanding 
of the relationship between concord and discord is a nuanced one, and none of his big treatises 
of the 1530s on language (De ratione dicendi), education (De disciplinis), and the soul (De 
anima) considers the possibility of completely overcoming discord without the help of divine 
grace. Rather, in a postlapsarian world, the only possible concord and perfection available for 
man – no doubt of great importance – has to incorporate ways of controlling impulses of discord 
and imperfection in education, civic life, and language usage more generally.  
It is within this conceptual framework that Vives assimilates a great deal of 
classical rhetoric to his philosophical, political, and educational thought. This process is a 
complicated one, since classical rhetoric portrayed the use of words as a sophisticated art 
dealing with social power and persuasion challenging the idea of pure and simple 
communication in a Christian world of trust, transparency, and concord. The classics of 
rhetorical tradition – from Aristotle to Cicero and Quintilian – transmitted an idea of the use of 
language in civic contexts, in courts, and in political deliberations. Moreover, they presented a 
highly developed system that meticulously described how to construct one’s character and ethos 
in a speech, how to touch and control passions in order to succeed in persuasion, and how to 
pick arguments and use concepts favourably to one’s case. The knowledge of classical rhetoric 
is adopted in Vives’s understanding of politics and social life as a central linguistic resource of 
countering discord by using existing dispositions and passions of men – in some case even 
corrupted ones. Thus, language does not simply overcome discord but it also controls it. 
 The third reason to problematize the simplicity of language is its explicit political 




active life and counselling. Although rhetoric in Vives and northern humanism more generally 
is incorporated in many contexts – ranging from preaching to letter writing – this study focuses 
on the significance of language and rhetoric for princely regimes.4 It argues that the discourses 
of concord, inner peace, and self-government so crucial for Vives’s political thought are 
conceptualized partly rhetorically. Thus, these discourses have to be evoked rhetorically for 
them to hold transformative force over those in power. Closely related to this rhetorical 
dimension, rhetorical theory and education incorporate the commonplaces of concord, self-
government, good rule, and tyranny into themselves; they provide insight into how these 
commonplaces could be evoked in a persuasive way by taking into account the opinions and 
the mind-set of the audience. Moreover, these rhetorical precepts quite explicitly link to 
different practices of counselling, ranging from immediate political deliberations to more 
general ways of setting the conceptual framework within which political action can be 
interpreted. 
 Throughout, this study argues for a broad conception of rhetoric and political 
concord. If it is recognized that language serves as the central medium that actively mediates 
between discord and concord, all reflections and problematizations of language – especially 
rhetoric – are potentially of great social and political importance. When the linguistic and 
rhetorical nature of politics and the political nature of rhetoric and language are combined, a 
range of possible links between linguistic reflections, humanist educational schemes, and 
political discourses emerge in Juan Luis Vives’s thought. In this way, different elements of 
Vives’s reception of classical tradition – ranging from education and the restructuring of arts to 
political philosophy and cognition – can be seen as varying contributions to the possibilities of 
social and political concord. Moreover, Vives himself was to emphasize greatly the links 
between educational, political, rhetorical, and investigational projects towards the end of his 
life. 
  
Juan Luis Vives, Biography, and Historiography 
 
The protagonist of the study, Juan Luis Vives (1492/1493 – 1540), was one of the most widely 
read humanists of the sixteenth century.5 He was born in Valencia in either 1492 or 1493 to a 
                                                          
4 Vives himself never wrote about preaching but its significance for northern humanism is visible in Erasmus’s 
major contribution to rhetoric that focuses on preaching: Ecclesiastae sive de ratione concionandi. 




converso family. He studied in his hometown under the auspices of the newly founded Studium 
generale, although our knowledge of the exact nature and content of those studies is quite 
fragmented.6 In 1509, Vives left Valencia for Paris – a popular destination among Spaniards at 
the time – for reasons most likely related to the decades-long problems his family had been 
facing with the Inquisition.7 In Paris, he studied at least at the Collège de Montaigu, and 
participated in activities related to the printing press, leaving the French capital in 1514 when 
he continued his European tour to the Low Countries. It was in Bruges and Louvain where he 
resided for the remainder of his years, with the exception of a number of travels to England – 
both to the Tudor court and to Oxford’s lecture halls in 1523 – 1528.8 In the Low Countries, he 
was active in the Habsburg court, in the academic environment of Louvain, and in the Spanish 
merchant circles of Bruges. It is probably in 1516 that he encountered the most famous humanist 
of the Burgundian Netherlands: Desiderius Erasmus. Ultimately, Vives came to play a crucial 
part in what has become to be known as the northern humanist movement, a generation of men 
of letters the most famous of whom was Erasmus who both symbolically and socially 
epitomized the intellectual current north of the Alps.9 Vives contributed greatly to some of the 
key projects of northern humanists: educational reforms (In pseudodialecticos, De disciplinis), 
poor relief (De subventione pauperum), political and social critique (De Europae dissidiis, De 
concordia), reassessment of rhetorical tradition (De consultatione, De ratione dicendi, De 
conscribendis epistolis), and a range of other issues. In 1540, Vives died in Bruges. He was 
survived by his wife Margarita Valldaura, a daughter of a converso merchant family, whom he 
married in 1524.10 
The interest of academic scholarship in the Valencian humanist has a history of 
its own. Already in the nineteenth century Vives was studied in a variety of academic contexts, 
all of which constructed distinct traditions of interpreting the thought of the Spanish humanist. 
Especially strong was the attention given to Vives in Germany, where he came to be seen as 
nothing less than the precursor of modern pedagogy and psychology emptied of medieval 
                                                          
6 Conversos were Jews or Muslims who had converted, or had been forced to convert, into Catholicism. They 
were the main target for the Spanish Inquisition. See Ruiz 2001, 95-101. 
7 González González 2008, 25-27; De la Pinta y Llorente – de Palacio y de Palacio 1964.  
8 The duration of the Parisian years has been reassessed by Enrique González González. Before his work the 
predominant view was established by Mayans y Siscar in the eighteenth century. According to it Vives left Paris 
in 1512. González González 1987, 127-182; González González 2008, 31-39; MA, vol. 1, 28; Noreña 1970, 29-
104. 
9 González González 2007, 9-10.  
10 González González 2008, 39; Noreña1970, 105-120. For the converso background of the Valldaura family, see 




metaphysical speculations.11 As Enrique González González has shown, in the Spanish context 
Vives was not always studied with scientific rigor, but his figure and thought were more fiercely 
and polemically debated than in any other country in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.12  
The most influential early twentieth-century general assessment of Vives’s 
biography and thought was offered by Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín, student of the immensely 
productive and influential Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, whose 1903 Luis Vives y la filosofía 
del renacimiento centred on proving the significance of Vives’s essentially Spanish philosophy 
to wider European currents of thought.13 The generally accepted view of Vives incorporated 
into the Spain of Franco was embedded in the conservative tradition which endorsed a picture 
of Vives as an orthodox Christian thinker uninterested in active politics. The placement of Vives 
in Spanish history has been, however, complicated after the Second World War and especially 
since the 1960s. As a direct challenge to the dominant interpretation, Américo Castro – one of 
the leading Spanish historians of the twentieth century – suggested that Vives belonged to a 
Jewish tradition characterized by a certain Unamunian tragic sense of life (sentimiento trágico 
de la vida). This claim was fiercely challenged by numerous scholars whose mind-set was 
captured by Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, who traced Vives’s “vital anxiety” (angustia vital) to 
personal traits and larger cultural processes, and who emphasized Vives as a thinker who 
transformed “Hispanic lifestreams” (Corrientes vitales hispanas) into a philosophical system 
sensitive to the variety of individual character-traits found in the Spanish people.14 In 
challenging the view of Vives as part of an organic Spanish history, one can hardly over-
emphasize the importance of the scholarly work of Miguel de la Pinta y Llorente, who together 
with José M. de Palacio managed to prove the converso background of Vives's family.15 This 
                                                          
11 One of the most influential works was F.A. Lange’s Die Leibesübungen printed for the first time in 1863. For a 
presentation of the German tradition, see González González 2007, 291-297.  
12 González González 2007, 309-353; González González 2008b, 394-395, 398-406.  
13 Bonilla y San Martín 1903, 561-570. Bonilla was a student of the productive Menéndez Pelayo, whose influence 
on Bonilla was decisive. Bonilla’s work belongs thus to the more conservative branch of Spanish turn of the 
century thought that aspired to a positive reassessment of the history of Spanish thought. See Menéndez y Pelayo, 
Marcelino: “La ciencia española” in Obras completas, Madrid 1911 – 1919 vol. 2; Menéndez y Pelayo, Marcelino: 
“Historia de los heterodoxos” in Obras completas, Madrid 1911 – 1919 vol. 4. Bonilla was more moderate in his 
assessment of Vives and explicitly denied the existence of a Vivesian system of philosophy (vivismo) as defended 
by Menéndez y Pelayo in assessing Vives’s significance.  
14 The actual importance of Vives was debated as part of the overall assessment of the distictive features of Spanish 
philosophy, Castro 1984, 260, 646-648; Sánchez-Albornoz 1981, vol. 2, 278-284.  
15 Castro only hinted at Vives’s Jewish background; see Castro 1984, 646-648. In de la Pinta y Llorente – de 
Palacio y de Palacio the link to Castro’s work is made in the very first page in the so called “nota importante,” 
see De la Pinta y Llorente – de Palacio y de Palacio, 1964, 9. What role practices of Judaism played in Vives’s 




complicated the placement of Vives in the nationalistic narrative of Franco's Spain, and created 
space for more daring research into specific areas of Vives's thought.  
Despite scholarship that challenged the placement of Vives in one harmonious 
and organic story, the horizon of Spanish thought has remained strong for reading Vives even 
after his converso background was proven.16 In the most influential general study of the second 
half of the twentieth century, Carlos Noreña’s Juan Luis Vives, the Spanish link is not lost, 
although it is given a distinct interpretation within the Jewish train of Spanish history. Noreña, 
who is keenly aware of Vives’s European dimension, whilst focusing much on Vives’s central-
European connections, still situates his basic mentality inside the Spanish converso-tradition.17 
In his monumental Historia crítica del pensamiento español from the 1970s and 1980s, José 
Luis Abellán argued that Vives belonged to a Spanish tradition by claiming, among other thigs, 
that the emigration of thinking is an integral part of Spanish history.18 Still in the current 
millennium, Emilio Hidalgo-Serna pictured Vives as a key figure in a Spanish tradition of 
rhetorical philosophy extending to Miguel de Cervantes, Luis de Góngora, Baltasar Gracián 
and Calderón de la Barca.19  
In this study, Vives’s place in the history of Spanish thought is not systematically 
pursued. Instead, my intention is to follow the path set by the Belgian tradition, especially by 
the famous early twentieth-century Belgian scholar Henry de Vocht, who understood Vives as 
part of the culture of northern humanism.20 There are good reasons for doing this. Since the 
focus is on the conceptual links between rhetoric and politics, the provenance for the basic 
conceptual framework for making sense of these issues lies within the context of northern 
humanism. In contextualizing Vives’s thought, I will employ both northern humanism and 
Erasmianism in my dissertation, with an awareness that both terms have been used in rather 
                                                          
smaller than what was thought before by making a distinction between the logic of Inquisitorial processes and 
actual Judaic practices. See González González 1998, 62-63. González González 2008, 19-31. 
16 This is also visible in a number of recent with significant biographical parts that dedicate a lot of attention to the 
context of Valencia as an important framework for Vives’s thought, see Gómez-Hortigüela 1998, Chapters one and 
2; Fontán 1992, Chapter two; Noreña 1970, 15-28.  
17 Although Vives appears as a thinker penetrated by a certain Spanish converso-spirit in Noreña’s classical study, 
the significance of his thought is still measured by comparing him to some of the authentic heavyweights of later 
European thought, such as Kant, Bacon, Descartes, Locke and Montaigne (yet without some of the glaring 
exaggerations of a part of early twentieth-century scholars), see Noreña 1970, 19-22, 76-104, 122-147, 176, 228, 
275-299.  
18 Abellán 1986, 108-109. See also Abellán 2005, 12. 
19 Hidalgo-Serna 2002, xiv-xv.  
20 In the Belgian tradition, this has been a commonplace ever since the nineteenth century and continues to be so. 
See for instance Matheeussen 1993, 28; Matheeussen 1998, 107-116; Ijsewijn 1988, 199; Cameron 1990, 148-149. 
For a detailed description, see González González 2007, 353-357. For an intermediary position, see González 




flexible and even conflictual ways in the existing scholarship.21 I do not want to claim that the 
application of these terms implies a clearly defined set of ideas that could be used to classify 
Vives’s thought. However, the flexible use of these terms is necessary for a historical study of 
Vives for it provides a reference point on three different levels, as I will argue throughout the 
study. First, beginning from the 1510s Vives explicitly identifies himself with the cause of 
studia humanitatis outside of Italy, and especially with the Erasmian variant of the movement. 
Secondly, some form of broad intellectual presuppositions and attitudes are intrinsically linked 
to the larger story of humanist studies outside of Italy, which has to be understood as a 
background for Vives. Lastly, the term Erasmianism, in addition to intellectual positions shared 
by many thinkers, refers also to tangible social and cultural activity around the great Dutch 
humanist, which has to be captured as forming the context of Vives’s intellectual claims. 
 
Vives, Northern Humanism, and Politics  
 
The political dimension of northern humanism has not always received a great deal of attention 
in histories of political thought with the partial exception of More’s Utopia. There is nothing 
new in this: in Allen’s famous interwar A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century, 
Erasmus and Vives hardly play a part. This same trend has continued in the post-war period: 
basically all existing works on the history of political thought move from Italian quattrocento 
and early cinquecento developments to consider the more explicit political theorists of the late 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries spearheaded by the likes of Jean Bodin or Thomas Hobbes. 
Thus, they omit northern humanism altogether or dedicate only minor attention to it.22  
                                                          
21 For two opposing uses of Erasmianism, see the classic theological formulation of Bataillon and the recent 
identification of Erasmianism with intellectual autonomy, Yoran 2010; Bataillon 1991, v; González González 
1998, 79. For a discussion on Erasmianism, see Rummel 2004, 106-109. For a classic presentation of northern 
humanism as Christian Humanism, see Ijsewijn 1975. In Skinner 1978 northern Renaissance refers to a set ideas 
on politics, education and virtues shared by a number of humanists outside of Italy, Skinner 1978, vol. 1, 193-262. 
22 In Skinner the focus is mostly on More’s Utopia, although his famous Foundations of Modern Political Thought 
dedicates a significant section to the political thought of northern humanism, see Skinner 1978, vol. 1, 193-263; 
Skinner 1988, 442-452. In the Renaissance Humanism (ed. Rabil) there is no separate section on the political 
thought of northern humanism, see Rabil 1988. In Republicanism, a Shared European Heritage (ed. Van Gelderen 
and Skinner) Vives is not mentioned and Erasmus figures mainly in Tilmans’ article, “The Burgundian-Habsburg 
Netherlands (1477 – 1566).” Tilmans writes that Erasmus “called upon a Ciceronian language” in his Institutio, 
but her focus is not on Erasmus, see Tilmans 2002, 107-108. In Hankins’s “Humanism and the Origins of Modern 
Political Thought” More’s Utopia figures but Erasmus is mentioned only once, see Hankins 1996, 137-140. In 
Coleman, Janet: A History of Political Thought. From the Middle Ages to the Renaissace (Blackwell 2000) 
northern humanism is completely absent. In Haddock’s A History of Political Thought, the chapters dedicated to 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries move from Machiavelli to Bodin, Filmer, Hobbes, Grotius, Pufendorf, 
Althusius and Locke, Haddock 2008, 70-113. A notable exception is Pierre Mesnard’s L’essor de la philosophie 




This has largely been the case also after the methodological changes the different 
traditions drawing on the linguistic turn brought to the writing of the history of political thought, 
ranging from German Conceptual History and the intellectual history of the Cambridge School, 
to currents of New Historicism and Cultural Semantics. These traditions of scholarship created 
an intellectual atmosphere where the significance of past thought was not assessed through their 
contribution to ahistorical and timeless questions arising from political philosophy and theory. 
Its different variants, although disagreeing on a number of issues, agreed on some fundamental 
principles on the dynamics of meaning and representation, which changed the way the history 
of political thought could be written. First, it became more common to think that the historical 
study of past thought had to be of a contextual nature, and that the context comprised the 
linguistic and conceptual possibilities a given thinker could have had at his disposal for the 
creation of meaning. Thus, to situate the language of a writer to the kind of discourse, langage, 
or a larger semantic field plays a fundamental role in recovering the historical meaning of his 
text. Secondly, most agreed that different semantic interpretations of key concepts or languages 
was a way to make normative claims over the very concepts that make social reality and 
experience understandable to us. Thus, semantic disagreements were intrinsically linked to the 
negotiation of social power. Thirdly and closely related to the previous point, the use of 
language is intentional. Words do not simply represent reality but every representation and 
description puts forward a normative claim to see the world in a certain way. People use 
language rhetorically to achieve something, to legitimize action, to do things.23  
While these dimensions of language use are theoretically present throughout the 
spectrum of linguistic usage, the specific way in which the history of political thought has been 
written in the post-linguistic-turn era has largely centred on those theories, or broader languages 
that present different and competing claims to normative vocabularies. The focus has been both 
on the reconstruction of the semantic fields in which normative concepts are embedded, as well 
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as on those moves that introduce conceptual change into existing semantic constellations.24 
Moreover, existing scholarship has not only treated concepts central to contemporary political 
discussions, but the political dimension of a range of other concepts has also been highlighted. 
Thus, the enriching effect of the history of political thought has not happened exclusively by 
historicizing existing normative vocabularies, but also by showing that politically and socially 
relevant discussions have been conducted in vocabularies somewhat alien to ours.25 The 
historical claim has linked to a broadening understanding of what counts, conceptually, as 
history of political thought. Simultaneously, different forms of intellectual and conceptual 
history have been relatively open to the manifold ways in which representations and creations 
of meaning both arise from, and affect larger cultural and social constellations and practices, 
with the lines between social, cultural, and intellectual histories being analytical rather than 
ontological.26  
Despite the openness of contemporary intellectual history to varying 
vocabularies, the problem of finding a place for northern humanists in the history of political 
thought has been twofold. First, their eclectic and rhetorical attitude to all philosophy has meant 
that a focus on what they have to say about classical concepts of political thought in the early 
modern period would surface them as somewhat unsystematic and un-theoretical.27 Even 
though Vives and Erasmus most certainly were very familiar with a range of discussions on 
political and social concepts, it is debatable whether they produce a coherent and original theory 
on say, sovereignty, law, justice, institutions, constitutions, rights, obedience, political freedom, 
or citizenship. Their more systematic and comprehensive contributions have largely been made 
elsewhere, mostly in education and theology. Secondly, the undeniable debt of northern 
humanist understanding of politics to a broader theological framework has pictured them as 
alien to political realities, as backward looking, and possibly irrelevant for contemporary 
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concerns.28 Thoroughly in this spirit, much of the scholarship focused on northern humanism 
from the vantage point of systematic questions or theory building, has voiced the accusation 
that for humanists, virtue and disposition are everything, whereas institutions and the letter of 
the law amount to very little.29 
However, some approaches have taken this larger framework of politics for 
granted and have endorsed the fact that there is no autonomous set of political problems in 
Vives or Erasmus, since politics itself is irreducibly woven into a larger Christian ontology and 
theology of man. The outcome has more often than not accentuated concord, and a somewhat 
apolitical understanding of social life, and has linked to the powerful image of Erasmus as 
primarily a theologian or religious thinker.30 In Noreña’s classic Juan Luis Vives the picture 
presented of politics is fundamentally a moral one. According to Noreña, Vives's views on 
politics must be viewed as a sort of a social extension of his Christian and Stoic ethical view of 
individuals: “all social evils, especially poverty and war, are passional disorders of individual 
citizens which have burst into the social dimension.”31 In this context, society and the body 
politic appear as “a redeeming device which seeks to repair the moral disorder.”32 However, 
Noreña’s emphasis on Vives the moral teacher reproduces the idea of Vives as partially naïf 
when it comes to politics, since he never considers “the possibility that the paternal character 
of political authority could prove a source of abuse and tyranny.”33 This is no doubt true if one 
looks into the tradition of law, where the problem remains unanswered with no theorization on 
the right to revolt, but is questionable if one looks into Vives’s ethical, rhetorical, cognitive, 
and educational texts. In these works, the threat of tyranny appears as a major problem and 
concern that violates all the principles of self-governance and Stoic-Christian natural law. 
Not altogether different from Noreña, the bulk of the existing interpretations on 
Vives’s social and political thought underline two things and their close interrelations. First, 
they show Vives as a thinker of peace and concord, which can be interpreted both as the ultimate 
goals of all collective life, or as more concrete social and political projects that facilitate the 
realization of that end. Secondly, this interpretation links to the idea that all human associations 
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frequently voiced, see for instance Tuck 1990, 60-61. 
29 See for instance Kisch 1960; Monzón i Arazo 1992, 315-316.  
30 Bataillon 1991, v, 79-82; Abellán 1986, 35; Abellán 2005 75-76. In Pierre Mesnard’s influential interwar 
interpretation of Erasmus’s political thought the conceptual dependence of politics on the evangelization of Europe 
is made very explicit, see Mesnard 1936, 86-91. 
31 Noreña 1970, 212. 
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are essentially pacifist moral redeeming devices that aspire to the restitution of man to his true 
God-like nature.34 For Francisco Calero, Vives is one of the foremost pacifist thinker of 
sixteenth century, and his De concordia, & discordia in humano genere is said to be one of the 
most important pacifist works of all times.35 For Alain Guy, classical and Christian tradition 
came together in Vives in a philosophy that aspired to concord and peace.36 Philp Dust sees 
Vives as the most acute theoretician of northern humanism, who combined a strong empirical 
and sociological analysis with a Christian call for peace and betterment of man.37 Fernández-
Santamaría, one of the more recent experts on Vives’s political thought, has painted probably 
the most overarching picture of all aspects of Vives’s social thought by arguing that what 
“informs his thought throughout is the conviction that man has the potential to recover the most 
important thing lost through the fall,” meaning his true God-like nature.38 In this context, human 
associations, arts, and education appear as necessary means for achieving just that.39 
While many of these interpretations have reconstructed the conceptual structure 
of Vives’s arguments with an eye to detail, they have sometimes been more interested to show 
the modernity of Vives’s positions than in asking what exactly that political or social theory –
rhetorical in nature – is supposed to do.40 However, simultaneous with these developments, 
there is a growing awareness that northern humanism can be approached somewhere in the 
crossroads of Christian concord, active life, and true realpolitik. Without focusing simply on 
political thought, two of the classics of the field, R.P Adams’ The Better Part of Valor. More, 
Erasmus, Colet, and Vives on Humanism, War and Peace, 1496 – 1535, and James Tracy’s 
Politics of Erasmus, painted a picture of northern humanists as actively participating in the most 
pressing political issues of the time, being keenly interested in contemporary social and political 
developments, and actually using these overarching Christian theories in more particular 
debates.41 Margo Todd’s Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order also underlined the 
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Vives’s political thought, see Abellán 1986, 109-111; González González 1998, 81.  
35 Calero 1999, 12, 18. 
36 Guy 1972, 1-8.  
37 Dust 1987, 10-11.  
38 Fernández-Santamaría 1998, viii.  
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literature. See for instance Matheeussen on De subventione pauperum, Matheeussen 1998, 110-111.  
40 The most common general argument is that humanist political thought, essentially pacifist, is a critique of 
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Vives’s analysis calling them empirical. He for example compares Vives’s discussion on man and beast to “those 
who study human growth and development.” Dust 1987, 141.  
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social reformist zeal of the Christian humanism and the critical potentiality of the language of 
Erasmus, Vives, and English humanists, linking it very closely with the active performance of 
virtue.42 On a conceptual level, Quentin Skinner, in his Foundations of Modern Political 
Thought, also suggested that northern humanism was intrinsically related to the practice of 
counselling, the active life, and the government of the body politic.43 Brendan Bradshaw, for 
his part, has united a fundamentally Christian framework into a socially radical political 
programme. According to Bradshaw, the essence of the political thought of northern humanism 
lies indeed in its optimistic anthropological starting-point of man as imago Dei – a notion that 
makes impossible the understanding of political thought as merely describing the possibilities 
of action in a corrupted world. This can be considered a somewhat traditional point about 
Christian humanism. Yet, Bradshaw’s insistence on the combination and acute awareness of the 
necessities of realpolitik and persuasion, combined with Christian and Platonic ideals of just 
government and social justice that fix the ultimate goals of politics, is a nuanced one. Hence, 
he has pointed out that the political thought of northern humanism can appear as novel and 
inventive only if it is approached in the complex crossroads of civil science, and the 
anthropological, theological, and ontological presuppositions that frame the understanding of 
politics and studia humanitatis.44 
More recently, Cathy Curtis has shown the engaged side of Vives. While 
reaffirming the idea of Vives as a theorizer of concord who tried to lead people to harmony 
from discord with the power of words, she has shown Vives’s close links above all to a group 
of English humanists.45 More importantly, Curtis has emphasized Vives’s understanding of 
successful monarchy as a system that presupposes wise counsel, liberty of word, and thus the 
active participation of humanists.46 While Curtis’s interpretation emphasizes greatly the 
importance of the use of language, she has not been focusing on Vives’s rhetorical reflections 
as such. 
In short, there is a growing awareness that the overcoming of the prevalent view 
of Vives as a Christian thinker of concord and peace can be nuanced by looking into the ways 
in which these languages are put into play in the active life and counselling. While the idea of 
Vives as a political actor gains momentum, the diverse ways in which princely regimes are 
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linked to counselling in Vives’s thought and in his activities as a man of letters, are still to be 
uncovered. Moreover, the diverse ways in which language and rhetoric both contribute to this 
process, and are problematized in relation to social and political concord, have not been 
systematically investigated.  
 
Classical Rhetoric as an Object of Study 
 
As is very well known, classical rhetoric was of the utmost importance for Renaissance culture. 
Its dissemination was guaranteed by its role in the educational structures of the time as a part 
of the so-called trivium.47 The theoretical tools of rhetoric were applied to letter-writing, 
preaching, poetry, philology, and literature – to name a few of the many fields in which rhetoric 
exerted influence. Thus, rhetoric was the fundamental art in a variety of tasks dealing with 
language, ranging from the written and oral composition of one’s own materials, to reading, 
note taking, commentary, and, ultimately thinking. Rhetoric was both a practice of writing and 
argumentation as well as a reflection on those practices. Even if rhetoric was never primarily a 
philosophical theory, but a reflection on the practices of language use, it could unite itself with 
cognitive, philosophical (mostly sceptical), political, and moral insights. Thus, the difficulties 
in grasping the whole meaning of rhetoric for the era seems to lie in the fact that it is at the same 
omnipresent – and because of its technical and non-substantial nature – partly invisible. This is 
why studying rhetoric can mean various things.  
Paul Oskar Kristeller, one of the leading scholars of the Renaissance in the 
twentieth century, defended in the 1980s the idea that rhetoric held a central position in the 
humanist culture, and called for research to focus not only on the “internal history of rhetorical 
theory and practice,” but also “its impact on all other areas of Renaissance civilization.”48 
Kristeller’s plea does not, of course, mean that the importance of rhetoric had not been noticed 
before. The famous contemporary of Kristeller, Eugenio Garin, for example, saw in rhetoric 
and in rhetorical education one of the keys to the self-understanding of Renaissance man as a 
historical being concerned with historically situated problems, as opposed to the dry and 
abstract metaphysics of the Middle Ages.49 However, in many ways Kristeller’s call has been 
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answered with the emergence of specialised monographs dedicated to different aspects of 
Renaissance rhetoric beginning from the 1970s and 80s. The scholarly expertise of people like 
James Jerome Murphy, John O. Ward, Paul Oskar Kristeller, Marc Fumaroli, Brian Vickers, 
John Monfasani, Quentin Skinner, Jacques Chomarat, Wayne Rebhorn, Ullrich Langer, John 
O’Malley, Markku Peltonen and Peter Mack, to name but a few, has provided every Renaissance 
scholar with high-quality research into a variety of themes around classical rhetoric.50  
Yet, the variety of ways in which rhetoric has been approached testifies to a 
broader divide as to what has directed attention to rhetoric in the first place. Very generally, the 
interest in language – so central to different philosophical traditions of twentieth-century 
thought – has channelled attention to very different aspects of rhetorical theory. This is visible 
in the existing scholarship on Vives and rhetoric as well.51 One of the more prolific writers on 
Vives’s linguistic and rhetorical thought, Emilio Hidalgo-Serna, has repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of rhetoric for the philosophy of man. He has argued that by shifting the emphasis 
from pure reason (ratio) to creative ingenium – from mechanical deductive reasoning to the 
creative side of thinking – Vives in fact devised a new philosophy of man as a creative being 
capable of adjusting to the time-specific challenges posed by society and nature. Hidalgo-Serna 
has been influenced by Ernesto Grassi, and ultimately by Heidegger, in focusing on the poetical 
and metaphorical language of Renaissance rhetoric as creative hermeneutics. In a more 
Wittgensteinian vein, Richard Waswo has presented humanist understandings of semantics as a 
revolutionary shift from representational to relational or holistic semantics, championed above 
all by Lorenzo Valla and Vives.52 However, in Hidalgo-Serna and Waswo, the links of rhetoric 
and language to social power, politics, and contemporary debates are partly ignored, and the 
focus has been on conceptual discussions arising from twentieth-century philosophy.  
The most attuned analysis of the details of Vives’s rhetorical theory has, however, 
been made by Peter Mack, José Manuel Rodríguez Peregrina and Edward George. All three 
closely engage with specific texts situating them into the tradition of rhetorical theory. Mack, 
the writer of the recent A History of Renaissance Rhetoric, 1380 – 1620, has made key readings 
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of Vives’s work dealing with rhetorical theory, and has assessed their practicality for the 
production of language and arguments. E. George, for his part, has been the first to analyse 
systematically the relationship between Vives’s rhetorical theory and practice.53 Thus, George 
has not only tried to position Vives’s rhetorical theory in the internal long tradition of the art of 
eloquence, but he has also systematically shown how Vives’s own literary production is based 
on a careful use of literary and stylistic tools and strategies. However, in George’s work the 
connections of rhetorical strategies and theoretical reflections to larger social and political 
processes, or political languages, are not systematically traced. Thus, with Mack’s and George’s 
work, a refined and nuanced understanding of the technical side of Vives’s rhetoric is captured, 
but the focus has not been on uncovering the implications of rhetoric as a larger social and 
political practice, or as an instrument of social and cognitive power.  
A far-more explicit connection between rhetoric and politics has been suggested 
by Nancy Struever, who has insisted on the thoroughly political nature of Vives’s rhetoric. She 
has defended the union of rhetoric, not with contemplative questions of epistemology and 
cognitive imaginary – but with civic action.54 In the case of Vives, her argument is indeed a 
bold one since she sustains that the Spanish humanist subordinates politics, jurisprudence, and 
psychology to rhetoric. She criticises E. George for “detaching rhetorical interests from 
investigational ones,” and goes on to argue that Vives's entire intellectual programme should be 
understood in the framework of rhetoric, since it works thoroughly inside a rhetorical 
modality.55 More specifically, in politics this means that all political writing is based on the 
typically humanist concept of decorum (appropriateness), interpreted in Struever through the 
lens of rhetorized pragmatic philosophy.56 However, her reading of Vives is not primarily 
historical with the bulk of the discussion being focused on comparing the Spanish humanist to 
contemporary philosophy. Her pronounced stress on rhetoric that incorporates practically 
everything may not stand up to historical scrutiny. It is questionable indeed whether rhetoric 
can be raised to play the role of an overall philosophical or civic modality, since rhetoric itself 
is always explicitly given a more limited and specific role inside larger theological, ontological, 
and ethical concerns in Vives. 
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However, the fact that rhetoric can be linked to civic practices and other languages 
has been voiced frequently in some of the most central interpretations of the early modern 
period. The bulk of these interpretations have largely taken place outside the confines of 
northern humanism, with some of the most influential interpretations of Erasmus’s rhetoric only 
touching upon the civic dimension. Indicative of this, Jacques Chomarat’s Grammaire et 
Rhetorique chez Erasme, and Gary Remer’s Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration, have 
focused on clarifying certain aspects of Erasmus’s theology through rhetorical categories rather 
than on the interconnections of rhetoric and civic practices. Thus, Chomarat, although well 
aware of the civic dimension of Erasmus’s rhetoric, turned Erasmus primarily into a pious 
theologian-orator who preached transformative philosophy of Christ to the Europe of his time, 
whereas in Remer, Erasmus’s toleration is intrinsically linked to the idea of dialogue.57 
However, it is outside theology and within the context of civil science (scientia civilis) that 
rhetoric has most frequently been linked to politics.  
In those approaches to rhetoric that emphasize its civic and political importance, 
part of the argument has been that rhetoric can be viewed as a set of techniques through which 
meaning is constructed. In this view, the recapturing of the meaning of a text is partly dependent 
on understanding the metalanguage of rhetorical theory that has been employed in the 
construction of those meanings. Because rhetoric provides the kind of techniques meant for the 
production of certain reactions in the audience, it is fundamental to understand those tools, 
because it enables an interpretation of what a writer might have been doing. However, equally 
as importantly, it has been shown that much of early modern rhetorical theory can be viewed in 
relation to a number of other discourses that make rhetoric appear as something more than a 
tool for literary composition or the construction of arguments. More specifically, it has been 
demonstrated that especially in the Italian Renaissance and in sixteenth-and seventeenth-
century English context, rhetoric came to be conceptualized as part of civil science (scientia 
civilis) that wove the art of eloquence together closely with a range of discussions outside of its 
purely technical range. Thus, rhetoric is incorporated into questions of the active life, 
participation, freedom, constitutions, and education, as well as into the ways in which normative 
vocabularies are negotiated and discussed. In the work of Quentin Skinner and John Pocock, 
                                                          
57 Remer 1996, 43-102. Underlining the social importance of rhetoric in Erasmus, Chomarat argued, among other 
things, that truth stands in opposition to violence, not merely to error, see Chomarat 1981, 1118. Marjorie Boyle 
O’Rourke has also highlighted the importance of civic dialogue in Erasmus’s discussions with Luther, see Boyle 
O’Rourke 1983, 5-42. Manfred Hoffmann has also strongly underlined Erasmus’s rhetoric from the viewpoint of 




rhetoric comes out essentially as a civic practice, as a culture of politics presupposing a certain 
dialogical nature of civic realm most suitable for republican or semi-republican values, cultures, 
and contexts.58  
This idea of dialogue has definitely underlined the passionate and aggressive 
nature of Renaissance rhetoric that always aspires to the domination of passions and emotions, 
linking rhetorical theory closely to questions of cognition, passion, and human motivation.59 
Some interpretations have raised the will to power as the central element of the self-
interpretation of rhetoric in the early modern period.60 Most explicitly, Wayne A. Rebhorn has 
argued that rhetoric cannot easily be squared with dialogue since the most common way of 
understanding rhetoric in the general discourse of the early modern period was that of pure 
power over the passions and minds of men. This use of power through the capacity to move the 
audience (movere) was, according to Rebhorn, understood as social and political power in the 
discourse and pictographic displays of the time.61 The focus on the most general aspect of 
rhetoric as the capacity to move the audience has the effect that it can be linked virtually to 
every political, theological, and philosophical constellation requiring words to achieve 
something. This enormous flexibility of rhetoric is also at the heart of much of Marc Fumaroli’s 
influential work that focuses on the European wide developments of the art of eloquence, and 
underlines the way in which rhetorical theory and activity can be adapted to a number of 
circumstances. Thus, the crux of Fumaroli’s project has been the way in which different parts 
of rhetorical theory – such as genres and styles – are rethought in varying contexts. Rather than 
being a clearly definable tradition, rhetoric is essentially a certain belief in the usefulness and 
power of words as a fundamental social practice, one that was ultimately debunked by later 
geometric and systematic philosophy. This basic view can then motivate an investigation into 
the practical possibilities of rhetoric to achieve this in specific circumstances by questioning 
new interpretations of audiences, speakers, cognition, styles, and a range of other things.62 
These multiform and varying approaches to rhetoric bring to the surface the 
difficulties in defining rhetoric univocally: it can mean the study of rhetorical techniques, the 
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use of rhetoric, or its educational, philosophical, civic or theological ramifications. Moreover, 
it can comprise the study of the most basic language, through which the social role of rhetoric 
itself is interpreted, as well as the investigation of rhetoric vis-à-vis its neighbouring sciences. 
Its relation to politics is equally manifold. Rebhorn, who defended the view of rhetoric as an 
identifiable discourse, defines the specific content of his The Emperor of Men’s Minds in the 
following words:  
 
“This book is concerned with the ways in which Renaissance people represented 
rhetoric to themselves, with how they thought about or, rather, wrote about it and how they 
imagined its powers and limits, its value to the individual and to the society, its characteristic 
uses, its relationship to other disciplines and activities.”63 
 
Defining the Problem  
 
This study takes as its starting point two key issues arising from existing scholarship. First, it 
acknowledges that every attempt to understand Vives’s political thought has to take seriously 
the contextualization of the very notion of politics itself in northern humanist thought. 
Consequently, throughout Vives’s work politics is conceptually linked to all other human 
associations and man’s sociability (societas). In a similar vein, civic prudence never looses its 
connection to eternal wisdom and truth, and social concord, peace, and law are intrinsically tied 
together with individual self-governance and piety. All this delimits and frames the conceptual 
autonomy of civic and political discussion, and weaves this together with a larger Erasmian 
reform programme. However, and equally as important, it is precisely both inside this 
framework and in its problematization that a range of questions dealing with good governance, 
duties, virtues, participation, and the use of language can be discussed together with the general 
dynamics of the political sphere. What is more, this large ethical framework is not merely a 
picture of a distant utopia in the self-understanding of Vives and other humanists; its critical 
and ethical potential is effectively evoked both as a social or civic critique in a world of 
profound discord, which is a point that accentuates the use dimension of social and political 
theories. Thus, the general ethical framework of politics found in Vives is not a reflection of an 
apolitical attitude, but a source that not only makes critique justified and necessary, but also 
                                                          




offers some conceptual possibilities for doing just that. 
This links to the second broad idea adopted from existing scholarship, namely that 
of the crucial importance rhetoric played in civic and social life in all early sixteenth-century 
culture. The thesis argues that the crux of Vives’s political thought does not merely lie in 
recapturing the architecture of his political and social philosophy, but in understanding that all 
this is linked intrinsically and explicitly to the use of language. In ascertaining the importance 
of active life and the exhibition of linguistic prudence for successful social and civic life, Vives 
and other northern humanists were truly indebted to classical thinkers and Italian humanists. 
What is more, the virtues of a life of negotium were performed primarily in language, by putting 
into use one’s knowledge of artes sermocinales (grammar, rhetoric, dialectic) under the 
guidance of prudence. However, the explicit union of rhetoric and successful civic life in the 
existing political languages was not the only way in which rhetoric exercised political and social 
importance. The profound linkage of political thought to language and rhetoric affect a number 
of issues; rhetoric is the place where meaning is generated, and political languages are put into 
motion, where political discourses and commonplaces are transmitted in educational practices, 
and where all relevant questions on the cognitive possibilities of persuasion are tackled; 
language itself is political. 
It is very much a broad understanding of the importance of rhetoric for the 
political and social thought of Vives that drives this study. In this respect, rhetoric is interpreted 
both as a culture – an educational paradigm and a linguistic practice – but also as a reflection 
on the possibilities of that culture. In this second sense, it is a theory on the art of persuasion 
and its civic importance. If rhetoric and linguistic usage are seen as a culture inside of which 
political discourse is generated and concord mediated, all questions from the social extension 
of rhetorical teaching to its internal theory appear as socially and politically highly relevant. If 
it is acknowledged that Vives himself is keenly aware of this, it is possible to shed light on 
political concord, not only as an internal question of political theory, but as a problem that is 
tackled in different discourses where specific aspects of concord are at stake. What is more, to 
see rhetoric as a culture means that it cannot be dissociated from an analysis of the places in 
which rhetoric should be employed because these are presupposed in all rhetorical theory. All 
this will lead to a broader understanding of the social dimension of concord in northern 
humanism in general, which is not merely a political concept but one that incorporates 
educational, theological, cognitive, and linguistic viewpoints. This omnipresent importance of 




evolution of Vives’s thought on three different fronts. 
First, the study analyses the development of Vives’s thought on the explicit 
importance given to language and rhetoric in his reflection on the functioning of human 
associations, and especially political communities. While reconstructing the basic 
presuppositions of Vives’s political thought, I seek to demonstrate that Vives comes to argue 
that a successful princely regime is ultimately dependent on the prudent use of language in 
different practices of counselling. Closely linked to this, I show that the connection is not merely 
a theoretical one since Vives’s reflection presupposes an actual culture of political deliberation 
that takes place not only in the representative institutions and in courts of princes but also more 
generally in the activities of a generation of men of letters. Moreover, this rhetoric does not 
simply try to overcome individual discord; it presents observations on how every non-utopian 
social and political concord is ultimately based on managing discord. It is in this context that 
Vives’s own life can also be seen as an attempt to perform the virtues of an active life close to 
power by influencing decision-making, setting a framework within which decisions could be 
judged, and as exemplifying how a Christian humanist should engage in civic practices without 
becoming a corrupt courtier.  
Secondly, I try to understand Vives’s educational plans as reflections on the civic 
and social possibilities of rhetoric and other linguistic disciplines. Thus, education is the place 
were linguistic abilities are socialized, and as I argue, all this is intrinsically linked to Vives’s 
ideas on social and political concord. More specifically, I intend to show that Vives’s major 
contribution to education and pedagogy, De disciplinis, can be read as an attempt to reassess 
critically classical and humanist traditions by underlining the social importance of rhetoric, but 
also restricting its use to those in the higher echelon of the educational ladder. Thirdly, I portray 
some of Vives’s well-known investigational schemes as reflections on the constructive social 
and political use of language. In this respect, I show that Vives’s modifications to the internal 
theory of rhetoric, as well as its relation to other artes sermocinales in his De consultatione, De 
disciplinis and De ratione dicendi, are intrinsically linked to the social and political possibilities 
of language. Closely related to this, I seek to demonstrate that many parts of Vives’s main 
treatise on the soul, De anima, can be read as reflections on the abilities of education, language, 
and rhetoric, to bring about a world of social and political concord inside man’s natural 
limitations and possibilities (ingenium).  
These three themes are not approached as abstract conceptual problems, but as a 




and especially rhetoric, into a Christian princely environment in the context of northern 
humanism. As is well known, the basic conceptual framework of Vives’s thought has been 
portrayed in the existing scholarship as resistant to fundamental change.64 While I agree that a 
significant break does not take place in Vives’s central ideas on society, politics, ethics, and 
language, the trajectory of his work shows evolution as to the depth with which some of the 
themes are tackled. Thus, the way in which some key issues are amplified, problematized, and 
even subtly rethought, demonstrates how closely Vives’s thinking on rhetoric, society, and 
politics evolved together with the very practical problems he faced. His attempt to fit classical 
and humanist wisdom into a Christian framework is simultaneously a reflection and a comment 
on some of the pressing issues of the 1510s and 1520s – such as educational reform, the 
Reformation, and European warfare propagated by Henry VIII, Francis I, and Charles V. 
Vives’s engagement with the studia humanitatis has some identifiable phases. He 
adopts the idea of rhetoric as communication of truth and wisdom in civic matters in the 1510s. 
In the late 1510s and especially in the 1520s, he becomes an Erasmian counsellor who reflects 
on the civic possibilities of rhetoric, and puts his mastery of humanist political discourse to 
work in his critique of warfare and discord. Finally, from the late 1520s he becomes detached 
from active politics and dedicates his efforts to reflecting on the place of rhetoric in education, 
somewhat rethinking its relationship to other neighbouring arts, and to questions of cognition 
and passions. Ultimately, by the late 1530s Vives’s thought depicts the only possible world of 
concord available to man without the grace of God, as being based on the control of the impulses 
of discord that can never be completely tamed. Thus, together with the perfecting of men 
through education towards a world of concord, Vives underlines the importance of controlling 
passion and bad judgement within social bodies by the prudential use of language of those 
representing its reason. As a political offshoot of this, Vives argues that prudent men should 
both guard the prince from sinking into tyranny, and educate people – prone to passions and 
anarchy – to a world of concord, whilst taking into account the possibilities and limitations 
every person. This last point is effectively a reflection on the highly optimistic take on the 
possibilities of education to mould the character of men found in northern humanism, especially 
in the 1510s. 
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Whilst discussing Vives’s thought in proximity to biography and larger European 
developments, there are some issues this study will not aim to tackle systematically. First, I will 
not assess the importance of psychological experience and Vives’s converso background to his 
thought. Biographical details are presented in order to shed some light on possibilities to be an 
ethical counsellor in the early sixteenth-century context, as well as to assess the collective 
dimension of political influence. Secondly, the aim is not to supplant the existing specific 
studies on different aspects of Vives’s thought, such as rhetoric, society, or the soul.65 Rather, 
the study contributes by analysing separate discussions on education, linguistic disciplines, 
cognition, moral philosophy, and explicit social and political reflections together. This is a way 
to broaden the understanding of the political and social dimension of Vives’s thought. 
Moreover, in my focus on a single humanist, I do not want to claim the autonomy of Vives in 
tackling conceptual problems – it is evident that his thought mirrors the basic semantic 
presuppositions of a whole culture of northern humanism within which he has to be understood. 
However, inside the culture of northern humanism, Vives’s work can be seen as one of the only 
attempts to deal encyclopaedically with all the major questions of the time. 
Regarding political thought, one could argue that separate disciplines – among 
many other things – shed a different kind of light on what is essentially the same problem: how 
to organise best the use of rhetoric and language in social and political life. This is not merely 
a conceptual implication, and Vives himself thought of different disciplines in relation to social 
and political concord. One can think of the idea of an ethical speaker, counsellor, and prudent 
man as being the centre of analysis in very different discourses. He is the subject of ethical and 
civic thought, as well as the object of educational patterns. He is analysed as a man of self-
governance partaking in the wisdom of concord and truth, as a prudent counsellor, as an 
educated man of great ingenium capable of reasoning and speaking, as the ideal object of 
education, or even as a member of the humanist circles of the Republic of Letters. In this 
respect, I do not wish to claim that Vives comes with an explicit theory where all these 
discourses are woven together in some ingenious way (Vives is not a system builder), but 
merely that he considers them to be interrelated. 
Lastly, while I greatly acknowledge the contributions of reception studies to early 
modern intellectual history, this study will not deal primarily with how meaning is created in 
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the reception of Vives, but rather with how Vives himself creates meaning in the reception of a 
predominantly classical tradition.66 Thus, this study reconstructs Vives’s intellectual project, 
not the process of reception in which Vives ultimately becomes a major sixteenth-century 
thinker. 
 
Description of Chapters and Materials 
 
The way in which Vives’s biography has been periodized has varied, although most writers 
have found four or five identifiable phases in Vives’s life.67 This study will largely rely on the 
existing periodization, but with a specific focus on certain key moments related to his rhetorical 
and political oeuvre. 
In Chapter two, I describe Vives’s initial contacts with humanism in Paris and 
Louvain in the 1510s. The chapter discusses what the profound changes introduced by 
humanism in language education, implied socially and politically. More specifically, it 
discusses the close connection Vives makes between educational reforms, linguistic production, 
and an active life of negotium – especially in his 1519 In pseudodialecticos, but also in a range 
of other works. Chapter three puts forward a two-fold argument. First, it discusses Vives’s 
incorporation into Erasmian humanism, interpreted as a cultural and social activity, and argues 
that Vives’s intellectual authority and credibility partly stem from the support of the most well 
known humanists of the time. Furthermore, it tackles the social dimension of that authority by 
examining its more openly civic implications, and presents an extensive analysis of Vives’s De 
consultatione – a work in which the tradition of rhetoric is discussed within the framework of 
counselling. 
Chapter four turns to some of the basic ideas that run through Vives’s political 
thought. It clarifies Vives’s basic dichotomy between good princely rule and tyranny, and shows 
how this language is turned into a strong demand of peace in the name of the whole of Christian 
Europe, rather than of any particular state. It also argues that some of the central political ideas 
are not only activated in actual political deliberations, but are also embedded in school exercises 
                                                          
66 There are great studies on the reception of Erasmus, see Bataillon 1991; Seidel Menchi 1987; Bietenholtz 2009. 
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problems of reception studies in general, see Machor, James L. – Philip Goldstein (eds.): Reception Study, from 
Literary Theory to Cultural Studies, Routledge, New York/London, 2001.  
67 A relatively typical periodization can be found in González González 2007: 1. Until 1509 Valencian years, 2. 
1509 – 1514 Paris, 3. 1514 – 1523 the Netherlands, Louvain, 4. 1523 – 1528 Between England and Bruges 5. 1529 




that show ways of putting them into use. Chapter five is centred on Vives’s main work on 
politics, De concordia & discordia in humano genere. It asserts that De concordia is more than 
a political deliberation; it presents a general cultural analysis of the reasons of discord that point 
towards the possibilities of perfecting man – of restituting him to his God-like nature. With its 
larger cultural analysis, it builds a bridge to Vives’s 1530s works that are detached from actual 
politics, focusing on different aspects of spiritual and intellectual renewal. The chapter also 
discusses the possibilities of the metaphor of social body as a source of collective social care 
(De subventione pauperum), and as a reaction against radical Anabaptism (De communione 
rerum). 
Chapters six, seven, and eight, focus firmly on Vives’s most comprehensive 
treatments on rhetoric, education, and the soul: De disciplinis, De ratione dicendi, and De 
anima. The point of departure for all these chapters is that that these major treatises of the 1530s 
can be read as reflections of a relatively isolated figure on the possibilities and threats of the 
optimistic humanist Erasmian project of the 1510s and 1520s. Chapter six discusses the 
restructuring of linguistic arts in the first part of De disciplinis as a critique of the optimist 
conception of rhetoric typical of humanist tradition. Its ambivalent portrayal of the history of 
rhetoric is coupled with a new demarcation of rhetoric vis-à-vis other arts, as well as with a 
reassessment of dialectic in the spirit of the Dutch humanist Rudolph Agricola. Chapter seven 
takes its cue from Chapter six, and shows how the conceptual discussions of the first part of De 
disciplinis influence the actual formation of the prudent man in the pedagogical part of the 
work. More specifically, it shows that the highly cautious attitude to rhetoric carries over to the 
actual constructive proposition put forward in De disciplinis. In this, rhetoric is portrayed as 
necessary, but is ruled out of elementary education. The chapter also discusses whom the truly 
prudent are that should master the trivium, their qualities, places of activity, and social 
extension. 
Finally, Chapter eight deals with Vives’s main contributions to rhetoric – De 
ratione dicendi, and the soul – De anima. These works are read as extensions of the prudent 
man and the possibilities of social and political concord. In De ratione, Vives tries to adapt 
rhetorical theory to a context where open confrontation is not the norm. This kind of rhetoric 
incorporates the knowledge of classical theory that strives at persuasion into a strong analysis 
of the recipient, as well as into new non-adversary genres. The picture of rhetoric that arises 
from De ratione is that discord and difference of opinion are best controlled and mediated with 




also to larger social wisdom that sets the ultimate limits for the possibilities of humanist 
educational, social, and rhetorical projects. 
The basic material source of the study is all Vives’s published and unpublished 
literary production, together with other humanist and classical literature that is relevant for 
understanding Vives’s points on rhetoric, education, and politics. The main intellectual context 
is formed by other Renaissance humanists, among whom Erasmus’s literary production 
together with his famous collection of letters have provided an invaluable framework for this 
study. Concerning Vives’s and other humanists’ treatises, I have used sixteenth-century editions 
wherever possible with preference to early editions.68 With classical writers, I have opted in 











                                                          























2. From Paris to Louvain, Vives becomes a humanist 
 
Chapter two focuses on Vives’s career in the 1510s. It argues that Vives’s first encounter with 
humanism in Paris in the early 1510s awakens his interest in humanist methods of reading and 
writing propagated by new materials on grammar and rhetoric. Vives’s humanism has clear 
links to larger trends in the French capital, where the value of humanism was first and foremost 
interpreted in the context of humanist philology aspiring to truth – an approach epitomized by 
Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples. Thus, despite Vives’s experimentations with a variety of styles, and 
his undeniable interest in rhetoric and the other arts of studia humanitatis, the significance of 
the humanist restructuration of language teaching is interpreted in the context of eternal wisdom 
and the unbreakable unity of the arts. The second part of the chapter deals with Vives’s late-
1510s writings printed in Louvain. Vives’s familiarity with Dutch humanism and Erasmus are 
undeniable, yet the central thread of his work does not relate to Erasmus’s late 1510s program 
of Biblical philology. Rather, Vives completes his critique of scholastic learning in In 
pseudodialecticos by attacking its dialectical method in an attempt to reform the whole trivium 
to a humanist mould that could be useful for the active life (vita activa). More specifically, this 
trivium should offer a method for reading and taking notes that could turn the linguistic 
resources of classical antiquity into production. This production should be put into use in a life 
of negotium that aspires to transform men and to cure discord with a responsible use of 
rhetorical language. 
 
Vives’s Quest for Wisdom, Sapiens 
 
In 1514, a certain young Spaniard named Juan Luis Vives entered the literary scene of Europe 
by publishing his first writings. Most of these short texts were gathered in a larger volume 
comprising a selection of eight pieces of varied sorts, all of which were closely related to 
Vives’s activities in the academic life of Paris. The central text that bound all other pieces 
together and gave them a larger interpretative framework in the compilation was Sapiens, a 
dialogue that discussed wisdom and university life in a playful a manner.69 In the introduction 
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to the dialogue itself Vives juxtaposes the current ignorant state of learning to the erudite 
wisdom of classical antiquity and early Christianity that produced great numbers of wise men, 
because, “in those free cities tongues were allowed to speak against vice.”70 Moreover, in 
addition to pleading for the duty of the wise to denounce vice in the soldiers of truth, Vives 
argues, in a typically humanist vein, that the antidote against corruption and beastly life lies in 
education and learning. The Spanish humanist also informs the reader that satire is a more 
suitable way of revealing truth than panegyric since it is less prone to adultery and deceit.71 In 
the dialogue proper, the satire is performed by Nicolas Bérault, Gaspar Lax and Vives himself, 
who all feature in the dialogue offering the reader a fictional tour around the halls and corridors 
of the colleges of Paris University in a quest for true wisdom. 
 The text is often read as a humanist critique of scholasticism, a sort of early 
version of Vives’s polemical and more famous In pseudodialecticos; yet, there are some issues 
that complicate this interpretation.72 One is the very election of the persons of the dialogue since 
it is not easy to decipher what role exactly – if any – they are supposed to play in the message 
Vives wants to convey to the reader. Bérault was one of the more famous French humanists 
collaborating with Vives in the printing house of Kees and Lambert, and he very likely 
introduced Vives to some of the humanist circles and currents of Paris. Gaspar Lax, on the other 
hand, was Vives teacher and a scholastic dialectician at the Collège de Montaigu, a relatively 
well-known student of the most famous member of the theological faculty, the prominent 
dialectician John Mair.73 Yet the dichotomy between Bérault and Lax is never brought to the 
forefront. Quite the contrary – the three protagonists seem to agree on all the judgements on the 
deficiencies of Parisian academic life. 
In the same spirit, the judgement pronounced on the respective failures of 
different arts is rather varied as to the exact points on which they are criticised. In the case of 
the teachers of studia humanitatis – the grammarian, the poet, and the rhetorician – the main 
agenda is not a critique of their scholastic jargon. The problem of the grammarian lies in a 
pronounced focus on ultimately useless details, whereas the failure of the rhetorician is based 
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71 Vives: “Sapiens”, 296. 
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on his incapacity to move and raise emotions.74 The poet, for his part, mumbles a confusing 
sequence of poetical sentences, where, to use the words of Lax, “the humane and the divine are 
entangled,” which clearly counts as true mockery of the “sacred theology of the poets.”75 As to 
the dialectician, the philosopher, the physician and the mathematician the point of critique is 
intrinsically linked to the incomprehensible nature and irrelevance of their scholastic and 
technical language. Thus, in criticising the dialectician, engaged in constructing what appear to 
be valid arguments deprived of any meaningful content, Lax states that this is divination and 
suggests a return to “good dialectic” that “uses very short enunciations.”76 
 The yearning for a man of encyclopaedic knowledge, as Vives puts it, in the early 
stages of the dialogue is finally fulfilled by a theologian who pronounces that “true wisdom is 
the Son of God,” contrasting this kind of wisdom to mundane riches and other temporal matters. 
The dichotomy between the wisdom of the soul and the passions of the body is made explicit 
and the final solution offered is the overcoming of mundane and bodily temptation in a relative 
isolation.77 Hence, a work leaning towards humanist studies in various ways, although not 
systematically portraying humanism and scholasticism as two clear structures of knowledge, 
ends with a turn to wisdom that is not explicitly linked to the practical knowledge of studia 
humanitatis often associated with humanism. On the contrary, the true wisdom propagated by 
the theologian is of rather contemplative – even monastic – nature in its pronounced focus on 
inner spirituality.78 All of this, however, resonated well in the academic ambiance of Paris at 
the time. 
 
Interpretations of Vives's Early Works 
 
Contrary to what was believed until recently, it is now widely accepted that Vives, who had 
arrived to Paris in 1509, stayed in the French capital until 1514. Moreover, thanks to the 
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76 Vives: “Sapiens”, 298: “...vera dialectica, enunciationibus perquam brevibus utentes, & quibus facile 
respondentem (ni esset impense doctus) capiebant....” 
77 Vives: “Sapiens”, 300: “Nonne recte ego vos dixi in nomine Domini congregatos? qui sapientiam, id est, Dei 
filium quaeritis....” 




groundbreaking work of Enrique González González we have a better idea of Vives’s activities 
in the French capital. Whereas all scholarship until the 1980s emphasized his scholastic 
schooling inside the walls of the famous and conservative Collège de Montaigu, we now know 
that he was also involved in other activities related to what can be broadly dubbed humanism.79 
More than experimenting with rhetorical compositions and teaching courses under the auspices 
of the university in a rather humanist mould, he was also actively collaborating with the printers 
Thomas Kees and Jean Lambert. It is very likely indeed that during this Parisian period Vives 
encountered currents of humanist learning outside the Collège de Montaigu, as González 
González has suggested.80  
Even if Vives’s Sapiens cannot be taken to portray humanism and scholasticism 
as antagonistic and all-encompassing intellectual paradigms, his connections with the printing 
world, experiments with literary styles, and pronounced focus on the teaching of classical and 
humanist materials witness a remarkable interest in the currents of new learning.81 Thus, 
whatever the self-understanding of Vives’s rapprochement with humanism might have been, he 
seems to have adopted the working habits and methods of humanist language teaching and 
production already in 1514. Vives’s approach and interest in texts, language, and the 
restructuring of the trivium and studia humanitatis – the minimal definition of humanism – can 
be situated inside the emerging humanist tradition. 82  
 If Vives is approached from the vantage point of a literary definition of humanism, 
his whole activities in 1514 display a strong adherence to classical writers and trends closely 
connected to the teaching of grammar and other arts of the trivium in a more humanist vein. 
This is most clearly visible in Vives’s five printed prelections (praelectio) based on the books 
he was then lecturing on.83 Firmly in accordance with the Parisian tradition, these prelections – 
possibly based on a real inaugural lecture by Vives – advertised courses that were most likely 
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to these, Vives published a work comprising three texts misleadingly entitled Opuscula duo that employed classical 




extracurricular and dedicated to humanist materials.84 Hence, they give a good overall picture 
of the intended contents of a lecture as designed by the teacher, as well as on the language the 
teacher chose in making publicity for his course. Two of these lectures are dedicated to Vives's 
own works while the three remaining are related to courses pronounced by Vives on other 
writers. These three were the Convivium of Francisco Filelfo, De legibus (On the Laws) and De 
officiis (On Duties) by Cicero and the pseudo-Ciceronian Ad Herennium.85 González González 
has argued quite convincingly that at this point Vives was most likely connected to the French 
humanist Nicolas Bérault who appeared in Sapiens, and if one takes the activities of the French 
humanist into consideration, a rather comprehensive picture of an overall interest in modern 
humanist studies emerges. In the years of 1513 – 1515 Bérault was lecturing on Quintilian's 
Institutio oratoria (Institutes of Oratory), Cicero's De legibus, Angelo Poliziano's Silvae – a 
poetical introduction to the Georgics of Vergil and the Poet Hesiod – on Roman Law, on 
astronomy, on Cicero's Phillipicae (Philippics) and finally in 1516, on Suetonius's De vitae 
Caesaris (The Lives of the Twelve Caesars). Bérault was closely connected to the biggest 
authorities of Greek studies of Paris Girolamo Aleandro and Guillaume Budé. Apart from this, 
he was the editor of the first French edition of Filefo's Conviviorum, a book that Vives was 
lecturing on in 1514.86 Moreover, Vives was the editor of Baptista Guarini’s De ordine docendi 
ac studendi for the Lambert press composing a short introductory letter praising humanist 
pedagogy.87 Taken together, the activities of Vives and Bérault indicate a broad interest in 
different aspects of humanist and grammatical studies moving from poetry and literature to 
history and the teaching of rhetoric.88   
 
Development of Teaching Materials and Grammar Courses, Defying the Late Medieval 
Tradition 
 
Even though the humanist-scholasticism debate understood as an open conflict hardly surpasses 
any other intellectual dispute in the French capital before in 1514, a gradual swift in the 
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structure and learning of the arts is taking place in many of the colleges at the University of 
Paris.89 The printing of humanist materials boomed from the start of the sixteenth century, 
which is exactly the moment in which the production of late medieval materials on grammar 
come somewhat to an abrupt halt. Moreover, contemporaries and printers knew well that 
something in the approach to the trivium and language teaching was indeed changing. Iohannes 
Balbi’s Catholicon – the scholastic grammar par excellence – was becoming outdated as the 
most important printer of the French capital Josse Bade noted in his introduction to the 1506 
edition of the work.90 There are clear signs that the very strongholds of nominalist scholasticism 
were also affected by new materials, as Nôel Beda's statutes for the famously conservative 
Collège de Montaigu from 1509 demonstrate. These are the only surviving statutes from the 
early years of the institution that state explicitly the content of the grammar course, and – 
despite their distinctively late medieval outlook – they reveal that the teaching of grammar was 
already influenced by new pedagogic literature. Although the grammar course is heavily based 
on the explanation of Alexandre de Villedieu's traditional textbook, Doctrinale, and to a lesser 
extent on Donatus's Ars minor and Ars maior, authorities that were then more current are 
mentioned as suitable materials for grammar teaching.91 These included Niccolò Perotti, 
Augustino Dati, and Guy de Jouenneaux (who had composed a growingly popular version of 
Lorenzo Valla's Elegantiae lingua latinae). 
 At least by the 1510s, the very practice of language education at Collège de 
Montaigu, where Vives studied at least at some point of his Parisian years, had also been 
influenced by the Italian way of teaching grammar.92 In 1509 the most prestigious theologian 
of the Montaigu, John Mair, was irritated by some of the developments of humanism that were 
potentially threatening to the scholastic process of clarifying truth, and he reminded his readers 
that even Pico della Mirandola had defended the technical language of scholastics as the 
appropriate tool for this task. In 1516, he seems to have been even more worried about recent 
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developments, and implied that the Faculty of Arts was not preparing students for the study of 
theology in a suitable manner.93 Also in the same year François du Bois, a teacher at the Collège 
de Montaigu and an active editor of classical texts for Josse Bade's printing house, published 
his Progymnasmatum, a contribution to the humanist trend of looking for an abundant, eloquent, 
and versatile style. Although the Faculty of Arts and its teaching habits are in many ways a terra 
incognita for modern scholarship, it has been shown that already in the early sixteenth century 
an M.A from the Paris University was the most prestigious qualification for a master in 
humanist colleges in France. This would indicate an increasing presence of humanist learning 
in the university halls of the capital.94 In addition to all of this, the practice of giving 
extracurricular courses, paid for by students, on humanist and classical materials was normal, 
and contributed to the introduction of the new learning to the lecture halls of Paris University.  
 The meaning of the change in grammar teaching had philosophical, semantic, 
practical, and cultural ramifications since what was increasingly challenged was a whole culture 
of approaching language and argumentation. In the late Middle Ages, the purpose of grammar 
had not been limited to the teaching of linguistic skills for the use of language in different 
situations, but it had predominantly, although not exclusively, evolved into an investigation into 
the meaning of words linked closely to a highly developed tradition of formal dialectical 
reasoning. The raison d’être of what is called speculative grammar was very often explicitly 
stated in the introductions and commentaries of treatises, and referred to the Aristotelian idea 
of unveiling the semantic relations of a mental language.95 In this way, some aspects of medieval 
grammar can be understood as propaedeutic elements leading to formal and terministic dialectic 
(logic), and many semantic problems expounded in terministic logic were indeed born out of 
grammatical commentaries.96 A change in grammar teaching and materials had potential effects 
                                                          
93 Mair, John: “Johannes Maior Alexandro Stevvard” dedicatory letter to Mair, John: Quartus sententiarum, 
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lucubratione enucleatae cum duplici tabella videlicet alphabetica materiarum decisarum in fronte et 
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humanism see Moss 2003, 76-86. 
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95 Moss 2003, 7. The significance of the change in teaching materials is discussed already by Eugenio Garin in 
his L’Education de l’Homme modern 1400-1600 1968, 19-42. He focuses more on the philosophical implications 
of the change linking it to man’s understanding of his historical nature than on the fact that specific educational 
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catégorie ou, à la rigueur, de la hiérarchie des intelligences, est assez significative: ce n’estpas par hasard que la 
science, le langage, la logique se définissent comme problèmes d’assimilation, de méthode, de classification et 
d’organisation du savoir.” For a primarily negative assessment of humanist grammar, see Padley 1976, 5-57. 




across language disciplines, since the elementary teaching of language cannot easily be 
dissociated from what is expected of language use. 
 Some widely used materials for grammar education accentuated their relation to 
deep semantic analysis. One of the standard dictionaries of the late Middle Ages, Iohannes 
Balbi's Summa grammaticalis quae vocatur Catholicon, which was printed numerous times 
throughout Europe in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, highlights words as 
components of the technical language typical of the Paris University of the fifteenth century.97 
For most of the Middle Ages, the basic text of grammar education was Donatus's Ars 
Grammatica – especially its first part Ars minor and the third book of the second part (Ars 
maior). Donatus was very often followed by the even more philosophical Priscian, who was 
unsuitable for elementary education and rarely used in arts faculties. Donatus’s Ars minor 
presented language not as a historical but as a formal system focusing on the web of semantic 
relations in detriment of syntactic ones. The more philosophical outlook of the work is also 
manifest in the third part of Ars maior dedicated to figures and tropes, where the problem is 
presented as a philosophical question of meaning and diversions of meaning, not as a possibility 
to rhetorical or literary style.98 All this directed the problematique of grammar away from the 
accidental aspects of language, namely from morphology and analysis of the particularities of 
the syntax of classical Latin to questions of abstract semantic relations and how they could be 
signified in language. Only Alexandre de Villedieu's Doctrinale – composed in verse in order 
to be more easily memorized by the pupil – provided a pedagogical grammar to students. 
Villedieu's work presents rules through definitions, not semantic reflections on those rules, but 
it is not rich in references to the classical tradition, so dear to the more modern approach. 
 In addition to the materials and formal understanding of grammar, the late Middle 
Ages offered a practice of reading and understanding that was closely connected to its explicitly 
stated ends. Since the thirteenth century (at least) in the Faculty of Arts of the University of 
Paris, the dominant mode of teaching was based on the pedagogic devices of quaestio and 
disputatio.99 Grammar, understood not only as prescriptive rules for language production but as 
                                                          
97 Balbi’s Catholicon included information on other aspects of grammar and rhetoric but by far its most 
extensive part was dictionary. For a more detailed analysis, see Moss 2003, 16-17. 
98 For a more detailed discussion, see Copeland –Sluiter 2010. 
99 This was the predominant but not the only way of reading texts. What is more, the medieval tradition created 
its own tradition of enarratio based on the commentary and reading of Latin authors, where the final goal was 
not only to fix correct language usage, but also to interpret the intentions of the writer through literal exegesis 
and to reconstruct the historical correct interpretation of texts. The medieval literary exegesis was heavily based 
on six questions: quis, quid, cur, quomodo, quando, ubi, quibus facultatibus. It was a method for contextualizing 




a way of reading and analysing texts, was organized around these basic tools. Quaestio, or 
quaestiones, as Weijers has noted, was a way of both amplifying and contextualizing problems 
arising from a text through a dialectical treatment. It was, furthermore, a method of presenting 
separate questions for a disputation and a way of exercising argumentative and analytical 
capacities.100 Disputatio was the active treatment of a quaestio through arguments for and 
against, followed by a refutation and a final solution to the problem posed. Like quaestio, 
disputatio could serve as an active exercise or as a way of exposing a problem arising from a 
commentary of a text. The dominant role of disputations is a clear indication of the prevalent 
role of dialectical motifs in commenting a text: disputatio was primarily an exercise in formal 
reasoning and semantic precision that accentuated the importance of the formal validity of 
arguments according to the semantic and propositional rules of dialectical reasoning. Despite 
their highly formal nature, quaestio and disputatio had a distinctive practical task; they showed 
how problems arising from authorities and other texts could systematically be clarified and 
bound together with the unity of all other knowledge through a proper dialectical treatment of 
questions.101 In this way dialectic, the art of truth and error had developed a clear method for 
clarifying truth in matters that were questioned, and in order that dialectic fulfil its function, the 




Even though dictionary was not the basic unit of teaching, the evolution of their content points 
towards a significant change in the study of words that moved from a focus on formal semantics 
to semantics of usus and literary abundance. The most popular newcomer to the market of Latin 
dictionaries was Niccolò Perotti's Cornucopiae, a work based on the analysis of Martial's poetry 
using enarratio – a typically humanist tool for textual commentary. The nexus of semantic 
references is radically changed in Cornucopiae, firstly because of the points of reference are 
fixed in the tradition of classical antiquity, and secondly, because the way a word is defined is 
entirely dependent on its usus in other classical texts. Thus, a web of semantic relations between 
the corpus of classics is created where every definition of words brings to the fore other possible 
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uses of the term as it is applied by a number of classical auctores. As the name of the book 
implies, rather than explaining semantic and syntactic relations in the medieval sense, the book 
offers the reader a tool for verbal abundance, tying it closely together with rhetorical invention, 
and not with scholastic reasoning. It was, however, the three humanistic works mentioned in 
the statutes of Montaigu that formed the basis of the new way of teaching grammar, Perotti’s 
Rudimenta Grammatices, Valla´s Elegantiae together with Jouenneaux’s version of Valla and 
Dati’s Elegantiolae. Despite their significant differences, they all propagated an understanding 
of grammar based on usus and classical authors.102 Moreover, all were largely available in Paris 
by the early sixteenth century and were clearly competing with the older materials for the 
hegemony over the authority in grammar teaching.103 
The modern way of understanding grammar is not only tied to the change in 
materials but to an overall understanding of how the grammar course should be conducted in 
the first place. Probably the most fundamental change a number of thinkers tried to introduce 
to the grammar course was a relative denial of the use of prescriptive grammar in language 
education. This was not only meant as a critique of speculative grammar, but it also explicitly 
denounced the more basic and pedagogical grammar course of Latin centred on Villedieu's 
Doctrinale, which aspired to ingrain a set of grammatical rules to the minds of the pupils by the 
use of metrical verse. Even though these new materials did present inflections in a manner not 
completely different from Villedieu’s, most of the humanist educational material agrees that the 
normative and prescriptive side of grammar has only a propaedeutic function, with the focus 
being on the reading of auctores. Thus, it is only through reading good literature that the pupil 
is introduced to the secrets of Latin language.104 This highlights that language and language 
learning is not taken as an abstract system of rules, but as a process where correctness is 
inseparably entangled with elegant style and the imitation of classics. To speak correctly 
requires not only a construction of a sentence that would be correct because of prescriptive 
rules, but it should also be an elegant sentence taken from the existing corpus of authorities. 
Grammar teaching should aspire to an understanding of language that would bring to life a 
whole set of semantic relations going back to auctores. Thus, reading Latin authors serves a 
multitude of functions where the learning of a language is to a certain extent inseparable from 
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the absorbing of a whole world of classical antiquity, its vocabulary, mythology, moral 
philosophy, ethical concerns, and ways of expressing itself.  
 This, however, did not mean that everything classical antiquity ever produced 
should necessarily be read. The existing curricula underlined that certain materials should be 
introduced at specific moments of the educational path; they should be suitable to the level of 
understanding of a student climbing up the ladder of ars humanitatis and they should lead him 
to a proper interpretation of Latin culture by a selective presentation of right texts and quotes. 
One pedagogic way of doing this was the practice of enarratio, that is, the narration of the text 
that enabled the positioning of it in the context of all other texts of classical Latin. Unlike the 
scholastic quaestio, enarratio was not strictly defined, but made possible all kinds of 
explicatory commentaries, ranging from philological and historical questions to the use of 
words in other texts. Thus, an enarratio of a text made it understandable mainly in the context 
of other knowledge a student might have possessed about the classics.105 In practice, these two 
ways of understanding grammar could live side by side. In the statutes of Montaigu, as devised 
by Nôel Beda,106 scholastic and humanist materials are not represented as two mutually 
exclusive alternatives to grammar teaching but as perfectly compatible with each other – 
probably even complementary. Accordingly, in the practice of explaining Villedieu, the teachers 
that are assigned different parts of the work are encouraged to read Villedieu together with 
poets. Even though quaestio is encouraged as a method, Beda also mentions that barbarisms 
should be avoided, and that lectio should be conducted elegantly, making it very explicit that in 
Beda’s mind the two modes of approaching texts are compatible.107  
 There can be very little doubt that whatever Vives’s understanding of the larger 
significance of humanism was at the time, he was interested in humanist grammar as a general 
method of reading texts and as a gateway to the wisdom of classical antiquity. None of his texts 
follows the method of systematic quaestio and Vives never showed any interest in the materials 
of late medieval grammar. More importantly, his opinion on the importance of grammar was 
made very explicit in his Praelectio in convivia Francisci Philelphi. Here he tells a revealing, 
polemical, and probably fictional, anecdote about a man who had read the description of the 
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course Vives was intending to give. Amid laughter, the man stated, “everyone who reads the 
notes will think that you lecture on natural philosophy or astrology whereas in this book you 
only comment on grammar.”108 What follows is an angry reply in which Vives makes clear not 
only that what he is teaching could be useful to natural philosophy and astrology – subjects that 
have been treated with great eloquence in classical antiquity – but also to all other philosophy 
be it civil or religious. Thus, he puts forward an interpretation of grammar that makes explicit 
a strong urge to bring to life classical antiquity in its wholeness through a grammatical reading 
of the past. Grammar by its very nature is tied to the understanding of ancient culture; it claims 
that it can transmit the most important literary monuments of wisdom. The point about the 
general, even philosophical importance of grammar was a humanist commonplace, and it was 
to evolve into one of the recurrent themes of Vives’s writings, magnificently exemplified by 
the laudatio of the importance of the grammarian in his 1519 In pseudodialecticos.109 
 The fact that Vives had chosen Filelfo’s Convivia as one of the subjects of his 
lectures is interesting indeed. In the Praelectio, Vives situates the work in the tradition of the 
encyclopaedic works of classical antiquity, Gelius’s Noctes Atticae (Attic Nights) and 
Macrobius’s Saturnalia. These were both somewhat disorganised collections of quotes. In 
quoting the famous metaphor from Seneca and Macrobius about the bee that gathers nectar 
from different flowers and turns it into honey Vives refers to the kind of eclectic method of 
gathering quotes so typical of the Renaissance education. For Vives, these are not merely 
random quotes, rather they point towards ultimate truths contained in the philosophy of classical 
antiquity. What is more, the importance of collecting quotes is explicitly tied to imitation and 
to one’s own production. In an eloquent ending Vives strongly affirms the humanist ideal of the 
union of wisdom and rhetoric; the truth and wisdom contained in these quotes shake hands with 
the most beautiful oratory in the writing of all great writers of classical antiquity, from Plato 
and Aristotle to Cicero.110 
 As a further demonstration of an interest in humanist grammar, Vives edited in 
1514 a short Italian educational manual, Guarini’s De ordine docendi ac studendi, praising it 
loudly in the introductory text for the reader. Guarini’s De ordine was as one of the key texts of 
Italian quattrocento humanism, and as an affirmation of its status, it appeared in the 1514 Basel 
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edition of Rhenanus as explicitly united to the humanist programme of Erasmus.111 Guarini’s 
is indeed a full-fledged curriculum of studia humanitatis based according to the author himself 
especially on “the doctrine of my father,” who happened to be Guarino Veronese, probably the 
most famous Italian humanist teacher of the quattrocento.112 Although De ordine docendi ac 
studendi was meant for pre-university education in the Italian context, the propaedeutic nature 
of the Faculty of Arts in Paris made it potentially relevant for language teaching conducted in 
different collegia. Guarini makes the distinction of grammar to “methodical” and the 
“historical”, dedicating some effort to explaining the rule-based nature of grammar falling 
under the category of “methodical,” and he even mentions Alexandre de Villedieu and Priscian 
as potential authorities.113 It is, however, in the reading of poets and historians followed by 
moral philosophy when one is really introduced to the secrets of Latin, understood not only as 
linguistic rules, but rather as a totality of culture. The emphasis on the variety of subjects and 
an abundance of material is brilliantly manifested in the recommendation of the encyclopaedic 
work of Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae), Macrobius (Saturnalia) and St Augustine’s De Civitate 
Dei (City of God), which according to Guarini was “filled with the histories, rites and the 
religious beliefs of the Ancient World.”114 Yet, as Guarini argued: “who is erudite in these 
studies [grammar] can move to the study of rhetoric.”115 The link from grammar to rhetorical 




                                                          
111 Rhenanus, Beatus: “Beatus Rhenanus Lucae Paliuro tubeaquensi”, dedication letter to Guarini, Battista: De 
modo et ordine docendi ac discendi, Strasbourg, Matthias Schürer, 1514: “Scribit de praeceptoris officio, et 
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Ciceronis orations intelligent, verum etiam ex superiorum rerum varietate, et copiosam, et ornatam cum arte 




From Grammar to Rhetoric 
 
The art that showed how words and quotes could be put into use in one’s own production was 
rhetoric. The importance of rhetorical motives for Vives’s understanding of humanist studies is 
wonderfully presented in his prelection to the fourth book of Ad Herennium, a flamboyant 
expression of the language of power surrounding the art of eloquence. In the text, rhetoric is 
not primarily presented as a question of style and beauty, nor as a practice of teaching wisdom 
or as philological method of reading. Above all these things Vives opts, in his attempt to create 
publicity for his lecture, for the brute language of power, highlighting rhetoric as a force that 
reigns supreme over the minds of men. Thus, Vives promises that he tries to form an orator 
capable of dominating the audience: “he will induce them into any mood; he will have 
command of anybody’s soul and will, and make them obey his words and speech without any 
resistance.”116 The selection of exempla of good orators hails Cicero as a king who was able to 
turn the collective mind of the Senate to whatever he wanted, and “the choice of war and peace 
between the Athenians and Philip was in the power of Demosthenes thanks to his eloquence.”117 
Thus, Vives’s eloquent praise of the utility of rhetoric for potential students at the Faculty of 
Arts is built primarily, although not exclusively, on a language of civic and social power based 
on the control of emotion and passion. 
  The fact that Vives’s primary reference points were situated in the classical 
tradition was hardly a surprise since the corpus of authoritative texts on the use of word was 
largely inherited from classical antiquity. Rhetoric – a key part of the trivium – was deeply 
embedded in the educational structures of the time and it was studied either in the last years of 
grammar schools, or in the propaedeutic Faculty of Arts at the university level. It is hard to 
make a clear-cut distinction between different kinds of educational institutions in the early 
sixteenth century since many universities outside Italy had preliminary colleges with functions 
similar to those of grammar and elementary schools. Some grammar schools, for their part, 
could adopt the teaching curricula of universities.118 Moreover, unlike in Italy, in central and 
northern Europe, philosophical faculties were often closely connected to the three higher 
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faculties of Medicine, Law, and Theology with many humanists actually both studying and 
pursuing a teaching career in higher faculties.119 However, irrespective of the exact institutional 
context in which rhetoric was studied, an educational hierarchy of rhetorical books and booklets 
emerges together with the possible pedagogic function they were meant to serve. 
  A general idea of the materials in use throughout Europe unfolds by looking at 
the number of printed editions of rhetorical materials. It is hardly an exaggeration to claim that 
every early sixteenth-century student of classical rhetoric in the elementary level would have 
been acquainted with Cicero's De inventione and the pseudo-Ciceronian Ad Herennium – the 
book Vives was lecturing on in Paris. These two works that present rhetorical theory in a very 
schematic and formulistic manner were printed more than ten times per decade in every ten-
year span in the early sixteenth century. Since most of the existing editions printed these two 
works together, the works were clearly thought of as presenting an essentially unified 
introduction to the secrets of eloquence. Their similarities are numerous, but the fact that De 
inventione focuses exclusively on one of the five traditional parts of rhetoric (invention), 
whereas Ad Herennium provided the pupil with a more ample knowledge of all rhetorical parts, 
shows that in certain ways they are complementary. If only one of the two was printed 
individually, it was usually Ad Herennium most likely due to its wider coverage of rhetorical 
tasks.120 These two works were not discovered in the Renaissance, but they had a huge reception 
already during the Middle Ages. However, although medieval rhetoric had never lost sight of 
the idea of rhetoric as an art of persuasion dealing with emotion, its general developments either 
integrated it to the abstract problematique of grammar and dialectic, or applied its rules to 
literary production in specific genres such as formulistic letter writing (ars dictaminis).121  
  A broader understanding of rhetoric was emerging partly because these two 
booklets were increasingly backed up by other introductory materials to the art of eloquence by 
Cicero, such as Partitiones Oratoriae (A Dialogue Concerning Oratorical Partitions), Topica 
(Topics of Argumentation), Brutus, and Orator. These were all printed together with Ad 
Herennium and De inventione, and some other works in Josse Bade’s 1511 Parisian edition of 
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Cicero’s rhetorical oeuvre.122 As with all rhetorical materials of classical antiquity, printing 
patterns clearly suggest that 1510s is exactly the moment in which Ciceronian corpus is 
becoming increasingly available in Transalpine Europe.123 In addition to the Ciceronian 
pedagogic corpus, more sophisticated, complex, and philosophically challenging treatments of 
rhetoric were available presenting a variety of issues – ranging from rhetoric’s social role to its 
relationship to other arts. Cicero’s most complete work on rhetoric, De oratore, not only 
presented rhetorical theory as a schematic system, but also reflected in a dialogical form on 
different aspects of the use of word. Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria – praised by many 
humanists – wove rhetoric together with a comprehensive programme of oratorical education, 
discussing its relation to all aspects of public life. Aristotle’s The Art of Rhetoric – the first 
systematic treatment of rhetorical theory – offered the reader the most complete treatment of 
passions. Still, Tacitus’s Dialogus de oratoribus (Dialogue on the Orators) offered insight into 
rhetoric’s relationship to political developments and constitutions. This growing popularity and 
reintegration of the entire rhetorical corpus offered a new context for the reading of the 
schematic elementary materials since it enabled broader discussions on rhetorical production 
together with other humanist ethical, cognitive, social, and political concerns.124  
  Despite the often significant differences between separate treatises, pupils across 
Europe would have received a largely similar overall picture of the basic structure of rhetorical 
theory. In these schoolbooks, the student would learn that the duties (officia) of an orator were 
to teach (docere), to delight (delectare) and to move (movere) the audience. Moreover, they 
would have learnt that the three genres of rhetoric were judicial, deliberative, and epideictic, of 
which the first dealt with the normative judgement of past actions. The second attended to future 
orientated decision-making, and the third one to the moral assessment of persons or actions 
through the rhetoric of praise and blame. Still, he would have been informed that the traditional 
skills of a successful orator were the invention of arguments (inventio) through places (loci) 
and commonplaces (loci communes); disposition, or arrangement of arguments (dispositio) 
according to the six parts of oration; style and elocution that referred both to the general 
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tripartite division of styles into grand, middle, and low, as well as to the generation of ornaments 
through figures and tropes. Finally, he would have learned that the two further skills of spoken 
oratory were memory and delivery. This framework was naturally not a clear-cut scheme of 
separate issues: the interrelations of different aspects of the theory were highlighted so that the 
invention of arguments in Ad Herennium, for instance, goes hand in hand with the demands of 
different parts of orations that aspire to specific goals. In the same vein, the disposition of the 
speech could incorporate ways of analysing the position of the speaker in the eyes of the 
audience; the first part of the speech, exordium, was for instance mainly about winning the 
listener’s favour.125 
  This framework of rhetorical theory was never, however, an empty generative 
tool, but closely linked to everything a student would have learnt in the grammar course. Its 
very idea was to arrange existing arguments and quotations in a way that would organize them 
in the most suitable way for the matter and question at hand. Because of this they refer to and 
are understandable only in relation to the whole set of materials incorporated into the trivium, 
providing the student with materials – Roman plays, theatrical pieces, orations, letters and 
practical examples for rhetorical production called progymnasmata. Thus, in humanist 
educational materials the rule-based schematic element of rhetoric was only part of a larger 
package that was supposed to turn pupils into able readers and producers of rhetoric, and drill 
into their minds the kind of maxims and classical quotations they were supposed to use in the 
composition of their own work. A manifestation of this was that the basic tool of material 
arrangement, the commonplace book, was primarily a collection of organized quotes that could 
be brought to mind for one’s own production through the successful use of places (loci).126 
  The Renaissance did, of course, produce some materials for school contexts, even 
though the bulk of Renaissance educational materials appeared later with the ascendancy of 
Ramism. George of Trebizond had composed in the fifteenth century, and in a somewhat 
Hermogenean vein, an introductory work to rhetoric entitled Rhetoricorum libri V, which began 
to be largely available north of the Alps from the late 1510s. Hermogenes's own rhetorical work, 
however, was not very often printed in the early sixteenth century, and even if some editions of 
his work might have been in use, they were not competing as alternative introductions to 
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rhetoric.127 Rudolph Agricola’s De inventione dialectica published for the first time in 1515 
also incorporated elements from rhetorical theory into its general theory of invention. Even if 
some editions of relative popularity are known mostly in Paris and in some German towns, the 
dominant role of Roman rhetorical treatises cannot be doubted, and it was only with the work 
of Erasmus and Philipp Melanchthon that popular rhetorical works produced in the Renaissance 
were becoming available.128 Philipp Melanchthon's De rhetorica libri tres (1519), Institutiones 
Rhetoricae (1521), and Elementa rhetorices libri duo (1529), all printed numerous times in the 
1520s and 1530s, were clearly meant to be introductory works to rhetorical theory. Despite 
some theoretical modifications, they were not thought to be in any apparent contradiction with 
the Roman treatises of classical rhetoric, and were studied often with them. Giorgio Valla's De 
expedita argumentandi ratione libellus, printed by Froben in 1519, was also meant to be read 
together with traditional rhetorical materials, and not as a challenger or competitor to that 
theory.129 Finally, Erasmus had made probably the most significant contribution to the teaching 
materials of grammar and rhetoric with a pronounced emphasis on production and writing. Out 
of his works the most important ones were a treatment of abundant style, De copia (1512), a 
letter-writing manual De conscribendis epistolis, a set of proverbs Adagia (originally printed in 
1500) and his collection of exemplary dialogues, Colloquia (first edition in 1518). None of 
these works was meant to supplant classical theory on grammar and rhetoric, but to provide the 
student with materials covering specific fields of applied rhetoric. Thus, they did not introduce 
change into the theory of grammar and rhetoric but rather showed ways of putting language and 
materials into play in writing. They aspired to introduce stylistic, dispositional, and generic 
flexibility as well as historical consciousness and a new set of commonplaces into the 
framework of classical rhetoric. 
   
Scientia Civilis as a Context for the Trivium 
 
Yet, to grasp fully Vives’s insistence on the social and political importance of the trivium in his 
prelection to Ad Herennium, one must look beyond rhetoric as a closed field of linguistic 
production. As seen, one of the crucial points of rhetorical theory interpreted in close union to 
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its grammatical basis is that it is not an empty theory of argumentation but an encyclopaedic 
practice that gathers all possible information from authors in order to turn that into production. 
Thus, rhetorical theory could only be approached together with the knowledge of the materials 
that provided the student and the orator material for his speech, and those materials pointed 
towards the themes and issues that were supposed to function as proper fields of rhetoric. What 
is more, in the tradition inherited from classical antiquity, rhetoric was already given a specific 
role not only as a general theory of language production but as a key part of civil science 
(scientia civilis).130 This is the place where the aspiration to rule over peoples’ minds through 
the art of persuasion was discussed in relation to civic possibilities, moral philosophy and 
political questions. As one could read in the first lines of Trebizond’s fifteenth-century Rhetoric, 
printed in France for the first time in 1512, “the civil science by which we speak in civil 
questions with the assent, as much as possible, of the listeners.”131 Trebizond, just as many other 
quattrocento humanist treatises on rhetoric, was always very clear about the fact that rhetoric 
was primarily a political genre. Mirroring this tradition Josse Bade, explicitly following Cicero, 
reminded the reader that rhetoric dealt with forensic and civic matters.132 
 Already the rhetorical corpus itself reminded the reader of the civic nature of 
rhetoric. Cicero’s youthful and schematic De inventione opens up with a depiction of the first 
civilizer-orator, who was the first to bring men together and turn them into civilized creatures 
with the wise and powerful use of word. It is in this initial part of De inventione that a moral 
union of wisdom and eloquence demanded by all rhetorical writers is achieved and given a 
distinctively social touch by insisting on its civilizing element. This union presupposed the 
relation of reason and language, knowledge of civic matters, and a capacity to communicate 
effectively. Vives himself referred to the importance of the union of reason and words in his 
prelection to Ad Herennium when asserted that what truly distinguishes man from beast is not 
that he conceives of rational ideas in his mind, but that he is able to communicate them to others 
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through signs.133  
 Moreover, Cicero, in his other works, and most notably in De officiis weaved the 
imperative of the union of ratio and eloquentia together with the primacy of active and 
prudential life. In De officiis, the most widely read book on moral philosophy in Europe already 
by the Middle Ages, Cicero reaffirms that the natural bonds of society are reason and speech, 
“which by the processes of teaching and learning, of communicating, discussing, and reasoning 
associate men together and unite them in a sort of natural fraternity.”134 Furthermore, this 
rhetorical activity is united with the virtues of active life for the common good, equated in 
Cicero with the good of the state. This way of living, dedicating oneself to civic virtue in the 
service of the state, was contrasted to a contemplative philosophical life that strives for the 
contemplation of eternal truths in relative isolation. These discussions were widely known in 
humanist circles, and Vives returned to them frequently throughout his career.  
 There was, however, another aspect of this teaching that had strong philosophico-
social implications, something that was emphasized by different writers to different degrees. 
This aspect had to do with the fact that despite of the strong moral ethos of many classical 
defences of rhetorical practice that underlined an unbreakable union of virtue and eloquence, 
much of rhetorical theory discussed the very same moral philosophy and virtue as a realm of 
argumentative flexibility. This was explicitly linked to the fact that the point of departure for a 
treatment of a rhetorical question in rhetorical theory was that it was always possible to come 
up with arguments for both sides, in utramque partem, and in Cicero and Quintilian, we can 
find successful orators being praised for this quality.135 Moreover, rhetorical handbooks state 
that political issues are always questions of honesty (honestas) and expediency (utilitas), but 
these terms serve as general categories or headings under which every successful argumentation 
of one’s case has to be placed. This is done by using the flexibility of normative terms to cater 
for a range of possibly opposite actions in an inventive way. However, rather than an 
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epistemological argument formulated in the language of philosophy, this flexibility was a 
presupposition of rhetorical practice. Echoing Plato’s famous attack on rhetoric in Gorgias it 
was exactly the ambivalent nature of rhetoric that masked truth that people condemned in the 
early sixteenth century. In the 1512 Paris edition of Domenico Nani Mirabelli’s Polyanthea 
printed by Josse Bade, one could read in the dedication letter a highly ambivalent description 
of eloquence as an art capable of the best and the worst.136 Vives’s own prelection to Ad 
Herennium also pleaded for a rhetoric that would not be separated for wisdom, truth, and made 
the honourable claim that in case a separation took place rhetoric would not be useful.137 More 
generally, rhetoric together with poetry posed a possible threat to the unity of arts, concord, and 
piety in the minds of many Parisian humanists. 
 
Harmony and Concord of all Arts and Disciplines: Framing Humanist Studies 
 
A clear change in the teaching materials of grammar and rhetoric, and the link of studia 
humanitatis and the art of eloquence to civic and moral philosophy does not mean that Parisian 
humanists were primarily interested in this aspect of humanist learning. A rather broad and all-
encompassing interpretation of rhetoric is visible in Vives’s depiction of the scope of rhetoric 
in his prelection to Filelfo that argued for a union of wisdom and eloquence in all intellectual 
enquiries from moral to divine philosophy.138 A view of the more famous and most widely 
known humanists of the French capital spearheaded by Lefèvre d’Etaples also reveals that they 
did not reflect on literary studies primarily in the context of civil science but linked humanism 
to broad and often philological questions of truth, metaphysics, Christianity, and mysticism. 
Guillaume Budé, one of the prominent humanists of France and the foremost expert in Greek 
studies, is sometimes attributed the invention of the Latin word encyclopaedia he coined in his 
1508 Annotationes in quatuor et viginti Pandectarum libros.139 Encyclopaedia was not 
understood only as a set of cross-references between different texts but comprised a more 
fundamental understanding of the ultimate unity of arts and knowledge in one harmonious 
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totality, the portrayal of which could get different forms ranging from music to more organic 
metaphors. 140 Likewise, when Vives’s Sapiens searches for a man perfectly versed in “the circle 
of disciplines,” what is called for here is a wisdom bringing together all different aspects of 
intellectual enquiry guaranteeing their encyclopaedic unity.141  
 Despite deliberately constructing the idea of scholasticism as a tradition of 
insignificant quibbling and propagating new learning on a number of fronts, many Parisian 
humanists had doubts about humanist learning. More specifically, by focusing on the question 
of poetry that could represent more broadly humanist literary studies, they also discussed the 
challenge humanism could pose to wisdom and piety.142 Poetry and Italian learning had been 
continuously debated ever since the famous late fifteenth-century Parisian quarrel between two 
Italian humanists, Girolamo Balbi and Fausto Andrelini. In this debate the end result had been 
the downfall of Balbi, who was accused of uncritical focus on classical eloquence and poetry 
and of indifference towards religious matters, whereas Andrelini had been more careful to 
highlight the union of classical studies and piety frequently.143 The thematic of this discussion 
was more widely known: Robert Gaguin, the grand old man of the first generation of Parisian 
humanism, also had serious reservations concerning the moral nature of the philosophy of 
classical antiquity.144 Erasmus, who knew Gaguin well and who had been active in Paris in the 
1490s, was in 1496 of the opinion that the truths of religion could be embellished with 
eloquence, but was ready to remind the reader that the style should always be chaste.145 Vives’s 
own 1514 Veritas fucata mirrored these themes largely with the young Valencian putting his 
oratorical and classical skills to work in the description of the triumphs of Christ in a 
pronouncedly classical language. 
 In the work of the most famous Parisian humanist of the time Jacques Lefèvre, a 
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famous commentator, and editor of Aristotle, humanist tradition is adapted in a very specific 
way. In the 1512 version of Trihemius's De scritoribus ecclesiasticis, a sort of a biographical 
dictionary of the most prominent men of letters, Lefèvre is described by an anonymous writer 
as the French Cicero who had saved philosophy from barbarism, restored liberal arts to their 
former splendour, and joined unpolished philosophy with eloquence.146 Lefèvre – heavily 
influenced by different branches of mystical tradition as well as Italian Neoplatonism – 
incorporated humanist studies into a philological and ultimately mystical framework. In 
Lefèvre’s project, the wisdom of classical antiquity is of worth mainly as a propaedeutic 
philosophy insofar as it partakes in the truths of an ultimately mystical Christianity. Indicative 
of this is Lefèvre’s systematic attempt to Christianize Aristotle whom he referred to often as 
primus theologus.147 Moreover, his writings on educational curriculum portray humanist studies 
as a preparation for mystical texts.148 
Lefèvre’s philological project too employed humanist literary tools to reach 
deeper layers of truth. The application of philological methods, never completely neutral but 
tied to the mystical interpretations he was promoting, was supposed to guarantee the emergence 
of the original and divinely inspired text corrupted by layers of later imperfections very often 
identified with the medieval commentary tradition.149 Thus, humanist grammar, methods of 
enarratio and use of literary tools get a distinctive interpretation as an excavation of truth, not 
primarily as a civic practice. In this approach, much of the tradition of classical antiquity is 
infused with sanctity and mystical truth that a scholar must find and expound. The popularity 
of the Neoplatonism of Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola in the French capital also 
contributed to the mystification of literary tradition.150 Marsilio Ficino’s programme was 
largely based on recovering prisca theologia, the old esoteric wisdom of the pre-Socratics that 
was perfected by Plato and prepared for the final revelation of Christianity. Together with his 
distinctively neo-Platonic understanding of the history of humanity after Jesus Christ, Ficino 
was able to turn the philosophy of history and the reading of past texts into research on the 
different manifestations of one unified truth in different spheres of life. Through this project, 
one could finally unite wisdom, faith, religion and philosophy into a unified whole, and Ficino’s 
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conceptualization of the organization of society, based on love as its binding force, is entrenched 
into the framework of greater harmony of the world and the sciences.151 As Marie de la 
Garanderie has argued, this was essentially “a divinisation of poetry” that revealed in various 
forms those ultimate truths that guided the world and human life.152 Thus, in the project of 
humanist grammar as a way of reading texts, there was something potentially divine; authors, 
poets, and words of classical antiquity are profound manifestations of truth. Hardly surprising, 
Vives too was knowledgeable of this dimension of humanist studies and poetry, and his 
reference to the “theology of the poets” in Sapiens reflected a deep interpretative tradition of 
Parisian humanism. 153 
In all these interpretations, the role of civic and moral philosophy is somewhat 
subjected to broader metaphysical concerns within the context of which they can only be 
understood. In his edition of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Lefèvre reminded the reader that 
the arts of moral philosophy and prudence are subjected to divine sapientia and bonitas.154As 
is well known, ethics and moral philosophy were in the late medieval Parisian tradition 
explicitly proclaimed as a philosophical discipline, and they drew on late medieval methods of 
quaestio and syllogistic procedures. However, during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries 
the scholastic tradition had developed a distinctively practical approach both to moral and 
theological questions arising from the auctores, linking these quite openly to a variety of 
contemporary issues. This tradition, going back to Jean Gerson, could explicitly affirm the 
autonomy of moral philosophical problems and develop highly sophisticated responses to 
contemporary questions as witnessed by the work of the most famous of early sixteenth-century 
scholastics, John Mair.155 The contribution of the more humanist minded scholars was not to 
affirm the autonomy of moral and civic philosophy – on the contrary, it has been argued that 
Lefèvre’s edition of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, for example, tries more explicitly to 
connect it to Biblical and Christian materials than was the norm.156 More generally, there are 
no defences of classical scientia civilis as an autonomous set of problems to be found in the 
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writings of the more famous humanist writers of Paris at the time. Although rhetorical materials 
begin to evoke the union of rhetoric and politics, literary studies do not draw their significance 
primary from their assumed contribution to civic philosophy.157 Vives’s 1514 corpus mirrors 
these Parisian developments. In his production from the Parisian period, one could indeed find 
ideas on the civic and cognitive power of rhetoric, on the importance of active life as well as a 
critique of scholastic quibblings.158 But equally as important, they also refer to the unity and 
harmony of all disciplines and to true wisdom transcending earthly life. Thus, although in 1514 
Vives was excited by classical studies, and was experimenting with different styles and working 
with humanist minded printers, the broader understanding of the significance of humanist 
studies lay firmly within a Parisian framework of the harmony and concord of arts and eternal 
wisdom. 
 
Louvain, Erasmus, and Dialectic. 
 
Despite his Parisian experience, it was Vives’s familiarity with the humanist tradition of the 
Low Countries and especially its most famous member Erasmus that was to mark his 
understanding of language, the trivium and the possibilities of humanist studies. After years of 
relative silence in 1519, a work entitled Opuscula varia by a certain Ioannis Lodovici Vivis 
appeared from the Louvain printing house of Thierry Martens, Erasmus’s preferred printer in 
the Low Countries. The compendium of 15 texts, five of which were edited reprints of the 1514 
works, witnessed a key awareness of typically Erasmian themes across the spectrum of 
intellectual preoccupations ranging from a fierce critique of the barbarism of scholasticism to 
the claim that true nobility stemmed from excellence of character and virtue, not from one’s 
ancestors.159 
 In reality, Vives was closely connected to the Dutch humanist at this point of his 
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life and it has been appropriately argued that around 1520 his career experienced a definite 
upswing.160 He had probably had some connections to the Low Countries at least since 1512, 
and he could have well been aware of some of Erasmus's work at the time.161 What is certain, 
though, is that by late 1514 Vives had moved to the Low Countries, and by 1516 he was already 
well connected both to the humanist circles of the Burgundian Netherlands and to the royal 
court in Brussels.162 Importantly, he enjoyed the warm favour of the Republic of Letters together 
with its most famous representative Desiderius Erasmus. It is very likely that it was the support 
of Erasmus that had at least partly guaranteed Vives a favourable position at court, as well as 
academic visibility in Louvain and the services of the revered printer Thierry Martens. As a 
demonstration of his importance, Vives adopted the role of a negotiator in a well-known 
scholarly dispute on style, audiences, and practice of humanist scholarship between Guillaume 
Budé and Erasmus, respectively the leading legal and theological humanists of the time – 
authentic heavyweights of European humanism.163 
 Vives’s incorporation into Dutch humanism occurs exactly in the moment in 
which Erasmus had just embarked on the most prolific phase of the development of his 
philosophy of Christ (Philosophia Christi) in its various forms. Philosophia Christi, that 
explicitly united ethical philosophy and theology, aspired to cultivate the kind of understanding 
that would not only speak to the intellect through a set of philosophical propositions, but that 
could transform, mould, and restitute one’s spirit and way of living to the standards set by Christ 
himself in the totality of his life (veritas vitae). However, as Erasmus pointed out, this 
philosophy did not only deal with Church reform or the purification of sacred texts: in its perfect 
form, it would pierce all human activities from theology to moral, legal, political, and 
educational realms. In his Paraclesis, one of the key texts uniting humanist scholarship to 
Biblical studies, he argued that if this philosophy reigned in princes, preachers and 
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schoolmasters, than the Christian republic would be free from discord on all levels of human 
intercourse.164 Thoroughly in this spirit, Erasmus did indeed activate some form of Philosophia 
Christi on a variety of fronts, ranging from educational materials to his Institutio principis 
Christiani that touched upon a range of issues related to virtuous government. 
 The concept of learned piety (docta pietas) central to Erasmus’s philosophy of 
Christ incorporated classical tradition and learning into Philosophia Christi in a way untypical 
of late medieval Devotio Moderna and other traditions. In his Enchiridion and in his De ratione 
studii Erasmus portrayed a way of life and a method of study to lay Christians in a way that 
greatly accentuated the importance of classical tradition. His Enchiridion focused on countering 
vice through learning, prayer and the reading of the Bible that had to be prepared by true 
erudition.165 This preparatory knowledge is largely presented in the Enchiridion, so much so 
that Erasmus himself explicitly refers to the “art and discipline of virtue” that can be spelled 
out in precepts and in a programmatic fashion.166 Although he expresses some reservation with 
regards to poetry and the poisonous side of humanism in a Parisian vein, the fact that Erasmus 
goes on to argue for a fully-fledged humanist training points to at least two ways in which 
humanist learning could, in his understanding, be of use. First, as a way of providing the student 
a necessary literary education to the secrets of the allegorical, and ultimately true, levels of the 
Scriptures, and secondly as a morally edifying educational pattern in itself. 167 Throughout his 
work, starting from his Antibarbari, Erasmus defended a position according to which the pagan 
authors, if brought together with the spiritual awakening in Christ and assimilated in the right 
spirit, will be edifying, and stand in harmonious unity with sacred texts.168 This ethico-Christian 
interpretation of classical knowledge is remarkably permissive as to the pagan tradition since it 
can adopt almost everything, and De ratione studii, Erasmus’s sketch for a school curriculum, 
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University Press, Toronto 1988, 54). 
167 Erasmus: Enchiridion, 18-19: “Apiculae exemplo, per omnes veterum hortulos circunvolitans,praeteritis 
venenis, succumb modo salutarem, ac generosum exuxeris animum tuum, ad communem quidem vitam, quam 
Ethicam vocant, reddideris non paulo armatiorem. Sunt enim profecto & illorum Palladi sua quaedam arma, 
neutiquam contemnenda.” 
168 Erasmus: Antibarbarorum liber, 81. Erasmus understood reading as a spiritual exercise in itself. The usefulness 
of reading depends ultimately on the spirit in which it is undertaken, since the mere letter of the text can never fix 




is in fact a presentation of a pronouncedly classical syllabus for an educational context. 
 The usefulness of classical knowledge was not, however, merely ethical and 
preparatory since the literary and rhetorical dimension of classical examples was also widely 
adopted for the production of language in Erasmian circles. In Erasmus himself, one finds 
arguably one of the most acute users and theoreticians of words, style, and rhetoric who never 
ceases to claim that whatever sophistication a rhetorical composition reaches, it does not 
necessarily put into question Christian truth. If the rhetorical and grammatical tools together 
with the moral and civic philosophy of classical antiquity are put into use in the spirit of Christ, 
they can be of enormous use. Thus, Erasmus’s lay piety adopts most classical traditions quite 
unproblematically but in a pronouncedly ethical form, and it is the ethical and pious nature of 
those engaging with and using classical materials that is judged decisive.169 In this framework, 
all moral and civic philosophy of the Ancients can be resuscitated side by side with the 
philosophy of Christ. Moreover, Erasmus’s interest in classical literature was far from abstract: 
his educational materials, rhetorical works and own production were in fact incorporating 
classical tradition on all domains of life in an inventive way. 
 However, all other branches of learning were ultimately subjected to Erasmus’s 
Biblical hermeneutics, culminating in his 1516 and 1519 editions of the New Testament (1516 
Novum instrumentum, 1519 Novum testamentum), the latter of which included Erasmus’s own 
Latin translation in the place of the Vulgate. Erasmus’s project of purifying the fountains of 
Christianity was, however, highly controversial from the very start. It represented the ultimate 
humanist transgression of boundaries to the realm of theology dominated by scholastic learning, 
creating an outright confrontation between the reach, limits, and possibilities of humanist 
literary methods. One of the first and better-known discussions took place between Erasmus 
and the Louvain theologian Martin Dorp.170 What started as a discussion on Erasmus’s Moriae 
Encomium is deliberately broadened to a far-fetching critique of humanist method in Dorp’s 
second letter to Erasmus. The discussion echoed a widely printed playful exchange of letters 
between Pico della Mirandola and Ermolao Barbaro who had discussed the relative merits of 
humanism and scholasticism in rather Platonic terms. Pico, in a satirical letter to Barbaro, based 
his argument on the separation of wisdom and eloquence making claims also about the 
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170 Dorp and Erasmus were friends, and it is possible that the discussion was partly staged. At least it was made 




potentially destructive implications of rhetoric as an art quite alien to the clarification of truth, 
and suitable only for the forum and masses.171 
Dorp too evokes the classical distinction of humanist studies as dealing with the 
elegance of the words and traditional theology based on the science of things (rerum scientia) 
provided by dialectic likening humanist theology to grammar and “frivolous poetry.”172 
Deliberately attacking the humanist union of eloquence and wisdom Dorp argued that linguistic 
barbarism and wisdom were in fact compatible: “But who except a perfect fool would not rather 
be wise even if he were to be a shining example of barbarism, than write beautifully without 
wisdom?” Dorp asks implying the answer.173 Thus, he is adamant in his defence of the division 
so dear to the traditional learning between grammar as the science of symbols and dialectic as 
the science of things and their relations providing a staunch defence of the dialectical method 
of quaestiones in shedding light on the obscure passages of the Scriptures.174 If the separation 
is undone in theology and one relies only on Erasmus’s philology, then getting to the ultimate 
layers of the Scriptures is practically impossible since meaning can never be stabilized through 
humanist literary tools; the endeavour will always turn into an endless interpretative project that 
is potentially threatening to Christian dogma. Hence, humanist philology that attacks the 
Vulgate and the tradition built around it is, without the true science of dialectic and commentary 
tradition, utterly incapable of guaranteeing truth opening a true Pandora's Box of the 
possibilities of an infinite number of interpretations.175 The fact that this is discussed in the 
language of method makes it a very general claim that is applicable to other domains outside of 
theology: literary studies are about the beauty of words whereas the science of things belongs 
to the true science of sciences, dialectic. 
Erasmus’s and Dorp’s discussion was not an isolated exchange of ideas but 
                                                          
171 Della Mirandola, Pico: “Iohannes Picus Mirandulanus Hermolao Barbaro suo”, in Della Mirandola, Pico: 
Auree epistole, Antwerpen, Thierry Martens 1509, B-Ci (Signature marks have been used in the absence of page 
numbers). Pico's letter to Barbaro was printed frequently as part of a collection of letters entitled Auree epistole. 
In Paris there are at least three editions of the work prior to 1514. Plato's work was also available in the French 
capital. See Universal Short Title Catalogue (USTC) 
172 Dorp to Erasmus, Allen 347, 133.  
173 Dorp to Erasmus, Allen 347, 128: “Quis enim nisi stultissimus non malit recte sapere, etiam si pater futurus 
sit barbariei, quam citra sapientiam vel optime dicere.” (English translation from Erasmus: The Correspondence 
of Erasmus, vol. 3 [trans. Mynors – Thomson], Toronto University Press, Toronto 1976, letter 347, 79-81). 
174 Dorp to Erasmus, Allen 347, 133-135.  
175 Dorp makes this point very clearly in the first letter, see Allen 304, 119-140. Jacobus Latomus, a doctor in 
theology, made similar points about right theology that should be based on a philosophical method and on the 
existing commentary tradition in his attack against the Collegium Trilingue De trium linguarum et studii theologici 
ratione dialogus, See Latomus, Jacobus: De trium linguarum et studii theologici ratione dialogus, Michael Hillen, 
Antwerpen 1519, Aii-Aiii. In the absence of page numbers I have used signature marks to identify quotes. It 




mirrored a larger process in which the relationship between scholasticism and humanism was 
growing increasingly antagonistic, above all in the academic context of Louvain. In the 
Brabantian town, Erasmus was both backed up as well criticised by programs that often were 
of collective nature, and his Biblical program had an institutional dimension to it in the 
Collegium Trilingue, an autonomous institution founded for the study of all three Biblical 
languages under the auspices of the University of Louvain in 1517. The Collegium was a 
realization of an older dream of providing the students of Louvain with the knowledge of all 
Biblical languages, and its connection to Erasmus’s own project of Biblical studies was quite 
explicit. It resonated well in the longer tradition of Louvain humanism that had had its initial 
contacts with Italian humanism in the late fifteenth century: many of the questions about poetry, 
grammar, and the merits of Italian humanism had been raised in Louvain just like in Paris, and 
conscious efforts to renew grammar education had been undertaken. Despite the fact that the 
Collegium represented a certain continuum in the humanist interests of the University, the 
whole project turned out to be ridden with internal conflict and strife, and the question of the 
right method of theology was fiercely debated based on Erasmus’s project.176 
Thus, in 1519 when Vives published his Opuscula varia in Louvain, he was in the 
epicenter of polemics where the classical dichotomy between scholasticism and humanism is 
transformed into a highly significant question of theology and, ultimately, of the limits and 
possibilities of humanist learning. The central piece of his work, In pseudodialecticos, drew 
heavily from Thomas More’s answer to Martin Dorp and deliberately attacked the crown jewel 
of theological learning: the dialectical method. Vives’s In pseudodialecticos, lavishly praised 
by More and Erasmus, did become a kind of a largely supported humanist critique of scholastic 
dialectical method, the arguments of which could have been approved by most members of the 
Louvain humanist circles. 
 
In Pseudodialecticos in the Context of Humanist Dialectic 
 
In pseudodialecticos appeared for the first time in 1519 in Louvain and it can be considered 
Vives’s main venture to the academic and educational disputes of the time. Its contribution 
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comprehensive treatment of the foundation of Collegium Trilingue, see: De Vocht, Henry: History of the 





happened mainly in the field of dialectic – the most fundamental scholastic method for 
developing and solving questions. The scholastic tradition Vives satirically describes in In 
pseudodialecticos disregards the constructive and practical elements of scholastic casuistry 
focusing more specifically on the kind of terministic logic found in Paris and Louvain that 
aspired to build a meta-theory of meaning (suppositio) based on mapping the possible semantic 
interpretations a term could possess in a sentence.177 The choice of dialectical method and 
teaching as the subject of the work had consequences. First, it was outright polemical, and put 
into question the learning of the higher faculties, challenging the existing institutional and 
intellectual hierarchy and aligning Vives strongly with the humanist circles of Louvain. 
Secondly, the problem of method did not restrict Vives to one single subject or question; the 
reader of In pseudodialecticos really gets the idea that what is at stake in dialectical method is 
the totality and unity of the trivium, education and knowledge. In pseudodialecticos did not 
represent this line of thought in isolation within Vives’s oeuvre; some other works of the time 
also accentuated the importance of dialectic. In his printed inaugural lection to Cicero's De 
legibus and De officiis, Vives united legal practice and natural law closely to a dialectical 
method that looked suspiciously Ciceronian in its outlook. The Valencian humanist argued that 
the part of philosophy responsible for legal reasoning should be dialectic adding a long 
quotation of Cicero's Brutus, where the method described is a dialectic of invention and division 
that connects particular cases to more general knowledge.178 
 What really sets In pseudodialecticos apart from the 1514 corpus, from Sapiens 
and the Praelectio to Cicero, is its open and much more specific defiance of the dialectical 
method used traditionally to define questions of truth and falsehood. Concerning its 
contribution to dialectic, In pseudodialecticos has been read in various ways in the existing 
scholarship: it has been described both as an invective lacking in philosophical depth and as an 
exceptionally perceptive understanding of the shortcomings of late scholastic method.179 In 
                                                          
177 Fantazzi 1979, 17-20.  
178 In the margins of the 1519 edition one could read that “Dialectica necessaria iuri philosophia laudes” Vives: 
PC, 111; Cicero: “Brutus” (trans. Hubbell), 1-296 in Cicero: Brutus – Orator, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1939, xli-xlii.152-154. The point about dialectic was made already 
in the 1514 version, see González González 1987, 173. 
179 For predominantly positive assessments, see Fantazzi 1979; Waswo 1987. Waswo has even connected In 
pseudodialecticos with a radical shift in semantics from foundationalism to more rhetorical philosophy. For a 
more negative assessment see: Ashworth 1974. For a rather negative assessment of humanist dialectic in general, 
see Perreiah 1982, 20-22. A recent reading of Perreiah audaciously claims that In pseudodialecticos is not a 
polemic but an introduction to the semantic problems it is mocking. There are very strong reasons to believe that 
this was not Vives’s intention. Even though the work could have been used for this purpose and it would invite 




what follows, my intention is not to assess the depth of Vives’s critique, but to situate it in the 
larger framework of the utility of dialectical learning and its relations to other disciplines. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Vives’s attack on method was not meant to put into jeopardy the 
relationship between dialectic, philosophy, and truth in any way: independently of what it 
conceptually does to the process of clarifying truth, Vives never ceases to argue that dialectic 
deals essentially with truth. This is firmly in line with the traditional interpretation of dialectic 
as well as with the larger humanist claim that their literary methods did not jeopardize the 
excavation of truth, but rather facilitated it. 
 In the heart of In pseudodialecticos, one finds a humanist philosophy of language 
focused on historical semantics to the detriment of formal ones. Vives does pick up the idea that 
dialectic is effectively an analysis of ordinary language, and much of the argument is dedicated 
to the development of the different ramifications of this theme. The basic idea Vives wants to 
convey to the reader is an amplification of the idea that dialectic is an art of words.180 
Underlining dialectic as an art of words accentuates what it should be about: it should find 
logical relations based on language use rather than invent its own set of rules. The reader is told 
that the logical rules of Spanish and Latin are different, that the object of analysis of dialectic 
is comparable to rhetoric and grammar, namely ordinary languages, and that logic is not a 
science that subordinates words to meaning and content, but an art that has to do precisely with 
existing words.181 Thus, the task of dialectic is to describe logical, argumentative, and semantic 
relations as they appear in classical Latin in the writings of the best authors and to extract rules 
based purely on them. The distinction so cried out for by Dorp between rhetoric as the art of 
the beauty of words and dialectic as the science of things or their mental representations is 
explicitly blurred, and the whole process of constructing a meta-language in which problems of 
things could be approached is systematically denied. Despite the fact that Vives recognizes that 
words signify conventionally, he insists strongly on the primacy of classical languages and 
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180 Vives, Juan Luis: “In pseudodialecticos”, 272-286 in Vives, Juan Luis: Opera Omnia, vol. 1, Episcopus, 
Basel 1555: “...non potius si ars, quae non de rebus aliis quam de verbis disputat....” 
181 For predominantly positive assessments, see Fantazzi 1979; Waswo 1987. Waswo has even connected In 
pseudodialecticos with a radical shift in semantics from foundationalism to more rhetorical philosophy. For a 
more negative assessment see: Ashworth 1974. For a rather negative assessment of humanist dialectic in general, 
see Perreiah 1982, 20-22. A recent reading of Perreiah audaciously claims that In pseudodialecticos is not a 
polemic but an introduction to the semantic problems it is mocking. There are very strong reasons to believe that 
this was not Vives’s intention. Even though the work could have been used for this purpose and it would invite 
the reader to consider its examples, this reading would be hard to square with Vives’s overall critique of 




authors spearheaded by Cicero as standards of correct language usage following a path set by 
Lorenzo Valla, the most influential Italian quattrocento humanist writer on dialectic.182  
One of the strategies employed by Vives is not only to show that the scholastic 
tradition personified in Peter of Spain, writer of a widely used schoolbook on dialectical 
reasoning, does not only twist classical Latin but is fundamentally at odds with the project 
envisioned by Aristotle, the very hero of dialectical tradition.183 Throughout, Vives underlines 
the inductive and descriptive character of Aristotle’s dialectic as an analysis of logical and 
semantic properties as they appear in language use, an interpretation of the Stagirite Vives might 
have taken from Lefèvre d’Étaples. However, what is truly important for Vives is that the 
philosophical mistake of scholastic dialectic has far-reaching consequences for the utility of 
dialectic, language, the trivium, and learning in general. Concerning Aristotle, Vives argues that 
Organon, a set of six books that contained all Aristotelian logic and constituted the basis for 
medieval commentary tradition, should be taken literally as an instrument, as a tool for reaching 
ends that are more important. 184 And since it is a tool (organon), a mere focus on its perfection 
would be as stupid as it would be for a shoemaker to dedicate all his time to the betterment of 
his tools.185 
The possible use and utility of scholastic pseudo-dialectics is assessed in 
thoroughly negative terms. It does not serve pedagogical purposes since it fails to sharpen the 
mind and, more importantly, it severely harms the possibilities of language to perform its social 
and communicative function. In a satirical critique of the conceptualist position, he reminds that 
if words would mean what each individual understands them to mean, “We would end up in a 
situation where no one would understand each other because everyone would put a personal 
meaning to a word and not the meaning, authorized by use generally assigned to it.”186 Whereas 
                                                          
182 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 277: “At hunc abs quibus autoribus petunt homines ignari? Non a Cicerone, non 
a Quintiliano, non etiam a Boetio, hominibus latinis, quibus credi latinis in rebus oportet, sed a Petro Hispano, 
seu si quis fuit alius ante ipsum.” There was a strong consensus that words signified conventionally, not because 
of any natural relation with the world. The notable exception to this was the tradition of Kabbala. See Vickers 
2002. 
183 Using a similar strategy, Dorp argued that Erasmus’s views on dialectic were against Erasmus’s own heroes, St 
Augustine and St Jerome, see Dorp to Erasmus, Allen 347, 246-264.  
184 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 279-280.  
185 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 282: “Quis ferat pictorem in componendo penicillo, in terendis coloribus: 
sutorem in acubus, in subulis, smiliis caeterisque cultris acuendis, in torquendo incerandoque filo, in setis illi 
addendis totam aetatem consumere?” 
186 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 276: “Quod si legem unusquisque de verbis feret, ut apud se significant, quid 
attinet, non dico Latinam linguam, sed ne ullam prorsus addiscere, quum illud facilius sit, verba id demum 
significare, quod unicuilibet visum fuerit, & quot erunt mente concipientes, tam varios habebunt significatus.Ita 




all other arts present a claim to practical or contemplative ends, dialectic cannot claim either. 
The only people one could speak to using dialectical language would be ones’ own disciples, 
and the claim about dialectic producing science (scientia) is brushed aside.187 Its claim to truth 
is contrasted to the clearness and simplicity of Vives’s own language, and the whole practice is 
described as aspiring to cunning victory in debate, rather than truth.188 Finally, its knowledge 
cannot be put to use by other disciplines, it does not perform its supportive functions for other 
domains of intellectual life. 
Omitting completely the casuistic method represented by John Mair, Vives goes 
to considerable lengths in describing how professional dialecticians are completely ignorant of 
all practical matters related to a life of negotium. This is, naturally, a serious mistake since it is 
exactly in these fields that the tool should be put into use. When confronted with social life, 
“you would think that they have been transferred to a new world, it is to that extent that they 
are ignorant about life and common sense.”189 After claiming that setting aside their external 
appearance there is little humanity in these dialecticians190, he goes on to argue that “they are 
most inept for undertaking negotiations, for taking part in embassies, for the administration of 
affairs, be they public or private, and for the handling of people's souls.”191 The reason for this 
is: 
“They do not cultivate the kind of arts that teach all these things that form the 
soul and human life: for example, moral philosophy, which adorns customs and minds, 
history, the mother of knowledge, and experience of things, namely prudence. Oratory, that 
teaches and governs life and opinion, and politics and economics on which the guiding of 
familial and city affairs is based.”192 
 
                                                          
187 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 282. 
188 Vives: In pseudodialecticos 1555, 274, 283: “Ita turbato eo qui cum certant, mira et inusitata vocabulorum 
forma atque ratione, miris suppositionibus....”; “...quam etiam causam fore suspicor, cur hanc meam epistolam, 
tanquam rem nimis sacram atque reconditam non multi ex ipsis attingent, cum tamen nihil a me clarius, nihil 
apertius scribi latine potuerit.” See also the part on Augustine, Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 280-281. 
189 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 282: “In alium quendam orbem perductos eos esse credas, ita usum vitae & 
communem sensum ignorant.” 
190 Cicero highlights that man’s ability to speak is what ultimately makes him superior to beasts, see Cicero: “De 
inventione”, i.v.  
191 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 282: “...ut negociis gerendis, legationibus obeundis, admisitrandis rebus aut 
publicis aut privatis, tractandis populorum animis ineptissimi sint....” 
192 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 282-283: “Neque enim iis sese artibus tradunt, quibus haec omnia percipiuntur, 
quaeque & animum, & vitam humanam instituunt, cuiusmodi est philosophia moralis, quae mores mentemque 
ornat, historia, quae mater est rerum cognitionis & usus, id est prudentiae. Oratoria, quae vitam sensumque 
comunem & docet & moderatur. Politica facultas, & Oeconomica, quibus civitatum rerumque familiarium status 




In other words, the dialectic taught at universities is not a suitable education for 
any kind of practical or active life (vita activa/negotium) based on studia humanitatis, and since 
dialectic is solely a tool for other disciplines this is a significant failure indeed. 
Although In pseudodialecticos does not present a large constructive idea of what 
dialectic should be about, it makes clear what should be demanded of dialectical education. The 
basic idea underlined by Vives is its propaedeutic nature; it should serve as the basis for all 
other arts.193 Throughout In pseudodialecticos dialectic is discussed in a close union with the 
other arts of the trivium dealing with words (that is, rhetoric and grammar) pointing out their 
differing tasks in the analysis of the language of classical auctores.194 It is to be noted that 
Vives’s focus most certainly is not on theology in In pseudodialecticos. He does of course 
contrast the dialectical theology of scholastics to the simple and understandable theology of 
Saint Augustine – a reference to one of the most veneered Church fathers that would have been 
understood as pointing to Erasmus’s theological programme by any Louvain reader.195 But this 
is rather a passing reference than the a central argumentative thread, and he is not concentrating 
on questions of Biblical exegesis and theology in the same way Erasmus had been doing in his 
letter to Dorp, and in his 1516 and 1519 editions of the New Testament where humanist literary 
tradition is turned into Biblical hermeneutics. Moreover, In pseudodialecticos does not 
concentrate on the philosophy of Christ eloquently pictured by Erasmus in his 1518 letter to 
Paul Volz. In taking this road, Vives is partly circumventing and setting aside the prevalent trend 
in Louvain context to discuss literary studies and classical languages in relation to theology as 
exemplified by Petrus Mosellanus’s famous and polemical Oratio.196 A reader of Vives’s In 
pseudodialecticos gets the idea that what is at stake is the usefulness of the trivium in all 
domains of life, ranging from the reading of Scriptures to the trivium, studia humanitatis and, 
ultimately, a life of negotium. The ideal of negotium should be understood in a relatively broad 
sense: it is the performance of active life in the service of the commonwealth or Christendom. 
It does not denote merely the actions of a citizen in the service of the commonwealth, but all 
actions of social and political utility that an entire generation of humanists starting from 
Erasmus and Vives exemplified in their own activities. 
                                                          
193 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 281: “Ars enim est dialectica, quae non sua causa addiscitur, sed ut reliquis artibus 
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194 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 274.  
195 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 280-281.  
196 Mosellanus, Petrus: Oratio de variarum linguarum cognitione paranda, Johann Froben, Basel 1519, 5-6; 




Even though very little is told about the constructive alternative in dialectic, the 
only humanist treatment on dialectical reasoning Vives could have had in his mind was Rudolph 
Agricola’s De inventione dialectica, lavishly praised by the Spaniard starting from the early 
1520s.197 In truth, there was not much to choose from. In Paris, the centre of printing business 
outside Italy, Trebizond’s Dialectica printed in 1508, and Lorenzo Valla’s very polemical 
Repastinatio (Paris 1509, Bade) were the only important humanist dialectical treatments. 
Mirroring the lack of materials, Erasmus in his De ratione studii from 1511 recommends 
Aristotle solely as a good introduction to dialectic.198 However, by 1520 many Erasmian 
humanists were indeed enthusiastic about Agricola’s work, with the jurist Cantiuncula taking 
his understanding of topics directly from Agricola.199 In 1515, the first printed edition of 
Rudolph Agricola's De inventione dialectica – the leading humanist textbook on dialectic in the 
1520s and 1530s – saw the light in Louvain through the printing house of Thierry Martens, the 
favoured Dutch printer of Erasmus and Vives. The edition was prepared by a group of humanists 
from the Louvain circle, most notably Alardus Amsterdamus, together with the famous member 
of the faculty of theology, Martin Dorp, who despite of his disagreements with the scholar from 
Rotterdam in 1515 – 1516, was favourable to many aspects of the Erasmian programme. Dorp's 
name appeared on the title page, supposedly to give the weight of a professional theologian and 
logician.200  
The possible advantages of Agricola’s treatment for Erasmus’s and Vives’s 
humanism were not merely philosophical but closely tied to its very hands-on usefulness for 
writing. De inventione dialectica is not only a technical treatment of argument, but a work that 
teaches and shows the reader possible ways of reading, talking and writing in a convincing 
manner that fulfils the rhetorical task of teaching (docere). In the heart of De inventione 
dialectica lies the use of topics for investigating questions. Throughout the treatise, Agricola 
offers the reader tools for analysing particular and general questions as to their terms and 
propositional structure, and ways of combining particular questions typically treated in rhetoric 
to general questions found in dialectic. As an example of a general question Agricola analyses 
“whether a philosopher should take a wife” by running through all the possible headings (loci, 
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topoi) that offer information about philosophers and wives, starting from their definitions to a 
range of other relations that can provide material on both terms.201 The aim is to find a middle 
term that connects or disconnects philosopher and wife and build a connection or a 
disconnection between the two terms. This method has a wide range of applications: it is applied 
not only to simple questions, but also to all cases where a question is involved as well as to the 
reconstruction of the decisive question found in texts analysed in the classroom.  
Agricola’s dialectic could thus offer the most general tool for analysing terms, 
propositions, and arguments based on topical descriptions. Despite being entitled De inventione 
dialectica, Agricola’s treatment operated somewhere on the borderline between rhetorical and 
dialectical traditions, incorporating particular questions and a range of phenomena dealing with 
the speaker, the recipient, and other contextual issues into its subject matter.202 Dialectic, the art 
of things, and rhetoric, the art of words, are thus irreducibly bound together: dialectic is the 
most general tool that can be used in analysing a question by recovering through topics all the 
possible materials and quotations on the issue, and moulding it to fit with the requirements of 
the particular context where language is required. For a student trained in humanist grammar it 
would offer a tool for organizing his material under topics (loci), and instruction for their 
inventive use in his own production. Agricola himself was very clear about the connection of 
headings and production. His De formando studio printed by Thierry Martens in Louvain in 
1511 – and highly popular in the 1510s and 1520s – argued explicitly that one of the main goals 
of collecting and arranging headings and commonplaces was that it allowed the student to treat 
any theme in a personal and inventive way. He states explicitly that if one only did all this for 
containing information, we would be like books ourselves, and that it is in one’s own production 
where “seems to lie the main fruit of the long effort and care that we put into studying.”203 Quite 
simply, dialectic should be the best and most general organizational tool for the generation of 
writing and arguments. 
Nevertheless, what should not be forgotten is that De inventione dialectica does 
not create topical descriptions in a vacuum, it rather points to existing materials that have an 
authoritative say on the matter. Thus, dialectic is inseparable from its content: its system of 
                                                          
201 This method provides a comprehensive topical description of a term.  
202 Agricola restricted rhetoric to elocution incorporating other elements of rhetorical theory into his dialectic.  
203 Agricola, Rudolph: De formando studio, Merten de Keyser, Antwerpen 1532, 17: “quando hic praecipuus esse 
videtur longi laboris, sollicitudinisque in studia collatae, fructus. Quid si nihil ipsi ad posteros mandare poterimus, 
nihil extra ea, quae didicimus, ad praesentes proferre, quid tandem inter librum, & nos intererit.” (English 
translation from Agricola, Rudolph: Letters [eds. and trans. Van der Laan – Akkerman], Arizona Center for 




places (loci) only organizes material that present a claim to be authoritative under each heading. 
This provides some insight into the way in which grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic could be 
interconnected in the production of language since it is the material places (loci) pointed to that 
is learned in the grammar course. Understood in this way, dialectic represents a generalization 
and a continuum of all other humanist materials, and everything learned in the grammar course. 
In addition to the examples of classical tradition, all Erasmian school texts, and especially his 
Adagia and Colloquia become significant. These works do not offer deep insight into the 
organizational principles and aims of rhetoric, but provide ample content and examples to 
rhetorical production and writing. Thus, they presuppose the irreducibly intertextual nature of 
rhetorical production; since the classificatory categories and places of rhetorical handbooks and 
Agricola’s De inventione always refer to existing argumentative patterns and materials, it is 
very important to rewrite the materials a rhetorical or dialectical invention would bring to the 
mind of the student. In short, Erasmus himself becomes one of the auctores to which headings 
point. 
  Adagia, explicitly woven into a rhetorical framework, is a very good example of 
this since it pictures proverbs as the generally accepted opinions that serve as the starting point 
for rhetorical composition. Adagia, the famous collection of proverbs printed for the first time 
in 1500, enlarged and changed in subsequent editions, served at least four main purposes 
according to Erasmus's words: philosophy, persuasiveness, grace, and charm in speech, and the 
understanding of the best authors.204 This presentation underlies the multipurpose nature of 
Erasmus’s understanding of proverbs that can serve both as ornaments (elocutio), and as the 
kind of generally accepted opinions that since Aristotle’s time had had the claim to form a good 
starting point for rhetorical invention (inventio), and that guarantee knowledge of things (res) 
or material as Erasmus understood it. What is significant in Erasmus’s Adagia, however, is the 
fact that they are presented, increasingly in later editions, with explanatory texts to the proverbs 
and with indexes classifying them for use. These texts were not only lists of references to the 
tradition but aspired to present Erasmian moral, Christian, and political philosophy in a form 
that could be woven into educational patterns, teaching methods and, ultimately, to pupil’s own 
production by controlling the web of references arising from proverbs. Thus, it is not surprising 
that Erasmus had insisted that in his De ratione studii that the topics should not be studied 
                                                          
204 Erasmus, Desiderius: Adagiorum chiliades tres, ac centuriae fere totidem, Venezia, Aldo Manunzio 1508, 2: 
“Conducit autem parcemiarum cognitio, cum ad alia permulta, tum potissimum ad quatuor, ad philosophiam, ad 




“vacuous in content and dull in form.” Rather they should be united to substantial knowledge 
of other studies and to the description of general maxims that could be moral in their outlook.205 
What dialectic can and should bring to all this would be an ability to organize material in a 
systematic and general way, and to provide procedures for recovering it for specific purposes. 
Thus, the interaction between the theoretical side of the trivium to the materials and contents 
used is crucial: theory organizes, classifies, and brings to mind but only the kind of materials 
and examples that have an authoritative status on the matter. School materials and examples 
provide the basic way of socializing ideas in the educational context – a point that Erasmus and 
Vives knew more than well. This provides the basic framework for thinking about and 
socializing linguistic production inside of which Vives operates throughout his life.  
  As Erasmus’s school materials make abundantly clear, the situations in which 
disciples should be able to use language cover a wide range of issues, not excluding politics. 
The overall importance of Adagia to Erasmus’s ethical and Christian philosophy is, of course, 
beyond any doubt. There is, however, a growing awareness that some of the central proverbs 
were among many other things of civic importance, with Silvana Seidel Menchi describing 
some of the central adages as being political.206 Thus, basic ideas of Erasmus’s civic and social 
thought are clearly woven into some of the most central proverbs that are amplified into 
authentic essays, and some of the contemporaries noted their social and political dimension.207 
One good example was Dulce bellum inexpertis that presented a strong pacifist treatment of 
warfare in an approachable form to students. For anyone writing about war and searching for 
arguments under the heading of bellum, it would offer valuable Erasmian material for the 
construction of one’s own argument. 
 
Civic Philosophy and Life of Negotium 
 
Unlike his 1514 Sapiens that had referred to a contemplative ideal, the harnessing of the trivium 
to utility for life went hand-in-hand with a strong focus on moral and civic philosophy in Vives’s 
circa 1520 texts composed in the context of the academic life of Louvain. His De initiis et sectis 
                                                          
205 Erasmus: De ratione studii, v: “Hinc iam thematis iis exerceri debent, in quibus illud in primis cavendum, ne 
(quod fieri solet), aut sensu sunt inepto, aut sermone insluso....” (English translation from Erasmus: Literary and 
Educational Writings, vol. 2, Collected Works of Erasmus 24 [ed. Thompson], Toronto University Press, Toronto 
1978, 676). 
206 Seidel Menchi’s selected edition of some of the most important adages is entitled Sei saggi politici in forma di 
proverbi. See also Puig de la Bellasca 2000, 13-16.  




et laudibus philosophiae, printed in the Opuscula varia together with In pseudodialecticos, 
accentuated the unity of all philosophy, while simultaneously underlining greatly the 
importance of its moral and civic branch. 208 In the very first lines of the work, philosophy is 
described as “the greatest gift that the immortal Gods gave us,” and that “only philosophy can 
make men perfect and lead them to good life.” The next phrase united the gift of philosophy 
with the search for truth.209 In addition to emphasizing the unity of all arts, Vives throughout 
De initiis reminds the reader that the greatness of both moral and natural philosophy lies on 
their usefulness for human life.210 
 Vives argues, following more Diogenes Laertius than the Italian Neoplatonics that 
after the great flood, truth was approached in a number of ways by a plethora of men from a 
variety of people, such as the prophets, priests, druids, magicians and many others who took an 
interest in questions of eternal wisdom.211 These various men are explicitly equated with the 
first mythical wise of the Greek, and with the first philosophers who focused on the secrets of 
nature. With the Greek, the mysteries of skies, music, poetry, and arithmetic were unraveled 
and the gaze turned towards earthly matters.212 Even if music was in the first place responsible 
for the birth of communities (communitas) and human associations (societas) through its 
unifying and civilizing force and its harmonious powers, true medicine of the soul (medicina 
animorum) is attributed to various wise lawgivers. They benefited different peoples and nations 
“not only by producing laws but by setting forth the examples of their own lives for all to 
imitate, something more elevated by far than their laws,” and they “had no desire to be exempt 
from those laws.”213 Following Cicero, Vives grants the palm for the invention of moral 
                                                          
208 The originality of the text has sometimes been over-emphasized since much of it is based on extracts of 
Diogenes Laertius’s The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, as well as on Cicero, see Matheeussen – 
Fantazzi - George: 3-5; Casini 2006, 25. Noreña made a more audacious claim in the 1970s calling it “One of the 
first modern sketches of a critical history of philosophy.” Noreña 1970, 149.  
209 Vives: “De initiis”, 79: “Inter omnes qui altius mortali humilitate exeruere sanctissima atque divina capita, 
constat, unam philosophiam munus illud esse, quod a diis imortalibus maximum optimumque nobis donatum est. 
Quae sola homines reddere perfectos potest. Et ad bene beateque vivendum, quae summa est votorum omnium, 
perducere.” 
210 Vives: “De initiis”, 88 “...esse ipsam [philosophia] pulchram iucundamque animis humanis, esse commodam 
et in primis utilem atque adeo unam rerum omnium maxime necessariam usibus totique vitae nostrae.”  
211 Vives: “De initiis”, 80; Della Mirandola, Pico: Conclusiones nongentae, in omni genere scientiarum, Johann 
Petreius, Nürnberg 1532, 12-22.  
212 Vives: “De initiis”, 80-83.The idea of Orpheus as a creator of harmony among people was used in classical 
period and in the Renaissance to defend poetry and literature, see Spies 1999, 55. 
213 Vives: “De initiis”, 83: “Nam populos gentesque suas ita prudenter, ita sancte instituerunt, ut non ferendis solum 
profuerint legibus, sed exemplo vitae omnibus ad imitationem expositio, multo suis legibus augustiore. Neque 
enim soluti iis legibus esse voluerunt quibus alios devinxerant et obligarant....” Politics as medicine of the mind is 
a prominent idea in Greek thought, see Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (trans. by Rackham), Loeb Classical Library, 




philosophy to Socrates, who was “the first to take philosophy [...] and apply it to daily life and 
customs both of states and of individuals,” and who promoted the idea that “people should turn 
themselves wholeheartedly to the adjustment of their lives.” For this reason he was considered 
the wisest man in Greece.214 After lavishly praising the utility of natural sciences for social 
living, he comes back to moral philosophy: “the study of how each person is to order his life, 
of how to govern both public and private matters” that restores our life to its humanity.215 
Ultimately in Vives’s De initiis, all philosophy and knowledge of visible things leads to the 
knowledge of the “immortal Prince of the Universe,” the greatest of truths which will enable 
one to live happily in peace, undisturbed by the world of fortune.216 Thus, a strong defence of 
civic philosophy, interpreted as medicine of the mind, is woven together with an ultimately 
teleological and religious framework. 
 In addition to De initiis, Vives greatly underlined the figure of Cicero in a number 
of texts from this period. He is not only the hero of In pseudodialecticos as the most revered 
example of classical Latin, but also the protagonist of Vives’s Praelectio in leges Ciceronis, as 
well as his Somnium compendium. Vives added a lengthy and eloquent biography of Tully in 
the 1519 edition of the text originally printed in 1514, a true piece of epideictic rhetoric 
composed in the grand style.217 The Cicero encountered here is primarily a man of affairs, an 
example of a statesman putting his intellectual tools to collective good. Despite the obvious 
literary aspirations that lead Vives to a rather militant and eloquent description of Cicero's 
career, the core of the praise – never morally neutral for the humanist way of thinking – can be 
taken as an example of good conduct. According to Vives, the pronounced reason for adding 
some biographical notes was the example of the commentary tradition of classical antiquity 
where this had been a common practice.218  
                                                          
214 Vives: “De initiis”, 85: “Socrates primus philosophiam in coelis elementisque versantem & divagantem ad 
civitatum atque hominum singulorum usus vitamque devocavit, ut ea primum mortals scirent quae scire....”; “...ad 
morum compositionem [...] totos sese converterent.”; Cicero: Tusculanae disputationes, (trans. King), Loeb 
Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts/London 1960, v.iv.10-11. 
215 Vives: “De initiis”, 89: “Iam et illa Deus immortalis cuiusmodi sunt de moribus uniuscuiusque componendis, 
de gubernandis rebus & publicis & privatis.”; “Per haec enim vita nostra humanitati suae reddita est, per quae 
docemur iusticiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem, adde etiam modestiam in omnibus rebus & temperantiam, in dictis 
et factis constantiam atque modum.”  
216 Vives: “De initiis”, 89: “Itaque quum per totam rerum naturam late fuerimus pervagati illum tandem ex 
visibilibus istis rebus invisibilem mundi principem omnipontentem, aeternum, immortalem inveniemus....” 
217 Vives: PC, 113, “Iam vero illam partem video meae praefationi veterum interpretum instituto de esse, qua de 
authore ipso nonnulla dicuntur, quam addam aequidem ex more magis quam necessitate....” Vives was most 
probably more familiar with Cicero than any other classical writer in his youth, see Matheeussen 1998, 107.  
218 This practice had been resuscitated by Italian humanism. Leonardo Bruni for instance had already written a 




 Vives opens the description with a lengthy appraisal of Cicero's natural capacities 
for all the liberal arts and praises his adherence to and talent in “poetry, philosophy, and oratory, 
which at the time in Rome was highly esteemed and considered” and underlines that “he 
[Cicero] put all his knowledge to the service of the Republic.”219 Unlike those who trust in the 
mere linage as a source of glory, Cicero focused all his labour, diligence, and ambition for doing 
honour to his father’s name. His career advanced with considerable pace reaching its apex with 
his election to consul in a year when the office “was not given to the biggest buyer of votes nor 
to the most influential, popular, ambitious or astute person; but in the middle of such a raging 
storm that was pestering the Republic, they elected the person who was not the most noble, nor 
the richest but the most prudent and the best man of affairs.”220 Vives is also firm in his defence 
of Cicero against possible critique: to those who call his prudence leggerezza, he reminds “the 
wise cautiousness with which he acted on the forum, and his flexibility to adapt to 
circumstances.”221 Ultimately, Cicero was a fierce defender of the liberty of the Republic. In 
doing this, he put his eloquence and wisdom systematically into what was undoubtedly a life of 
negotium.222 
 In his Veritas fucata from 1520 and in his Somnium compendium, Vives further 
elaborated on the place of language in mediating truth and wisdom in the world of error. 
Somnium – a set of texts built around Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis, a surviving fragment of 
Cicero’s De republica – contained Vives’s fictional commentaries entitled Somnium and Vigilia 
on Cicero’s text. In Vives’s Vigilia, an enarratio of Cicero’s texts, the dream of Scipio Africanus 
presents an amplification of some of the themes of the original text to long discussions on virtue, 
glory, and a range of other Erasmian issues. In Vives’s Somnium, Cicero is harnessed to speak 
for the humanist cause against the dreams of the scholastics. 223 During a fictional speech, 
                                                          
219 Vives: PC, 113: “Nactusque ingenium tale, quale Plato fingit liberalium omnium artium capacissimum, ad 
nullum litterarum genus ineptum, poesi, philosophiae, dicendique arti, qui erat tunc in urbe ad summos honores 
gradus, totum sese tradidit....” 
220 Vives: PC, 114: “Neque enim illo anno, ut multis antea, traditus est ei consulatus tanquam profusissimo 
suffragiorum emptori, aut potentissimo, aut maxime gratioso, aut ei qui callidissime ambiuerat, sed in illis 
procellis et tempestate reipublicae electus est ipse non vir nobilissimus aut ditissimus, Caeterum prudentissimus, 
et optimus gubernator, cui clavus commendaretur, in cuius fidem tota respublica confugeret, ut non magis 
consulatus Ciceroni videatur datus quam Cicero consulatui....” 
221 Vives: PC, 114: “Qui vero timidum ipsum levemque appellant, ii rationes temporum vitaeque Ciceronis non 
conisderant, et maligni rerum omnium interpretes Ciceronis prudentiam scientiamque utendi foro et sese tempori 
accommodandi laevitatem vocant rigidam illam Catonis gravitatem inflexibilem in proposito perseverantiam 
vocaturi coecam et obstinatam pertinaciam.” 
222 At the time, one of the only Dutch texts praising a Ciceronian understanding of the active life was Jacobus 
Canter’s late fifteenth-century Dialogus de Solitudine, see Tilmans 2002, 112.  
223 Ths story presents a dichotomy between the soldiers of the day and the soldiers of the night. In the soldiers of 




Cicero argues that it was he who gave Greek philosophy Roman citizenship, and he laments 
that people take all of his philosophy to be mere grammar.224 In a later section called 
Argumentum Somnis Scipioni Ciceronianis, Cicero unites his republic with that of Plato, but 
with the difference that his Roman treatment accounts for how different ingenia demand 
different motivational principles.225 Thus, Roman philosophy of prudence and rhetoric could 
offer ways of moulding eternal truths to the different ingenia of the people.226  
By 1520, the philosophy of language usus defended vehemently in In 
pseudodialecticos was closely linked to three issues in Vives’s mind. First, one finds a 
redefinition of the trivium on a very practical level, which builds a close connection between 
all linguistic arts. This model facilitates reading, textual analysis, collection of arguments and 
commonplaces, and ultimately aspires to production, as is remarkably witnessed by Erasmus’s 
rhetorical and grammatical materials that taught people to write. Secondly, the reform of the 
trivium is connected to a larger reflection on the contexts in which language should perform its 
social role. Despite looking for a union of wisdom and eloquence in almost all domains of life, 
Vives’s 1520 experiments with linguistic styles, as well as his humanist admiration for a life of 
negotium, both point to a pronounced interest in civic and moral philosophy as the domain in 
which language should be put into use.227 Thirdly, this life of negotium appears primarily as a 
way of transmitting wisdom in a world of discord, one in need of medicine for the soul. Thus, 
conceptually, a life of negotium is closely connected to the teaching of concord and harmony in 
a world of discord. The conceptual implication in his 1519 Opuscula varia was closely linked 
to practice; throughout the 1520s, Vives dedicated all his efforts to putting his linguistic skills 
to use in his life of negotium. 
 
                                                          
Greek and Roman philosophers and speakers: Saint Paul, Saint Jerome, Saint Ambrose, Saint Augustine, Saint 
Hilary, John Chrysostom, Aristotle, Plato, Demostehenes, Cicero, Vergil, Pliny, Seneca, Livy, Quintilian and 
Cicero, who represent intellectual aristocracy. In Plato’s The Republic Athropos sings about the things to come, 
thus Vives’s selection was not coincidental. In the soldiers of the night one finds Ockham, Swineshead, Gregory 
of Rimini, Paul of Venice, William Hentisberus, Peter of Spain, Duns Scotus and the Italian jurists Accursius, 
Bartolus, Baldus. Of this group, composed of dialecticians and jurists, Scotus is singled out as the one who 
embraced sleep to the point of madness, Vives, Juan Luis: “Somnium Scipionis”, in Vives, Juan Luis: Somnium. 
Est praefatio ad somnium Scipionis Ciceronis. Eiusdem vigilia. Quae est enarratio somnii Scipionis Ciceronis, 
Johann Froben, Basel 1521, 30, 35.  
224 Vives: “Somnium”, 46-47: “Et perfeci, nisi vehementer fallor, ne quicquid esset philosophiae, solis Graecis 
literis contineretur, quae iam velut Romana civitate per me donata est....”; “...qui nihil quod meum sit philosophiam 
esse volunt, omnia grammatica esse unica sententia pronunciant.” 
225 Vives: “Somnium”, 51-52. 
226 Dominic Baker-Smith has also underlined the Ciceronian spirit of the text in its call for a life of negotium, see 
Baker-Smith 1976, 241-242.  





























3. The Republic of Letters and Counselling 
 
Chapter three sets aside the educational debates of Chapter two, and moves on to consider the 
ways in which language could be put into use in a life of negotium – especially in counselling. 
The chapter discusses three interrelated issues: first, it describes the Erasmian Republic of 
Letters as a social and cultural practice that has to be understood as forming the background of 
Vives’s work, fame, authority, and ethos throughout his career. While the Republic of Letters 
predominantly focused on theological and educational questions related to Erasmus’s major 
projects, the men of letters also discussed peace, war, and good rule. Closely linked to this civic 
dimension, the chapter argues as its second point that in the 1520s Vives uses his authority 
primarily for counselling, which can be seen both as the immediate giving of advice, and as an 
attempt to set the general framework for the judgement of princely action. Lastly, it analyses 
Vives’s short piece on rhetorical theory, De consultatione, which was an adaptation of the 
tradition of symmetrical deliberative rhetoric intended for republican settings to a princely 
context. This rhetoric takes place in a pronouncedly asymmetrical environment in which 
recognizing hierarchy and understanding the mind of the prince are of utmost importance for a 
successful use of language. 
 
In Pseudodialecticos as a Rhetorical Piece 
 
Vives’s In pseudodialecticos put forward a humanist critique of the scholastic trivium and 
especially its dialectical method, siding Vives with major northern humanists. There is, 
however, an additional dimension that further accentuates the reading of In pseudodialecticos 
as a defence of all ramifications of Erasmian humanism; the highly rhetorical nature of the text 
linked to its possible audience. As Martin Dorp had pointed out in his second letter to Erasmus, 
he was not only unsatisfied by the content of Erasmus’s claims but also by the rhetorical and 
persuasive modality of his writing.228 Similarly, what was possibly provocative about In 
pseudodialecticos was not only its interpretation of dialectic but the rhetorical element of the 
treatise. In pseudodialecticos is essentially an oratorical piece, and whatever the philosophical 
                                                          
228 Dorp to Erasmus, Allen 347, 12-14: “Cave tamen rhetoricis utare persuasionibus, quibus scio quiduis dacias 




force of it was, it would not necessarily have been devastating for the scholastic method because 
it revealed the internal impossibilities and contradictions of the dialectical system to a Louvain 
or Paris theologian. It is rather framed as an eloquent social critique, and as a satire of the 
outcomes of scholastic dialectic, understood as an educational and epistemological paradigm. 
Thus, the primary audience of the work is not the intellectual elite of the theological faculties 
of main European universities, but most probably boys and young men entering the Arts 
Faculties of academic institutions. In pseudodialecticos is not framed as a move in a purely 
academic debate; it partakes in the satirical tradition of More and Erasmus, and hence the 
philosophical depth of the argument was not necessarily of primary importance. Revealingly, 
Vives presents the work as advice to a friend on the merits of scholastic and humanistic dialectic 
respectively, stating that “...if I have any good effect on you, I can also hope to exercise an 
influence on a great number of the young men who are your disciples.”229 Furthermore, the 
structure of the work based on a dichotomy of obscure scholasticism and humanism strongly 
underlines the importance of In pseudodialecticos in a broader narrative. This story is about the 
rebirth of humanist studies and culture in general. Vives’s personal conversion from the 
darkness of scholasticism to the light of humanism is deliberately woven into the overall 
narrative.230 
In other words, In pseudodialecticos is not opening up a discussion with those 
committed to the traditional dialectical method, but is a piece that turns them into a hilarious 
theme in a satire meant for humanist readers. All the humorous examples of the possible 
manipulations of the supposition theory paint a picture of dialectic as an absurd trickery of 
words and sophistry. On a more general level, it has been argued that humanist critique of 
scholastic dialectic rarely assessed its merits as a totality, or as a system where different logical 
concepts would be interrelated, but focused instead on separate elements that could be turned 
into an entertaining take on scholastic language, and on critique of the figure of scholastic 
himself.231 Rather than engaging in a systematic critique of all aspects of a theory, humanists 
often picked elements for their own purposes, and aimed at their own audiences. Firmly in this 
tradition In pseudodialecticos presupposes an audience that would support its claim as to the 
                                                          
229 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 284: “Scripsi quoque ad te eam ob causam [...] tum etiam quod cum in te profecero, 
proficiam partier in ista multitudine iuvenum, quae te sectatur....” 
230 Vives: In pseudodialecticos, 272-273, 283-286. Edward George has also argued that In pseudodialecticos is 
not an internal critique of dialectic but that it focuses primarily on social issues. See George 1992, 131. 
231 Perreiah 1982, 11-12. Perreiah does argue that Valla and Vives engage with the system in toto but in the case 
of Vives that seems to be an overstatement. In no text that I know of does Vives make the connection between 




barbarisms of the scholastic method.  
What is more, individual treatises such as In pseudodialecticos did not engage in 
polemics in isolation. Not only did they point to some of the most widely employed 
commonplaces in humanist literature of the time, but the persuasiveness of the text could be 
backed by right kind of introductory and dedicatory letters that wove them together with a larger 
humanist programme. This was not completely new. As Erika Rummel has argued, some of the 
possibilities of collective projects had first surfaced in the context of the so-called Reuchlin 
affair in the 1510s. What had started as a more local and restricted question of the heretic nature 
of Jewish literature, had evolved into the defining dispute on questions of learning and method 
in the 1510s, during which the divide between two academic cultures was consciously 
constructed. In the debate, Johannes Reuchlin, the leading Hebrew scholar of Europe, harnessed 
collective humanist support for his cause by way of a published letter collection entitled 
Clarorum virorum epistolae, printed in 1514. The collection that comprised letters from some 
of the most prominent humanists of the time was republished in 1519 under the name of 
Illustrium virorum epistolae in an extended version that included four letters by the leading 
humanist of the time: Erasmus. During the Reuchlin affair, much of the issues related to the use 
of humanist methods, and the interpretation of the Bible were hotly debated. Equally as 
importantly the debate was not conducted in closed academic circles, it was rather constructed 
as a dispute between two European intellectual groups, both to which a set of arguments, 
practices, and followers are attributed.232  
 In many instances, a dispassionate treatment of the theme was transformed into a 
question of the credibility of the opponent, an attack on his ethos in an attempt to draw a wider 
audience to one’s side, and to effect general opinion. Reuchlin’s own activities also centred on 
mobilizing collective forces not directly linked to the debate itself – something his adversaries 
were keen to point out.233 Throughout the debate, the authority of theological faculties of main 
universities to pass judgement on the matter was refuted. Furthermore, throughout the 
discussion a difference of opinion concerned not only particular issues discussed and the 
authority to judge, but also the very method of discussion as well as good practices of 
                                                          
232 Even if the debate in the letters was constructed along these lines, the whole nature of the humanist scholastic 
debate has been discussed to a great degree. James Overfield has claimed that there never was a European wide 
humanist scholasticism debate and that the Reuchlin affair was primarily about anti-Semitism. Rummel, on the 
other hand, stated that in the early sixteenth century the humanist scholasticism debate was the primary 
intellectual debate of Europe. Nauert has adopted a middle position although he seems to be somewhat closer to 
Rummel. See Overfield 1984; Rummel 2002; Rummel 2008; Nauert 1998; Ménager 2008, 45-54. 




argumentation. During the Reuchlin affair, the importance of printing for creating common 
projects was becoming visible.234  
  
Erasmianism as a Common Project for Intellectual Authority 
 
Despite Erasmus’s ambivalent feelings about the dynamics of the Reuchlin case, some of the 
methods for building collective projects were becoming more common at the turn of the 
1520s.235 These collective projects of men of letters were a more public continuum of an older 
network of the learned and the wise, that is, the Republic of Letters – a term coined in early 
fifteenth-century Italy. The activities of the humanist Republic of Letters consisted in sharing 
information and opinions, as well as cultivating discussion through oral and literary means; it 
provided a shared intellectual space based on private discussions and letter writing, which 
facilitated the emergence of a certain kind of distinctive identity of the men of letters. This 
network could serve a wide range of purposes, ranging from the discussion of intellectual 
matters to the enhancement of each individual’s cause and career in different ways. It also 
offered a context where intellectual and spiritual qualities could be cultivated in the literary 
company of like-minded men of letters, a space that in the tumultuous decades of the early 
sixteenth century represented a retreat from worldly affairs to a realm of trust and comfort.236 
Simultaneously, however, it provided a collective space where the most important social, 
religious, and political questions could be discussed independently from more local allegiances, 
and in a more dispassionate manner. Thus, in addition to all the geographical, hierarchical, and 
personal contexts in which different humanists operated, there is a claim for a separate space, 
the Republic of Letters, in which things should be discussed with respect to the rules of 
conversation cultivated among men of letters. Contemporaries acknowledged the social, 
cultural, and political importance of the Republic. As Guillaume Budé in his 1517 letter to 
Thomas More argued, humanist correspondence could be likened to embassies that maintained 
peace between allied monarchs. 237 Common humanist projects that led to – among other 
matters – the Universal Peace of 1518, were external signs of this. 
 It has often been noted that the concept of the Republic of Letters takes shape in 
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early sixteenth-century context under the guidance of the prince of the humanists: Erasmus.238 
A great part of this is that what had been before predominantly an invisible sphere based on 
private letters and discussions, becomes partially public with the printing press. Starting from 
the 1510s some of the activities of this humanist circle are deliberately made known in a filtered 
form to different audiences through the publication of selected materials.239 This publicity 
should not be seen as being synonymous with northern humanism as an intellectual paradigm, 
nor with the totality of those participating in the literary network of the Republic of Letters, but 
as a specific social phenomenon centred on a group of humanists in the Low Countries. It was 
with the intellectual guidance of Erasmus, physically located in Louvain, that the idea of a 
common European wide humanist programme was created by universalizing local debates on 
education, theology, social and political reform.240  
 This particular form of Erasmian Republic of Letters appears in a specific 
moment, in the mid-1510s, and coincided with the larger cause of northern humanism that was 
implemented in school and university contexts at an ever-increasing pace.241 The public creation 
of the Republic of Letters had, however, forms of production that were specific to it. First, the 
emergence of a distinctively Erasmian Republic of Letters presupposed a larger humanist 
network that was ready to acknowledge the man from Rotterdam as the prince of humanism.242 
At least from 1515, the humanist from Rotterdam is lifted to the centre of the movement, – a 
role and status a number of German, French and English humanists enhanced with their own 
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writings.243 All of this coincides with Erasmus’s rise to the apex of European humanism and to 
the leading brand of printing industry – partly dependent on larger humanist circles that 
presented him as the torchbearer of new learning north of the Alps.244 
 Ultimately, the presentation of the praise of other humanists to a larger audience 
was dependent on the possibilities of sharing that image using the printing press; it is indeed 
through printing that the older humanist practice of epistolary dialogue can be made public. 
Erasmus himself was famously connected to the most important printers of his time, and spent 
a significant share of his worldly existence in the actual production of books. It is very much in 
the printing presses of Froben in Basel and Thierry Martens in Louvain that the idea of a 
collective programme is created.245 What emerges from the printing patterns of these two 
printing houses is a clear indication of an almost total service to the Erasmian cause – a fact 
greatly helped by Erasmus’s commercial success that turned him to the biggest brand of the 
literary world before the Reformation.246 
 The production of a common humanist cause was aided by an understanding of 
the possibilities of printing in framing and constructing collective projects. The structure of the 
editions produced was of help since they allowed for a number of cross-references to other 
humanist works in the materials accompanying the main text. The habit of framing works and 
weaving them into a more general humanist cause through introductory letters and prefaces was 
a typical method of connecting individual works with a more general programme.247 Hence, a 
work like More's Utopia, printed in Louvain by Martens in 1516 and consequently by Froben 
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in Basel in 1518, was a common project in which Erasmus, together with a number of other 
Dutch humanists, participated. Equally as important, in addition to being a common project, it 
is also presented as such by a number of introductory letters from some of the more famous 
humanist names of the time.248  
 A special place, however, should be reserved to Erasmus's published letters where 
Vives is also included.249 Editions of Erasmus’s letters begin to appear starting from 1515 and 
they constitute one of the basic ways of presenting the Republic of Letters engaged in a common 
responsible dialogue on a number of shared issues.250 From the very start, the Erasmian editions 
of letters are pronouncedly international with 1519 Farrago presenting Erasmus’s 
correspondence with Thomas More, Guillaume Budé, John Colet, Philipp Melanchthon and 
tens of other leading European humanists.251 Thus, a reader of Farrago would find the most 
important humanists of the Tudor, French, Papal, and Habsburg courts entering into a friendly, 
supposedly intimate, dialogue on a number of issues, a dialogue that is then divulged to a wider 
audience. The bulk of the discussion concerns the faith of humanism and Erasmus’s theological 
programme, and the advancement of humanist studies in educational contexts, but the pressing 
political issues of the time such as peace and warfare are never absent.252 In this way, printed 
letters and treatises such as Erasmus’s Institutio principis Christiani and Thomas More’s Utopia 
point towards a common humanist cause that turns the collective intellectual credibility and 
authority of the Republic of Letters into what is at times a critical attitude towards actual 
educational, religious, and secular authorities on a European scale. 253 
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Vives and the Republic of Letters 
 
The case of Vives’s early career is in some ways paradigmatic and the support of Erasmian 
circles of the Low Countries for the Valencian humanist from the late 1510s to 1522 was 
unconditional, even though the young scholar might have not become a close personal friend 
of Erasmus and Thomas More.254 However, here one has to differentiate between two 
dimensions of support that were intrinsically linked to one another. First, it was with the help 
of humanist friends that Vives obtains importance in the academic world of Louvain and in the 
Habsburg court, where he is promoted as a gifted tutor by Erasmus. Secondly, it is only with 
the help of the Erasmian circles that Vives becomes a literary humanist of any note. This is 
important: the figure of Vives throughout his life is hardly separable from Vives the writer – 
one of the foremost specialists of humanist learning outside Italy. This intellectual prestige was 
not achieved in the existing institutional frameworks: Vives most likely never achieved an 
academic degree. Thus, it is only in the context of the Erasmian Republic of Letters that Vives 
can appear as a writer of great importance.255 
As Lisa Jardine has convincingly shown Vives’s journey to the apex of European 
humanism comprised elements not directly controlled by the young Valencian, since from 1517 
he is systematically portrayed as an emerging star of the humanist movement by Adrianus 
Barlandus, Thomas More and most of all by Erasmus – present in Louvain at the time.256 
Interestingly, the kind of publicity offered to Vives in these years did not picture him as a 
philologist or a Biblical scholar, but as a philosopher of the trivium, knowledgeable on dialectic, 
rhetoric, and civic and moral philosophy. In 1520, a selection of Erasmus's correspondence, 
Epistolae aliquot selectae ex Erasmicis per Hardianum Barlandum, appeared in the press of 
Thierry Martens in Louvain dedicating some attention to the promising young Spanish scholar 
in the form of a letter from More to Erasmus, and a short response of the latter.257 The praising 
of Vives's humanist skills in More's letter takes a more particular turn when the English 
humanist moves to the presentation of Vives's two main publications from 1519 and 1520, that 
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is, In pseudodialecticos and a set of fictional oratorical exercises, Declamationes Quinque 
Syllanae.  
The Vives of In pseudodialecticos is presented as following brilliantly the path 
set by More himself, in making explicit the absurdities of scholastic logic and bringing Vives 
some academic credibility as a skilful dialectician. However, the first and larger part is 
dedicated to Vives the orator.258 More begins his praise with an imaginary description of how 
he accidentally came to see some of Vives’s texts and was charmed by them.259 Then he moves 
on to the presentation of the qualities of the Declamationes that most impressed him, pointing 
out first that Vives is not depicting the political situation surrounding Sulla as a mere outsider 
but makes it truly alive through his oratory, and, secondly, that Vives's declamations manifest 
an extraordinary union of eloquence with good knowledge of all other arts. Thus, in More’s 
assessment a union of wisdom and eloquence so cried out for by northern humanists is fulfilled 
in Vives’s Declamationes.260 In addition to this, More’s praise highlights Vives’s capacity to 
create energeia, to bring the situation alive in the form of a painting. Thus, what is attained in 
Declamationes is not just a collection of aphorisms in the style of Erasmus’s Institutio, but an 
example of how to put all that into a continuous speech that takes into account all contextual 
phenomena in accordance with the rules of rhetoric. This was a great compliment indeed, and 
firmly in line with what Quintilian – one of the foremost authorities on rhetoric – understood 
to be the key point about declamations.261 
If Vives's Declamationes was surrounded by external hype in the form of the 
published letter exchange between More and Erasmus, the internal composition was also meant 
to underline the importance of Declamationes. In the first edition from 1520, printed in Antwerp 
by Michael Hillen, Declamationes is preceded by two introductory letters, the first of which is 
composed by Erasmus and destined to the Count Hermann von Neunahr. In the letter, the Dutch 
humanist presents his own eulogy of Declamationes as not so different from More's. After 
praising the noble and learned spirit of Hermann, and undertaking some publicity for his own 
theological project at Louvain, he moves on to Vives's work. Erasmus claims that Vives has 
revived the art of declamare, something that not even Italian humanists had achieved, and that 
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the Spaniard had succeeded in practising the genre in a way that differs from the rantings of 
others.262 He is praised because of his rhetorical skill in treating a serious matter – and even 
though his “discovery and presentation of the argument” are taken for granted, considering 
Vives's experience in philosophy, what makes Vives's declamations ultimately unique is the 
union of rhetoric and philosophy, eloquence and wisdom.263 Thus, like More, Erasmus 
underlines that in Vives the age-old Ciceronian dream is fulfilled, an achievement that makes 
him different from those whose focus is on eloquence without rhetoric, and from those whose 
wisdom does not meet the standards of rhetorical composition – that is to say, the scholastics. 
 The purpose for the publication of the letter from the most famous humanist of 
Europe could obviously aid sales on the book market, but it simultaneously contributed to the 
creation of the right kind of ethos for Vives to emerge as an intellectual authority and writer on 
the trivium and on civic philosophy more generally. Hence, a Spanish humanist in his late 20s, 
without any significant formal qualifications from any academic institution is elevated to the 
zenith of the Republic of Letters by two humanists portraying Vives as someone capable of 
surpassing them.264 Vives himself returned the favour very explicitly to some of the leading 
humanists who had contributed to the construction of his intellectual figure in his commentaries 
on Augustine’s De civitate Dei, where he not only praised Erasmus but also dedicated a 
significant section to the laudatio of a number of humanists including Guillaume Budé.265  
In addition to being systematically propped-up by humanist circles, some of his 
writings were published by Erasmus's favourite printers, such as Thierry Martens in Louvain, 
Michael Hillen in Antwerp, and more importantly, Johannes Froben in Basel.266 Moreover, 
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Vives most certainly was one of the defendants of the Erasmian cause in the court of Charles V 
in around 1520, and his letters to the Dutch master never fail to mention how Vives had 
enhanced Erasmus's reputation and cause in the imperial milieu.267 However, after the relative 
failure of a project commissioned by Erasmus, Augustine's De civitate Dei printed by Froben, 
something changes and Vives is to a certain extent shut out of Erasmian publicity.268 Not only 
is he not published any longer by Basel’s printing houses prior to Erasmus's death in 1536, he 
is also not supported by Erasmus's publicity campaigns. As a glaring example of this, in the 
Dutch humanists’ Ciceronianus from 1528, where all the important humanists of the time are 
presented and critically assessed, Vives is not mentioned – something that the Spanish humanist 
noticed and gently bemoaned.269  
There is also a strong sense that Vives consciously opts for a different road 
compared to the Dutch master in the 1520s by taking a more cautious approach to publicity. 
This can be seen in a number of fronts, one of which being his letter writing that apart from 
certain openly political letters destined to the most potent men of Europe, is not made public. 
Furthermore, his letters are more private, less eloquent, and rhetorical in general – and probably 
not destined for publication in the first place.270 As to his own works, he does not engage in any 
significant staging of his own literary production through laudatory introductory letters from 
other humanists and he does not write such letters himself.271 From what little is known, his 
relations with the printing world were less intense compared to those of Erasmus’s and he spent 
significantly less time in the actual production of books than did the Dutch master.272 Moreover, 
Vives seems to be very wary of public confrontation during the 1520s in his mode of writing, 
taking as his motto the famous sine querela (without quarrel). This was very different from 
Erasmus’s satirical and at times aggressive strategy of the 1510s and 1520s, as well as from the 
style Vives himself had employed in his youthful In pseudodialecticos. In a sense, and despite 
his close connections to power, Vives’s public ethos in the 1520s and 1530s is built rather on a 
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certain seriousness and distance from the pressing issues of the time, which allows him to give 
counsel and comment from the position of a more detached erudite.  
There are many possible reasons why Vives did not follow Erasmus in turning 
himself into a public brand – ranging from differences in personality traits, to Vives’s Jewish 
background. In theological and religious questions, this background did not exactly encourage 
a public role in a highly conflictual moment in European religious history.273 What is more, 
Erasmus’s publicity is rather an exception than a rule; no other Catholic humanist of the time 
comes even close to Erasmus’s popularity in the printing market. However, Vives, despite his 
hesitance toward publicity, still held a place among the most widely printed writers of the time. 
It is also possible that Vives grows wary of the threats inherent in Erasmus’s strategy that led 
the Dutch humanist into a series of conflicts in the tumultuous decade of the 1520s. At this time, 
it became common to unite humanist literary methods to the Reformation. Under this pressure, 
Erasmus complained repeatedly about the misreading his opponents made of his texts, and 
Vives often discussed with the Dutch master the difficulties in controlling the meaning of one’s 
own work.274 Moreover, in the first decades of the sixteenth century, the public dimension of 
the Republic of Letters is almost inseparable from the figure of Erasmus, and its fortunes can 
hardly be separated from the faith of the Dutch humanist. Thus, with the problems Erasmus was 
facing in the 1520s, the idea of undertaking public common projects becomes more difficult 
and the collective publicity campaigns lose some of the force of the period around 1520.  
Nevertheless, although Vives did not become the new Erasmus, all his activities 
throughout the 1520s and 1530s reveal a close connection to the most important men of letters 
of Europe ranging from Guillaume Budé and Thomas More to Juan de Vergara. What changes 
is rather the degree of publicity of these activities, and their presentation to a larger audience. 
Thus, Vives continues to write about all social, political, academic, and even religious issues in 
his private correspondence with other men of letters, and there is a strong sense that the 
Republic of Letters continues to provide him with a space for intellectual reflection, as well as 
a place where difficult matters can be discussed with relative freedom. Furthermore, Vives’s 
identity as a member of a common humanist movement cannot be doubted; his support to the 
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cause of Erasmian humanists in Spain around the debate of Valladolid in 1527 was 
unconditional.275 Moreover, it is clear that his epistolary exchange with other humanists 
provides him with an unofficial channel for talking not only about scholarly matters but also 
about politics with a range of significant humanists in a variety of courts.276 It is, however, 
possible that Vives’s public role after the breakup with Erasmus remained more limited in 
European humanist circles. 
When Vives himself reflected on the life of the true erudite in his 1531 De 
disciplinis, he presented the learned man very much as a member of the Republic of Letters: an 
erudite discusses his projects with others to get their opinion, partaking thus in the collective 
discursive activities of humanists. However, he should avoid all disputes in his focus on truth, 
and not victory, he should publish little, and only after consulting friends in order to avoid 
public attacks. Moreover, he should not keep re-editing his work because it obscures the 
intention of the writer. The relation to what had happened to the great Dutch humanist in the 
1510s and 1520 was too close to go unnoticed by the reader.277  
 
Vives, an aspiring Counsellor. 
 
At a moment when Vives becomes incorporated with Erasmian circles, there were at least two 
contexts he was active in: one was the academic life of Louvain, present in his Opuscula varia, 
Declamationes, Veritas fucata and Somnium compendium, the other one was the court. Thus, 
in a moment in which Vives is increasingly interested in studia humanitatis and life of negotium, 
he himself is educating men for powerful positions, and performing the duties of a counsellor. 
Already in late 1516, the city of Valencia had approached Vives as a man capable of speaking 
at court for a matter concerning the recently founded Studium Generale of Valencia, where 
Vives himself had studied before moving to Paris in 1509.278 Starting most likely from 1517, 
Vives was tutoring the young Guillaume de Croy, and the very same year one finds Vives 
writing speeches in the context of the peace negotiations between the Emperor Maximilian, 
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young Charles and Francis I in Cambrai.279 Early in 1519, Erasmus promoted Vives as the best 
possible tutor to Charles's brother Ferdinand who had arrived to the Low Countries in 1518 
from Spain.280 
All these connections were of great importance. As a tutor of Guillaume de Croy, 
cardinal, archbishop of Toledo, and the nephew of the even more famous Guillaume de Croy, 
Lord of Chièvres, Vives most certainly enjoyed the hospitality of some of the most powerful 
men in the court of the new Emperor, Charles V. Moreover, the tutorship of Ferdinand must 
have been a flattering offer indeed considering the importance of the person. It dealt with one 
of the potentially most important and powerful figures of the future, since the young prince was 
destined to serve in a political office, although there was no certainty about what region would 
be granted to him. Margaret, the regent of the Burgundian Netherlands, even promoted 
Ferdinand as a potential candidate for the imperial crown in 1518 – 1519, a plan that his brother 
Charles refused categorically.281 As a reflection of his position, in his letters both to his best 
friend, the lawyer Franciscus Cranevelt, and to Erasmus, the mood is openly optimistic, and 
Vives is not shy in representing himself as someone capable of promoting the cause related to 
a possible position of Cranevelt at the court during the summer and spring of 1520.282 
However, in around 1520 Vives was not sure about what road to choose in his life 
and consulted Budé on the matter.283 One thing was certain for the young Valencian: as a 
converso whose family had had problems with the Inquisition, he wanted to avoid theology. In 
his letters to Cranevelt in 1520 Vives expresses his opinion on the current state of theology in 
a very direct manner stating that for “a free mind” it was a path “full of rocks.” In another letter, 
Vives claimed that questions related to the burning of Jewish books (the Reuchlin affair) and to 
Luther did not really interest him at all.284 In fact, it is mainly in his introduction to the 
commented edition of Augustine's De civitate Dei that Vives explicitly unites himself with 
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Erasmus's theological programme of polishing the fountains of Christianity. 285 Moreover, 
despite having a number of lawyer friends such as Nicolas Bérault, Cranevelt, and Thomas 
More, Vives never studied jurisprudence in depth. 286 
Despite Vives’s engagement with the teaching of studia humanitatis, and his 
continuous interest in the future and practice of education, the years around 1520 witness a will 
to secure a place close to the most powerful men of Europe. Another recurrent theme in his 
letters from the time is his dissatisfaction with teaching, and a deep frustration with the 
academic life of Louvain.287 When Vives's life took a dramatic turn in the January of 1521 with 
the death of his patron Guillaume de Croy, his urge to find a place close to real seats of power 
is manifest. 288 Despite an offer from the University of Alcalá to be the successor of the famous 
Spanish humanist Antonio Nebrija, Vives eventually chose to go to England in 1523.289 His trip 
and stay on the island did have an academic dimension: he was actively teaching in Christ 
College, the crown jewel of Cardinal Wolsey's project for the revival of humanist studies at 
Oxford.290 However, right from the start Vives was looking for a place at court, as his letters 
amply testify. Moreover, his introduction to his English patrons, of whom the Spanish Queen 
Catherine had been financially supporting Vives already in 1521, was that of a potential 
counsellor. The first dedication in the English context was that of St Augustine's monumental 
De civitate Dei to Henry VIII himself. In the introductory letter dedicated to Henry VIII, Vives 
deliberately situates the work in the tradition of Varron, Sallust, Livy, and Cicero's The 
Republic, together with modern Italian humanists emphasizing its role as a social and political 
text, although the more general preface connects it quite explicitly to theology.291 In December 
1523, it was Cardinal Wolsey's turn to be noticed by Vives in the form of two orations by 
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Isocrates on the merits of monarchy and republic, translated by Vives. The introduction with 
the selection of the theme highlights clearly Vives's aspirations to be considered a civic 
philosopher and adviser. Only Queen Catherine was to receive a dedication to a work on female 
education – a natural choice considering Vives's views on the marginal public role of women.292 
 
The Possibilities of Political Influence in Humanist Circles 
 
In around 1520, the idea of putting humanist skills into practice in counselling was gaining 
momentum for Vives. However, counselling in early sixteenth-century context could mean 
different things for humanists, and if one accepts a recent characterization of Vives as adopting 
the role of a relatively independent counsellor in the period under discussion, it is important to 
understand what the dynamics of this kind of counselling were.293 First, inside the confines of 
traditional direct counselling in central questions of war and peace, most humanists had limited 
possibilities of influence. The decision making processes in all European princely courts at the 
time were not clearly systematized, despite the incipient institutionalization of central 
administration, and the existence of certain councils, most notably privy councils, for the most 
important affairs of the state.294 In practice, power continued to be inseparable from personal 
relations with the prince, and in the case of Charles V, for instance, one can perceive a certain 
change not only with regards to persons using power close to him, but also with respect to the 
specific functions these people were officially embodying in the court and in the 
administration.295 Some powerful offices such as secretaries or even chancellors were indeed 
often occupied by people with humanist education, but although Vives might have dreamt of a 
position of that sort, he most certainly never reached the direct political influence of people like 
Mercurio Gattinara, Thomas Wolsey, Alfonso de Valdés, Thomas More, or Guillaume Budé. 
Equally as important, some influence in the court could well be conducted indirectly though 
patrons or powerful friends as a member of their circle or household. Thus, even if Vives's 
access to both Charles V and Henry VIII was often limited, he did have some direct contact 
with men close to princes, and it is partly in this light that his career choices in the early 1520s 
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should be understood. Croy was a good example of this, and in the early 1520s, one finds Vives 
exchanging letters that show closeness and friendship with George Halewyn, Lord of Praet and 
Juan de Vergara – all members of Habsburg circles. Thus, the possible influence of Vives could, 
in addition to direct counselling, occur through his patrons whom he tried to educate and direct 
either in the role of a tutor (the case of Croy) or as an intellectual friend or client (the case of 
Halewyn). In the end, his efforts to be close to power lead him to hold a position very close to 
the Spanish Queen Catherine of Aragon in the English court, culminating in the central role 
Vives played in the defence of the queen in the royal divorce process in the latter part of the 
1520s.296  
 However, there is another dimension to counselling that transcends the confines 
of the oral world, and that is highly significant in the case of Vives. The Vives we know today 
operates also in the literary world of men of letters that has some importance at least in three 
ways. First, part of his authority and ethos was created in print: the man who will “surpass 
Erasmus” and who prepared an edition of the monumental De civitate Dei must have been 
known as a writer of note in major European courts. Secondly, much of his literary activities of 
the 1520s are in fact outright counselling. He is using his pen to address Henry VIII, Charles V, 
the Pope, and the Lord Chancellor Wolsey on fundamental questions of war, peace, and the 
unity of Christendom. Thirdly, and very importantly, the fact that the political deliberations that 
have survived were published in the 1520s adds another dimension to Vives’s counselling, since 
printing significantly broadens the potential audience of political deliberations. Although 
publishing a political deliberation was partly a way of drawing the attention of the prince and 
the court to what the Spaniard considered important, it simultaneously turned the potential 
readers of these deliberations into spectators of political action.  
 Understood in in this light, a central purpose of the publication of these political 
texts was to reproduce the standards with which a somewhat larger audience could assess 
politics.297 In this way, Erasmian political literature did not only try to affect direct decision 
making, but also to set the conceptual framework within which decisions could be made and 
judged. The promise of human glory and the threat of tyranny were present in a literature that 
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could, in addition to deliberative rhetoric, draw on the epideictic rhetoric of praise and blame; 
this epideictic rhetoric framed expectations for the future by applauding the virtuous nature of 
government.298 Erasmus, for instance, perceived his political laudation of Philip IV the 
Handsome entitled Panegyricus exactly in this way as he elaborately explained in his Apologia 
for the text.299 Moreover, when Erasmus elaborated on what would be expected from his 
Institutio principis Christiani dedicated to the young Charles, he pointed out that he did not 
give practical advice on this or that matter, but wanted to explain the sources from which good 
advice arises.300 The result, Institutio principis Christiani, not only discusses the formation of 
the prince, but the totality of culture surrounding him – from the selection of counsellors to the 
statutes and sobriquets dedicated to him. Thus, Institutio is first and foremost second-order 
counselling, it does not aspire to deliberate on a specific action but to instruct the ruler more 
generally of what is expected of him. What is more, a crucial part of Institutio ensures these 
standards are deliberately made public, since the work was printed numerous times in the 1510s. 
Equally, Vives’s De bello, & pace, a printed letter to Henry VIII, can be read as a public 
monument to a good ruler that promises glory in exchange for good governance. In a paragraph 
on the importance of the exemplar nature of the prince, Vives not only reminds the monarch 
that his example has persuasive force that emanates to people, turning them into good men, but 
also implies that the monarch is constantly watched. As Vives reminds the monarch, nothing, 
“impedes that what the monarch does is communicated to the people,” and that the monarch 
should think of himself as being, “in a theatre full of people, where his acts and words do not 
remain hidden.”301 
This broader notion of politics highlights that politically significant action is not 
restricted to the confines of deliberative rhetoric, to actual decision-making in some particular 
situations, since the activation of other resources of rhetoric and the printing of deliberations 
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could influence and control the conceptual framework inside of which actual politics should be 
assessed and discussed. Even though the actual constitution of the potential audience could vary 
from one country to another, and its range is never specifically determined, one can well 
imagine that in the civic culture of the Burgundian Netherlands – based on the idea of consensus 
between princes and Estates – humanist rhetoric would find receptive readers in the relatively 
populous town patriciate.302 The idea of audience Erasmian humanists held was, of course, a 
far more exclusive one than the more popular literary culture blossoming in the Reformation 
context of the 1520s, and they never ceased to address their audience in classical Latin.303 But 
inside a Latin speaking world, the social aspect is further accentuated by the fact that the basic 
commonplaces of monarchy and tyranny activated in deliberations and advise books are 
intentionally socialized both in Erasmus’s and Vives’s educational materials, so a potential 
reader would indeed be familiar with them.304 The fact that political works could well be printed 
with marginal differences in different contexts with different political practices shows that they 
were not necessarily considered to be tied to any particular political system or culture.305 Thus, 
humanist texts could address different audiences interested in the limits of princely power and 
tyranny, independent of specific institutional arrangements. 
 
Ethos and Authority 
 
To appear as a possible counsellor both in the oral and written world required that a humanist 
possessed ethos and credibility in the eyes of his potential audience. Even though much of ethos 
was constructed in different orations and speeches to the prince and the people, in personal 
relations and networks of patronage, at least one part of Vives’s ethos and authority stemmed 
from his printed oeuvre. This takes us back to the Republic of Letters as its collective enterprise, 
with its claim to autonomy and rationality could endow its members with ethos and authority 
to present themselves not only as scholars, but also as useful counsellors. The collective 
enterprise of creating a web of references between individual authors and works vested different 
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humanists with authority that was partly emanating from the common project. There was, 
however, a way in which the process of building authority could be given a distinctively 
rhetorical interpretation in the concept of ethos that underlined the importance of the speaker 
or writer as a potential source of persuasion. In reflecting on ethos, humanists could draw on 
the tradition of classical rhetoric that offered ways of thinking about the speaker as a source of 
persuasion.306 In the Aristotelian model the three sources of persuasion (pisteis) were logos, 
pathos and ethos, the last of which referred to the character of the speaker. This character was 
essentially revealed in the act of speaking as virtue and a certain disposition towards political 
deliberation, as well as the practice of oratory in general. Furthermore, Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
pointed towards his Politics and Nicomachean Ethics, linking ethos closely to his political 
philosophy: the social and intellectual responsibility of the speaker was supposed to guarantee 
rhetoric would not be turned into a purely technical instrument of persuasion, but would retain 
its character as a truthful and responsible civic practice.307 
  In Roman rhetoric, the moral dimension of ethos is never lost but much of the 
focus is on the production of ethos through carefully described rhetorical techniques – an 
element not completely absent from Aristotle either. Roman oratory contributed to the 
understanding of ethos primarily in two ways. First, Roman oratory turned the analysis of 
character, namely ethos, into an analysis of all the persons involved in a rhetorical situation, 
probably because of its focus on judicial rhetoric. In Cicero, Quintilian and in rhetorical 
handbooks there is a very strong understanding that the mastering of the character of the persons 
is of utmost important for the judgement of a speech or an action.308 Secondly, the extension of 
ethos was transformed. In Aristotle, it is primarily a creation in speech itself that reveals the 
ethical nature of the speaker. Roman orators were much clearer about the fact that some issues 
precede the rhetorical situation and give authority to certain persons involved, and that the idea 
of a good man (vir bonus) who can succeed in speaking also points to his status as a member 
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of the optimates.309 As Quintilian argued in his treatment of deliberation: “The personality of 
the adviser also makes a lot of difference. If his illustrious past, his noble family, his age, or his 
fortune raises expectations, we must take care that what is said is not out of keeping with the 
man who says it.” The opposite situation, for its part, requires a humbler tone.310 Even though 
this authority can be constructed, or at least brought to mind in the speech itself, because of the 
irreducibly flexible nature of all rhetorical production, things like the speaker’s dignity, 
reputation, and achievements always point to the actual social position and reputation of the 
speaker. These set a framework for the role he can adopt and, ultimately, to his rhetorical 
possibilities.311 
  Humanists knew well the importance of ethos, understood as authority, and 
discussed it frequently. In Vives’s De consultatione, authority was treated explicitly together 
with rhetorical possibilities. But it was in his later De pacificatione (1529) and De disciplinis 
(1531) that Vives analysed the concept at length.312 There is no doubt that authority in all of 
Vives’s literature combines different layers of meaning. In his De pacificatione, it is portrayed 
as one of the key instruments or faculties that can enhance peace, and it is not completely 
detached from the acknowledged institutional and social arrangements of power. Thus, different 
duties related to one’s social and institutional position hold different kinds of authority that can 
be used for the enhancement of the cause of European peace. Moreover, in his De disciplinis 
authority clearly refers primarily to auctores, the classical sources of wisdom whose authority 
is confirmed by the tradition.313  
  Side by side with these connections, authority can, however, be discussed as an 
ethical concept that is juxtaposed to the current sources of institutional and hierarchical 
authority, and especially the nobility whose authority should emanate from their virtue and not 
from their established social position.314 Moreover, authority can be discussed in a 
contemporary context with reference to what creates authority to one’s message. In Vives’s De 
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disciplinis, authority is one of the topics covering a wide range of issues that lend believability 
and credibility to one’s message – covering not only social positions, but also a range of ethical 
and Christian qualities that create trust and not only obedience. Unsurprisingly Vives, referring 
primarily to philosophers, goes on to argue that among men it is the wise and the honest who 
have the greatest authority to convince, thus describing their activities in very Erasmian 
terms.315 More generally, Vives continuously argued that the most persuasive argument was the 
integrity of one’s life – a point that could be found already in classical thought, and that was 
reiterated in Pico’s letter to Ermolao Barbaro.316 This idea had, of course, a distinct 
interpretation in Erasmian circles that always underlined the truth of one’s life in contexts 
detached from immediate persuasion; the truth revealed in one’s moral life follows the example 
of the veritas vitae of Christ.317 The undeniable ethical and spiritual dimension of one’s life that 
holds transformative power over others is hugely important for Vives too, as he made very clear 
on numerous occasions.318 
  However, the double nature of ethos as a true ethical condition and as an 
instrument of persuasion was well known to Vives, and he was well aware that these two did 
not necessarily go together: the persuasive dimension of ethos did not stem from one’s moral 
character in any straightforward and transparent way. Vives highlighted this in his rhetorical De 
consultatione. In this work, following Quintilian, Vives argued that the famous Roman maxim 
according to which only a good man can be an orator is partly true, but only because a man who 
is considered not good would not be persuasive.319 What is presupposed here is that the 
authority one’s life is related to the judgement of the one we are persuading, and that judgement 
can radically diverge from what should be considered truly good, as Vives made perfectly clear 
in his De consultatione. In a similar spirit, in his De pacificatione Vives could discuss authority 
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as an instrument relative to the judgement of the audience.320 
  However, to mould one’s ethos according to the respective ideas on authority 
different audiences possessed was facilitated by the communication of one’s ethical nature, 
integrity, and authority more generally. Many humanists were well aware that part of authority 
emanated from one’s position in the established hierarchy. Erasmus himself acquired a 
doctorate in theology at the University of Torino in less than month, explaining that he did this 
largely to gain authority.321 However, part of non-institutional authority could also stem from 
one’s recognition by the Republic of Letters. The extent to which Erasmus’s authority and 
importance as the prince of humanists was recognized by the most powerful rulers of the time 
is revealed by the fact that the famous Dutchman was lured to all major European courts at 
some point of his career.322 Erasmus himself was also exchanging letters with different patrons 
from the position of the autonomous leader of the Republic of Letters after serving as a 
counsellor of young Charles in around 1516.323 More generally, collective mastering of personal 
image through cross-reference, introductions, and introductory letters does contribute to 
rhetorical authority. It is partly with the backing of the Republic of Letters that humanists could 
appear as true auctores and authorities –wise men that really should have an authoritative say. 
Thus, the common humanist project of the Republic of Letters gets a distinctive interpretation 
in the light of rhetorical theory. It presents a plea to intellectual authority that had an actual 
theoretical basis in classical rhetoric. The presentation of each other’s life and intellectual 
qualities in print was somewhat important for a successful realization of a variety of rhetorical 
tasks in different spheres of life. 
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Self-concealment, Friendship and the Republic of Letters 
 
Despite the tension between ethos as a rhetorical fabrication on the one hand, and as a moral 
category on the other, the ethical nature of all Vivesian and Erasmian philosophy is quite 
evident. Different branches of thought from education and pedagogy, to theology and civic 
philosophy come together ultimately only in the vir prudens. Reading, writing, interpreting and 
thinking are dependent on the ethical qualities and pious nature of the one engaging in these 
activities. In a perfect state, the use of language too should mirror one’s ethical character in a 
transparent way so that no break between the interior and the exterior should take place.  
  However, this transparency was conditional, and Erasmus himself was very clear 
that art could be employed by those who were virtuous. Erasmus had explicitly treated the issue 
of self-hiding in his adage Sileni Alcibiadis where the Dutch humanist discussed Greek 
statuettes, Sileni, that despite of their comic exterior held a hidden deity inside. The metaphor 
is presented in order to illustrate the highly positive self-concealment, as epitomized by 
Socrates.324 Erasmus's own dream to be the Lucian or the Socrates of the age – a role he 
famously performed in his Encomium Moriae, revealed a constructive understanding of this 
Socratic fool – a jester whose foolishness could reveal deep truths about the stupidities of his 
time on all spheres of life. What distinguishes him from a flatterer, however, is his deep 
commitment to the basic goal of rhetoric, namely teaching (docere) truth to others: it is the 
belief in the truly Christian God-like inner constitution of the fool and his intention to 
participate in the reform of others that makes self-concealment and the veiling of truth possible 
in Erasmus's mind.325 The flatterer, thus, is not only analysed in relation to the discrepancy 
between thought and speech, and interior and exterior, but also with respect to his corrupted 
inner constitution, namely a twisted character that impedes a truthful judgement of the nature 
of things.326 This general model of ethical dissimulation is applicable to different contexts; in 
addition to Sileni, Erasmus discussed self-concealment in politics, recognizing the importance 
of dissimulation also in the practice of counselling on the condition that the counsellor does not 
enhance evil things.327 Thus, a truly virtuous spirit could indeed employ literary devices in an 
                                                          
324 Erasmus, Desiderius: Sileni alcibiadis, Basel, Johann Froben 1517, 2; Snyder 2009, 52. 
325 Erasmus to Dorp, Allen 337, 91-114, 163-166, 204-214. Erasmus’s use of invective was in this sense deeply 
epistemological; it revealed truth. See Furey 2005. 
326 As Chomarat has emphasized, in Erasmus inner piety and the art of rhetoric destined to teaching are combined. 
See Chomarat 1981, 20-25.  




inventive way, he could break transparency to teach the world, and the kind of ethical adviser 
practicing some form of self-concealment is to be found in much of humanist literature from 
Erasmus’s playful and satirical Moriae encomium, to More’s Utopia and Vives’s political 
writings.328  
 Vives himself was equally interested in giving truth a mask in certain contexts. In 
1521, Vives published a completely altered text under the name of Veritas fucata. In the new 
treatment (the complete title was Veritas fucata sive de licentia poetica) some of the themes 
relate loosely to the line set in the 1514 text, published under the same name Veritas fucata. In 
some ways, one could argue that the second text presents a solution to the first. Whereas in the 
youthful Veritas Vives argued playfully that every attempt to embellish truth is a fundamental 
divergence from and distortion of it, the second text intends to come up with a solution and set 
of conditions under which the union of truth with poetry and literature is possible. 
 From the very start, the difference to the 1514 treatment is clear. The text is set 
as a dialogue between Vives and Juan de Vergara, a selection that underlies the non-academic 
dimension of the treatment in comparison with the first one that had taken place in the halls of 
the Paris University.329 Soon enough, the discussion is taken down from the heights of 
Philosophia Christi by Juan de Vergara, who wishes to talk to the Valencian “in a simple manner 
and starting from the common use of words,” moving on to a presentation of an allegorical story 
built around two camps, those of Truth, and those of Error.330 In the story, the naked simplicity 
of Truth is juxtaposed to the extravaganza, make-up and twisted nature of Error accompanied 
by many vices, and not an insignificant number of people, all of whom decorate themselves 
with wrong names, “denying proper ones,” putting up a show of an ultimately flawed rhetorical 
redescription. Thus, among other lies, “falsehood was called negligence, perjury stating truth, 
guile prudence.”331 In striking opposition to this, in the followers of Truth no rupture occurred 
                                                          
328 More, Thomas: De optimo reip. statu deque nova insula utopia libellus vere aureus, nec minus salutaris quam 
festiuus, Johann Froben, Basel 1518, 61-62; Vives: “De bello, & pace”, xiii-xiiii. 
329 Vergara was most certainly Vives's closest Spanish friend in the court of Charles V in the early 1520s. He had 
served as a secretary to Cardinal Jiménez, one of the most influential people in Spain at the time, in 1516 – 1517 
and he was sent to the Low Countries in 1520 to inform Cardinal Croy about the state of affairs in Toledo thus 
meeting Vives's protector. In January 1521, he became Charles V court chaplain and during the 1520s, after some 
initial problems with Erasmus on the Zùñiga affair, he became the most important advocate of Erasmus's cause 
in Spain. See BR III, 384-387; Bataillon 1991, 127-134, 167-168, 256-257. 
330 Vives, Juan Luis: “Veritas fucata, sive de licentia poetica, quantum poetis liceat a Veritate abscedere”, 518-531 
in Vives, Juan Luis: Opera Omnia (ed. Mayans y Siscar), tomus II, Valencia 1782, 518: Vergara says: “Tu hic 
plane altiora quaedam spectas; ego tibi simpliciter et ex usu vulgari hominum loquor.”  





between the real nature of things and the names with which they were evoked, and everything 
was “naked, open, simple, certain, solid [...] truthful.”332 
 Unlike in the 1514 Veritas fucata where the structure is quite a static one, here 
some significant developments loosely coincide with historical phases. Thus, in the party of 
Truth an original dispute between different philosophers is cleared away by a manifestation of 
Christian truth. Some problems arise, however, when Truth – with its maternal affection for 
everyone – gives “great men” and, most notably Plato, the task (negotium) of persuading 
soldiers of Error to change camps.333 However, these negotiations with Plato as the leading 
spokesperson of Truth come to an unfruitful end with the soldiers of Error, and poets 
represented by Homer. But amongst the soldiers of Error (falsiani) a tumultuous encounter takes 
place where it is agreed that an embassy should be sent to Truth to negotiate a peace treaty 
under certain conditions – the most important of which was that Truth should obey Error: people 
“with delicate ears and education should not suffer the roughness and uncultured nature of Truth 
without the offence of arrogance.”334 Homer, together with Hesiod, Lucian, and Apuleius is sent 
to undertake the negotiations. Quite amazingly, Homer in the negotiations convinces Truth of 
the necessity to conceal its naked beauty, the unveiling of which according to one of Homer’s 
many arguments, would cause men some additional satisfaction because of the effort put into 
it.335 When Truth expresses its will to “show itself naked,” arguing that if it was perceived 
directly by men it would excite love in everyone, Homer does not deny this. However, the Greek 
poet argues that he “knows the habits and character of his people,” implying strongly the 
necessity of concealment on these grounds.336 
 When Homer is awaiting the final verdict and decision of Truth, and is led through 
the different places of the Palace of Truth, he prays to be taken to Plato's Republic, which turns 
out to be a desolated architectural masterpiece with Socrates and Plato as its only inhabitants. 
After thinking through the matter overnight, Truth reveals its decision to accept Homer's offer 
with ten different clauses that are explicitly spelled out. These clauses include ideas about the 
                                                          
332 Vives: “Veritas”, 520: “Cuncta erant in porticu Veritatis contraria, nam illic nuda erant omnia, aperta, simplicia, 
certa, solida, et, quo maxime veritati similia, vera....”  
333 Vives: “Veritas”, 521-522: “Veritas [...] dedit magnis quibusdam viris negotium, et in primis Platoni, ut illos 
deserto Falso cum impurissimo et teterrimo comitatu ad Veritatem transire adhortaretur....”  
334 Vives: “Veritas”, 522: “...homines tam delicatis auribus, et educatione, aspera illa et rudia Veritatis pati sine 
offensione insolentiae non posse....” 
335 Vives: “Veritas”, 522-526.  
336 Vives: “Veritas”, 525: “Veritas se libentius nudam acturam respondit.”; “Homerus se non dubitare ita esse quae 
Veritas diceret, ait, ceterum nosse se mores, et ingenia sui populi; illa se habere mandata, quibus repudiatis transigi 




limits of poetical and literary education framing the ultimate conditions under which the union 
is possible and beneficial, thus presenting Vives’s solution to the age-old problem of poetry and 
truth.337 In the very last part of the dialogue following Vergara's presentation of the allegorical 
history, Vives puts forward his concern about the incapacity of poets to pursue their task inside 
these limits, a concern Vergara encounters with a great degree of optimism since the limits 
provide ample space and liberty for poetical invention. In a personal turn, Vives the interlocutor 
claims, referring to literary invention, that if he himself cannot “give birth to great and bright 
offspring,” he will at least teach the duty and office of a writer to others.338 
 Veritas fucata is full of implications. First, the turn to Homer after the failure of 
Plato is significant. It has to be remembered that, famously, Plato was highly esteemed by Vives 
and a number of other humanists at the time.339 Thus, in Veritas fucata, Plato does not come to 
symbolize flawed philosophy, that is, scholasticism, but all philosophy deprived of its rhetorical 
capacities and ability to convince. If anything, Plato – the primary spokesperson for Truth – 
represents ultimately truthful philosophy that has to be tailored to the ingenia and educational 
background of the falsiani with knowledge provided by Homer and the poets. Secondly, even 
if this overarching story about the handshake between poetry and truth could be read in the 
context of the rebirth of the arts, and most of all poetry in the academic environment, Vives's 
treatment of the theme underlies some important issues transcending the purely academic 
context.340 The selection of the protagonists is quite revealing. Vergara is one of Vives’s 
influential friends in the court of Charles V, who in the first part of the dialogue initiates the 
story by shifting the attention from the heights of Philosophia Christi to the language of vulgus. 
The presence of Apuleius and Lucian as helpers of Homer is hardly an insignificant one. The 
latter was, of course, one of the special heroes of the humanists in the 1500s and 1510s that 
represented Erasmus's Socratic dream of the enigmatic and satirical revelation of deeper truths, 
which provides an additional – even playful – element to the option offered by the poets. In the 
same vein, Apuleius was not primarily a poet but a satirist whose Asinus aureus was one of the 
most famous Latin works in prose.341   
                                                          
337 Vives: “Veritas”, 526-531.  
338 Vives: “Veritas”, 531: “Si ipse nihil magni et praeclari foetus possum parere, at saltem ad pariendum alios 
adhortabor....” He quotes Horace to make the second point, Vives: “Veritas”, 531: “Munus et officium, nil scribens 
ipse, docebo....”  
339 Vives’s works in the years around 1520 are full of praise for Plato. See for instance Vives: VCA, vii.xv. For a 
good treatment of the theme, see Margolin 1998, 15-28. 
340 In the Parisian debate over humanism the question was often framed as a question on poetry, see Chapter two. 
Thus, the academic connotations of the debate must have been evident for all the readers involved.  




 Even more importantly, the dialogue makes very clear that Vives is not discussing 
poetry as a narrowly defined metrical art, but as something representing the whole range of 
humanistic literary studies. After treating the relation of truth and the liberty of rhetorical 
invention in historically remote themes, Vives moves on to argue that “everything that looks 
into customs or for the utility for life is left free for writers,” mentioning explicitly the genres 
of apologue, comedy and dialogue.342 The truths of different arts have to be respected, but in 
conditions eight and nine, the emphasis is put on decorum that cannot be separated from moral 
philosophy or customs and utility.343 Veritas fucata, thus, highlights greatly that under certain 
conditions things have to be given a fictional form in all domains of life.344 The work is 
essentially a plea to mould truth to meet the requirements and imperfections of the real world 
under the guidance of decorum. This is not far from what Erasmus had claimed in the dedicatory 
letter to his thoroughly satirical Moriae encomium where the Dutch humanist had reminded the 
reader of the importance of Christian decorum that should be free but not licentious in its 
critique of the stupidities and errors of human life.345 In his Somnium compendium, Vives had 
made similar points about the capacity of Cicero’s Roman philosophy to mould Greek 
philosophy to a variety of ingenia. Once again, this did not diverge from Erasmus’s assessment 
of Roman philosophy. In the 1523 edition of Tusculanae Disputationes (Tusculan Disputations) 
Erasmus himself had hailed Cicero as the one who had brought philosophy to the understanding 
of the people (vulgus), but who philosophically did not diverge from Greek thought.346 
Throughout Somnium Vives underlines that what is at stake in the abstract debate between 
humanism and scholasticism is the relevance of literary studies and language, a relevance that 
is not only tied to Biblical motives but to the active influence of civic and moral philosophy on 
all domains of life.347 In a fictional form, Vives underlines that for truth to stand a chance in the 
world of error it has to shake hands with literature, rhetoric, poetry and resort to self-
                                                          
for instance Margolin 1999, 224, 233; Fumaroli 1980, 94. Erasmus also translated Lucian. For Thomas More and 
Lucian see Baker-Smith 2009, 168-169. 
342 Vives: “Veritas”, 528: “...quaecunque vel ad mores spectabunt, vel ad aliquem vitae usum, libera reliquentur 
scriptoribus....”  
343 See conditions eight and nine, Vives: “Veritas”, 529.  
344 This last point is emphasized also by Gómez-Montero, Gómez-Montero 1995, 87.  
345 Erasmus, Desiderius: Moriae encomium, Matthias Schürer, Strasbourg 1511, letter to More: “Stulticiam 
laudavimus, sed non omnino stulte. Iam vero ut de mordacitatis cavillatione respondeam, semper haec ingeniis 
libertas permissa fuit, ut in communem hominum vitam salibus luderent impune, modo ne licentia exiret in 
rabiem.” 
346 Erasmus, Desiderius: “Ad Ioannem Vlattenum”, in Cicero: Tusculanae quaestiones, Johann Froben, Basel 
1523, A3.  
347 Biblical motives are not absent from the preface to Somnium Scipionis, and interestingly, it is Cicero who 




concealment that speaks to the ingenia of the people. This is what Vives as a person in the 
dialogue Veritas fucata commits to in the end.  
  This self-concealment should not, however, be practiced in all contexts; it was 
needed when one was engaging with erroneous judgement and it was something fellow 
humanists would recognize as ethical dissimulation. Erasmus, who often pleaded to his own 
conscience in justifying self-concealment and literary choices, was very clear that the wise and 
posterity would see through his disguise and would indeed understand his true intentions and 
the meanings he wanted to convey.348 As the Dutch humanist elaborated at length in his defence 
of Moriae encomium to Martin Dorp, self-concealment, rhetoric, and satire could be employed 
when one was confronting a world ruled by folly and error. However, in discussions with friends 
and learned members of the Republic of Letters other rules of discussion should apply. Indeed, 
friendship and membership in the Republic of Letters were conceptually very closely 
interlinked. The Republic of Letters uses the notion of friendship constantly in defining the 
reciprocal relations of its members; it was essentially a consortium of friends tied together with 
the bonds of fidelity and trust.349 The language on friendship inherited from the classical 
tradition emphasized both in its Aristotelian and Ciceronian forms the reciprocal and 
symmetrical nature of friends, which was ultimately based on a certain sympathy of souls. This 
kind of friendship was ethical and virtuous since the very notion of exclusive friendship found 
in the classical tradition presupposed the ethical character of the people cultivating it.350 As 
Vives emphatically declared in his letter to the Bishop John Longland, only “a good man can 
be the friend of a good man,” whereas a bad man cannot be a friend of anyone.351 
  In Vives and Erasmus, one finds of course a notion of an ultimately universal 
community of Christian friends that comes together in the love of God manifest in Vives’s 
commentaries of St Augustine’s De civitate Dei where he states: “For they say that everyone is 
                                                          
348 Erasmus to Pirckheimer, Allen 856, 58-61; Erasmus to Maarten Lips 899, 18-20; Erasmus to Jan Slechta 950, 
34-36. At times Erasmus raises his conscience above the judgement of his supporters but even then he reminds 
that the judgement of the good agrees with his conscience, see Erasmus to Draco, Allen 942, 16-21. 
349 In Vives’s letters amicus is one of the recurring terms in referring to Erasmus, Budé, Cranevelet and many 
others. Furey has emphasized this side of the Republic of Letters, see Furey 2006, 4-13.  
350 Lochman & López 2011, 1-15. Vives in his Introductio ad sapientiam makes the point about good character as 
the presupposition of friendship. Vives, Juan Luis: “Introductio ad sapientiam”, in Vives, Juan Luis: Introductio 
ad sapientiam satellitium sive symbola, epistolae duae de ratione studii puerilis, Simon de Colines, Paris 1527 (in 
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tantummodo est inter bonos, inter quos facile amor coalescit.”  
351 Vives to Longland, “Ioannes Lodovicus Vives D. Ioanni Episcopo Lincolniensi” (printed in De Europae), lxx: 




united to everyone else by nature, so that everyone is naturally friends with everyone.”352 Yet, 
an equally typical use of the word referred to the exclusive classical sense reserved for similar 
souls, and the word is systematically employed in Vives’s work and letter-exchange exactly in 
this way. Budé’s and Erasmus´s famous exchange in the late 1510s tackling questions of style, 
audience, and intellectual community has one of its grandest moments when Budé proposes to 
the Dutch humanist that “they should share friends.”353 Ultimately, a participation in the 
friendly activities of the Republic of Letters could be seen as an external sign of a good, 
virtuous, and noble character that was revealed in one’s engagement with other Erasmian 
humanists.354  
  The definition of the Republic of Letters as an association of friendship has a 
distinctive importance for language use since it points to a certain classical model of conducting 
discussions. When Vives in his De conscribendis epistolis defined letters as sermo absentium 
per literas (conversation of those who are absent through letters), linking them to friendship, 
he was pointing to a notion of conversation (sermo) that in Cicero is contrasted to rhetorical 
language (oratio).355 In a number of writings, Cicero makes the distinction between passionate 
rhetoric meant for the multitude and a calmer philosophical conversation with epistemological 
goals.356 In De officiis, the Roman statesman contrasted oratio and sermo, arguing that sermo 
was a more informal discussion meant for social gatherings or friendly intercourse. Sermo could 
discuss politics, domestic affairs, arts, and learning, but in an unemotional way. This separated 
sermo from deliberative and judicial rhetoric that strove for immediate action using passion. 
But most importantly, sermo is no one’s possession and others should not be excluded from it 
– it is a dialogue where the other person has to be recognized as a subject or a partner in the 
                                                          
352 Vives: VCA, x.iiii: “Nam unumquemque hominem cuiuis alteri a natura conciliatum esse dicunt, ita omnes 
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355 Vives, Juan Luis: “De conscribendis epistolis”, in Vives, Juan Luis: Brevissima maximeque compendiaria 
conficiendarum epistolarum formula compendium Joannis Ludovici vivis valentini de conscribendis epistolis, 
libellus vere aureus. Eiusdem argumenti D. Erasmi Roterodami compendium, ab ipso autore denuò recognitum, 
Thomas I Platter & Balthasar Lasius, Basel 1536, 3: “Epistola est sermo absentium per literas....” 





  In spite of the obvious Christian resonance of sermo, preferred to verbum by 
Erasmus in his translation of logos in St John’s Gospel (a choice that accentuated the 
communicative dimension of Christian religion incarnated in Christ), the two classical modes 
of discussing were well known to humanists.358 Erasmus, for instance, revealed his mastery of 
the genre of civil dispute in his De libero arbitrio, thoroughly analysed by Marjorie Boyle 
O'Rourke in her Rhetoric and Reform: Erasmus' civil dispute with Luther. The idea of an 
essentially civilized discussion proposed by Erasmus as the ultimate genre and way debating 
the matter with Luther over free will, was the kind of investigative Ciceronian dialogue that is 
ultimately made possible by a number of factors – one of which is a certain idea of a trustworthy 
character of participants in conversation.359 Erasmus, on the first page, frames the discussion as 
a conversation between friends, inviting Luther to the community of virtuous scholars to discuss 
the issue, a strategy that stands in sharp contrast to many of his earlier and polemical writings 
against scholasticism, such as Moriae or Antibarbari.360 The importance of friendship for the 
conceptualisation of rhetorical discussion is clearly discernible in humanists’ understanding of 
their own language usage. Not only is epistolary exchange conceptualized as sermo, but also 
Vives’s De ratione dicendi makes the distinction between an unemotional discussion among 
philosophers and a true oration dealing with passion very clearly.361 In his De consultatione, 
                                                          
357 Cicero: De officiis, i.xxxvii-xxxviii.  
358 For Erasmus’s translation, see Jarott 1964, 35-38. Erasmus made the distinction in the very start of his response 
to Lucian´s Tyrannicidae. Erasmus, Desiderius: “Declamatio, lucianicae respondens”, 136-175 in Erasmus - 
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399-659 in Cicero: De natura Deorum, Academica, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts/London 1961, ii.iii; Cicero: De Officiis, i.i.3, ii.ii.8; Cicero: De finibus bonorum et malorum, (trans. 
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Vives also noted that with a friend one could speak more openly.362 Vives’s In 
Pseudodialecticos, framed as a letter, partakes in the discourse of exclusive friendship in 
arguing, in the very first lines, that the content of the letter was borne out of the criticism of 
some close friends with whom one could discuss in a friendly tone.363 Moreover, in his later De 
disciplinis, in discussing the life of the erudite, Vives strongly underlined the fact that truth 
reveals itself through dialogue with both ancients and contemporary writers and that it, 
according to him, is “no body’s property.”364 Furthermore, many of his letters testify how these 
friendly discussions between scholars on serious issues were conducted in a non-adversarial 
tone, and in a tolerant spirit.365 Of course, the connection between character, friendship and 
sermo is not is not an empirical one, but an idealized model of conduct that was in practice 
frequently violated even among leading humanists.366 However, the idealized claim is clear; 
with the circle of friends of the Republic of Letters and with other men of letters, rules of sermo 
should apply, whereas in communication with others the art of rhetoric and other literary 
dissimulation could be required by a virtuous and learned member of the Republic of Letters. 
   
Utopia and the Problem of Counselling 
 
As Erasmus’s defence of Moriae encomium to Martin Dorp made perfectly clear, princely 
courts were not free from the reign of folly, and one was in need of literature, satire, and rhetoric 
in dealing with them.367 However, self-concealment and rhetoric applied to the specific context 
of princely courts was far from unproblematic and Thomas More’s Utopia, one of the most 
widely known humanist political treatises of the time, offered a highly nuanced interpretation 
of counselling and rhetoric in princely contexts. In the form of a dialogue conducted in the spirit 
of sermo, the questions of counselling and rhetoric are given a distinctively political treatment 
in Utopia as framing the most basic problem of humanist active life: how to counsel 
successfully the prince without becoming a corrupt flatterer. 
                                                          
sententiis instructam popularibus, nec iunctam numeris, sed solutam liberius, ut sermo potius, quam oratio 
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362 Vives: DCO, 248: “Apud amicum familiarem, apertius....”  
363 Vives: In pseudodialecticos 1555, 272: “Neque enim duxi diutius differendum, quo minus redderem te 
certiorem, quid iampridem expostulant mecum homines doctissimi, et amantissimi mei. Quibus cum familiariter 
dum commentor incidimusque in mentionem renascentium literarum....” 
364 Vives: DD, 398: “Veritas [...] nullius est propria, sed communis omnium....”  
365 Vives to Grynaeus, DAE 174.  
366 The late 1510s argument between Erasmus and Budé is a good example.   




  More's Utopia treated the problem in the first part at length. The work that was 
printed in Louvain was also promoted as the most important work on politics by the Louvain 
circle of humanists, and considered of great importance by Vives; he mentions it as one of the 
few political texts worth reading in his later De disciplinis.368 A complete clarification of More's 
own intention and commitment to the views presented by Hytholday, Gillis, and More as a 
person in the dialogue would might be next to impossible. However, for our present purposes 
it may suffice to show the presence of certain problems on counselling presented by More in 
the first book of Utopia without taking a strong view on the specific solution he gave to the 
problems posed.369 
  Utopia's first part presents a conversation between a sailor who has first-hand 
knowledge of the island of Utopia, Raphael Hythloday, Pieter Gillis, and Thomas More himself. 
After a lengthy detour to questions of theft, poverty, and private ownership, Thomas More and 
Hythloday come back to the original theme of the dialogue, started by Pieter Gillis’s initial 
remark that Raphael should put his knowledge to the service of a prince as a counsellor. This 
suggestion is ironically rejected by Hythloday since “the difference [between service and 
servitude] is only a matter of one syllable.”370 When they return to the theme of the relative 
merits of negotium and otium, and the possibilities of counselling towards the end of the first 
part, the theme is amplified and treated in an interesting manner. As is well known, the question 
of active life had a long history in the humanist tradition that often drew explicitly from Cicero’s 
widely read De officiis where the Roman statesman argued that the life of negotium was of more 
importance and demanded greater abilities of its practitioner than a life dedicated to otium. 
Furthermore, Cicero countered in De officiis those who claimed that a life of negotium was a 
perversion of true philosophy, by arguing that a wise man can and should indeed take an active 
role in the stage of politics, drawing a parallel to the vocabulary of theatre.371 
                                                          
368 Vives: DD, 373-374.  
369 What More might have intended to say in the work has been debated throughout history. John Stuart Mill's, 
Karl Kautsky's and William Morris's philosophical interpretations emphasizing utilitarianism, socialism and 
communism respectively have been followed by more historically nuanced explanations. See for instance 
Skinner, Quentin: “Sir Thomas More’s Utopia and the Language of Renaissance Humanism”, 123-157 in 
Pagden, Anthony (ed.): The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, Cambridge University 
Press, 1987; Bradshaw, Brendan: “More on Utopia”, 1-27 in Historical Journal 1981; Hexter, J.H: More’s 
Utopia. The Biography of an Idea, Princeton University Press, 1952; Surtz, Edward – J.H Hexter: The Complete 
Works of Thomas More, vol. 4, Yale University Press 1965; Fenlon, Dermot: “England and Europe: Utopia and 
its Aftermath”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society XXV, 1975. 
370 More: Utopia 1518, 32: “...mihi visum est servias regibus, sed ut inservias. Hoc est, inquit ille, una syllaba 
plusquam servias.” (English translation from More, Thomas: Utopia [eds. Logan – Adams], Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2002, 13). 




  Hythloday, who argues for the impossibility of expedient counselling and for the 
merits of contemplative life, makes the first move by presenting two hypothetical situations of 
actual counselling. In the first, a discussion on French foreign policy is portrayed, a discussion 
in which other counsellors seek methods for broadening the power and the territory of the 
French king through cunning and perfect domination of traditional methods of realpolitik. Here 
Hythloday, instead of answering the original question, would try to reframe it by arguing that it 
is not expedient to enlarge territory and power in the first place, and that all effort should be 
focused on governing the territory given to the prince in question. In the second example, 
reminiscent of the first one, Raphael is forced to argue against a mass of counsellors on the 
possibilities of filling the treasury of the king through manipulation of existing laws, the value 
of money, make-believe wars, legislation, and the interpretation of laws to the prince's 
advantage. Against counsellors who agreed on the principle that the king should maximize his 
treasury, Hythloday would have to try to argue that these policies are both dishonourable and 
ruinous to the king, whose duty lies in the perfecting of his people and in the guarding of their 
pursuit of the good life.372 After the presentation of these examples, he concludes by stating that 
his listeners “would turn deaf ears to me [Hythloday].”373 
  Thomas More, the person in the dialogue, answers by arguing for the rhetorical 
philosophy of Cicero: “There is another philosophy, better suited for the role of a citizen, that 
takes its cue, adapts itself to the drama in hand and acts its part neatly and appropriately.”374 He 
is ready to grant that it is impossible to make everything good in a corrupted world, but the 
rejection of the ideal of complete transformation should not make the humanist to abandon the 
commonwealth since they can try to make things bad as little as possible. More, thus, restricts 
the role of rhetorical philosophy to the incomplete world that takes for granted the less-than-
perfect nature of the people we might encounter at court – including the prince himself. 
Hythloday, however, is not convinced. According to him, either one speaks the truth or adjusts 
ones methods to the way people already live and understand the world, which is to confirm the 
error. There simply is no way to reform people who persist in their corrupted nature through 
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vehementer inclinatos, quam surdis essem narraturus fabulam.” (English translation from More, Thomas: Utopia 
[eds. Logan – Adams], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, 34). 
374 More: Utopia 1518, 61-62: “Sed es talia philosophia civilior, quae suam novit scaenam....” (English 





any kind of indirect rhetorical approach.375 At the heart of the problem, there lies a specific 
problem of all rhetorical theory stemming from the tension between the obligation to teach, and 
the fact that teaching was possible only if one could ground it in the opinions the audience 
would accept. This problem was at the centre of Vives’s reflection on rhetoric in his De 
consultatione.  
 
De consultatione as reassessing Deliberative Genre in a new Context 
 
In 1523, Vives composed a short work on rhetoric for the Lord of Praet, Vives’s and Erasmus’s 
friend who had been active in Charles’s privy council since 1517, and who had undertaken the 
role of a resident ambassador in England in 1523. The work, entitled De consultatione, presents 
a theory of rhetorical counselling which incorporates some of the classical tradition of 
deliberative rhetoric in a flexible way into its precepts. The work has rarely received significant 
attention in the existing scholarship. When it has been touched upon, the reception has been 
somewhat mixed and confused because of the conflict between Christian humanism and the 
highly technical tone of De consultatione that presents the use of word as an internal question 
of rhetoric and persuasion.376 Like More’s Utopia, which can be read as a participation in an 
internal dispute of civic philosophy on true virtue and active life, Vives’s De consultatione can 
well be placed in the internal tradition of deliberative rhetoric.377 However, simultaneously it 
points to a larger understanding of rhetoric as a practice of the world of discord, the necessity 
of which is predicated on the breakdown of concord.378 Within this general framework of 
politics, De consultatione approaches rhetorical theory from the vantage point of the problems 
inherent in counselling as a civic practice, and offers the best possible insight into how Vives 
understood the dynamics of asymmetrical political discussion and persuasion between a 
counsellor and a ruler in a princely setting. The theoretical model Vives offers the reader stands 
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376 Mack has described the ethical tone of the treatise as awkward since Vives, in addition to emphasizing the 
spontaneous persuasiveness of ethical life, gives detailed information on how to construct an appearance of it in 
speech or in writing, see Mack 2008, 253. Noreña does not analyse De consultatione in depth even though he calls 
it “an important political treatise on diplomacy and negotiations”, see Noreña 1970, 86. E. George also comments 
on the movement between descriptive and normative points; see George 1992, 142. Some interpretations seem to 
me very curious. Adams for instance argues that in De consultatione Vives “sets forward [...] his ideas on 
conciliation between princes.” Adams 1962, 235.  
377 Skinner has placed Utopia in the context of Renaissance scientia civilis, see Skinner 2002, vol. 2, 224-226.  
378 In De ratione dicendi rhetoric belongs to a postlapsarian world of corruption, a fact that creates a close nexus 
between the fall, passion, and the necessity of true rhetoric, Vives: DR, 107-108. For a more detailed analysis, see 




in stark contradiction with Ciceronian sermo, and draws heavily on the tradition of emotional 
and passionate rhetoric. This implies an understanding of the prince not as a participant in 
conversation, but as an object of persuasion touching consequently upon all the questions 
related to the power relationship between the prince and the counsellor. In short, De 
consultatione is an insight into the world of the counsellor who has to operate in a world of 
discord and passion through persuasive language. Even though the work was published only in 
1533, and the exact outlook of the 1523 manual is impossible to retrace, many aspects of the 
work strongly suggest that its overall structure coincides with the 1523 manual.379  
  If De consultatione is analysed as something more than just a purely technical 
instruction for the practice of counselling, it has to be situated inside the Erasmian claim of 
ethical advising. There are a number of issues that link the work to the fundamental Erasmian 
duty of teaching (docere). First, there are moments when Vives's voice explicitly pleads for 
ethically responsible rhetoric, as do many handbooks of the classical tradition.380 Thoroughly 
in this spirit, he strongly emphasizes the ethical nature and character of the counsellor in writing 
that “whoever gives counsel on a number of issues should be well equipped with judgement 
and prudence,” and that he “should be very skilled in everything related to what is honest and 
what is expedient.”381 Secondly, Vives tries to rewrite the categories of the honest and the 
expedient that framed all political deliberations in Roman tradition by filling the category of 
the honest with Christian concepts suitable for contemporary counselling. In all rhetorical 
theory, arguing one’s case in deliberations was based on one’s possibilities of showing the 
honest as well the useful nature of the course of action suggested. In Vives’s De consultatione, 
the category of honesty is placed within a Christian framework. The Valencian argues: “In the 
category of the honest everything related to God should be most powerful – things such as piety, 
flame for higher things, cognition of and adoration for that omnipotent nature. Eternal life 
consists of knowledge of these things according to Jesus in the Gospels.”382 Thirdly, one has to 
                                                          
379 It is clear that Vives never made an effort to merge its precepts together with his 1530s literature on rhetorical 
theory. Differently from 1530s literature, De consultatione focuses almost exclusively on rhetorical inventio, not 
on elocutio. For opinions on the problem, see George 1992; 142-143; Van der Poel 1991; Rodríguez Peregrina 
1996, 350-351.  
380 Cicero: “De inventione”, i.iv. 
381 Vives: DCO, 243: “Ex his quae in nobis sunt posita, satis ut puto intelligitur, oportere cum qui multis de rebus 
consilium daturus est, plurimum & cordis habere, & prudentiae, calentissimum esse ingenii, tam multiformis & 
varii animantis hominis: tum consultissimum totius honestatis atque utilitatis.”  
382 Vives: DCO, 241: “In honesto potissima esse convenit, quae ad Deum pertinent, huius generis sunt pietas, ardor 
rerum supremarum, cognitio, & adoratio illius omnipotentis naturae: quam cognitionem Dominus in Evangelio 




bear in mind how rhetorical invention works. Since invention is a somewhat structured way of 
organising and collecting material for whatever questions asked, by its very nature it refers to 
the whole set of political, educational and rhetorical literature available, as Vives points out 
when he described invention not as a closed set of all possible arguments but as a tool that 
indicates possible sources of argumentation.383 Hence, invention is practiced in order to bring 
to mind exactly the kind of political precepts, maxims, and ideas that Erasmian as well as more 
generally humanist educational and political literature had promoted in the preceding years. 
The union, thus, to the whole set of political and ethical literature is integral – no rhetorical 
invention would be possible without presupposing that the questions arising from the invention 
somehow refer to existing examples and answers. In some ways, thus, the book is thought to be 
a way to organise and collect existing materials for the particularities of a rhetorical situation. 
  Fourthly, Vives originally composed the work in the form of a manuscript on the 
petition of his friend, one of the humanist-minded members of the court, the Lord of Praet. This 
probably in Vives's mind guaranteed the unproblematic character of the people reading the work 
and using its precepts. In other words, the potential readers were understood to be members or 
friends of the Erasmian community of wise, which in itself implied a certain notion of moral 
character. Controlling rhetorical performance merely by rewriting rhetorical theory, places, and 
commonplaces is always insufficient because of the irreducibly dynamic nature of all rhetorical 
production. This is why it is ultimately character that guarantees the responsible use of the 
dissimulative art of rhetoric. Furthermore, even when Vives decided to print De consultatione 
with his De ratione dicendi it is clear that he meant it for a relatively constricted audience.384  
  Thus, De consultatione appears as a booklet that mitigates between the world of 
concord of the counsellor, and the passionate discord of the one advised, by employing 
rhetorical precepts. Just as More’s Utopia had shown, this was full of tensions. One of the main 
points of the difficulties of counselling in the first part of Utopia is that inside the maxims the 
prince would accept as premises it is hard to defend a moral case. This problem was widely 
recognized by classical sources. Already in classical rhetoric the question of what kind of 
opinions should form the basis of rhetorical argumentation was very much present, since all 
authorities on the matter somehow followed Aristotle in that rhetoric always takes as its point 
of departure generally accepted opinions.385 Cicero in his De Oratore had also argued strongly 
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384 See Chapter eight.  




that excellence in rhetoric depended on its capacity to adapt to common usage, and to the mental 
capacity of the untutored.386 Depending on the audience and the social structure of generally 
accepted opinions that could be popular or more exclusive, rhetorical theory could potentially 
deal only with socially accepted values and truths, bringing with it a distinctively social touch 
that could or could not be accentuated in particular treatises.387 In Vives's De consultatione, the 
generally accepted opinions are mostly reinterpreted as the princes’ world of ideas.388 Thus, 
despite of the plea that the category of honesty is based on Christian concepts, one has to be 
aware that the deliberator is not able to judge rightly on the nature of things. Thus, one has to 
start from the kind of general maxims he would accept, and argue one’s case inside these limits 
without turning into a flatterer.389 
  A similar tension could also be discussed through the age-old question of the 
relationship between the honest and the expedient by connecting them to the level of the 
audience.390 Vives, like most writers on rhetoric, strongly defends the union of the expedient 
and the honest, and vehemently reminds the reader that they have to go together, although the 
Roman populus, according to the Valencian, proclaimed expediency as more important.391 Here 
Vives follows a long tradition of humanist thought that tried to argue for the exact congruence 
of the two in politics – a view that could be traced back to Cicero's De Officiis.392 There was, 
however, an acute awareness that in the performance of counselling itself, the honourable and 
the expedient could be in contradiction – something that was connected to the level of 
understanding of the audience. Quintilian had touched upon the problem uniting it exactly with 
                                                          
opinions of the wise, see Aristotle: “Topica” (trans. Forster), 265-739 in Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, Topica, 
Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1960, i.i. In Roman tradition this is 
rarely put into explicit words yet all treatises of deliberative rhetoric are places to gather communal opinions and 
ways of arguing for the orator. 
386 Cicero: De oratore, i.iii.12: “... [oratory] is concerned in some measure with the common practice, custom, and 
speech of mankind, so that, whereas in all other arts that which is most excellent which is farthest removed from 
the understanding and mental capacity of the untrained, in oratory the very cardinal sin is to depart from the 
language of everyday life, and the usage approved by the sense of the community.”  
387 Cicero makes the difference between popular and exclusive audiences explicit; see Cicero: De finibus, 
ii.vi.17. See also Peltonen 2012, 27-41. 
388 Quintilian: IO, iii.viii.38-39.  
389 This tension was recognised by many contemporaries, see for instance Fonseca to Erasmus, Allen 2003, 70-72: 
“Sed plenum periculi est negotium, plenum difficultatis. Aut enim optimatibus foede assentandum, aut eorum 
moribus conutium odiose faciendum.”  
390 See for instance Quintilian: IO, iii.viii.2.   
391 Vives: DCO, 253, 254: “Olim Romanus populus saepe numero in deliberationibus illud usurpabat, Vincat 
utilitas.”; “Execrabatur Socrates, qui primus honestum & utile natura coherentia opinione disiunxisset....” 
392 In Ad Herennium their possible contradiction is depicted, see Ad Herennium iii.v. In De officiis Cicero argues 
for their congruence, see the book III and especially Cicero: De officiis, iii.xxxiii.119. In his commentaries on 
Augustine Vives discusses the Roman proverb “the State cannot be governed without injustice” presenting, 




the character of the audience, arguing that if we are advising many, we must be aware that 
inexperienced people are prone to dissociate the useful from the honourable, whereas the wise 
– the senate – do not make the same mistake. Furthermore, in the case where advice is given to 
just one person, then his character limits our possibilities of having a say. If the men we are 
advising are bad, one should not persuade them by appealing to honour, “but to praise, public 
opinion, and (if these vanities are ineffectual) the future advantages, or, even more, by pointing 
out some frightening consequences of taking the opposite course.”393 Moreover, Quintilian 
explicitly claimed that rhetorical persuasion was needed when the character of those addressed 
did not live up to the expectations, “It is very easy to commend an honourable course to 
honourable men; but if we try to ensure the right action from persons of bad character, we must 
take care not to seem to be criticising their very different way of life.”394 Despite the fact that 
Vives reminds the reader of the exact congruence of the two, the whole treatise is built on the 
premise that in the mind of the one advised a break between the honest and the useful is often 
indeed the point of departure. However, inside this world of discord De consultatione shows 
ways of finding one’s way in politics in the best possible way. 
 
De Consultatione as Rhetoric of Counselling 
 
Although Vives’s claim to originality at the beginning of the work should not be taken at face 
value, he takes as his starting point the basic rhetorical and contextual rule that different 
situations and times demand different kinds of precepts.395 Just like his later De ratione dicendi 
that significantly alters the traditional division of rhetoric into three genres by introducing 
multiple new ways of writing more suitable for early sixteenth-century context, Vives’s De 
consultatione starts with the claim that the places of argumentation should be “exposed 
according to a new method.” Here he is hinting, among other things, at a temporal and 
contextual gap that separates traditional books on rhetorical invention regarding the deliberative 
                                                          
393 Quintilian: IO, iii.viii.39: “...permovendus, sed laude, vulgi opinione, et, si parum proficiet haec vanitas, 
secutura ex his utilitate, aliquanto vero magis obiciendo aliquos, si diversa fecerint, metus.” The same distinction 
between the many and the wise was widely known in classical antiquity. Plutarch, for example, referred to it in his 
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Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1966, 9: “For to please the multitude is to displease 
the wise.” 
394 Quintilian: IO, iii.viii.38-39: “Et honesta quidem honestis suadere facillimum est; si vero apud turpes recta 
optinere conabimur, ne videamur exprobare diversam vitae sectam cavendum.” 




genre.396 Thus, rhetorical theory itself is not ahistorical but partially subjected to modifications 
in accordance with the changes in surrounding context, something that becomes explicit on 
numerous occasions in the work, and is well in accordance with the more general Erasmian 
understanding of the art of eloquence – most clearly manifested in the Dutch humanists’s 
famous dialogue entitled Ciceronianus.397 The fact that the work was always printed together 
with De ratione dicendi from the 1530s onwards seems to emphasize the submission of the 
deliberative genre to a more general theory of rhetorical persuasion. However, many aspects of 
the work show that Vives never made the effort to merge it with an overarching general theory 
of argumentation where its relationship to dialectic and other rhetorical genres would be 
harmonized when he published it in 1533.398 
  Yet, there are two points one should emphasise regarding De consultatione’s 
relation to the later De ratione dicendi. First, it represents the only genre that draws explicitly 
from the tradition of deliberative rhetoric in the totality of Vives’s treatment on the art of 
eloquence. Secondly, its structure built on an analysis of the persons involved in a rhetorical 
situation is loosely based on applying the general precepts – set out in Vives’s exposition of 
decorum (appropriateness) in De ratione – to the specific case of deliberations.399 Thus, 
although there is no general treatment of rhetoric or dialectic by Vives from the 1520s, the work 
can be seen as aspiring to cover only a limited part of rhetorical theory, namely counselling, not 
the totality of rhetorical precepts. Vives himself was very clear about this in De consultatione, 
claiming that he “writes on the deliberative genre” on the petition of the Lord of Praet, adding 
a little later that the part on invention only deals with suasoria.400 
  I agree with van der Poel that Vives's work adopts a rather flexible notion of the 
concept of deliberations as to the contexts in which they are needed.401 Unlike classical treatises 
written primarily for the institutional and oral context of the Roman republic, Vives is writing 
                                                          
396 Vives: DCO, 233: “...inventio tota ex locis argumentorum sumitur, qui mihi aut repetendi erunt hoc loco, aut 
certa quadam & nova ratione proponendi....” 
397 Vives De consultatione emphasizes this, see Vives: DCO, 247-250. One of the central points of Erasmus’s 
Ciceronianus is to defend the historicity of language and rhetoric, see Mañas Núñez 2009, 37-48; Fumaroli 1980, 
92-110.  
398 In his De ratione dicendi, and also in his De disciplinis from 1531 Vives delimits the scope of rhetoric mainly 
to elocution. Yet, his De consultatione is largely dedicated to invention (inventio). Vives: DD, 143: “Elocutio 
magis artis huius est propria....” 
399 Vives: DR, 134-170. 
400 Vives: DCO, 233, 234: “...de genere deliberativo separatim a reliquo artis Rhetoricae corpore scribam.”; “Ita 
nos primo loco de inventione suasoriarum disseremus.” Suasoria was really a ficitonal exercise in deliberative 
rhetoric but Vives most certainly refers to it here in a more general sense as deliberative rhetoric. 




here to a counsellor of the prince. In Vives's case, it is clear that the precepts of the work could 
be applied both to oral counselling and to written pieces. In fact, the complete absence of two 
traditional parts of rhetoric – delivery and memory – point to an understanding of counselling 
that could be primarily written.402 Moreover, Vives’s idea that was amplified in his later De 
disciplinis that destructive rhetoric in Rome and Athens was partly due to the momentous and 
swift nature of speaking in those political cultures, hints at the fact that one could be more 
optimistic about the possibilities of a purely literary rhetoric.403 Furthermore, the general 
headings meant for the analysis of the persons involved would imply a rather flexible idea of 
the status of the counsellor, since they present different strategies depending on the distance 
and relationship one might hold with respect to the prince. This strongly implies that the one 
advising might not in fact be very close to the ruler. Thus, even if De consultatione is a book 
for actual counsellors operating close to the prince, as was the case of the ambassador the Lord 
of Praet, the precepts could be applied equally well by a humanist looking for a possibility to 
express his opinion in writing. This makes it more understandable why Vives indeed decided to 
publish it as part of his rhetorical corpus in the 1530s.404 
  Finally, a broad understanding of the application of deliberative rhetoric might 
also be the reason why Vives never explicitly defines the subject matter of deliberations. Rather 
vaguer than what was common in the classical tradition, he states, “we deliberate on everything 
that is in our control, on questions demanding physical vigour as well as on the actions of the 
soul.” This implies an understanding of deliberation that could be extended far beyond 
traditional political questions to religion, education, private matters, and a range of other issues 
where decisions were needed and that in a princely context were deemed socially, politically, 
and religiously significant.405 In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the themes related to the deliberative 
genre are explicitly mentioned. Ad Herennium and De invention also treat deliberative cases in 
a way that makes clear that possible questions are restricted to political issues debated in an 
                                                          
402 The fact that he is thinking about both possibilities is perceivable in a part where he recommends carefully 
composed written speeches that give the impression of a more serious thought. Vives: DCO, 247. More generally, 
one of the characteristics of Erasmus’s rhetorical oeuvre was its pronounced emphasis on written rhetoric, see 
Mack 2011, 76-77; Monfasani 1988, 198-200. 
403 Vives: DCO, 261: “Athenienses, quod ea celeritate uterentur, non diu imperium tenuisse: & Caesarem ruisse in 
mille facinora, diutius & maius cunctatores Lacedaemonios habuisse imperium....”; Vives: DD, 235-236.  
404 The possibility of counselling someone you hardly know and problems related to it are presented in the piece. 
See for instance Vives: DCO, 247-248. 
405 Vives: DCO, 239: “Ergo de omnibus quaecunque sunt in nostra potestate consultamus, de operibus manuum, 




actual moment of decision-making.406 What one finds, thus, is at least a partial redefinition or 
opening up of the subject matter, places, and media of traditional deliberative rhetoric with 
respect to the bulk of the classical tradition in a clear attempt to mould existing theory into a 
princely context. One thing, however, is quite absent in Vives’s exhibition of deliberations. 
Even though Vives understood the importance of a more general audience in the practice of 
writing, the deliberator or the judge of the issue discussed here is almost exclusively the prince. 
There is practically no analysis of how the activation of a third party – a general audience for 
instance – would affect the dynamics of counselling and the decision making of the prince. In 
other words, De consultatione does not offer a reflection on how the publishing of a deliberation 
to a wider audience could potentially change the way in which the genre should be approached, 
but focuses exclusively on persuading the prince in more immediate contexts. 
 
Rhetorical Invention in De consultatione 
 
Vives's basic rule before moving into topics is that one should ask general questions, both about 
the persons involved in the consultation, and about the contextual phenomena of the matter such 
as things discussed, the place, time, and the circumstances of discussion. General questions are 
a sort of an introduction to rhetorical places (loci, topoi); the places are nothing more than a 
tool to carry out this kind of analysis through more specific inquiries. In all rhetorical tradition, 
places were a set of headings that could be used for gathering material for one’s cases. Thus, 
they suggest questions that can be asked about anything relevant for deliberation, as well as 
point towards possible answers by connecting the questions asked to existing materials. The 
next few pages provide material in abundance for analysing these issues by asking questions 
drawn from a few general headings.407 The first part – the most comprehensive treatment of 
loci – is structured around the questions of what comes temporally and socially before, with 
and after the persons involved in the deliberation, that is: the deliberator, other counsellors, as 
well as the speaker. By far the largest treatment is given to the things that come with the 
                                                          
406 Aristotle famously declared that the most important topics of deliberations were ways and means, war and 
peace, defence of the country, imports and exports and legislation, Aristotle: Rhetoric, i.iv.7. In Ad Herennium 
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the Senate. See for instance Ad Herennium iii.ii. 
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counsellor or the deliberator, and here the general headings are his mind and his body.408  
  This means that by asking internal questions about persons, an orator or a writer 
can reconstruct the constitution of their mind, for example, the natural talent, prudence, manner, 
education, passions etc. of a given person. Vives offers, furthermore, ways to analyse what 
specific objects certain passions might imply for the person in question – a feature that could 
be found in Aristotle’s rhetoric that comprised the most ambitious exposition of passions.409 By 
asking external questions on the other hand, one can get an idea of his life, family, wealth, social 
status and a number of other issues. Vives also shows how the analysis can be extended through 
the general categories from questions around persons to what can be considered one of the 
central concepts of political deliberation – the commonwealth.410 With analogous questions, 
one can gather information about its history, laws, customs, military power, and various other 
aspects. The idea is clear: to gather as much material as possible, the relevance of which will 
then be analysed in relation to the problem at hand.411 Yet, and despite the fact that Vives shows 
the possible analogy to the analysis of commonwealths, one thing seems to be striking in this 
initial exposition of the loci; the material gathered in this way is not primarily meant for the 
treatment of certain thematic questions on specific problems of politics.412 This was the case in 
the classical tradition where topics were primarily employed for the analysis of a question 
debated.413 In De consultatione topics point to persons and their attributes, such as their 
instruments, opinions, social status, and relations. The focus on persons is understandable in the 
context of counselling; the adversity to overcome is not necessarily another deliberation 
presented by an adversary but the state of mind of the prince. De consultatione does not 
primarily portray an open debate in an institutional setting focused on a question, but ways of 
                                                          
408 Vives: DCO, 234: “...quae ante ipsam, quae cum ipsa, quae post ipsam.” George has categorized all the 
specific headings. See George 1992, 140. 
409 Vives’s analysis is not very comprehensive. He mainly writes that some passions have determined objects, 
Vives: DCO, 235. 
410 Vives explicitly uses the analogy between the individual and social body here. Thus, the same questions that 
can gather information on individuals also serve for the republica or civitas, the two terms employed by Vives 
here. Vives: DCO, 237: “Invenuintur proportione quadam haec in republica, aut civitate, sicut in unoquoque 
hominum.”   
411 Vives: DCO, 234-238. Vives states later explicitly what any reader of a rhetorical handbook would have 
known, namely that “the alphabets of invention” exposed here are situated to the place where they have their 
greatest force by “prudence and art” and that all places should not be used in all discourses. 
412 Towards the end of the part on invention, he does include a short section on how to think about and classify 
problems, see Vives: DCO, 261-263.  
413 For the importance of character, see Quintilian: IO, iii.viii.14-15. The part on deliberative rhetoric on Ad 
Herennium for instance, is heavily focused on the analysis of a question through the general headings of honestum 
and utile. An example of a question would be “Does it seem better to destroy Carthage, or to leave her standing?” 




guiding the prince in contexts that are more private and possibly through written deliberations 
such as letters. In fact, its closest link is to the letter-writing manuals of the Erasmian tradition 
that emphasize the analysis of the addressee as one of the keys to invention.414 
  In a traditional manner, Vives moves on to argue that deliberation is always about 
possible futures, in other words, about a possible course of action to be taken in an issue in 
which we can actually have a say.415 The next move Vives makes is crucial for his rhetorical 
politics, as it presents an analysis of how, from the point of view of the faculties of the soul, the 
persuasion of the prince is possible. The basic categories here are faculties and the will, since 
“he who can and has the will does it, but if one of the two is not there he will not do it.”416 
Faculties refer not only to external, but also internal possibilities, such as natural talent 
(ingenium), and to the possible possible impediments of the soul such as passions. The link to 
the list of headings is evident; in order to get a comprehensive understanding of the possibilities 
– both external and internal – of a given actor one has to run through the headings already 
mentioned. But equally as important is a good analysis of what the deliberator wants since 
“everything refers to the will of the one deliberating.” The will, of course, is naturally inclined 
to seek what is good, but this, as Vives is quick to point out, refers not so much to the criteria 
of reality as to people´s personal judgement, which can be erroneous.417 
 
Directing the Will 
 
The introduction of the notion of the will (voluntas) opens up explicitly two fronts of analysis 
in De consultatione: what everyone wants and what they should want. In some ways, the 
orators’ main task is to start with the analysis of the deliberator and especially his judgements 
of the good and the bad. This analysis should then be used to bring him as close as possible to 
what is considered to be the true standard of virtue as judged by Vives’s understanding of 
                                                          
414 Erasmus, Desiderius: Opus de conscribendis epistolis, quod quidam & mendosum, & mutilum aediderant, 
recognitum ab autore & locupletatum, Johann Froben, Basel 1522, 10-11, 17, 19; Mack 2011, 246.  
415 Vives: DCO, 238: “Deliberatio omnis ac electio de futuris est, non necessarriis, neque impossibilibus....”; 
Aristotle: Rhetoric, i.ii.12-13, i.iv. In Ad Herennium the fact that deliberative rhetoric is about choosing a right 
course of action is mentioned, Ad Herennium, iii.ii.2; Quintilian: IO, iii.viii.22. 
416 Vives: DCO, 239: “Tractantur haec perpensa voluntate & facultate, nam qui & potest, & vult, faciet, utique 
non facturus si alterum desit.” In classical tradition, the use of voluntas is different and does not play a role in 
rhetorical theory. 
417 Vives: DCO, 240: “...quoniam omnia ad voluntatem deliberantis referuntur.”; “...quae ad iudicia nostra 
referuntur magis, quam ad veritatem rerum.” The fact that our natural inclination to search good and avoid bad 
refers to our own judgement is one of the premises on which Vives’s third book of De anima on passions and 




Christian humanism, or at least use the deliberator’s assessment of the good and the bad to 
promote an honest course of action. The question in Vives’s mind is never only between two 
neutral opinions, but about bringing the other to reason, persuading him to follow the good, 
directing his will to a righteous path. Vives equates counselling with medicine of the soul that 
he calls the “art of curing” in a discussion on whether counselling should be based on experience 
or on universal rules opting for the latter, since they are “more stable and less exposed to 
deceit.”418 The idea of advising as curing underlines, of course, the Erasmian emphasis on 
teaching (docere) that lies in the very heart of its conception of rhetoric.419 It is exactly 
erroneous judgement of the true good in the actual world, understood to be the norm by the 
humanists, that has to be overcome or at least controlled.   
  What is more, this idea of teaching (docere) implied a very specific relationship 
between reason and power. In describing rhetorical deliberation as an attempt of the reason to 
persuade the blind will, Vives wonderfully demonstrates the inverted intellectual hierarchy 
between the counsellor and the prince. The prince’s world of ideas is not taken as the expression 
of a sovereign will that should be blindly listened to, but it is analysed only as a point of 
departure for rhetorical composition with the question of how he can be persuaded, brought to 
reason, and prevented from sinking into tyranny forever looming in the background. What was 
inherent in the writing of De consultatione – the interplay between an inner and outer 
deliberation creating a playful analogy between the counsellor and the prince, as well as the 
reason and the will – was explicitly stated in his later De pacificatione and De anima where 
Vives likened the prince to will (voluntas) and the counsellor to reason (ratio).420  
  In other works too Vives was very clear that a in a healthy monarchy or a princely 
regime, in questions of decision making the judgement of good counsellors is placed above that 
of the prince. Indeed, in his 1522 letter to the newly elected Pope Adrian he complained that 
some learned men were persuading princes – who were ruled by their passions – that every war 
was just, which implied the corrupted nature of those supposed to perform the duties of 
                                                          
418 Vives: DCO, 264: “Et quemadmodum in medendo sunt, qui solis consisi experimentis, suscipiunt aegrorum 
curam, quos greco verbo IMPERIKOS nominant; alii habent canones universales, quos ad singula rerum, quum 
locus poscit, deducunt.” This refers to the capacity to generalize the particular question to universal precepts. The 
link to Vives’s ideas on dialectic is evident as well as to Cicero’s treatment of general and particular questions in 
De oratore, Cicero: De oratore, ii.xxxiii-xxxiv.  
419 Chomarat 1980, 20-25. 
420 Vives: DA, 99-100; Vives: DP, C2-C3: “...ut Rex voluntas sit regni, Consiliarii vero mens eius, & ratio, & id 
quod nomen ipsum loquitur, consilium, cuius rei aptissimam concepit ac expressit imaginem, qui dixit, praestare 




reason.421 Good counselling that fulfilled a duty to teach reason was of utmost importance for 
princely regimes and it consists of uniting princely will with a true assessment of the nature of 
things through virtuous counselling. This was a point emphasized repeatedly by humanists.422 
Some of the examples mentioned by Vives in De consultatione testify clearly of this inverted 
intellectual hierarchy. A great example is Vives’s praise of the persuasive power of 
Demosthenes’ story on wolves and sheep.423 The story is about how a wolf, Alexander the Great, 
offers his friendship to and persuades a shepherd to give up his dogs – orators – the result being 
that the wolf, after getting rid of the watchful eyes of the dogs, eats the sheep. This, in the guise 
of a non-adversary tale, is as clear a metaphor of tyranny that breaks with the paternal duties of 
a Christian prince. Simultaneously it promotes the role of the watchdogs as guardians of the 
prince.  
  
The Question of Passions 
 
That Vives takes as a presupposition for rhetorical situations the incompleteness of the world 
around him is clearly manifested in his treatment of emotions and passions as a way of 
redirecting the will. In his treatment of emotions in De consultatione Vives reveals ways of 
persuading and controlling someone with different emotional judgements of good and bad. 
Vives's ambivalent notion of emotions is present here: on the one hand one has to use emotions, 
because the only way to redirect opinions rhetorically is through emotions, but on the other 
hand, the use of very strong and blind passions, potentially uncontrollable, should definitely be 
avoided. Hesitantly Vives states “passions of the soul should not be excited and thrown into 
disorder” admitting only that they can be “pinched” by “things themselves.”424 What is more, 
he is adamant in proclaiming: “You are a saintly counsellor if you do not light up those passions 
                                                          
421 Vives: De tumultibus, vi: “Sunt beatissime pater nonnulli docti homines, qui proximi & probati princibus 
magnaque apud illos authoritate, quum de bello consuluntur, ita de iusto & iniusto bello differunt, ut facile ex 
eorum oratione ansam Principes alioqui in suos affectus proni & praecipites arripiant existimandi quodlibet bellum 
modo placeat, iustum esse.” 
422 The importance of counselling for Erasmian humanists has, of course, been recognized before. See for 
example Skinner 1978, vol. 1, 213-221 Very often humanists remind the prince about the importance of choosing 
good counsellors in their political treatises. See Erasmus: Institutio, 46: “Alioqui tolerabilior est reipublicae 
status, ubi Princeps ipse malus est, quam ubi Principis amici mali.” 
423 Vives: DCO, 259: “Sunt inter exempla fabulae poetarum, & apologi, qui saepenumero magnam vim ad 
persuadendum afferunt: ut ille de cassita, qui est apud Gellium: & quod Demosthenes dixit de lupis & pastorbius 
ad populum Atheniensem, et similes.”  
424 Vives: DCO, 259: “Affectus non sunt in hoc genere, ut in aliis nonnullis, concitandi & perturbandi: propterea 




but calm and appease them. Persuasion is not worth so much, that in order to achieve it, you 
would want to be a bad person.”425 Even though Vives’s main reflections on emotions and 
passions happened only later in the context of his De anima, he most certainly subscribed to the 
typical dichotomy, well known in Roman rhetorical theory, between good ethical emotions that 
in the more Christian interpretations pointed towards a union in God, and disturbing passions 
on the other hand. His hesitance about strong passions, however, is in stark contrast with much 
of the Roman theory that described elaborate ways of using them, despite Quintilian’s insistence 
on the destructive side of passions.426 
  The most fundamental technique of emotional persuasion concerns the 
redescription of the ends the one deliberating has set himself. As an example of a twisted 
understanding of the ends of political action, Vives portrays a man who has set himself the goal 
of gaining power, and who will do everything in order to reach that objective – even destroy 
humankind. If one wants to redescribe the ends, one has to show that the goal set has to be 
understood through negative evaluative terms. According to the Spanish humanist, one should 
argue in these and other cases that what the prince has set as his final aim “is not magnanimity 
but cruelty, not glory but vanity, not honour, but an empty shadow, not magnificence but 
madness, not justice but injustice, not liberality but profusion, not fortitude but foolhardiness, 
not a dispute but a brawl, not erudition but fraud.”427 Here Vives is activating the resources of 
the rhetorical theory of neighbouring concepts according to which one can always find an 
opposite concept that can be employed to describe the same action but with a different 
normative value. Thus, neighbouring positive and negative evaluative terms compete for the 
description of exactly the same set of actions, something that highlights the flexibility of 
rhetorical production in coming up with normative statements.428  
  The redescription of the ends one has set is not, however, the only technique 
proposed. The other strategy deals more directly with the use of the passionate disorders of the 
ones we are advising by using a neighbouring passion to show in another light the action 
proposed. In the background to all this, there was a theory of passions that emphasized their 
                                                          
425 Vives: DCO, 259: “Verum sancti consultoris erit, non accendere hos affectus, sed sedare ac placare, nec est 
tanti persuasio, ut vir malus esse ob eam velis.” In another passage, Vives: DCO, 251 (erroneously numbered as 
252): “Nemo est qui non malit sibi caetera omnia, quam iudicium aut prudentiam detrahi....”   
426 Quintilian: IO, vi.ii.  
427 Vives: DCO, 260: “...non esse eam magnanimitatem, sed crudelitatem: non gloriam, sed vanitatem: non 
honorem, sed inanem umbram: non magnificentiam, sed vecordiam: non iustitiam, sed iniuriam: non liberalitatem, 
sed profusionem: temeritatem, non fortitudinem: rixas, non disputationem: captiones, non eruditionem....”  




interrelations and the possibility to counter one passion with another. Thus, Vives states, “strong 
passions should be countered with another passion considered of no less importance by the one 
deliberating,” and proceeds to give some examples.429 Thus, one can use the psychological 
disposition of the one advised in order to show that what he is seeking contains threats that 
appeal to some other passion of his. Naturally, conceptual flexibility of rhetoric is an integral 
part of how this can actually be done. 
  What is clear here is that the one being persuaded is not the prince envisioned by 
Erasmian educational schemes. It is taken for granted that motivating passions can be those that 
would be despised and nullified in northern humanist thinking, and even though strong passions 
should not be lit up, some ways of using the emotional dispositions of the princes are needed. 
What is more, the exact same passions that make man unfree in Vives’s mind serve as a point 
of departure for rhetorical composition. All this, in addition to being a presupposition in a 
conceptual sense, was also so in practice. Erasmus and Vives's letters amply testify to the fact 
that they were very well aware of the limitations of European princes, and that they understood 
their published eulogies to be ways of entering rhetorical persuasion.430 Rhetoric is essentially 
dealing with an incomplete world. It is a practice that gets its relevance exactly from the fact 
that the world is not living in a Morean utopia; there are wills that either have to be conquered 
or motivated by appealing to a distorted understanding of the true ends of human life since they 
are guided by reason that attributes incorrect evaluative terms to erroneous actions. One good 
example is the category of glory. 
  On the one hand, Vives's thinking, in line with the Erasmian currents of the time, 
rejected glory as a motivating principle because of its closeness to destructive passions and to 
improper evaluative criteria. Vives’s Vigilia, an amplification of Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis 
from the Republic published together with Cicero’s piece in a volume that enjoyed considerable 
success in the print market, is essentially about glory and problems related to it.431 In the 
Somnium compendium, Vives very consciously argues against a whole tradition of civic glory 
related to the exhibition of virtue, praised not only by Roman republican writers but also by a 
number of Italian quattrocento humanists, as well as the chivalric practices of his own time.432 
                                                          
429 Vives: DCO, 260: “Opponendum percussae affectioni, aliam affectionem apud ispum non minorem....”  
430 Erasmus to Dorp, Allen 337, 88-91. 
431 For its success, see González González 2007, 65.  
432 Vergerio: “De ingenuis”, 67-69. Despite underlining the importance of military virtues, the argument about the 
bestiality of war was a commonplace in Roman thought. Cicero, for instance, did argue for the primacy of peace 
regarding war as a demonstration of force suited for beasts. Cicero: De officiis, i.xi.34. Vives also dismisses this 




In one of the most emphatic moments, Scipio Africanus gives his opinion on glory to Pompeius. 
The paragraph that plays a key role already in Cicero’s text where eternal and mundane glories 
are juxtaposed is amplified into a long and eloquent treatment in Vives’s Vigilia. The treatment 
that brings some essential insight and depth to the concept shows how Vives intends to upgrade 
Cicero into a truly Erasmian humanist.433 In Vives’s Vigilia, Africanus starts by noting that 
Pompeius still has his eyes on earthly issues but that he is positive that Pompeius can raise his 
spirit and soul to higher matters. However, he is still worried about Pompeius’s possibilities to 
“easily shake off and to repudiate ambition and desire for glory,” the most seductive of vices 
that is yearned for and sought after even by men of good ingenium.434 This is because the nature 
of glory is interpreted erroneously. Africanus argues, “glory is indeed not borne out of vices, 
and it is not what ignorant and stupid multitude and capricious people judge it to be,” uniting 
glory with the social appreciation of the masses who are blind.435 True glory, on the other hand, 
is united with virtue, and especially the judgement of the wise.436 
  On the other hand, the political literature of the humanists uses the concept 
constantly in political treatises.437 Vives’s own De consultatione reproduces the idea in the form 
of a precept. Vives writes that “another ingenium” can be either “drawn or forced.” At times 
force has to be partly based on deceiving and seducing, so that “an ambitious man can be 
seduced through honor.”438 Furthermore, already in Vives’s list of things lingering somewhere 
                                                          
bellum, ut virtutem in eo, vigoremque animi & corporis ostentarent. Optari poterit tibi, sed longe diversa ratione. 
Illi enim vastando, sternendo, occidendo, cladem stragemque longe faciendo ac late magnam laudem, clarum 
nomen, immortalem parari gloriam arbitrabantur, ut eorum memoria sacrosancta esset mortalibus, quam magnam 
mortalium partem delevissent, & ii essent humano generi chari, qui adeo homines oderant, ut plurimos de 
possessionibus, de fortunis, plurimos de vita deiecissent, & grati bonis hominibus essent, quibus solis bellum 
faciebant latronibus & consceleratis comitati ac adiuti.” The court culture was very present in many royal practices 
of the Burgundy of the time. See for instance Martínez Millán 2005, 231-232.  
433 Cicero’s treatment of the theme in Somnium: “Sentio, inquit, te sedem etiam nunc hominum, ac Domum 
contemplari. Quae si tibi parva (ut est) ita videtur; Haec coelestia semper spectato, illa humana contemnito. Tu 
enim quam celebritatem sermonis hominum, aut quam expetendam consequi gloriam potes.” Vives: “Somnium”, 
59-61. 
434 Vives: “Somnium”, 126: “...non facile possis excutere & repudiare, ambitionem illam & gloriae cupiditatem.” 
435 Vives: “Somnium”, 126-127: “Neque enim gloria de vitiis unqum nascitur, neque gloria est quod imperita 
multitudo stulta & levis plebes iudicat, vel non iudicat potius.”  
436 Vives: “Somnium”, 127: “Vera namque gloria virtutem semper tanquam umbra corpus consequitur, 
sermonibusque et voce constat, eorum qui optime de summis virtutibus iudicant.”  
437 See Chapter four.  
438 Vives: DCO, 264: “Alienum ingenium corpusque; vel allicitur, vel cogitur. Allicimus aut recta ratione ostensa, 
ut honesto, pio, legibus: aut affectu eius capto. Id sit partim rationis viribus, partim dolo, qui illectamento aliquo 
tegitur: ut avarus pecunia capitur velut esca, voluptate delitiosus, honore ambitiosus....” In a letter to Cranevelt he 
writes that he would rather live with lions than with drunkards since lions can be drawn to wherever one wants to 
take them by using lion’s instincts. Thus, bestiality, if not cured, should be controlled, see Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 
30, 10-13: “cum leonibus vixero libentius, quam cum ebriosis; inest enim aliquis in leone sensus, ita ut eo illam 




between the honest and the good in De consultatione, one could find such social concepts that 
are effectively turned into faculties of persuasion.439 Thus, there is an acute awareness that, in 
a world where the moral constitution of men and especially rulers is far from perfect, one has 
to use traditional and false motivating principles in rhetorical persuasion. By redescribing glory 
and fame in attaching them to different actions – namely the perfecting of citizens in the prince’s 
case – one could try to use the vain and ambitious side of the ruler in order to advance Christian 
politics. Thus, theories based on glory are not to be understood as merely preceding the 
rhetorical situation: quite the contrary, they are evoked exactly because politics is 
conceptualized in rhetorical terms. 
 
Ethos as a Source of Persuasion 
 
What is clear in the analysis of rhetorical redescriptions and in the moving of the will is that it 
has to bring about a real (even though possibly a momentary) change in the way the deliberator 
understands the ends and the means of social life. This cannot be brought about if the changes 
do not touch upon emotions and passions. A new way of seeing things brings with it a new 
emotional attitude towards the objects of deliberation that affects the will. However, there was 
something else to persuasion: the speaker should also use his own ethos in bringing about a 
change in the prince.  
  Ethos, as was earlier argued, could refer to the true character of the one speaker – 
a notion that was connected to the ethical integrity of life as a member of the paucis one social 
interpretation of which was the Republic of Letters. Yet, in rhetorical tradition, the question was 
always of the possibilities of evoking or creating an ethos in the production of speech or text, 
and if no art of ethos building was used, one’s rhetorical capacities would diminish significantly. 
Character is presupposed as a prerequisite for a good orator, but in oratory itself ethos means 
primarily the getting across of a message Vives and other northern humanists would consider 
important, and hence, the focus is on the possibilities of rhetorical ethos building. Since De 
consultatione is not conversation, but oratory, some moulding of character is needed to meet 
the standards of the situation where what counts is appearance, and where the point of departure 
is framed by the kind of judgement that other people involved have of our character. 
                                                          
439 Vives: DCO, 241-242: “...acumen ingenii, iudicium, eruditio, dignitas, honor, laus, gloria, gratia, autoritas, 





  Vives's treatment makes the basic assumption of the rhetorical importance of 
ethos clear: “the same thing said by various people does not have the identical effectiveness.”440 
What follows is an introduction to character building in which the notion of appearing is key. 
In the very first sentence, Vives writes that “in advising two things are enormously powerful 
for persuasion, the reputation [here opinio] of honesty and prudence,” adding later in his 
analysis love.441 It is quite clear that Vives's language easily slides towards the impression one 
makes on the deliberator who is mostly, but not exclusively, analysed as the prince. Thus in this 
part virtues are virtues only as far as they are perceived as such by the deliberator. The whole 
section built under the general headings of honesty (probitas), love, and prudence, takes as its 
point of departure the corrupted nature of political reality and the people involved in the 
situation. This manifests itself in manifold and interesting ways. Vives opens up with an 
exposition of the category of honesty. The Spaniard claims that wisdom without honesty is 
worth nothing since we do not trust people we do not consider honest. According to him there 
are mainly two things that guarantee the honesty of our character, namely that we live “honestly 
and saintly,” and that our words and deeds are in no way in conflict with one another.442 Both 
suggestions underline the extra rhetorical dimension of ethos, since they are mainly concerned 
with advice for the totality of our life as constructing the right kind of authority to be persuasive 
– a point Vives might have taken from Augustine.443 But as was already seen in De 
consultatione these operate in a rhetorical framework: Vives argues explicitly that the famous 
Roman maxim according to which only a good man can be an orator is partly true, but only 
because a man who is not considered good would not be persuasive.444 Thus, life is viewed 
through its persuasive possibilities related to how it is perceived and portrayed. 
  In his treatment of love and prudence, this tension is even more apparent. The first 
thing Vives hurries to remind us about love is that it is of utmost important that it is believed 
that you love the person you are counselling.445 The very particular use of love in this context, 
                                                          
440 Vives: DCO, 244: “...eadem enim ad variis dicta, non idem efficiunt.” The same point is made in De 
disciplinis under authority, see Vives: DD, 596: “Non omnis persona eiusdem est autoritatis.” 
441 Vives: DCO, 244: “Duo sunt in consiliis potentissima ad persuadendum, opinio probitatis, & opinio 
prudentiae.” 
442 Vives: DCO, 244: “Existimatio probitatis duabus potissimum rebus vel paratur, vel confirmatur. Parabitur 
primum si honeste & sancte vivas, ac consulas, unde vetus illud, Vitam maxime persuadere. Nec est quod perinde 
avertat homines a persuasione, quam si vitam dictis videant dissentire.” 
443 Vives: DCO, 244-245; Augustine: De doctrina Christiana libri IIII, Eucharius Cervicornus, Köln 1529, 
iv.xxvii. 
444 Vives: DCO, 244-245: “Caput est apud Quintilianum, in extremo libro, non posse oratorem nisi virum bonum 
esse, quum aliis de causis, tum vero quod non persuadebit, nisi credatur talis....”  




as something gluing the counsellor to the person deliberating and enabling persuasion, is clearly 
exposed when Vives emphasizes: “the one deliberating most gladly hears to be loved, because 
that is truly pleasing and he really thinks that this is the case,” and that everyone believes 
themselves to be “most worthy of love.”446 A more explicit expression of how vanity and self-
love of the prince can be evoked is hard to find. In another passage he argues that one should 
always respond to love and “more so with a powerful person, a prince, whose friendship can do 
so much good, and whose wrath can cause so much destruction,” and that it is safer to call the 
prince “very stupid” than to say that one does not love him.447 
  Vives, moreover, compares love and general good reputation as sources of 
persuasion, and cannot decide between the two, still arguing that love guarantees we are well 
considered since “our friends seem us better than our enemies.”448 Rather than general Christian 
love, what is meant here is the kind of exclusive love reserved for friends or members of one’s 
party that also look after one’s personal interest. What is more, this is primarily a love that is 
recognized and understood by the one deliberating. For this reason, it is of utmost importance 
that “it appears that you are only thinking about the well-being and interest of the one you are 
advising and not that of yourself or someone else.”449 Just as in Erasmus’s Institutio, where the 
prince is told to try to make friends with “the best,” friendship, although approached from a 
technical standpoint, is understood here as a key concept gluing the prince together with good 
counsellors with all the connotations of trust and fidelity that loom in the background.450 
  Prudence, for its part, is treated in its double function as the virtue guiding the 
whole construction of a speech, and as an appearance of this virtue that enhances the 
believability of what we say. Clearly referring to its second function Vives states that we should 
avoid “demonstrations of arrogance.”451 On the same note, he gives very specific technical 
                                                          
446 Vives: DCO, 246: “& is qui consulit, laetissimo animo audit amari se: quoniam id est iucundissimum, & credit 
ita esse, propterea quod nullus tam parum sibi fauet, aut tam exacte se novit, quin censeat se multa habere, propter 
quae amore sit dignissimus.”  
447 Vives: DCO, 252 (erroneously numbered as 252): “...nihil autem est tam ingratum, tamque inhumanum, quam 
non respondere in amore illi, a quo sis provocatus: multo magis si sit potens, si princeps, cuius amicitia tantopere 
prodesse potest, & obesse odium: ita ut maiorem dent tolerantiae significationem, si quis eos stultissimos dixerit, 
quam si non satis principem diligere, ipso maxime audiente, aut aliquo per quem possit ad illius aures permanare.” 
448 Vives: DCO, 245: “...amici nostri semper meliores nobis esse videantur, quam inimici.”  
449 Vives: DCO, 245: “Ita totum consilium sic temperandum est, ut commoda & rem illius, qui consulit, videaris 
spectare: non tuam, vel alterius cuiusquam.” 
450 Erasmus: Institutio, 31: “Cum natura genuerit omneis homines liberos, & praeter naturam inducta sit servitus, 
quod ethnicorum etiam leges fatentur, cogita quam non conveniat, Christianum in Christianos usurpare dominium, 
quos nec leges servos esse voluerunt, & Christus ab omni servitute redemit.”; “Constulit igitur tuae maiestati, qui 
civium libertatem ac dignitatem tuetur.”  




advice by arguing that we should always ascribe the opinion we are arguing for, not to our own 
genius but to the one deliberating. This can be achieved, for instance, by arguing that we learned 
it all through the person who is consulting us, or because of a mission or task we were ascribed 
by him. Someone close to the king might say, for instance, that he learned it in the exercise of 
his duty – a strategy Cicero used to build his authority in the eyes of the Roman people 
according to Vives. Whereas love can be more openly exposed, the exhibition of prudence has 
to be more hidden and subtle, and all hints of anything resembling arrogance must be 
avoided.452 
  The impression that ethos building is really an art with its own rhetorical rules – 
not just something spontaneous emanating from our character – is strengthened when Vives 
unites these questions to possible complications of the process. Thus, for example, loyalty built 
on virtues is always exposed to envy, a threat Vives counters with a detailed list of ways of 
strengthening the ties uniting us to the deliberator. There is very little analysis of how to build 
systematically a rhetorical disposition but as a way of a general rule guiding all specific 
strategies of proceeding Vives suggests that “all along the oration we should try to avoid saying 
anything that diminishes the general opinion of honesty, friendship, and prudence, and aspire 
to augmenting it.” He moves on to advise that with people we do not know, “we should proceed 
with circumspection so that we do not exhibit any appearance of temerity, arrogance, 
imprudence or that we do not seem as if we are looking for personal advantage.”453 In what 
follows a set of specific rules is given for choosing the right tone in relation to the social 
position, moral character, and intellectual capacities we hold in relation to the person to whom 
we are talking. Once again, the contextual nature of Vives's treatment is exposed: the general 
categories of prudence, honesty, and love, are to be tailored to a variety of situations where the 
way we manage our ethos and relations with others in different ways is the key. The most 
interesting section deals with the managing of our relationship with the hierarchically superior. 
Vives is well aware that the rules of the game are significantly different from the republics of 
classical antiquity, where due to the equality of the persons involved, more liberality and 
directness in expression are possible. With princes and with nobles one has to be aware of the 
asymmetry of the situations, and of the dreadful consequences of inciting anger.454 Here, the 
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amicitiae, vel prudentiae imminuat: augeat potius quantum licebit.”; “...agendum circumspectius, ne qua species 
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managing of the relationship, taking a prince's prudence and wisdom in appearance for granted, 
directing him gently and with artfulness, as well as hiding and concealing possible 
disagreements, is of utmost importance for successful counselling. Somewhere in the 
background, one could hear echoes of the words of Peace in Erasmus’s Querela Pacis: “kings 
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4. Christian Peace under Good Princes 
 
Chapter four looks at Vives’s political texts of the 1520s on princely action and counselling. 
Rather than analysing all texts separately, the chapter sees them as partaking in an identifiable 
discourse on politics centred on the dichotomy between a good prince and a tyrant. This 
discourse can be found both in political deliberations meant for princes, in political texts printed 
for a wider audience, as well as in school exercises. This underlines the variety in contexts and 
audiences Vives is operating with. On a conceptual level, Vives, following closely Erasmus, 
argues that the primary duty of princes is to guarantee peace at all costs since it is only in peace 
that all other aspects of humanist Christian life become possible. The limits of a successful 
performance of the office of prince are not set merely by legal constraints but by the moral and 
virtuous nature of the prince. His self-governance can, however, only be guaranteed by the 
active and continuous performance of counselling that does not happen merely in the confines 
of existing institutions, but also in humanist literature more broadly conceived. Thus, Vives is 
both educating people in the performance of counselling, and realising a life of negotium in the 
service of the common good of Christendom, rather than of any one particular state. 
 
Vives’s Political Literature and its Context 
 
Vives put his literary skills and his intellectual ethos to work in moral and civic philosophy in 
the 1520s; his published literature in the years 1519 – 1529 was overwhelmingly of a political 
and social nature. Already his 1519 Opuscula varia had touched upon political and social 
themes, and two of the published texts, Praefatio in leges Ciceronis and Aedes legum, openly 
discussed questions related to law. In 1520, the Argumentum Somnium Scipionis Ciceroniani 
appeared first on its own (Thierry Martens, Louvain) and later that very same year together with 
Vives's own Somnium et Vigilia (J. Thibault Gorneens, Antwerp). In 1520 Vives's 
Declamationes Quinque Syllanae was printed by Michael Hillen. In addition to these, the 
critical edition of Augustine's De civitate Dei wit commentary, commissioned by Erasmus, 
appeared in 1522 from Froben's famous printing house in Basel. Despite its theological and 
encyclopaedic importance, the edition presented a number of views on a wide range of social 




the works published in the thoroughly political compendium entitled De Europae dissidiis & 
Republica, printed by de Croock in Bruges in 1526 were composed in these years. The works 
included in the compendium were his letter to the Dutch pope, Adrian of Utrecht, from 1522, 
Ad Adrianum VI Pontificem de tumultibus Europae, Vives’s Latin editions of Isocrates's 
orations Areopagitica and Ad Nicoclem dedicated to Cardinal Wolsey in 1523. In addition to 
these, two letters to Henry VIII from 1525 entitled De Rege Galliae capto and De regni 
administratione, bello, & pace were included, as well as a letter to the Bishop John Longland 
from 1524. Finally, the edition was completed with a fictional dialogue De Europae dissidiis et 
bello turcico composed in 1526. The famous De subventione pauperum on poor relief was 
written in 1525 and in early 1526, and it was published in autumn 1526 by De Croock.456 
Finally, Vives’s grandiose De concordia printed together with two shorter texts, De 
pacificatione and De conditione vitae sub turca, appeared in 1529 (Hillen). In short, these years 
witness a remarkable production of social and political literature varying in its scope and 
themes. The texts covered a wide range of issues in formats that varied from school texts to 
political deliberations pointing at the different places of political and social activity Vives was 
working in.  
The composition of these texts happened, however, in somewhat differing 
contexts with regards both to Vives’s personal life and the larger developments of European 
politics. Two interrelated themes have to be understood as forming the background of Vives 
and Dutch humanist thought more generally. The relationship between Habsburg princes and 
Dutch towns and provinces, as represented by the General Estates on the one hand, and on the 
other, the international relationship between the three big princely powerhouses of the European 
scene: England, France and the Habsburg dominions. Both of these discussions could be linked, 
furthermore, to the threat posed by the Turks who were advancing at an ever-increasing pace 
into the South East corner of the continent.  
 In 1519, when Vives discussed political and legal issues in his Opuscula varia he 
did so in a distinctively positive and optimistic moment. On the international level, the last 
years of the 1510s represented the culmination of pacifist humanist projects that had been 
developed and propagated in London, Mechelen, Brussels, and Paris, after a series of wars that 
had taken place mainly in the Italian peninsula between France and League of Cambrai led by 
                                                          




the Holy Roman Empire and England.457 In 1518, the Treaty of London designed by Cardinal 
Wolsey, the Lord Chancellor of England and the most powerful figure of the Tudor court until 
the late 1520s, was signed by the ambassadors of all European powers. According to the solemn 
treaty, all major European nations agreed, among other issues, to a non-aggression pact, which 
also required all to fight a party that would break the agreement.458 In 1520 a series of talks 
between European princes took place in the continent, culminating in the flamboyant meeting 
between Henry VIII and Francis I on the Field of the Cloth of Gold, where the intention was to 
end warfare for all time, no less. The dawning of a new age was tangible, not least because the 
realization of the dreams of a number of European humanists seemed to have been made true 
by three young princes, all of whom had been borne after 1490, and whose policies were to a 
certain extent affected by the currents of humanist political thought.459 This all should be 
accounted for when assessing the naïveté and utopianism of Erasmian policies: in their 
exhortations to peace in the tumultuous years of the 1520s many humanists working in the 
Imperial and English courts actually refer to an existing document signed by all European 
princes.  
 The optimism of the late 1510s, however, was short-lived. During the 1520s, the 
political situation of the Burgundian Netherlands and of Europe as a whole deteriorated 
dramatically from the vantage point of Vives, Erasmus, and the humanist project of peace more 
generally. In 1521, a war between Charles and Francis had broken out, and starting that year 
there were discussions between the imperial and English chancellors, Mercurio Gattinara and 
Thomas Wolsey, on a possible attack on the French soil. These negotiations, which resulted in 
the Treaty of Windsor in summer 1522, effectively signified an Anglo-Habsburg war against 
France. The early 1520s political outlook based on a Habsburg-English alliance against the 
French soon turned upside down after the battle of Pavia and the ensuing Treaty of Madrid 
between Charles and Francis, who was prisoner of the Emperor at the time.460 In May 1526, 
Francis, after having been released from his imprisonment in Spain, formed the league of 
Cognac together with the Pope, Milan, Venice, and Florence – openly challenging the Emperor 
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and nullifying the basic contents of the Treaty of Madrid he had signed under pressure.461 
England finally joined the league in the summer of 1527 after flirting with pro-French policies 
since at least 1525, and suddenly Charles was left very much alone.462 
 There was also a local dimension to the distinctively Dutch humanist thought of 
the time closely related to wider European developments. Since 1477, the Dutch provinces had 
been in the possession of the Habsburg family who had acquired the region through the marriage 
of Maximilian (who became the Holy Roman Emperor in 1493) to Mary of Burgundy. After 
Mary's death in 1482, Maximilian's relationship with the Dutch provinces had been extremely 
complicated partly as, according to their wedding contract, none of the two could inherit each 
other’s territories, but partly also because of the Great Privilege of 1477 that had reconfirmed 
many of their ancient privileges and liberties of the Dutch provinces. After 1477 Habsburg 
rulers failed to get a hold over the provinces, and the central government remained week by 
European standards and quite incapable of enforcing princely authority despite the success in 
nullifying the Great Privilege. In fact, already by the early sixteenth century, most towns and 
provinces of the Low Countries had developed a distinctively constitutionalist tradition and 
civic consciousness.463 Consequently, not only taxes but also questions related to warfare that 
legally pertained to the prince were constantly negotiated with the towns represented by the 
General Estates.464 Throughout the early years of the sixteenth century, before the reign of 
Charles V, the Estates had declined to finance Habsburg wars, pointing to the close connection 
between the European aspirations of the Habsburgs and the will of Dutch towns to finance 
them.465  
 A clear example of how the international and the local were entangled was the 
problem of the Duchy of Guelders that did not recognize Habsburg rule, and that was supported 
by France in its defiant and militaristic activities. When two factions emerged in the 1510s in 
the discussions between the Habsburg rulers and the towns on a possible war against the Duchy 
of Guelders people knew well that a choice of policy towards Guelders was linked to France, 
international relations, and ultimately, to the taxation of towns and the authority of the central 
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462 Treaty of the More on 30 of August 1525 signaled the beginning of close relations between England and France. 
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government. Erasmus, who was supporting a pro-French alliance lead by his protectors Jean 
Sauvage and the lord of Chièvres, was among others keenly aware of these connections. 466 In 
short, the question of war nationally and internationally was always tied to financial issues 
related to the relationship between the Habsburgs and the General Estates, and ultimately the 
powerful towns. An additional ingredient to the Dutch situation was the ascension of the young 
Charles, prince of the Dutch provinces, to the throne of Spain in 1516, and then to the imperial 
throne in 1519. The Low Countries were tied to international politics, something that the 
General Estates and the towns were to notice throughout the 1520s and 1530s. 
  
Vives’s Allegiance  
  
Vives’s own development as one of the prominent humanists occurred during these years with 
the help of the Erasmian Republic of Letters in the Low Countries. However, the contexts in 
which Vives performed his humanist work as a member of that Republic varied greatly due to 
the wider of developments of European politics. His first acquaintance with Erasmian 
humanism happened in the optimistic moment of the late 1510s when some sections of Dutch 
humanism were trying to secure the goodwill and favour of the young Charles.467 As an 
indication of this, the years spanning from 1515 to the early 1520s, witness some production of 
political texts, the most important of which were Thomas More’s Utopia – a common project 
of a number of Louvain humanists – and Erasmus's two main political texts: Querela Pacis and 
the Institutio Principis Christiani. Both of these works were written on the commission of Jean 
Sauvage and the Lord of Chièvres – powerful members of the court.468 These were by no means 
the only political texts printed in the Low Countries during the 1510s469 Different treatments 
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were partly incompatible with each other due to their literary form, and differed greatly as to 
their respective geographic aspirations. Some were written as histories, some as political 
treatises (Utopia), and they all employed moral and legal arguments to a different degree. 
However, irrespective of whether epideictic rhetoric of praise and blame, historiography, or the 
language of law were employed, all partake in the fundamental idea of reminding the ruler of 
his duties and teaching him virtuous conduct. In this way, the praise and blame of these treatises 
is not primarily about the assessment of past conduct, but about framing expectations for the 
future as well as about reminding the prince of the limits of his power. 
 Despite the importance of local and other political tracts, it was Erasmus’s 
Institutio Principis Christiani, printed by Thierry Martens three times in 1516, that undoubtedly 
represented the most far reaching and influential attempt to frame expectations for the young 
Charles. Institutio was, among other things, a piece of epideictic rhetoric, a sort of a mirror-of-
princes reminding the ruler of his virtues and vices as well as an instruction book on education 
and policymaking. Furthermore, like More’s Utopia, Institutio from 1516 onwards was very 
often printed together with a number of other works turning it into a truly comprehensive 
political compendium. In the first page of the 1516 Froben edition, the reader could discover 
that in addition to the Institutio, the book comprised Erasmus’s translation of Isocrates’s 
Nicocles, his own Panegyricus to the late Habsburgian Prince Philip, and Plutarch’s De 
discrimine adulatoris & amici (How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend). Thus, taken in its totality, 
the reader is offered a treatise that touches upon the important themes of politics, law, good 
education, and the selection of suitable counsellors. In addition, Erasmus’s Institutio was most 
openly connected to Vives’s own production, and explicitly woven together with his 
Declamationes Syllanae. In the dedication letter to Declamationes, the Valencian informed the 
reader that Prince Ferdinand's predisposition to learning, manifested by his reading of 
Erasmus's Institutio under the supervision of the doctor Juan de la Parra, led him him to dedicate 
the work to Charles’s brother.470  
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 In 1523, Vives sailed to England. It is, however, unlikely that the decision reflects 
a complete turn in his allegiances vis-à-vis his Habsburgian years. The exact nature of Vives’s 
relations and reasons during his English sojourn are hard to pin down. It has been quite 
convincingly suggested that Vives was closely connected to a powerful group of Tudor 
humanists in Henry’s court, spearheaded by the likes of Richard Pace, Cuthbert Tunstall, 
Bishop Fisher, and Thomas More, most of whom were friends of Erasmus.471 As is well known, 
this group had been influential in the late 1510s peace politics, and still vied in the 1520s for a 
Europe-wide peace under the protection of the Emperor Charles V. Thus, whereas Cardinal 
Wolsey, their chief opponent in the court and the most powerful man of England after Henry, 
has been seen as epitomizing a Realpolitik approach to an alliance with Charles, the humanist 
circle Vives was mostly acquainted with, hoped for a long-term Pax Christiana. This would be 
based on an alliance with the Emperor that was destined to be the starting point for a European 
wide peace.472   
 Yet, activities in English humanist circles by no means hindered other allegiances. 
Vives was well connected to the Habsburg representatives of the English court, spearheaded by 
Lord of Praet and the Queen Catherine of Aragon, Charles’s aunt.473 Furthermore, his constant 
trips to the mainland and his lively exchange of letters with Charles’s advisors – such as 
Cranevelt – show that Vives most certainly did not understand his cause in England to be in 
contradiction with his old Habsburg contacts. It seems very clear that Vives’s possibilities in 
England – at least from 1525 onwards – were closely tied up with the faith of the Aragonese 
queen. The change in general English climate vis-à-vis alliance with the Habsburgs coincided 
with a cooling of the relationship between the Spanish Queen Catherine. Henry himself was 
thinking about ways of nullifying his marriage with the Spanish queen, starting in from 1525 at 
least. After the Spanish-Imperial cause in the Tudor court had suffered a blow with the 1525 – 
1526 political turmoil, Vives’s activities on English soil are centred on the defence of the queen. 
Indeed, the Spaniard did defend her until an eventual break up between the Spanish scholar and 
Catherine occurred in 1528 primarily because the Valencian humanist advised the Queen not to 
defend herself in a trial that according to Vives was mere theatre the result of which being 
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472 Curtis 2008, 127-132. 
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It is symptomatic how Vives’s loss of position in the Tudor court immediately led 
him to reactivate his Habsburg connections in order to carve out a place in the Habsburg context. 
The way in which Vives actively sought Charles’s attention was one of the recurrent themes of 
his letters towards the late 1520s.475 Among others, Juan de Vergara’s letter to Vives written in 
December 1527 reveals that the Valencian was seeking the attention of the Emperor. In a 
soothing tone, Vergara assured Vives, “he has a great conception of you due to the praise I 
dedicate to you in his presence.”476 What is more, it is known that Vives did indeed establish a 
relationship with the Emperor, which allowed him to give counsel on educational and political 
issues throughout the 1530s, although the closeness of Vives to the Emperor is not easy to pin 
down. However, it does testify to a continuing interest to serve as an advisor of Charles, and 
somewhat breaks with the traditional interpretation that emphasized Vives’s isolation in the 
1530s.477 
 The way Vives moves around in the 1520s can also be interpreted through more 
local allegiances. His stay in England could have well been partially linked to his local contacts, 
since his family life happened in the Spanish merchant circles of Bruges, where Vives went on 
to marry the daughter of merchant family (Valldaura) in the spring of 1524. Flanders and Bruges 
in particular had close economic links with England that could be greatly disturbed by a war 
between Henry and Charles, and Vives himself was well aware of the logic of commercial 
relations as a member of a merchant family. In 1525, Vives himself was granted in England the 
license to import Gascogne wine and Toulouse wood, and to export corn, a license that must 
have been connected to the commercial activities of his family.478 However, it is not necessary 
to choose between different levels of allegiance in order to explain Vives’s activities in the 
Habsburg and Tudor courts. Rather, one can interpret Vives, a prominent member of the 
Republic of Letters, as serving the wider cause of European peace that was the precondition for 
all other commercial and intellectual activities that Vives’s humanist circles and own merchant 
family would judge as important. In this view, he utilises his positions and humanist authority 
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in different courts for the enhancement of a project of peace in rather flexible ways, and he is 
well aware that this project is of collective nature and has different spokespersons in different 
places.479 Moreover, his activity in the wider humanist circles did not seem to contradict his 
more local allegiances as a member of a Bruges merchant family, since the best way to promote 
the cause of Flanders’ merchants was to work for peace in the international environment.  
 Despite an ambivalent attitude Vives manifested to worldly possessions – 
declaring “nothing but virtue is beautiful and great” in an Erasmian spirit – his writings portray 
commerce as a precondition of spiritual and humanist renewal. This is wonderfully represented 
by De bello, & pace, where Vives argued that the cessation of commercial relations leads to a 
decline of generosity that “sustains men of study.”480 The idea of peace as a precondition for 
commerce must have resonated especially well in the merchant circles of Bruges. In the context 
of the 1488 rebellions, Bruges had made very clear that the duty of the prince was to guarantee 
peace and prosperity.481 Thomas More, who had famously close connection to commerce, wrote 
in 1524 to Vives’s friend Cranevelt, “as long as the fury of war grows everywhere, no-one can 
freely take care of one’s particular interests.”482 
 It is in these changing contexts that Vives’s political writings can be understood 
as varying contributions to the project of peace. First, one has the circa 1520 texts, spearheaded 
by Declamationes and Somnium, that are first and foremost about propagating a certain 
language of civic action and moral philosophy in the school context of Louvain. Secondly, the 
letters to the Pope Adrian and to Henry can be read as political deliberations, exhorting the 
recipient to action on very concrete matters such as the organization of a Church council or a 
peace among European nations. Hardly unsurprising, all texts written in the form of 
deliberations are composed in the more pessimistic years following the breakdown of peace. 
Thirdly, the same texts printed in 1526 with the dialogue De Europae dissidiis offer somewhat 
different readings since the future orientated deliberations presented in these letters referred to 
things in past. Pope Adrian has already passed away and Vives’s relations with the English king 
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had deteriorated to the point where his possibilities of convincing Henry of peaceful politics 
must have been marginal.483 Moreover, one of two letters composed directly after the news of 
the Battle of Pavia had reached England, argued that England should not take advantage of the 
situation, something that had become irrelevant in autumn 1526 when Francis I was not only 
free but had already formed the League of Cognac. However, the content of De Europae 
dissidiis printed in Bruges was by no means random. It creates a speculum where the central 
message of past deliberations, European religious and political peace, combined with a joint 
war against the Turk, was still well in line with the main goals of a generation of humanists in 
the latter part of the 1520s, when the battle of Mohács had created a renewed sense of 
urgency.484 Moreover, the language in which the Vivesian 1520 corpus was embedded drew 
heavily on the common humanist discourse of the time.  
 
Justice and Aequitas between Law and Ethics 
 
Because of the varying contexts and audiences of Vives’s 1520s literary production, the texts 
show different selections of style, length, and openness. However, despite Vives’s capacity to 
give truth different forms according to the ingenia of the audience, it is clear that what is 
moulded according to the requirements of a context stems from a relatively stable conceptual 
basis: all the texts partake in a distinctive discourse of politics, shared to different degrees by a 
number of northern humanists. Naturally, the basic language adopted by most northern 
humanists did not operate with concepts that would have been alien to the everyday discussion 
on politics throughout Europe. In the Low Countries, every well-informed citizen would have 
been very familiar with the central concepts of concord, justice, and peace and he would have 
known that the duty of the prince was to serve as a prudent minister of justice for the common 
good. Moreover, he would have known that in a dominium politicum et regale such as the Low 
Countries, the political community had the right to participate in the administration of issues 
concerning everyone.485 These same concepts, however, did refer back to the longer tradition 
of political thought and to the classical authors humanists were deliberately resuscitating in 
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educational contexts. In Vives’s case, his somewhat eclectic debt to the classical tradition 
spearheaded by Aristotle and Cicero was dominant. However, this tradition was filtered through 
the Christian humanist heritage of Erasmus and Guillaume Budé. Thus, although no system 
building is to be found in Vives, some basic conceptual presuppositions present throughout his 
literary production can be discerned in these years. 
What all northern humanist thinkers agreed on was that social life, as well as 
political communities, had to be based on justice – following the most important authorities of 
classical tradition such as Cicero, Plato and Isocrates. In his De officiis, Cicero had argued that 
in maintaining a commonwealth justice (iustitia) and charity (beneficentia) were needed. In a 
later paragraph, where Cicero linked cardinal virtues to specific themes, the Roman statesman 
treated justice in the context of human associations.486 Vives closely echoed Cicero and other 
classical thinkers in his Vigilia in arguing in the voice of Scipio Africanus for the centrality of 
justice as the glue of human associations – adding in the margins the maxim: “Justice is the 
bond of human associations” (Iusticia nodus humanae societatis), which indicated the central 
message of the passage.487 Justice, however, was not only the main glue of humans on the level 
of all associations (societas) according to Vives, but the primary task of the magistrates of a 
civitas was also to guarantee justice.488 These were not the only instances Vives underlined the 
centrality of justice as a basic bond between humans living in a commonwealth.489  
 The concept of justice evoked by humanists was of complicated semantic nature, 
and when it was employed in political deliberations, it was rarely defined, leaving it open to a 
variety of interpretations. However, whenever Vives reflected on the nature of law some basic 
assumptions always came up linking justice to natural and divine law, as well as to the 
Aristotelian concept of equity (epikeia, aequitas). His 1519 Opuscula varia comprised two texts 
on law, Praelectio in leges Ciceronis and Aedes legum, both of which united law and 
jurisprudence strongly with moral philosophy. As Matheeussen has shown, the thematic and 
composition of these texts was closely linked to the academic disputes of Louvain between 
humanists and scholastics. In this debate, the evocation of the philosophical nature of law was 
one of the strategies employed for bringing law under humanist textual criticism and philology 
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from the confines of the traditional specialists of Roman Law working in the mos italicus.490 
However, these polemics presented simultaneously a view on law that was repeated with minor 
differences in all Vives’s reflections on the theme, implying a number of issues for 
jurisprudence not only as an academic discipline but also as a language of civil science.  
 In his Praefatio in leges Ciceronis, Vives presented the lawgiver and the judge as 
a mitigator between natural and positive law. He had to be a philosopher since the study of 
natural law understood in a predominantly Stoic sense meant that positive law should be 
promulgated in accordance with the natural ends for which man was created. Since the question 
of man’s thelos and the correct way to get there, belonged to the subject matter of philosophy, 
the legislator needed an understanding of these issues together with a contextual knowledge of 
whether particular laws were suitable for “the circumstances, places, times [...] and the 
citizens.”491 It was, however, not enough that positive law was devised in accordance with the 
requirements of natural law but the active interpretation of the law also had to take place in 
right spirit, guaranteeing that no divergence from natural law could ever take place. Thus, Vives, 
following Aristotle, argued in his Aedes legum that the correction and interpretation of law was 
an essential part of epikeia, underlining greatly the importance of the judge as the spirit of the 
laws.492  
 At the heart of this interpretative task lay the concept of epikeia, the central 
concept of both Aedes legum and the parts on law found in De disciplinis – arguably Vives’s 
most substantial contribution to jurisprudence in his later years. Vives’s interest in epikeia did 
not happen in a contextual vacuum: Vives’s main reference point on law, Guillaume Budé, had 
linked Ulpian’s definition of jurisprudence as the art of the good and the equitous (ars boni et 
aequi) to the Aristotelian notion of epikeia with all the philosophical and political implications 
the concept could imply. Budé had given the old Aristotelian concept new centrality in his 
Annotationes in quatuor et viginti Pandectarum libros where he presented equity as a correction 
(emendatio) of written law, evoking the importance of the flexibility of interpretation in the 
spirit of epikeia. 493 In his commentaries on Augustine’s De civitate Dei, Vives praised Budé 
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exactly on explaining how jurists failed to grasp the meaning of Ulpian’s definition.494 In the 
humanist circles close to Erasmus, epikeia was also gaining importance: one of the leading 
authorities of legal studies in Louvain and Basel, Cantiuncula, based his understanding on law 
essentially on a notion of epikeia, which was endorsed by Erasmus himself.495 More generally, 
most humanist jurists of the first rank were familiar with the concept and reflected on it in 
various ways.496 
 In classical treatments of epikeia, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Aquinas’s 
Summa Theologica, epikeia complemented a merely legal notion of justice. As Aristotle argued, 
universal laws could not cover the infinite number of particular cases satisfyingly. Moreover, 
this was not accidental: it lay in the very nature of practical issues that all individual cases could 
never be covered by universal statements.497 In Vives’s Aedes legum epikeia performs the same 
function: it is the virtue of interpretation that guarantees the relationship of natural law to 
particular situations that can never be bridged by a mere interpretation of the letter of law. Vives 
writes about epikeia in a number of ways, making his debt to Aristotle explicit: it is the virtuous 
interpretation of the law according to the norm of law, the interpretation of the intention of the 
lawgiver in promulgating the law or, as he eloquently puts it, the “way, norm, reason, law, mind, 
sense, spirit, soul and life” of laws.498 However, whereas in Aristotle epikeia performs a more 
specific function inside a general theory of justice and law, in Vives’s Aedes legum epikeia is 
described in terms that make the letter of the law seem marginal, and always subject to the 
performance of this virtue in the act of interpretation. In this spirit, Vives evoked the Ciceronian 
commonplace that the “greatest justice” can be “the biggest injustice.”499 Thus, at the heart of 
Vives’s philosophical reflection on law is the lawgiver and interpreter of epikeia, and he never 
ventures to a systematization of specific problems of law in the manner of professional 
jurists.500  
A few themes tie Vives’s discussions on epikeia, natural law, and positive law 
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intrinsically to questions of good government. Firstly, what it meant to practice the virtue of 
epikeia could get a more specific interpretation in the ongoing discussions on the room of action 
of the princes conducted in the language of law. It opened up the possibility of criticising the 
actions of the powerful by referring to equity and the good that stated that positive law had to 
be in accordance with the common good, and interpreted in the right spirit. In this way, a law 
could be bad or interpreted incorrectly, if it served primarily the private interests of the 
powerful.501 Very much in this vein, Vives equated bad laws in his Aedes legum with laws that 
punished the vulnerable but did not reach those in power.502 There was a more particular way 
in which this language could be evoked in the critique of the possibilities of the prince to enlarge 
his room of action through deliberately malicious interpretations of law that only superficially 
covered a logic of bestial violence – the classical counterpart of lawfulness.503 The wonderful 
dialogue of De Europae dissidiis in which Vives embarked on a satirical analysis of the recent 
war in Italy between Charles V and Francis I, portrayed violence that was only superficially 
covered by law as the norm in power politics. At one point, in discussing what constitutes the 
right to geographical areas Tiresias – representing the humanist cause in its purest form in the 
dialogue – asks, “What else are these old rights than living roots from which a sequence of wars 
arises”? Such rights, according to Tiresias, are linked to the will to conquest, not to govern what 
one already has.504 Scipio, a warrior that represents a realist line of thought in De Europae, 
argued that the weapons of the princes really represented the sole right to “dominions and 
kingdoms.”505  
These critical ideas of law as an excuse to expand one’s room of action or 
possessions, and law as masking the rule of force by the strong could also be found in Budé’s 
letter to Lupset, printed for the first time in a 1517 edition of Utopia. This same point had also 
played a major role in Erasmus’s Institutio, where in a section entitled Enacting or amending 
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laws, the Dutchman had essentially tried to argue that laws should never serve private purposes, 
but rather the common good.506 All this was in line with the thoroughly Erasmian idea of law 
as something that protected citizens, as Erasmus made clear in his Institutio where he argued 
that law is something that makes men free.507 The basic idea of law as protecting the weak from 
bestiality is captured in Vives’s remark in his De concordia were he asks 
 
“What hope is left for poor citizens when they have lost in a storm the only port 
of justice and public tranquillity, if exactly those who publicly declare and promise to fight 
against injustice have their souls ready to cause wrongs?”508 
 
There were possibilities in existing legal languages that could also be employed 
for restricting the room for action of the prince. In some of his work, Vives expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the conceptualization found in Roman Law that the ruler is free from law 
(legibus solutus) in a plea for a good prince not to posit himself above the law but to be bound 
by it. Erasmus had made the argument in Institutio, and Vives wrote in his 1519 De initiis a 
passage on good lawgivers that “did not want to be free from law.”509 Furthermore, he was 
capable of evoking the typical constitutionalist argument in his take on law in De disciplinis 
according to which princes were constituted by the consent of the people to enhance the 
common good. Differently from some tenets of the constitutionalist tradition, Vives did admit 
that originally these princes were not bound by law but that this was exclusively predicated on 
their moral and prudential character. Thus, if the legal definition of the prince as free from law 
(legibus solutus) is understood in the right spirit and in its original context, it most certainly 
does not mean that current princes can do whatever they wish, as Vives is quick to point out.510  
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510 In De disciplinis Vives does admit that initially princes were not bound by law because of the greatness of their 




As often in the constitutionalist tradition and in Vives himself, the necessity to 
have princes in the first place is predicated on discord since in a simple and natural world of 
justice no political authority would be needed. In the new corrupted state, magna potestas, with 
the consent of the community, was given to very wise men of great judgement – specialists of 
epikeia who were free from passion, and who could enhance and sustain common good.511 De 
disciplinis was not Vives’s only reference to the constitutionalist tradition. In an outspoken 
section of De pacificatione, Vives deliberately discussed princes alongside magistrates, 
claiming that they were “elected by the people,” pointing out that they had sworn fidelity to 
laws.512 In a work that was part of a compendium dedicated to the Emperor, this was essentially 
a way of reminding him of the consensual nature of the politics of the Low Countries.  
Secondly, epikeia was not only meant as a possibility to criticise specific 
interpretations of law, but a certain culture of discussion centred on law more generally. 
Evoking epikeia opened up a space for redefining the academic discipline of law by claiming 
the philosophical status of jurisprudence. Whereas it was not uncommon in the early modern 
period for lawyers to use the philosophical basis of law as a justification of their own practice, 
in Vives it is systematically employed as a critique of the system of Roman Law within the 
confines of specific legal questions.513 Despite activating certain argumentative possibilities 
derived from the language of law, Vives was keen to argue more generally that talking politics 
in the technical language of law could never fill the gap between universal laws and particular 
cases. More specifically, in De disciplinis, Vives’s critique of legal tradition was fierce and 
linked to political history. The corruption of law goes hand in hand with the will of the prince 
– already ruled by his passions – to enact laws suitable for him with the aid of jurists. The 
following process of expanding written legal corpus with comments and interpretations is 
judged in profoundly negative terms as a process that alienated law from the common good and 
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epikeia, and makes the understanding of law by non-experts overly difficult.514 Ultimately, to 
cover all possible and hypothetical cases through the expansion of written law and casuistry is 
an impossible task – as Aristotle had shown in his Nicomachean Ethics. What is called for is a 
return to simple and reduced number of laws that are useful for people, and leave room for the 
practice of epikeia.515 Thus, Vives’s depiction of the development and expansion of written 
Roman Law is predominantly negative and linked to the rule of the powerful, social discord, 
and complication of original simplicity. In this spirit, Vives argued repeatedly in De disciplinis 
that true philological humanist jurisprudence should transcend the confines of Roman law, and 
focus on the universal aspect of epikeia. 
An indication of how Vives approaches the tradition of Roman law as a totality is 
that all classical jurists are grouped together, irrespective of their position on central questions 
of law. Thus, both Bartolus, one of the most famous legal writers on tyranny, is presented as 
part of the same tradition of law as Accursius – hardly an advocate of popular sovereignty. Like 
in many other humanist writers the whole tradition is woven together with an over-arching 
dichotomy of humanism and the darkness of scholasticism that transcends the particular points 
a given jurist is making.516 Vives’s assessment is, univocally more negative than that of 
Guillaume Budé, for instance, who acknowledged the greatness of Accursius and Bartolus – 
arguing that their failures were due to the times they had to live in.517 In assessing all of this, 
one should not rule out that Vives’s knowledge of the tradition of Roman Law might have been 
superficial. In the absence of specific discussions with the tradition, his specific knowledge of 
it is hard to decide. 
Still, there are strong implications for civic discussion in conceptualizing the 
whole tradition of Roman Law in negative terms as one of discord. The preference for paternal 
simplicity found ideally in Christian princes, and the hesitance to employ legal language in the 
conceptualization of the relationship between the prince and the people, equates to the hesitance 
to define the rights of people vis-à-vis tyranny. Thus, Vives’s philosophy of concord never 
delineates any kind of right to revolt or disobedience for the people but rather aspires to sustain 
concord inside the existing institutional framework.518 On a conceptual level, law predicated on 
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discord could be contrasted to the simple philosophy of Christian caritas, which could be 
condensed into Christ’s fundamental message of reciprocal love that should rule on all levels 
of human associations.519  
Thirdly, the most central point of all was that the use of epikeia simultaneously 
implied that all legal questions concerned, conceptually, moral philosophy. Since questions of 
law always comprised the possibility of the practice of virtue of epikeia, the failure of the 
lawgiver or a judge to promulgate or interpret law according to what was just according to 
natural law, was never merely a technical error, but intrinsically tied to his moral condition. In 
Vives’s later De disciplinis, the very first corruption of law is the corruption of legislators ruled 
by their passion and ignorance.520 As a conceptual consequence of this, breaking positive law 
is described as an ethical failure, meaning that unlawful princely action was not tyrannical 
solely because it could be judged as such in light of existing laws but because it was a break 
from natural law – an incapacity to live according to one’s nature. More concretely, despite the 
presence of certain legal arguments, monarchical and tyrannical action was predominantly 
discussed in the language of virtues and self-governance inherited from the mirror-of-princes 
tradition dating back to Seneca’s De clementia (On mercy), which had played a key role already 
in Erasmus’s Institutio.521 This shifts the focus from the language of law to the language of 
ethics, and from the professional lawyer to the humanist expert of moral philosophy more 
generally. The possibilities of the language of virtues were systematically employed by Vives 
throughout the spectrum of his political oeuvre: Vives’s most elaborate mirror-for-princes, De 
bello, & pace, drew predominantly from the language of self-governance and virtues reminding 
the ruler that he is the soul of the commonwealth and laws.522 
More specifically, the idea that natural law served as a yardstick for the 
assessment of political action had another link to discussions of duties and virtues since a life 
in accordance with natural law consisted essentially in virtue.523 In the case of the prince, the 
outward sign of virtue was a peaceful rule that enhanced common good, which meant the 
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perfecting of citizens in a life of virtue that was natural for men.524 A prince should be a doctor 
that cures the social body to its natural state. When referring to natural life, law or state, the 
concept for Vives had often some obvious prelapsarian connotations, since natural life is 
essentially about living according to one's Christian nature embodied in the unbroken 
relationship to God that preceded original sin.525 In his Vigilia, Vives solemnly proclaimed: 
 
“the love of one’s country is in accordance with human nature, it is something that restitutes 
man to his natural place, and that city of yours and those human laws, made according to the 
ones that govern heavenly kingdom, or brought to the earth by wise, divine men [will raise 
people] to the fountain of their origin.”526 
 
The idea of politics that emphasized the role of the prince as a doctor of the 
political body did have precedent in classical thought, although without the temporal and 
Christian framework of original sin. In Seneca’s De ira (On Anger), the teacher of Nero argued, 
“it becomes a guardian of the law, the ruler of the state, to heal human nature by the use of 
words, and these of the milder sort.”527 Erasmus, in his Institutio, drew heavily form the idea of 
the Christian ruler as a doctor of a political body and argued that laws should be above all 
persuasive, and aspire to perfecting citizens.528 In the same spirit, Vives’s De bello, & pace 
reminded the ruler that “princes should busy themselves in order to labour for and strive at 
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old one, see Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, ii.i; x.ix; Plato: Laws (trans. Bury), vols. I-II, Loeb Classical Library, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts/London 1961, vi: “These are our original principles; and do 
you now, fixing your eyes upon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought or ought not to be, praise and blame 
the laws—blame those which have not this power of making the citizen better, but embrace those which have; and 
with gladness receive and live in them; bidding a long farewell to other institutions which aim at goods, as they 
are termed, of a different kind.”  




making themselves and their people good.”529 This was not only to practice virtue but also to 
perform one’s duty as a prince.530 Once again, Vives’s De bello, & pace put forward a perfect 
example of how good government was about performing one’s duty:  
 
“But even more important than all these things is that the king fulfils his duty in 
governing his kingdom. Most certainly, in the case of a painter, a shepherd, a shoemaker, or a 
labourer, everyone mocks and dislikes him who they suspect cannot fulfil his duty. In the case 
of those who are important as well as those who are less important, it is considered ugly and 
despicable if they cannot excel in whatever they profess.”531 
 
Thus, a good prince reigned according to natural law: the successful performance 
of virtues and duties in the service of the common good meant that he was just and able to 
interpret and promulgate law in the spirit of epikeia. Ultimately, his main duty consisted in the 
perfecting of his citizens. 
Vives’s views on the merits and importance of law should not be taken lightly. 
The old contractual system of the Low Countries was based on consensus manifested by the 
joyeuses entrés, which served as a symbolic demonstration of the respect for the ancient rights 
and privileges of towns. This situation was largely visible in the debates between towns, 
represented by the General Estates, and the Burgundian and Habsburg princes. Simultaneously, 
and increasingly in the early sixteenth century, the importance of professionally trained jurists 
was increasing both in the Habsburg administration, and in the administration of the towns that 
created good career opportunities for trained men of letters.532 Thus, Vives’s point about the 
primacy of natural law, virtue, and aequitas together with a historical and philological 
understanding of jurisprudence and a great distaste for professional jurists occurs at a moment 
in which juridical education was the best way to guarantee a position in the administration of 
the prince. Furthermore, it was the best possible education for participation in the kind of 
                                                          
529 Vives: “De bello, & pace”, xv: “Quocirca omni studio Princibus laborandum, atque annitendum est, ut ipsi boni 
suos quoque bonos faciant.” 
530 Virtues and duties were closely connected in classical discussions. See for instance Cicero De officiis, book I. 
At the start of book II, Cicero argues that he has already shown “how duties are derived from moral rectitude, or 
rather from each of virtue’s four divisions.” Cicero: De officiis, ii.i.1  
531 Vives: “De bello, & pace”, xx: “Sed haec, atque alia, quaecunque dici possent, superat quod Rex sic 
administrando regno officio suo satisfacit. Quippe sive pictorem, sive pastorem, sive caligarium, sive fabrum, aut 
alium quemcunque nemo non tum ridet, tum est odit, qui explere munus susceptum non queat, adeo & in magnis 
& in parvis non praestare quod quisque profiteatur, turpe atque invisum habetur.” 




political discussions that would potentially be of interest to the prince by defining the lawful 
sphere of his actions. Thus, Vives’s explicit rejection of the language of technical jurisprudence 
is meant to be a critique of the authority of professional lawyers, as well as a way of expanding 
legal questions to the realm of larger humanist concerns, opening up the possibility of ethical 
discourses of tyranny and good government.533 Vives’s critical attitude clearly had a local 
element tied to the culture of consuetudo of the Low Countries. The centrality given to epikeia 
and to the right interpretation of very few laws resonated well in the framework of Flanders 
where the relationship to the count, Charles V, was essentially moderated through a simple 
culture of consensus not based on written documents.534 In accordance with a medieval political 
language found in the Low Countries, the prince should be the father of his state, the shepherd 
of his subjects, and he should prudently be reminded of that.535 
 
Christian Peace and the Turkish Threat 
 
What remains somewhat stable throughout the 1520s was not only the basic language and 
presuppositions in which politics was assessed, but also the more tangible demand Vives put 
forward: the duty of all princes to secure peace at all costs. This was not only Vives’s point: it 
was effectively the main concern of both Erasmus and the Tudor humanists active in Henry 
VIII’s court. Erasmus himself had provided the perfect and most persuasive laudatio of the 
importance of peace and concord in his Querela Pacis where he claimed that peace was the 
source of all that is good, and that it was the primary duty princes to guarantee this.536 The same 
theme in different forms was to develop into one the recurrent demands of humanist discourse 
of the 1510s and 1520s. The most grandiose and international manifestation of this was the 
Universal Peace of 1518 between the most prominent European princes.537  
 In practically all Vives’s individual texts of the period, peace is of central 
                                                          
533 Koenigsberger 2001, 5-15, 44, 75-86, 103; Tracy 1990, Chapter two. The influence of professional jurists was 
growing in other places too. For France, see de la Garanderie 1995, 18; Ridder-Symoens 1981, 277-301.  
534 In his De disciplinis Vives takes the example of Pannonia (Hungary) that was better ruled with its customary 
laws than with Roman Law interpreted by specialists. Vives: DD, 218.  
535 Blockmans 1988, 145-148.  
536 Erasmus: Querela, 5: “Etenim si ego Pax illa divorum simul & hominum voce laudata, fons, parens, altrix, 
ampliatrix, tutatrix, rerum bonarum omnium, quas vel caelum habet, vel terra.” The idea of peace is the 
precondition for the greatness of political communities is, of course, an old one, see Skinner 2002, vol. 2, 22.  
537 The orations of Richard Pace and Cuthbert Tunstall in the context of the Universal Peace of 1518 are perfect 
examples of a humanist discourse of peace and they have been connected to the development of Vives’s ideas, 




importance. Vives’s 1526 and 1529 political compendia are essentially focused on the 
possibilities of peace.538 The most far-reaching and all-encompassing understanding of peace 
found in Erasmus’s Querela pacis, and in numerous printed texts and letters of Vives, presented 
an interpretation of peace that went far beyond the confines of politics underlining the 
importance of a true peace in Christ as a precondition for the peacefulness of individual souls 
as well as for communal life.539 As Erasmus pointed out in his Querela, it was only through 
Christ that a reconciliation of man with himself and with others was ultimately possible – a 
reconciliation that signified a complete transformation, a restitution of man to his true nature.540 
Vives largely agreed with Erasmus on this point. Very generally, Vives had declared peace as 
the source of all that is good in a commentary on a passage in Augustine. In this passage, the 
bishop of Hippo distinguished between different layers of peace leading from the body and soul 
to a perfect harmony of the City of God, and ending with an all-encompassing notion of peace 
between all creatures as tranquillity of order.541 The idea of peace as tranquillity of order, 
harmony, and concord is also amplified at great length in Vives’s 1529 texts De concordia and 
De pacificatione.  
However, in some of his 1520s texts destined to the temporal rulers of Europe, 
Vives described peace in a way that could be interpreted primarily as the termination of warfare, 
referring naturally to the specific and urgent way a prince could contribute to a more profound 
Christian peace. In two of his published letters to Henry VIII Vives reminds the ruler – who is 
to his commonwealth “what a soul to a body” – of his pastoral and paternal duties towards the 
people, duties that demand the cessation of all violence.542 Both letters, De bello, & pace and 
De Francisco Galliae rege a Caesare capto, refer to a very specific worry Vives had in the post 
Pavian context in which the English reaction to the imprisonment of the French king was 
hanging in the air. The letters linked the securing of political peace to a more general idea of 
social concord by arguing that it is only in peace that other realms of life could flourish – from 
commerce and the private life of households to the arts, and religion. In this way, the 
maintaining and securing of peace must be the basic and most fundamental duty of the prince, 
                                                          
538 Calero has argued that peace is the central theme only in Vives’s 1529 compendium with the 1526 compendium 
being largely focused on politics. The fact that peace appears as a central theme in all the texts printed in the 1526 
compendium does not support a clear separation between the two, see Calero 1999, 15.  
539 See for instance Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 144, 14-22. 
540 See for instance Erasmus: Querela, 10: “Quid autem tam idem potest, quam eiusdem corporis membra?” 
541 Vives: VCA, xix.xiii: “In hoc capite ostendit Augustinus omnia bona pace constare, quod si ita est, mala omnia 
in discordia & dissensione sita erunt.” 




since it is only in a peaceful state that any of the other dimensions of humanist social programme 
become possible, ranging from the performance of virtues and justice, to education and 
commerce. As Vives put it “Only in peace can the goodness of the people remain untouched, 
since the activities that make men better are strengthened by peace, and suffer during wartime: 
the cultivation of arts and sciences, religion, laws, justice, negotiations, tranquillity, work.”543 
Very much in the same vein, he continued, “In peacetime all these things are guaranteed by the 
prince as he is the soul of the laws, the guarantor of public confidence and mediator of 
concord.”544  
 In other words, political peace is the precondition under which all other human 
and humanist activities directed towards the reformation of Christianity become possible, 
paving the way for the truly perfect peace in Christ that cuts through and transforms all levels 
of human existence.545 What is more, all this systematically united to the promise of glory that 
would follow a prince who dedicates himself to the arts of peace. In his De bello, & pace, Vives 
linked the securing of peace to Pax Romana:  
 
“Therefore a righteous and peaceful prince is followed rightly by these things; the praise of 
men of letters who owe the prince their otium. Augustus was most illustrious and praised by 
writers of all kind to whom he had provided the possibility of leisure with his prosperous 
peace extended to the whole globe thus obtaining a glory that is very rare among men.” 546 
 
What is taken up is social glory that relates not only to the relationship between 
prince’s action and conscience, but to the judgement of good and virtuous men – something 
Vives strongly emphasized in his commentaries on Augustine as well.547 
                                                          
543 Vives: “De bello, & pace”, xvii: “Unicus tempus conservandae bonitatis populi est pax. Nam ea quibus homines 
meliores fiunt pace vigent, languescunt bello, litterae, religio, leges, iusticia, negociatio, quies, opiscia, honesta 
per civitatem contractio, atque occupatio otium, & utilis.” 
544 Vives: “De bello, & pace”, xix: “Haec omnia in pace Principi debentur tanquam legum animae, sponsori 
publicae fidei, secuestri concordiae, unde qui hanc violant, contra pacem domini Regis dicunt fecisse.”  
545 This idea can be found in other humanist writers as well, see Fonseca to Erasmus, Allen 2003, 75-79. Vives 
grows increasingly sceptic of a truly Christian peace. See Vives to Erasmus, Allen 2061, 33-42; Vives to Cranevelt, 
CRA 261, 16-18; Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 266, 8-11.  
546 Vives: “De bello, & pace”, xix: “Idcirdo probum et quietum Principem iure haec omnia consequuntur, laus a 
litteratis, quam suum illi ocium debent, quo nomine clarissimus fuit Augustus Caesar concelebtarusque ab omni 
scriptorum genere, quibus ille festa pace toto orbe diffusa altissima fecerat ocia, nactusque est eam gloriam, quam 
es per gentes rarissima....”  
547 Vives: VCA, v.xii: “Haec est in universum gloria, sed de vera gloria Cic. III Tusculanae Quaestiones sic inquit: 
Est gloria solida quaedam res & espressa non adumbrata: ea est consentiens laus bonorum incorrupta vox bene 
iudicantium de excellente virtute, ea virtuti resonat tanquam imago.” Making the other point about God as the only 




 Vives did of course argue that a prince should contribute to the more profound 
peace through all possible means. He should give an example of virtuous conduct that has 
persuasive force for all other people.548 He should also serve as a patron of arts and participate 
in the restructuring of learning with his financial possibilities. But the role of the prince in 
bringing about true Christian concord should not be overestimated outside the confines of peace 
and warfare: much of Christian renewal rested on other domains of life. In Erasmus’s Institutio, 
the Dutch humanist suggested to the prince ways of occupying himself in the time of peace, 
which included active engagement and enhancement of his dominions, ranging from the 
improvement of the infrastructure of towns to the cultivation of land.549 Yet, the main point of 
Erasmus is to warn the prince about what he should not do. The prince should remember that 
he is not above law, that he should not change status quo for petty reasons, he should not tax 
heavily, he should guarantee the right interpretation of a relatively short legal corpus, and of 
course, ensure that no war should break out.550 By providing a positive content as to how law 
should be interpreted, and by advising about what the prince should do, Erasmus is clearly 
implying that he should not break the age-old consent (consuetudo) with the Estates and the 
towns.551 Even though a similar kind of explicit reference to the Dutch system is not found in 
Vives, partly because of the English dimension of some of his key political texts, his main points 
do not diverge so greatly from Erasmus. What is more, Vives’s own appreciation of Dutch 
towns, their privileges and government, shines clearly through in the more locally embedded 
De subventione on the social welfare of Bruges. In a description of man’s postlapsarian history, 
centred on the rise of different kinds of human associations from the natural social possibilities 
of man, the concord of political communities (civitas) is finally broken by the emergence of 
princes, who profit from the work of others without truly providing anything except for 
tyrannical rule.552 Furthermore, in his 1531 De disciplinis, Vives wrote in a tone that left very 
                                                          
aut ab humano die. Est humanum iudicium, quo quis ab hominibus bene vel male audit; cui contrarius est dies 
domini, qui intima cordis scrutatur, & iudicat.” 
548 Vives: “De bello, & pace”, xvii “Vides summam administrandi imperii in bonitate vertii tanquam in cardine, ut 
is demum habiturus sit principatum iucundum ac stabilem, quisquis effecerit cives probos, facillime facturus tales 
exemplo sui. Nemo fert enim exigere quenquam ab aliis, quod ipse non praestet, nec frustra dicitur, vitam maxime 
persuadere.” 
549 Erasmus: Institutio, 61-63. The section is entitled De principum occupationibus in pace. Tracy has argued that 
Erasmus had a deep mistrust towards the Habsburg government, see Tracy 1978, 128.  
550 Erasmus: Institutio, 61-63.  
551 Erasmus: Institutio, 50 -57, 61-63. The section is entitled De legibus condendis aut emenandis. Tracy 1978, 35-
38.  
552 Vives, Juan Luis: De subventione pauperum. De humanis necessitatibus libri II. Ad senatum Brugensem. Prior 




little doubt as to where his preferences rested concerning princes, when he claimed, “they 
consider very greatly those who take from the poor what adds to the dignity of the princes” and, 
“everyone who reminds him [the prince] of public prosperity and the liberty and tranquillity of 
the people is considered seditious.”553 Furthermore, Vives does indeed present similar views on 
the necessity to tax lightly, to guarantee the existing legal system, or to secure peace under all 
circumstances already in his 1520s political literature, and while these are not specifically 
destined to the Dutch context, all these texts were indeed printed in the Low Countries.554 
Despite his constant plea for peace and concord throughout the 1520s, the Turkish 
threat complicated this. Even though concord and peace should be advanced in Christendom, 
Vives – like many other humanists – was one of the spokespersons of at least a defensive war 
against the Turks in the middle of the 1520s. There are very specific issues that arise here. As a 
servant to the Queen in the English court attached to Habsburg politics, a court he had served 
in the past, the election of Turks as the primary opponent at the very moment in which they 
emerge as a possible ally of France, was far from being only a general intellectual stance.555 
Yet, Vives’s participation in an ongoing policy campaign against the Ottomans had a strong 
conceptual basis: they represented a threat to Christian life and concord, a threat that had 
become a recurrent commonplace in humanist discourse at least since the 1510s.556  
 Vives has also repeatedly referred to the Turkish threat before his 1526 
compendium.557 One of the central points of his 1526 compendium is that the discord and 
warfare between European princes ultimately would allow the Turk to conquer Christendom 
and make impossible any kind of practice of Christian life. In a more political sense, Vives 
comes to associate Turkish rule with exactly the kind of political phenomena that go with 
tyranny: arbitrariness of rule, lack of legalist tradition, and no possibility to have an effect 
                                                          
Av: “Hactenus quidem pulchre illi & concorditer inter se agitabant, sed avitum malum non paucos vexavit aliis 
praeeminendi, imo vero premendi, ut ociosi & honorati alienis laboribus fruerentur, ceteri imperata facerent, ipsi 
regno & potentia conspicui, stipati manu eorum quos vel arte vel metu in consensum tyrannidis suae pertraxissent, 
hoc ex ambitione illa proauthorum est natum, qua sibi spem divinitatis praesumpserant.” In the absence of page 
numbers, I have used signature marks to identify quotes. It indicates the next signature mark following the quote.  
553 Vives: DD, 205: “...ut eum putet esse sidissimum sibi; quisquis de misero populo detrahit, quod addat principis 
dignitati, quae iam quo crescat non habet: & in seditiosis habeatur, quisquis de commodis publicis, de libertate 
populi, de quiete eius audeat vel meminisse.”  
554 See especially Vives: “De bello, & pace”. See also Vives: DC, book 3. 
555 Starting from late 1525 the French were trying to establish an alliance with the Turks. See Knecht 2001, 124.  
556 In Erasmus’s Querela, the general attitude towards the Turks seems still to be rather peaceful. See Erasmus: 
Querela, 16.  
557 Vives to Erasmus, Allen 1362, 74-75; Vives to John Longland, “Ioannes Lodovicus Vives D. Ioanni Episcopo 
Lincolniensi” (printed in De Europae); Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 47, 13-14; Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 185, 16-21; 




through the performance of the active life.558 Thus, if the duty of a Christian prince is to 
guarantee the possibilities of not only political peace, but of Christian life more generally, than 
the duty to take arms for Christian Europe should not be disregarded since the possibilities of a 
Christian peace and concord are dependent on a successful defence against the Turk. Peace and 
concord are not of universal extension, but are rather closely tied to the life of concord between 
Christian states, to a concord that transcends the purely political dimension. 
 In addition to these conceptual reasons for fighting the Ottomans, the crusade 
against the Turks offered a possibility to redirect the existing hunger for glory associated with 
warfare. In the dialogue De Europae dissidiis et bello turco, by far the longest speech – a true 
exercise in deliberative oratory – is delivered by Scipio Africanus (one of the few traditional 
military heroes of the Erasmian circles) who calls for a collective European crusade against the 
Turks. In Scipio’s speech, the existing interpretation of military glory is not redescribed, but 
used for the advancement of the cause.559 In many ways, Scipio, in doing this is speaking in 
accordance with the conceptual framework of Italian quattrocento humanism, where the 
defence of one’s homeland and one’s fellow citizens was indeed a major exhibition of virtue 
and an important source of civic glory.560 The fact that this is done in a dialogue gives Vives 
freedom to manoeuvre; rather than openly promoting the cause, he portrays it as a possible 
course of action, albeit quite a tempting one. Even though the dialogue is stuffed with Erasmian 
ethos, and that Scipio’s opinion is somehow framed by it, no explicit condemnation of his words 
is ever made. The openness of the dialogue is not coincidental; if one thinks of the dialogues 
were one of the interlocutors is introduced to make a case for an ultimately erroneous cause, 
the norm is to condemn the absurdity of their words with ridicule.561 Thus, Scipio’s opinion that 
follows the rules of deliberative rhetoric in proving the righteous and advantageous nature of 
the solution presented emerges from the dialogue as a very plausible course of action indeed. 
Alternatively, to be precise, if one does not want to follow the voice of pacifist reason found in 
Tiresias, one should at least follow Scipio’s advice that appeals to an erroneous notion of glory. 
 Scipio’s speech starts by aligning itself with the critique of the princes blinded by 
                                                          
558 See especially Vives, Juan Luis “De conditione vitae Christianorum sub Turca”, in Vives, Juan Luis: De 
concordia & discordia in humano genere libri quattuor. De pacificatione, liber unus: quam misera esset vita 
christianorum sub Turca liber unus, Michael Hillen, Antwerpen 1529.  
559 Vives: De Europae, xxxviii-xlii, as an introduction to the theme one could read in the margins “Scipionis de 
bello Turcico sententia.”  
560 See for instance Vergerio: “De ingenuis”, 67-69, 73.  
561 Good examples of the kind of closed dialogues are Erasmus’s Ciceronianus and the Erasmian critique of papacy 




their anger and discord, moving on to argue that it would be both more advantageous and more 
honourable to take the war to the Turk. He argues that if one wants money, riches, or land, then 
Asia is the best option because of its immeasurable wealth and its large territory. Much of the 
argument is also about making a detailed analysis of the weaknesses of the Turkish army and 
military structure, and about the use of historical examples for proving this could be achieved 
since Europeans had always been and still were by their very nature stronger than Asians were. 
In the end, if “the wind changed direction and you directed your hatred and anger against the 
Turk, you will learn to know the spirit of the Asians.”562 After the long speech by Scipio, 
Tiresias, effectively speaking in the name of Christian humanism in the dialogue, does not 
condemn but somehow incorporates Scipio’s ideas into his own position. In an Erasmian vein, 
Tiresias states that Europe’s strongest defence lies in Christ who guarantees mutual love and 
concord. Yet he continues by claiming that if the princes still “wish to augment their land, it 
would be better if they fought against a stranger and an enemy of the religion and not someone 
they are united to through blood and initiation to shared mysteries (Christ).” In a later 
paragraph, he goes explicitly to plea for a common defence of Germany.563  
 Thus, in a moment when the old Turkish threat was present in the aftermath of the 
loss of the Christian army in Mohács and when the Ottoman successes were closely related to 
the alliances and future of European affairs, Vives shows the flexibility of his rhetorical politics 
by incorporating an aggressive action aimed to appeal to the destructive side of princes. For the 
Valencian humanist, this was a way of redirecting the violent and ambitious impulses of princes 
to war, which could save the possibilities of a Christian reform programme in Europe.  
 
Sulla and the Case against Tyranny 
 
In addition to political deliberations, political concepts could be transported to texts that were 
primarily meant for an educational context. In this way, many of the commonplaces and 
arguments about tyranny and monarchy could be found in texts that were not primarily meant 
for princes or office holders, but to those in the highest echelon of literary training. A perfect 
example of this is Vives’s set of five fictional declamations: Declamationes Syllanae, printed 
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563 Vives: De Europae, xliii: “...aut si regnum liberet augere, alienissimum potius & pietatis hostem, bello 




in 1520. Where Veritas fucata and Somnium Scipionis yearned to dress Greek philosophy in 
Roman garb meant for the variety of ingenia, Declamationes showed how to put existing 
political commonplaces into motion in a persuasive way. With this respect, it might be 
symptomatic that Vives did not only underline the dependency of law and justice on philosophy 
and natural law, but also in a more general sense on scientia civilis and humanist dialectic.564 
As in De consultatione, the point of departure of Declamationes is that all normative concepts 
of political thought such as virtue, duties, common good, and justice could be understood in 
dynamic terms as claims that could cover different sets of actions. Just as Cicero could talk 
about the honest and the useful both in his rhetorical works and in his moral philosophical De 
officiis, Declamationes shows ways of situating one’s argument under the headings of honestum 
and utile. 565  
The political nature of the declamations has aroused some curiosity. 566 It has been 
pointed out that there is a possible conflict in Vives’s explicitly pronounced reasons for writing 
the work, since on the one hand Vives emphasizes greatly the fictional side of declamations as 
a genre together with the adaptation of arguments to characters and particular questions. On the 
other, Vives states that one can draw specific political lessons from the work.567 Indeed this 
tension runs through Declamationes where so much effort is put into reconstructing the 
specifically Roman situation around the time of Sulla and Marius with its linguistic and 
institutional specificities. Thus, one could not apply Decalmationes to current political 
situations in any simplistic way because some of the commonplaces reflect specifically Roman 
institutional and moral settings. Moreover, in Declamationes, the way the commonplaces reflect 
the character of the speaker and his intentions is crucial, and the arguments offered by Sulla’s 
speech, for instance, would not be regarded exemplary as such. Yet, it is clear that even though 
the Declamationes are not comparable with simple progymnasmata leading from grammatical 
commonplaces to rhetorical production in a simple sense, they did indeed serve didactic 
purposes in ways that are more refined as E. George has suggested.568  
The way the importance of declamation is highlighted as the most refined 
                                                          
564 Vives: PC, 109-112. 
565 As George has noticed, Vives mentions three reasons for writing the Declamationes: 1. Against the inarticulate 
flatterers (scholastics), 2. An example of art of declamation, not merely Progymnasmata linking grammar and 
rhetoric 3. Specific political lessons to Ferdinand. George 1989, 2-3.  
566 Some scholars have seen them as literary rather than political exercises. Lorenzo Riber for instance in his 
Spanish translation of the Opera Omnia situates Declamationes and the whole Somnium compendium under the 
general heading of Obras Filológicas (philological works) emphasizing their literary character. Riber 1947-1948.  
567 George 1989, 2-3. For an in-depth analysis, see George 1989b. 




rhetorical exercise in Vives’s De disciplinis had deep roots in the classical tradition: already 
Quintilian, the rhetorical teacher of classical antiquity par excellence accentuated their 
pedagogical significance and practical usefulness.569 They could be useful in various ways. 
First, one finds in these declamations a set of political arguments and commonplaces that can 
be arranged in a number of ways. Because of the heavily rhetorical nature of these literary 
pieces, it is hard to distinguish a certain overarching architecture of argumentation where all 
the themes would come together into a one single chain of hierarchically related thought. 
Rather, the texts are a collection of arguments drawn from places (loci) through the methods of 
inventio. The material gathered is then arranged into a speech according to the rules of 
disposition (dispositio), always keeping the ultimate goal of the argumentation, the role of the 
speaker, the audience, the time and the theme in mind in accordance with the rules of decorum. 
Thus, at the same time as they taught political arguments or political commonplaces drawn from 
the places, they also transmitted a certain practice or modality of politics that are ultimately 
rhetorical and dependent on a range of contextual phenomena surrounding the case. In 
Declamationes, understood as an educational text, these two are inseparable. 
However, the most important point of all is that the practice of rhetoric 
Declamationes portrays is clearly a rhetoric of counselling, where questions of good 
government and tyranny are treated in a context in which open speech is not always possible, 
and in which a mastery of decorum is needed. It, thus, mirrors many of the issues found in De 
consultatione in a theoretical form. One finds in Declamationes five different speeches, the first 
and second of which argued for the abdication of Sulla on both sides of the matter. The third 
one is Sulla’s own resignation speech, and the fourth and the fifth orations flow through the 
mouth of Lepidus dealing with Sulla’s condemnation and his possible public funerals 
respectively. The corpus of five speeches presents deliberations about future, assessments of 
the lawfulness of past actions, and moral evaluations of characters incorporating elements 
flexibly from different genres of classical rhetoric. This, naturally, points toward exactly the 
kind of rhetorical tasks Vives took to be potentially relevant in the princely context, where 
counselling and moral assessment of actions was of primary importance. All these features are 
even more pronounced in the 1538 edition printed in Basel, where Declamationes appear 
together with Quintilian’s Paries palmatus, and Vives’s response to Quintilian. Furthermore, 
                                                          
569 Quintilian: IO, ii.vi; ii.x. Quintilian higlights the importance of impersonation in deliberative exercises, 




Vives had included in the edition his translations of Isocrates’s orations Areopagitica and 
Nicocles, both dealing with questions of good government and the respective merits of 
monarchical and republican constitutions. Still, Vives had added four texts of his own from his 
1526 political compendium, all of which were clearly composed to advice the princes of the 
time on the most pressing issues of the moment.570 Finally, the dedication letter of the 
Declamationes to Ferdinand had been modified, although the 1538 edition still claimed that it 
was written in 1520. The new letter accentuated even more the contemporary relevance of the 
oratorical exercises reminding the reader that what was put in precepts in other works is 
presented in Declamationes in examples.571 Furthermore, like the 1520 edition, the 1538 
dedication emphasized the importance of guaranteeing the goodwill of subjects in presenting 
lessons that could be drawn by a prince from the Declamationes. The 1538 corpus is nothing 
less than a compendium of exemplary texts for advising that weaves the educational and 
fictional Declamationes together with texts treating contemporary issues, building a connection 
between Sulla and current princes that would be noticed by the reader. What is implied in the 
1520 edition – namely that the rhetorical situations of Declamationes can be helpful to present 
day counselling – is made even more explicit in the 1538 edition. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the general conceptual outlook of humanist political 
thought is regularly evoked in Declamationes. As George has argued, the Declamationes could 
be read as the dynamic and more eloquent counterpart of Erasmus’s Institutio, composed very 
much as a collection of commonplaces.572 The inherent flexibility of the concepts is brilliantly 
exemplified by Sulla whose speech is based on covering his actions with favourable normative 
vocabulary, although every humanist reader would have spotted the twisted nature of Sulla’s 
arguments that try to embellish an ultimately tyrannical action. It is important to notice that the 
rhetorical flexibility of normative vocabularies is not taken to its ultimate conclusion by Vives: 
                                                          
570 These texts were his letter to the Pope Adrian (De tumultibus Europae), two letters to Henry VIII (De Francisco 
Galliae Rege a Caesare capto and De pace) and De bello turcico.  
571 Vives’s dedication letter to Ferdinand in the 1538 edition of Declamationes in Vives, Juan Luis: “Ioannes 
Lodovicus Vives Principi Illustrissimo Fernando, Archiduci Austriae”, in Vives, Juan Luis: Areopagitica 
areopagiticus de praesenti statu Europae, et bello Turcico diversa opuscula Joannis Lodovici vivis valentini 
declamationes sex. Syllanae quinque. Sexta, qua respondet parieti palmato Quintiliani. Eiusdem de praesenti statu 
Europae, & bello Turcico diversa opuscula. Item. Isocratis orationes duae, areopagitica & nicocles, eodem Joan. 
Loco.vive interprete, Robert Winter, Basel 1538, “...et quae alibi praeceptis traduntur, hic exemplis.”  
572 Edward George has studied the work in depth. He concludes that Vives’s historical dramatization, closely 
connected to the precepts of Quintilian and examples of Sallust, portray a different and a more dramatized way of 
presenting Erasmian ideas compared to the Dutch master. According to George, “Erasmus is the Isocratean reciter 





his intention is not to present Sulla’s story as an equal claim to normativity with all the other 
speeches. Already in the preface Lepidus, who “ferociously” attacked Sulla, appears as the 
potential hero of the story.573 Moreover, Vives is keen to point out that since the rules of 
declamation state that one should not simply put forward one’s opinion, but to present a 
persuasive case for every cause, one “should not be surprised” if some of the arguments appear 
as being “easy to refute.”574  
Thus, even though Sulla’s defence is effectively based on proving that he had 
acted honestly and expediently for the common good, despite of the harsh measures he had 
resorted to, the reader would understand the ultimately flawed and twisted nature of his rhetoric 
that tried to embellish tyrannical action and unreliable character with normative claims. In the 
end, Sulla states that it was only through his actions – carried out with conscience and the good 
of the community as the only guiding principles – that it became evident that in Rome (civitas) 
nothing was more highly esteemed than “liberty, laws, equity, and the good.”575  
Similarly, the first speech advising Sulla not to give up his power delivered with 
the mouth of Quintus Fundanus, would be recognizable to a humanist reader as a defence of 
tyranny. Even though Sulla’s rule is presented as necessary for the future of Rome in the current 
corrupted state of virtue and habit that make a republican rule impossible, much of the speech 
betrays an attitude that would be recognized as ultimately flawed by a reader trained in humanist 
thought. A clear demonstration of this is that one of the key arguments in the speech for Sulla 
not to abdicate is based on his own private interest, since to step down after a regime based on 
fear and cruelty would result in his and his family’s doom. Fundanus asks Sulla if he really 
thinks, “he could become a private citizen in this country where at your [Sulla’s] command over 
a hundred twenty thousand citizens were slaughtered?”576 This is a cynical appeal to private 
advantage always deemed as the natural opposition to common good. 
 Yet it is mostly in the declamations two, four and five that one sees a constructive, 
                                                          
573 Vives: Declamationes 1520, Praefatio, B: “Lepidus [...] ferociter non solum in Syllae iam mortui acta, sed in 
ipsum etiam vivum esse contionatum....” In referring to the 1520 edition of Declamationes Syllanae signature 
marks have been used since the digital copy on Ghent University lacks page numbering. The signature mark given 
here refers to the one following the quote. 
574 Vives: Declamationes 1520, Praefatio, B: “Quo circa nemo mirabitur, si levibus interdum argumentis, parum 
fortibus coniecturis usus fuero, & iis quae alicui dissolvi facile posse videantur.” In the margins one could read, 
“In declamatione non quod sentis, sed quod persuadet dicendum.” 
575 Vives: Declamationes 1520, Declamation 3, K1: “...ut nihil appareat plus quam libertatem, leges, aequum, 
bonumquae in hac civitate valere.”  
576 Vives: Declamationes 1520, Declamation 1, D1: “Quid in hac te civitate in columem fore privatum putas? in 




although not a straightforward, way of putting humanist principles into work. In the second 
declamation that argued for the abdication of Sulla through Marcus Fonteius, one could 
effectively find an example of an asymmetrical situation of counselling dealing with less than 
a perfect recipient that is Sulla.577 Answering Fundanus, Fonteius tries to convince Sulla by 
claiming that the only way to secure glory in the history of Rome is to abdicate, and to show 
that power is not an end in itself but a troublesome burden one has to bear for the good of the 
community.578 Fonteius also emphasizes the ultimately impossible task of ruling Roman people 
in their current state. He argues, among other things, that their “virtue” and “liberty” require 
that “all others be subject to them, and that they are not be subjected to any of their own 
citizens.”579 With Fonteius, whose argument is heavily based on Sulla’s own faith and not only 
on the general question of the good of the Republic, one could indeed learn how to activate the 
vain side of the prince for one’s cause. Two of the political lessons Vives presented to 
Ferdinand, both in his 1520 and 1538 dedications, were that “nothing renders the burden of 
power lighter than the good will of one’s subordinates,” and that “men’s mouths can be shut 
and their speech constrained by fear, but if it relents even slightly free, speech and unfeigned 
opinions break out into the open.” These were given a veiled and dramatic Roman form in 
Fonteius’s speech.580 
 In Lepidus’s speeches, one finds a flamboyant condemnation of tyranny; albeit in 
a pronouncedly Roman language of freedom from dependency not found in Vives’s other 
political writings. Harnessing a variety of rhetorical strategies, ranging from character 
descriptions to the narration of history, shows in a new light the respective qualities and actions 
of both Sulla and Marius. At the end of the fourth oration, Lepidus claims that Sulla’s tyrannical 
actions were against, “all justice, laws, equitous and good, against religion, faith and all 
gods.”581 All the traits of tyranny, from the breaking of laws to acting against reason and 
                                                          
577 Already in the introduction Vives pointed out that the first two speeches dealt with deliberations. See Vives: 
Declamationes 1520, Praefatio, B. 
578 Throughout Erasmus’s Institutio the office of the prince is portrayed as a burden, see for instance Erasmus: 
Institutio, 22: “Cum principatum suspicis, ne cogita, quantum accipias honoris, sed quantum oneris ac 
sollicitudinis....” 
579 Vives: Declamationes 1520, Declamation 2, E1: “...cui in primis caeteras, ipsam vero nulli suorum civium 
subiici pro virtute huius populi decet, pro libertate oportet....”  
580 Vives: Declamationes 1520, Dedication to Ferdinand: “...ut nulla res levius regni pondus reddat quam bona 
subditorum gratia, eaque firmum ac perpetuum imperium stabiliat, tum, ut metu hominum ora comprimantur, & 
coerceantur sermones: si abscesserit tamen parumper metus, erumpere liberas voces et iudicia non simulata.” 
Vives’s dedication letter to the 1538 edition of Declamationes Syllanae reproduces this passage.  
581 Vives Declamationes 1520, Declamation 4, M1: “...contra ius omne, contra leges, contra aequum & bonum, 




common good, with passion and private interest as guiding principles are amplified eloquently.  
 
Citizenship, Rhetoric, Princely Action 
 
How, then, was the relationship between the prince or the monarch and the people 
conceptualized? What gives the people or Erasmus and Vives for that matter the right to make 
a number of strong claims? One of the classical concepts for interpreting the relationship was 
that of a citizen not absent from Erasmus and Vives’s reflections on politics. Erasmus and Vives 
knew well that a Roman interpretation of the term portrayed the relationship as one of active 
participation in politics guaranteed by law.582 In Erasmus’s Institutio, some isolated moments 
could be interpreted as implying the Roman language of citizenship where the concept was 
presented in a dichotomous relationship to slavery, understood as dependency on the will of 
others. Erasmus argued that man is free twice over, once by nature and another by law, moving 
on to argue that true majesty consists essentially in the protection of the liberties and dignity of 
citizens.583 However, the central thread running through Erasmus’s Institutio is not built on 
Roman language of freedom, but on explaining the analogy between Jesus Christ and a truly 
Christian prince. Thus, the main point is to explain that the basic political and judicial concepts 
of dominium, imperium, regnum, maiestas, potentia, are unsuitable for a Christian prince who 
is described through a range metaphors underlining his paternal nature, not his legal status. It 
is in this general framework that the dichotomy of citizens and slaves appears as freedom from 
the bestial terror of the prince, and as possessing a right to his paternal love.584 As Erasmus 
reminds Charles and the reader, God also wants to rule over free men and not slaves.585 Thus, 
all possible hints to the Roman language of liberty are always mixed with and framed by a more 
dominant Christian language. 
 Vives himself also knew perfectly well fact that citizenship did indeed imply 
constitutional and legal viewpoints in Roman political thought. Thus, it is hardly a surprise that 
one can discern a certain pattern in Vives’s election to use the words citizen (civis) and subject 
(subditus). In his letters to princes and in his treatments of princely regimes, the word citizen, 
although not absent, appears more infrequently whereas the word subject (subditus) is 
                                                          
582 Van Gelderen – Skinner 2002, 2-3. 
583 Erasmus: Institutio, 29, 31: “At homo divinum est animal, ac bis liberum, primum natura, deinde legibus.”; 
“Constulit igitur tuae maiestati, qui civium libertatem ac dignitatem tuetur.”  
584 Erasmus: Institutio, 29-31.  




omnipresent.586 A clear shift occurs, however, when he addresses the town of Bruges, lauded 
for its republican constitution in his Subventione Pauperum in 1526, where the word civis and 
civitas are employed frequently. The fact that the words are indeed connected to certain forms 
of government in Vives’s mind is seen in the translation of Isocrates’s speeches where the 
Oratio Areopagitica – a plea for republican constitution – uses the word civis throughout 
whereas in the monarchical Nicocles subditus is by far the more common term.587 
 It is, however, in his Declamationes that Vives exhibits a knowledge of Neo-
Roman political discourse. In Declamationes Syllanae, and especially in the speeches of 
Marcus Emilius Lepidus, we can find a presentation of a republican notion of political 
citizenship. In the first of his speeches, Lepidus is trying to accuse Sulla of a number of crimes 
committed before and during his reign while in the second one he makes a case against the 
public burial of the recently deceased Sulla. Both speeches make a systematic use of a 
republican language were Sulla’s tyranny is related above everything else to his violation of the 
Roman freedom of citizens. By doing this and in using his arbitrary power he has effectively 
turned citizens into slaves depriving them of any possibilities to participate in the law-making 
process. Vives is using a language here that has a link with institutional arrangements instead 
of just hinting more loosely to the rights of citizens vis-à-vis the arbitrary power of the tyrant. 
This is made quite clear in his treatment of Sulla’s attack against the people’s tribune.  
 This is not just something additional in the text; it is one of the central points of 
Lepidus’s oration. He asks, “By what right is the entitled power of the tribunes of the plebs 
restricted. Why is the sole rampart of this people’s liberty hurled down from its citadel: why is 
this sole protection smashed and ripped away?” Later he adds,  
 
“Seeing that all this was impossible so long as any free tribune’s voice remained, he 
began by assailing the very head and stronghold of liberty. He mounted a siege on the 
tribuneship, so that he could proceed in safety and at leisure to stamp out our liberty.”588 
                                                          
586 De bello, & pace employs civis and civitas but subditus is more frequent. 
587 A tentative analysis of the first edition of De subventione pauperum confirms that the terms, civis, civitas and 
civilis are employed over 15 times in De subventione. In the dedication letter to the work Vives famously calls 
himself a citizen of Bruges, Vives: De subventione, dedication letter entitled Consulibus & senatui Brugensi 
salutem.  
588 Vives: Declamationes 1520, Declamation 5, P1: “Quirites, audire, quo iure tribunorum plebis ius potestasque 
minuitur, cur unicum libertatis huius populi praesidium de arce sua deiicitur, unica custodia frangitur, 





These and other pleas for the freedom of the plebeian citizens form the very core 
of Lepidus’s attack. Thus, in a text that portrays a fictional setting for supposedly pedagogical 
purposes, Vives is able to demonstrate and bring to life the more specifically Roman notion of 
citizenship that was contrasted to the dependency of a slave.589 Moreover, the attack on the 
tribune as the protector of people surfaced the bestial tyranny of Sulla primarily as an assault 
on the liberty of his people. Neverthless, despite Declamationes, it is clear that Vives and 
Erasmus never explicitly theorized about how the freedom of active citizens could be 
guaranteed by institutional arrangements against the mere possibility of arbitrary power of a 
prince or a monarch.590 
 However, the lack of theory on the legal conditions of citizenship does not mean 
that a prince should not be guarded. Both Erasmus and Vives are adamant in demanding that 
people expect and even have the right to demand good government from the prince. Vives in 
his De bello, & pace was very clear that the people did indeed expect virtuous policies from the 
prince, claiming that “all the people expect and demand from you as their right [...] that you 
complete it [peace].”591 This strong claim is accompanied by a pronounced stress on the 
importance of counselling, and by transplanting the virtues of active life demanded of a citizen 
to the duties of a counsellor. Erasmus’s Institutio undelined the importance of counsellors, 
claiming, “those citizens who are distinguished for their moral character, judgement, and 
prestige are held in suspicion and distrust by the tyrant, whereas the king holds fast to them as 
his helpers and friends.”592 This is primarily a plea for the prince to choose good counsellors 
and that he listens to them. In De bello, & pace, the Valencian put forward a strong demand for 
the prince to listen to his counsellors since the best road to wisdom consisted in “being 
reminded, instructed, corrected.”593 This entire subject links closely to the moral dichotomy 
                                                          
arcem primum impetiit atque oppugnare adorsus est, ut nudatam praesidiis tutamentisque nostram libertatem ipse 
extinguere....”  
589 Vives: Declamationes 1520, Declamation 4, N1: “O Quirites, quam pudet me Syllam mansuetudine & lenitate 
nostra tam esse abusum, patientiam tentasse, expertum esse quantum servitutis ferre & perpeti possemus, quid 
enim ad extremam & ignominiosam servitutem relictum est?” 
590 Tilmans 2002, 113. 
591 Vives: “De bello, & pace”, xxii: “Gentes omneis, quantum fama, & hominum sermonibus intelligimus, a te 
expectare, ac prope suo iure exigere, ut qui pacis initia & spem mundo ostendisti, eam tu idem absoluas....” 
592 Erasmus: Institutio, 23-24: “Rex se sua erga cives beneficentia et civium erga se benevolentia satis tutum putant. 
Tyranno suspecti sunt et invisi, quicunque civium, virtute prudentia, aut authoritate pollent. At hos rex ut adiutores 
et amicos potissimum amplectitur.” (English translation from Erasmus: Literary and Educational Writings, vol. 5, 
Collected Works of Erasmus 27 [ed. Levi], Toronto University Press, Toronto 1986, 224). 




between flatterers and counsellors often evoked by humanist writers, and to the duty of 
counsellors to direct the prince gently to virtue.594  
 The evocation of counselling and counsellors found in Vives is, however, 
somewhat ambivalent as to the precise extension of the concept. It might well have referenced 
the Dutch system of consensus where the General Estates offered the prince counselling on 
fundamental issues of the state, and it could definitely imply the people officially dominating 
key offices of counselling.595 However, it could equally well refer to anyone who was able to 
give counsel and converse with a prince, or to anyone who was his friend. Erasmus’s Institutio 
discussed the importance of friends as potential counsellors, and Vives’s De consultatione had 
made very clear that to be a friend of the prince was crucial in the practice of counselling.596 
Finally, however, the question of counselling understood in very broad terms could be united 
to a demand for the freedom to express one’s opinions as a precondition to a successful 
monarchy, or a princely regime – a point Vives underlined in De bello, & pace.597 Indeed, one 
manifestation of this liberality happens outside the court in writing. Vives himself was very 
clear that he performed the duties of a counsellor in his De rege capto referring to himself as a 
counsellor (monitor). Erasmus, for his part, argued that books were of great importance in 
counselling and instructing princes; it is in this context that part of Vives’s own activities of the 
1520s must be understood as the performance of the active life as a counsellor of princes. 598 
 However, to be a counsellor was not merely a social or institutional position, but 
it was ultimately always discussed as an ethical condition in dichotomy with the flatterer. As 
has been seen, the traditional dichotomy of tyrant and prince goes back not only to the medieval 
and Renaissance mirror-of-princes genre, but also eventually to the Senecan tradition of Roman 
political thought that emphasized moral self-governance of the prince as a precondition for 
                                                          
quam reliquis hominibus....” 
594 Erasmus: Institutio, 38-43; Vives: “De bello, & pace”, xiii-xiiii.  
595 Vives to Erasmus, Allen 2208, 13-17: “Sed revalvit, et in adinistratione rerum Hispaniae est Augustae et 
Caesarae discendente. Queis duobus additi sunt Dux Albae, et Magister Equitum, nuper mortui filius; ita ut hi tres 
sint velut admonitores et consultores, illa Imperatrix et rectrix omnium.”; Vives De Galliae, xii: “Non addam plura, 
ne praecipere videar prudentiae vel tuae, vel tuorum consultorum, & in primis D. Cardinalis viri in gerendis 
publicis negotiis exercitatissimi.”  
596 Erasmus: Institutio, 43.  
597 Vives: “De bello, & pace”, xiiii: “Magnum regni columen sunt amici prudentes, ac liberi, quibus moderata 
potentia sustentatur.” The paragraph was marked in the margins by the heading libertas consultorum. Curtis has 
also underlined the importance of counselling in Vives, see Curtis 2011. 1. Thomas More famously called for 
liberality of speech in a speech in the House of Commons in 1523, see Roper, William: The Life of Sir Thomas 
More, c. 1556 (eds. Wegemer, Gerard – Stephen Smith), Center for Thomas More Studies, 2003, 7-10. 




healthy and legitimate rule.599 The outward sign of self-governance and freedom from passion 
was, thus, a rule in accordance with the by definition natural virtues and duties of a prince that 
posited common good as the ultimate goal of political action. As is well known, humanists 
would often underline the importance of right education of the prince as a right path to good 
rule.600 However, in highlighting the importance of the counsellor, the ethical demand is 
transposed to those undertaking counselling; he should be free from passions, and he should 
guarantee that government occurs in accordance with reason and natural law. Vives’s De 
pacificatione made this demand clear when referring to the counsellor as the reason of the social 
body that has to refrain the will, to teach what is best, and excite to everything that is laudable 
and honest.601  
 The evocation of the moral nature of counselling was linked to the omnipresent 
discussion on the true source of nobility, which according to humanists lays in virtue and not in 
lineage. Thus, it links to the broader process where the educated elite, men of letters, and 
members of the Republic of Letters, slowly populate the more important offices of the state.602 
However, the ethical demand had far-reaching conceptual consequences since to be a virtuous 
person is essentially to participate in natural law. The moral claim implies that the one 
undertaking a life of negotium cannot be partial but has to be a true citizen of the world. This is 
a point Vives makes frequently about the concept citizenship: it is not a legal privilege but a 
moral condition predicated on one’s capacity to partake in the world of reason and natural law. 
Of classical writers, Seneca most famously discussed the two commonwealths men were a part:  
 
“One, a vast and truly common state, which embraces alike gods and men, in which 
we look neither to this corner of earth nor to that, but measure the bounds of our citizenship 
by the path of the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the accident of 
birth. This will be the commonwealth of the Athenians or of the Carthaginians, or of any other 
city that belongs, not to all, but to some particular race of men.” 
 
                                                          
599 Stacey 2011.  
600 Erasmus’s Institutio focuses greatly on this. 
601 Vives: DP, C2-C3: “Consiliarii vero mens eius, & ratio....”  
602 On the vera nobilitas discussion, see Vives: DP, B4-B5. According to Erasmus the best, not nobles, should be 
magistrates, see Erasmus: Institutio, 58. This dichotomy was more widely known in humanist circles, see for 




He went on to show that the first world was not a mere realm of otium and 
contemplation but one that could be served by “enquiring what virtue is, and whether it is one 
or many, whether it is nature or art that makes men good.”603 Openly referring to the Stoic 
universal commonwealth, Vives argued in his Praefatio in leges Ciceronis that the context for 
thinking about the thelos of man and law was the “universal commonwealth,” composed of 
human race where the lawgiver should act as the “perfect citizen.”604 
 All of this implies a systematic denial of the Ciceronian model in which the 
performance of citizenship for the common good is equated with the Roman state.605 Vives 
explicitly denounced this in his De consultatione where he complained that Romans thought 
about the honest within the confines of patria claiming that religion – the true measure of 
honesty – should win over particular commonwealths.606 In Vives, the citizenship of the world 
can at times be equated with Christendom, but in other instances he describes this in even more 
open terms.607 However, the point is clear: the political goals and common good of separate 
states in no-way conflict with Pax Christiana which enables good government and the 
unharmed flourishing of the arts and commerce. Moreover, this is where the true glory of 
princes lies, and they should constantly be reminded of this by wise, educated, and virtuous 
counsellors. In the 1520s Vives was definitely one of these men who translated wisdom to civic 
prudence, and he educated others other in the performance of these duties. 
 
 
                                                          
603 Seneca: “De otio” (trans. by Basore), 180-201 in Seneca: Moral Essays, vol. 2, The Loeb Classical Library, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1965, IV.1-2: “Duas res publicas animo complectamur, 
alteram magnam et vere publicam, qua dii atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hunc angulum respicimus aut 
ad illum, sed terminos civitatis nostrae cum sole metimur; alteram, cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi. Haec aut 
Atheniensium erit aut Carthaginiensium, aut alterius alicuius urbis, quae non ad omnis pertineat homines sed ad 
certos.”; “...ut quaeramus quid sit virtus, una pluresne sint; natura an ars bonos viros faciat....”; see Stacey 2007, 
29-30.  
604 Vives: PC, 111: “...is etiam tanquam optimus civis huius universae civitatis, quae totum genus humanum capit 
inventa sua publicos in usus in medium reponit.”  
605 Tuck 1990, 44-45. 
606 Vives: DCO, 254: “...Romani fortasse summam honestatem putabant, patriae prodesse [...] Nos vero dicamus. 
Honestas vincat, sed potius, Vincat religio.” See also Erasmus to Budé, Allen 906, 501-503: “Quid autem necesse 
est sic me huic aut alteri principi addicere, ut a reliquis me eximam? Malo servire nulli, et prodesse, si quem, 
omnibus.”  




5. Between Concord and Discord 
 
Chapter five focuses on Vives’s 1529 political compendium built around the grandiose De 
concordia & discordia in humano genere. Rather than analysing the totality of De concordia, 
the chapter tries to argue three things. First, Vives’s use of the social body in De concordia 
suggests that the perfecting of man is essentially a social undertaking; it can be discussed on 
the level of social bodies. This social perfecting is not predicated merely on the perfecting of 
its individual members, but on the capacity of the head of the body to enhance and guarantee 
the common good. Secondly, the chapter argues that the general focus of the work on all human 
association directs the attention away from politics to a whole range of issues sustaining discord 
and error on all levels of human association. In this way, it implies the entire humanist 
educational project that aimed to produce prudential men through education. Lastly, it shows 
how the metaphor of social body is extended to a constructive proposal in De subventione, and 
to a critical reaction in the case of radical Anabaptism. 
 
Vives, Charles V, and Universal Monarchy 
 
In 1529, a monumental political and social compendium comprising three works entitled De 
concordia & discorida in humano genere, De pacificatione and Quam misera esset vita 
Christianorum sub Turca appeared from the printing house of Michael Hillen in Antwerp. It 
presented arguably Vives’s most ambitious attempt to analyse the social and political problems 
that were pestering Europe. The 1529 compendium that touched upon a variety of themes 
familiar already from his 1526 De Europae dissidiis was the last political treatise Vives ever 
wrote, with the exception of the very short De communione (1535), and it marks a clear shift in 
Vives’s literature towards larger, more philosophical treatises. The monumental compendium 
proposes several readings pointing to different levels of meaning found in the work. 
 At the very first level lies its evident relation to its immediate context. Two of its 
most important works – De concordia and De pacificatione – are aligned with the goals Charles 
V, advised by numerous humanists at the court, set himself in Augsburg in 1530: political and 
religious concord among European states guaranteed by a Church council, and a joint crusade 




after the disaster of the Sack of Rome in 1527, a plan that could portray the Emperor effectively 
as a peaceful defender of Christendom while simultaneously ending the burdensome war 
against the League of Cognac.608 Suggesting this reading, Vives gives at one point specific 
content to the semantically ambivalent, flexible, and general terms of peace and concord by 
uniting peace to continuing warfare, and concord to the question of opinions that implied the 
idea of a Church council:  
 
“A peace between princes, firm and enduring, as far as it is possible, and a concord of 
opinions which I consider more useful and important for human race. I think the latter is 
harder to achieve than a peace between princes.”609 
 
Church council and cessation of warfare that formed the background for De 
concordia pointed to two key issues in the compendium: religious division and Vives’s relation 
to the emerging imperial project of Charles V. By 1529, religion had evolved into one of the 
main concerns of Charles V’s dominions. Issues related to the Reformation were discussed in 
royal courts around Europe, as well as in the papal curia. Thus, in the decade of the 1520s – 
when warfare among Christian princes was continuous – questions of religion added yet another 
dimension to European problems. The document of the Diet of Worms, signed in 1521, did not 
halt the advancement of reformed churches in large areas of Europe. Moreover, as the 1520s 
passed, the extent to which the document of the Diet of Worms could and should be imposed 
was heatedly debated in imperial Diets. These religious concerns were also closely linked to 
larger political problems of dynastic warfare and the Turkish threat.610 
 Despite the fact that Vives did not reside in the epicentre of religious problems, 
much of the reformed literature beginning from Luther was widely available throughout the 
Dutch provinces, and issues around the Reformation pestered Vives’s mind increasingly 
                                                          
608 Martínez Millán 2005, 238-239. Vives had pleaded for a church council already in his letter to the Pope Adrian 
in 1523, Vives: De tumultibus, vii: “Omni memoria tumultibus Eccleasie occursum est indictis conventibus patrum, 
quod generale consilium vocamur, haec una est medicina morbis etiam, qui deplorati putabantur.” Thus, this is not 
a posture he adopts after loosing his position in England.  
609 Vives: DC, letter to Charles V: “Pacem scilicet principum, quoad eius fieri possit firmam mansuramque: Tum 
concordiam opinionum, quam ego ut utiliorem magisque humanae genti necessariam, ita factu difficiliorem puto, 
quam alteram illam inter principes....” In a later paragraph, Vives refers to these same points, see Vives: DC, book 
3, S: “Nec occurri potest tanto malo, aut medicina ulla adhiberi, quum in commune consultari non queat, quippe 
principum discordiae regiones claudunt, ne congregari & in unum convenire possunt corpora, & doctorum odia 
animos disiungunt, ne inter se ad communem deliberationem mentes coeant, ut nec loqui utrinque de alteris sit 
iam tutum....”  




towards the end of the 1520s. The visible social side of religious dissent had manifested itself 
in various forms despite of the fact that the central government had reacted more vehemently 
to the heretic threat. Possibly around 20 or 30 executions had occurred over the course of the 
1520s in the Low Countries, with Bruges being one of the centres of Lutheran practices.611 The 
problem of heresy, closely tied in contemporary minds to social upheaval, was also tackled 
throughout the 1520s with a number of royal ordonnances forbidding different activities related 
to the Reformed faith.612 However, Vives’s 1520s concerns were not tied to the purely local 
manifestations of the rebellious and social side of the Reformation. As an aspiring courtier and 
member of the European Republic of Letters, he was keenly aware of the recent political and 
religious development of Europe as is wonderfully demonstrated by his 1526 compendia on 
European politics, and by his private letters to some of his best friends. Hardly surprising, Vives 
was very well informed about all European issues ranging from comuneros revolt in Spain, and 
the Franco-Spanish Italian wars to the developments of the Reformation in German lands, 
interpreting these very much as manifestations of general discord.613  
 What is more, Vives reacted strongly to the implications of German Peasant 
Revolt. For him, the Peasant Revolt represented a more pressing form of warfare compared to 
dynastic wars among princes. As Vives wrote to Erasmus in summer 1525, the Peasant Revolt 
was a way “to assure the Gospel with three hundred thousand soldiers, destroy everything, and 
sow calamity and death everywhere they enter.”614 Vives’s interpretation, that implied the use 
of theology for social ends, made a strong link between the reading of the Bible and social and 
political concerns – an association that was becoming more and more widely acknowledged 
with the Peasant Revolt, which, in its famous Twelve Articles, mixed religious and evangelical 
issues with social concerns somewhat randomly. It is exactly in 1525 that Luther himself was 
forced to criticise the increasingly radical and social side of the Reformation in his Wieder die 
                                                          
611 Alistair Duke has showed how much the Low Countries were influenced by different currents of the 
Reformation thought already in the 1520s. Duke 1990, 1-59; Van Houtte 1967, 97; Tracy 1996, 163-164. Vives 
was concerned about Lutheran developments quite early, see Vives to Cranevelt, CRA2 26, 28-31. 
612 Tracy 1990, 52-60; Tracy 2005.  
613 De Europae Dissidis is a good example, it is essentially an assessment of the recent political history of Europe. 
Vives on warfare in Italy, see Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 128, 27-28; Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 217, 9-22; Vives to 
Cranevelt, CRA 227, 9-15; Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 248, 37-52. Vives on Reformation and the peasant wars, see 
Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 157, 12-22; Vives to Virués, MA VII, 200-201. Vives discusses warfare continuously in 
his 1520s letters, see Vives to Cranevelt, CRA, 8-12; Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 167. Vives and comuneros, see 
Vives: De Europae, xxix: “Dum in Germaniam ad invendum principatum ex Hispania Carolus redit, consecuti 
sunt motus Hispaniae plebis adversus nobilitatem, urbium adversus urbes.” 
614 Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 137, 14-17: “Hoc demum est asserere Evangelium, tercentis milibus armatorum 




Räauberischen und mörderischen Rotten der Bauern. Luther specifically disapproved of the 
Bible being used in twisted ways, and for an outright social agenda.615 Thus, the central 
concepts of concord and discord comprised and irreducible religious element that was evident 
for any reader of Vives’s De concordia. Referring to these two concepts Erasmus claimed in a 
letter to Jean de Carondolet, “the substance of our religion is peace and unanimity.”616 As it is 
well known, throughout the 1520s the Dutch humanist himself was famously vying for religious 
concord that would not be based on violent suppression of heresy, but on tolerating error – a 
point Vives reflected on in his 1529 compendium and that served as a point of departure for 
Vives’s call for Church council.617  
 Another issue to take into account in the analysis of the compendium organized 
around De concordia was Vives’s general rapprochement with imperial politics. Simultaneous 
with Vives’s attempt to seek a place close to the imperial court, something also changes in 
Vives’s outlook of the wider European situation. Between the summers of 1525 and 1526, a 
change is visible in his private letters in the way he refers to the person of the Emperor and to 
imperial politics more generally. Until July 1525, Vives’s pessimistic description of European 
warfare treated its main protagonists, Charles V and Francis I, symmetrically. Thus, the problem 
of warfare is attributed to the competition between young princes as well as to their lack of 
understanding of the destructive forces of warfare.618 This attitude is largely echoed in Vives’s 
De Europae dissidiis et bello turcico finished somewhere after the disastrous battle of Mohács 
in the late summer or early autumn of 1526.619 Yet, already starting from the letter to Cranevelt, 
dated 10.6.1526, Vives’s tone is quite different, and Charles is described in private letters in a 
more positive light than his adversaries who had formed the League of Cognac on May 22.620 
Furthermore, in early September Vives wrote to Cranevelt that the official defence of French 
policies, Apologia Madriciae Conventionis inter Francorum regem et Carolum electum 
                                                          
615 Hillerbrand 2007, 145-146.  
616 Erasmus to Jean Carondolet, Allen 1334, 217: “Summa nostra religionis pax est et unanimitas.” 
617 Tracy 1996, 163-171; Remer 1994, 309-321. Vives’s most forceful defence of toleration of heresy happens in 
a letter to the archibishop of Seville and might well refer primarily to an autobiographical experience of Spanish 
developments, see Vives: DP, A3.  
618 Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 128, 28-29; Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 159, 11-17.  
619 Vives: De Europae: xxviii, xxxii: “De imperatore deligendo ambitu & profusissimis largitionibus apud electores 
a Carolo & Francisco certatum, quasi mercimonium licerentur, non regnum.”; “...Carolus hic velut haereditatem 
suam armis reptetit, quando hoc solum est ius interponentes.”  
620 Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 193, 19-34; Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 217, 9-39. Cranevelt was a member of the Great 
Council of Mechelen. His relationship with Charles was good. Erasmus himself approached Cranevelt when he 
tried to recover his imperial pension, see BR 1985, 354-355. He had held speeches in the court of Charles V, see 




imperatorem dissuasoria, was “the most shameful and foolish thing that can be said.”621 
 The difference in the choice of words between Vives’s letters to Cranevelt and the 
portrayal of Charles in De Europae dissidiis might partly be due to their different purposes and 
degrees of publicity. Whereas in his private letters, Vives from 1526 onwards builds a closer 
and more privileged relationship with imperial politics, the whole point of De Europae dissidiis 
is to appeal to audiences on both sides of the war, and encourage them to a joint crusade against 
a Turkish threat. By taking a symmetrical approach to the primary actors of European politics, 
Vives is making sure that he can talk in the name of Christendom for the project of peace – a 
goal that could not be achieved through one dimensional propagandist texts that would nurture 
division and discord. In this way, Vives’s De Europae dissidiis contrasts strikingly both with 
the official propaganda on either side – namely the French Apologia and the Imperial Pro divo 
Carolo, both of which tie the explanation of the happenings of the 1520s to an explicitly partisan 
framework where the future of Christendom is equated with the French and Imperial political 
programmes respectively.622 
 Thus, despite the limited presence of the Imperial language of the programme in 
the 1529 compendium, Vives never breaks with Erasmus’s strict line of not aligning himself 
with any of the European powerhouses in the 1520s. As it is well known, the Dutch master was 
highly critical of Gattinara’s project of universal monarchy, and Vives’s distaste for Gattinara’s 
project is also beyond any doubt.623 It is true that whereas the 1526 compendia does not partake 
in the imperial propaganda campaign spearheaded by Mercurio Gattinara and Alfonso de 
Valdés, the 1529 literature makes explicit reference to Charles as an instrument of God, whose 
“success was not borne out of human, but divine forces” according to the dedication letter of 
the work to the Emperor himself.624 This dedicatory letter to the compendium is also more 
generally an example of how to unite Charles’s success and virtues to a Godly plan – something 
proposed by Alfonso de Valdés, one of the main architects of Charles’s imperial propaganda 
who had argued in the aftermath of the battle of Pavia that “it looked as if God, miraculously, 
had given this victory to the Emperor.”625 However, this eloquent praise is manifest only in the 
                                                          
621 Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 202, 21-23: “Puto cidisse te Apologiam Madriciae Conventionis pro Rege Galliae; 
quo nihil potest aut impudentius dici, aut stultius.”   
622 For French and Spanish propaganda campaigns, see Headley 1983. 
623 In a letter to Cranevelt Vives exhibited a rather critical attitude towards Gattinara, see Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 
159, 18-26. For Erasmus and imperial politics, see Van Gelderen 2005; Bataillon 1991, 243-253; Tracy 1996, 194-
196. 
624 Vives to Charles in DC: “hos tantos, tamque admirandos successus non humanarum esse virium, sed 
divinarum....”  




letter to the Emperor himself. In none of the actual books forming the corpus does the argument 
about Charles’s special nature as the instrument of God play any significant role. Moreover, 
Vives explicitly denied the attribution of military glory to divine motives in a thoroughly 
satirical section in Book four of De concordia. Here Vives, with the voice of a fictional prince 
states that “I pray you most gentle and mild Father, that you give me force for achieving that 
[to cause havoc], that you show me the way, assist me in my plans, and direct favourably my 
undertakings.” He adds that if someone were really to ask this, he would be considered “more 
degenerated than any devil.”626 The section dedicated to kings and princes in De pacificatione 
is most explicit in its claim that reason truly resides with counsellors rather than princes, 
opening up a trend that is present throughout the 1530s.627 If anything, the 1529 compendium 
is even more suspicious of princes than Vives’s earlier writings, and it is not kind on Charles V 
either.628 
 Thus, by appealing to an existing and vigorous language of universal monarchy 
Vives’s idea is to address the Emperor as the most powerful man in Europe who bears the duty 
to work for peace and the union of the Church. Yet the actual plan he is offering is not based on 
a notion of divine rule understood in any other sense than as pastoral care – an image familiar 
from numerous Erasmian texts epitomized by Erasmus’s Institutio.629 In Alfonso de Valdés’s 
Las cosas acaecidas en Roma (also known as Diálogo de Lactancio y un Arcediano) recent 
political events are interpreted through the dichotomy of good and evil, represented by the 
Emperor and his opponents respectively. Conversely, De concordia and De pacificatione do not 
rely in any way on an interpretation that underlines the godly nature of Imperial action.630 In 
                                                          
626 Vives: DC, book 4, V: “Rogo te pater clementissime, ac mitissime, ut ad eam rem suppedites vires, aperias 
viam, consilias adiuves, secundes coepta.”; “Haec si quis diceret, nonne omnes eum [...] quovis diabolo 
desperatiorem clamarent....” 
627 Vives: DP, C.  
628 E. George has shown how De concordia functions also as a veiled critique of Charles through the precepts of 
non-adversity as spelled out in De consultatione, see George 1997. 
629 In the actual texts, the symmetrical treatment is present: Vives: DC, book 3, L5: “Et his bellis proximis, quam 
serviliter Gallus Helvetio se submisit, Carolus desperatissimae ac perditissimae Germaniae atque Hispaniae foeci! 
Et qui Principes nobilissimi, ac praeclarissimi, noluerunt paulum alter alteri velut levi lateris declinatione cedere, 
coacti sunt impurissimos dominos toto corpore perferre, & eis propter bellum adulari, quos in pace 
crucifixissent....” 
630 Alfonso de Valdés’s main target is the Pope, his Las cosas acaecidas en Roma presents the common accusations 
against the Emperor through the mouth of Arcediano. These accusations are, however, refuted by Lactancio, the 
hero of the dialogue, who unites the destruction of Rome to godly vengeance, Valdés, Alfonso de: “Diálogo de 
Lactancio y un Arcediano”, 331-481 in Valdés, Alfonso de: Dos diálogos, 1850, 338: “Lo primero que hare, será 
mostraros, cómo el Emperador ninguna culpa tiene en lo que en Roma se ha hecho. I lo segundo, cómo todo lo 
que ha acaezido, ha sido por manifiesto juizio de Dios, para castigar aquella ciudad.” Valdés and Gattinara are not 
the only ones participating in the process. See for instance Miguel de Ulzuxia: Catholicum opus imperial regiminis 




fact, they are not based on the primacy of the Emperor and the empire, understood as a legal 
right or as a supreme Godly mission in any sense. Vives’s De concordia starts from the premise 
that there is symmetry in the relations between the European princes.631 Vives himself 
considered the work of such impartiality that in 1529 he sent it to the French humanist 
Guillaume Budé arguing in a letter to Budé that it was “written for the compassion that these 
times we are living through arouse in me [Vives].”632  
 Yet, although the kind of overtly propagandist partiality is not to be found in any 
of Vives’s political texts, his knowledge of the discussions and currents of the imperial court 
should not be underestimated. He is clearly suggesting a course of action that was present in 
the imperial court of the time where Gattinara’s and Valdés’s strict line never represented all 
humanist thought; many humanists showed little interest in defending the idea of universal 
monarchy interpreted in a Gattinaran sense, which incorporated Erasmian moral critique into 
an aggressive and missionary plan of defending Christendom.633 More importantly, the flexible 
nature of the imperial language assimilating different elements for the enhancement of at-times 
directly opposing actions has been recently emphasized, something that surfaces the strict line 
of imperial propaganda as only one attempt of using Erasmian language for the propagation of 
certain political goals.634 
 However, in many ways Vives’s De concordia seeks deliberately to transcend its 
immediate context. Despite the contextual element of the compendium, it is clear that Vives’s 
aspiration in De concordia is not to give advice but to write primarily as a philosopher, to show 
much more fundamental patterns that have lead Christendom to discordia and that continue to 
sustain it.635 It is true that it was the norm in all humanist discourse to cover very particular and 
                                                          
nature of Charles’ monarchy was Ruiz de la Mota in a speech at the Cortés of La Coruña in 1520. For the 
differences between Gattinara and de la Mota, see Menéndez Pidal, 1946, 12-25. Menéndez Pidal wants to 
demonstrate how de la Mota’s idea of universal monarchy is essentially a moral one whereas Gattinara emphasizes 
the legal rights and possibilities of the monarch. Menéndez Pidal was criticising Karl Brandi´s attribution of the 
imperial programme to Gattinara, see Brandi 1959, 74-79. Modern literature emphasizes also the limits of this 
programme and the scarcity of voices defending Charles’s actions in the late 1520s and, especially, the Sack of 
Rome. See García Cárcel 2003, 31-33.  
631 The difference between Alfonso de Valdés and Vives, two supposedly Erasmian thinkers, is well-known. See 
for example Fernández-Santamaría 1977, 38-57. 
632 Vives to Budé, MA VII, 219: “Accipies a Valdaura meo librum De concordia scriptum a me proxima aestate, 
dem mu horum temporum miseret....” 
633 Vives’s main link to the Spanish court was Vergara who did not partake in the aggressive dimension of the 
language of universal monarchy, see Bataillon 1991, 166-168, 256-257. He also knew the main protector of the 
Erasmian movement in Spain, the inquisitor-general Alfonso Manrique. For biographies of Manrique and 
Gattinara, see Martínez Millán 2000, 256-263; BR II, 76-80, 373-375.  
634 Martínez Millán 2005, 236-240.  
635 Despite being a philosophical work, De concordia lies stylistically firmly within the humanist tradition. As with 




local problems with the most general language of virtues and vices. Consequently, simple 
political deliberations about taxation would connect their arguments built on the utility and 
honesty of a cause to the most general possible language of virtues. However, leaving the 
dedication letter to Charles V aside, De concordia is not primarily a political deliberation. In 
fact, Vives’s selection of style shows that he did aspire to a treatment that would transcend 
particular questions of decision-making. Even though peace and Church council effectively 
refer to existing political projects that were highly important when the text was published, the 
pure length and depth of analysis would hardly make it the best possible medium to give actual 
counselling. We should consider that Vives had employed other, much more rhetorically attuned 
ways of proceeding in his 1526 De Europae dissidiis.  
 Moreover, it is in these years that Vives most likely undertook his more ambitious, 
general, and profound analysis of the state of Christendom. This was to materialize in the years 
around 1530 in the form of De disciplinis, De ratione dicendi and De anima. These works cross-
reference one another, which points to the larger educational and social programme Vives was 
devising for the future of Europe around 1530. The compendium built around the De concordia 
– composed of four separate books – takes the earlier themes of concord, peace and self-
government, analysing them in the most general and all-encompassing form. In this process, it 
makes their connections to larger cultural and historical dynamics, as well as passion disorders 
explicit. This was essentially a way to show patterns that sustained discord and hindered 
concord, which took the analysis far-beyond policy making to the cultural arrangements that 
nurtured misjudgement and actual political decisions. Generalizing the problems of religious 
discord and warfare among princes was Vives’s answer in the 1529 compendium, which brings 
us to the second level of analysis. 
 
De concordia and the Social Repercussions of Passions 
 
De concordia and De pacificatione were built around the central concepts of concord 
(concordia) and peace (pax) that had been central in all Vives’s political reflections and all 
political discussion more generally in preceding years. The problematisation of these in the 
1529 corpus most surely related to the fact that the ideals of peace and concord were in a stark 
                                                          
arguments for and against a case. Disregarding the only systematic method of clarifying questions gives the 
continuous prose of the work composed of eclectic quotes a disorganized touch. Hence, the architectural structure 




opposition with the actual state of affairs surrounding the Valencian humanist. In Vives’s private 
correspondence peace and concord surface repeatedly and often in a pronouncedly pessimistic 
tone. Even where Vives was openly promoting a discursive solution leading to concord – as is 
the case of the convocation of a Church council for solving the problem of the religious 
separation of Christendom – he often expressed reservations about the actual possibilities of 
reaching a concord through dialogue in his private correspondence. This was because a 
successful dialogue could only be based on good judgement that presupposed the inner concord 
of the ones judging on the matter, something that in Vives’s opinion evidently was not the 
case.636 In increasingly desperate tones Vives argued towards the end of the 1520s that a true 
concord depended ultimately on the help of Christ to bring about a lasting peace, “in a century 
so plagued by factions and the souls irritated by differences of opinion” – a view shared by 
Erasmus.637 However, in De concordia and De pacificatione Vives takes the challenge of 
describing and analysing the possibilities of concord as a potentially realizable horizon, 
although not necessarily as an instant political project. Concord, peace, and their potential 
threats such as factions are not merely political concepts in the work: De concordia is not 
primarily an analysis of the specific political steps to be undertaken but of the deeper dynamics 
that nurture the judgement of discord 
 De concordia, more than any other work of Vives, portrays a Stoic and Christian 
theorization of the dualistic worldview found in numerous youthful texts, which are centred on 
a continuous and omnipresent fight between the social counterparts of truth and error, 
wonderfully presented in his Veritas fucata.638 Already the initial focus on societas underlines, 
however, that De concordia is strictly speaking unpolitical: it opens up with a general 
explanation of human association and community (societas, communitas), the temporal 
incarnation of which are the family and different forms of political associations.639 Societas 
performs an important function in all of Vives’s reflection on different human associations, be 
they private, public, or sacred. It can be used as a general term under which all other associations 
                                                          
636 See especially Vives to Cranevelt, MA VII, 199-200; Vives to Virués, MA VII, 200-201. 
637 Vives to Virués, MA VII, 201: “In concilio nihil video difficilius, quam statuere qui erunt iudices tantae rei, 
praesertim in seculo adeo infecto, partibus, et animi affectibus concitatissimo.” The plea for a true peace in Christ 
is recurrent in his letters, see for instance Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 261, 16-18; Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 266, 8-
11. Vives’s plea for peace was widely shared by his friends, see for instance Fevyn to Cranevelt, CRA 131, 4; 
Erasmus to Charles V, Allen 1873, 23-26.  
638 Noreña has also emphasized the tension between Vives’s insistence on man’s corrupted features, on the one 
hand, and his reliance on the Stoic possibilities of self-improvement, on the other. Noreña 1989, 48-49. 





are placed, but it can also be temporally employed to describe the basic sociability of man that 
is then realized in different ladders of actual social organization.640 Vives does evoke society in 
referring to the mystical union in the body of Christ.641 However, more generally, societas is 
used to describe the social bonds and needs that are natural for man and that set the ultimate 
preconditions for more particular associations. In De disciplinis, political communities arise 
from more primordial social associations based on benevolence that were manifestations of the 
social nature of man.642 Similarly, in De concordia society (societas) is essentially pre-political: 
it refers to the sociability of man, out of which associations that are more particular are borne.643 
This gives De concordia an accentuated level of generality and guarantees that all human 
associations, including political ones, can be discussed primarily as parts of human society – 
the concord of which they have to enhance, not as separate entities with specific goals. It also 
constantly invites the reader to think about the different instances of concord, from education 
and intellectual discussions to politics and religion together. A clear separation between these 
fields and an analysis of their precise relations is not to be found in De concordia. 
 De concordia brings the duality of truth and error to the realm of society (societas) 
in the analysis of concordia and discordia that comprise clusters of opposing pairs of concepts. 
Thus, concordia – already the central concept of Stoic political philosophy as well as Erasmus’s 
most overtly political writings Querela pacis and Dulce bellum inexpertis – would go together 
with at least peace (pax), wisdom (sapientia), charity (caritas), benevolence (benevolentia), 
conscience (conscientia), reason (ratio), judgement (judicio), prudence (prudentia), tranquillity 
(tranquilitas), friendship (amicitia), pacience (pacientia) and virtue (virtu). Whereas discordia, 
for its part, would combine well with war (bellum), ignorance (ignorantia), envy (invidia), 
arrogance (superbia), fury (furor), glory (gloria), slyness (astutia), multitude (multitudo) and 
passion (affectio). Vives’s point is that these issues come in packages; they create a harmonious 
totality that penetrates into every part of human society ranging from the family to the 
international community, and this dynamic is not easy to separate.644 Even though Vives’s 
                                                          
640 For the first use, see Vives: DD, 134: “Humanae omnes societates duabus potissimum rebus vinciuntur, ac 
continentur: iustitia & sermone.” For the second one, see Vives: DD, 201-202.  
641 According to medieval thought, the ultimate society was a union in Christ, Black 1988, 592.  
642 Vives: DD, 201-203. It is true that in the second part of De disciplinis, De tradendis, Vives offers a story where 
all human associations are born out of the necessities of individuals. It is necessity that makes humans realize their 
social possibilities. Vives: DD, 220-221.  
643 Vives: DC 1529, B2-B4.  
644 The use of these concepts very often happens in clusters emphasizing their mutual interdependence. See for 
instance Vives: DC, book 1, B4: “Addidit rationem ducem & consultricem operum, quae nunquam ad discordiam 




analysis of different individual ingenia, in his De consultatione and in the later De anima, show 
that he considered some people more prone to some specific vices, on the level of social bodies 
virtues and vices come by-and-large together since they entail and support one another in the 
social level.645 Ideally, all virtues would come together in a union in Christ that would guarantee 
a move from the omnipresent discordia to a worldview and life of concordia, a general natural 
harmony in and between souls.646  
 These clusters of concepts are predicated on a body: in the heart of De concordia 
lies the corporeal metaphor widely used in the Middle Ages that creates an analogy from 
individual to social self-control. There can be no doubt that on a number of occasions in a 
number of works Vives addresses directly the individual reader showing the right path to true 
wisdom through different ways of controlling passions.647 In his De pacificatione and De 
concordia the word concordia, harmony, in addition to sociability, refers to inner peace or 
concord where judgement and action are in harmony with the laws of nature understood as the 
basic precepts and ends of good life.648 The kind of play of parallels between the inner 
constitution of a person and the structure of society is continuous in Vives’s work – certainly 
more than a coincidence – and it makes possible the discussion of the duties and functions of 
groups of people by likening them to different body parts and faculties of the soul.649 Moreover, 
                                                          
genus voluntatem adhortatur, & instigat.”  
645 Vives: DA, 77-83. De consultatione starts from the premise that different people can be persuaded through 
different vices because of differences of ingenia.  
646 In the best tradition of Philosophia Christi he argues in Vives: DC, book 4, T4: “Christi vero pax aspera inquietis 
affectibus rationem magnis opibus instructam in solium totius animi evehit, ut iam nec oblignatis tabulis, nec 
testibus, nec iureiurando sit opus, nec paratis armis & ostensione terroris, quando quidem dissensionis materia, 
occasio, authores, arma sunt penitus erepta.” 
647 This side of Vives’s thought has been heavily emphasized. See Noreña 1970, 200-213. A recent article on 
Vives’s political thought also emphasizes political concord as a direct result of individual harmony, See Strosetzki 
2014.  
648 As seen, Vives’s notion of natural law implies living according to one’s natural capacities that are inseparable 
from man’s ends, not a set of rules making different realizations of the self possible. The semantics of concord are 
hard to pin down yet it clearly did have numerous connotations. The kind of social harmony Vives was talking 
about was definitely not just a harmony based on balance of power between states but also a natural harmony more 
akin to the harmony in music or harmony in accordance with nature related to the affinities of sympathy. The point 
is that it is not a harmony arising from the management of conflict but a harmony were conflict is absent. See 
Vives: DC, book 4 ,T4: “...Haec est pax illa, quam se Christus ait suis impartiri, sed qualem dare non valet mundus, 
homines enim pactionibus suis affectus leniunt, non comprimunt, blandiuntur, non cohibent, ad summum vi & 
metu manus arcent ab iniuria, id est maiore discordia, ligant minorem.”; Vives: DC, book 4, T2-T3: “Piratae & 
latrones, quorum ars atque exercitium est infestare hominum genus, perturbare quietem, leges ac iura conculcare, 
contaminare sacra & profana omnia, tamen inter se pacem quandam & concordiam conservant definitam certis 
quibusdam legibus & velut iustitiae aequitate nec aliter possent coitiones illas suas & latrocinii societatem 
retinere.” 
649 See especially the book four of De tradendis, Vives: DD, 315-352; Vives: DC, book 3, M: “Quum & aer, & 
aquae pestilenti sunt aliquo vicio contaminatae, corpus quod in illis semper necesse est versari ac vivere, difficile 
servatur incorruptum & sanum. At quum in ipsis ossibus medullisque affixa haeret lues, & saeva morbi vis totum 




by discussing the social body one could describe a concord that went beyond individual acts of 
coming to reason in Christ, or in Stoic self-control.650 The idea of social concord could be used 
in De concordia in a rather flexible manner. First, it could relate to the mystical union of all 
Christians in the body of Christ – a powerful image that emphasized the deep associations of 
charity and benevolence between all Christians independent of the political units they were 
living in and the different churches to which they were attached. In fact, this metaphor is evoked 
precisely to argue for a peace between nations and a concord of opinions as the curing of the 
body of Christ, and its significance transcends the institutional confines of the Catholic 
Church.651 Vives also employed the metaphor of the body to discuss political unions both on 
the level of the city and larger kingdoms or empires. In talking to the city council of Bruges, 
for example, he reminds that the administrators have to look after and listen to “the whole body 
of the city.”652 In De concordia Vives could also write that “in vast kingdoms there is always a 
part that harms and worries the whole body with its particular sickness,” referring here to larger 
political entities.653 These two general meanings are not used in any antagonistic way by Vives. 
                                                          
oppressa mente, & omnibus corporis sensibus, tanta & tam tumultuosa morbi concitatione. Talis est imago externae 
discordiae & intestinae.” 
650 This has been suggested in different forms by most writers on Vives’s political thought, see Noreña 1970, 212-
222, Fernández-Santamaría 1998, Chapter three, Curtis 2008, 155. In his early The State, War and Peace 
Fernández-Santamaría saw Vives’s and Valdés’s differences in the fact that Vives “enlists into his cause of total 
reform every member of the Christian commonwealth,” Fernández-Santamaría 1977, 56.  
651 Vives: DC, book 4, Cc2: “Haec omnia haeserunt in humano genere ex noxia vetusti Adam. Novus vero Adam 
exors peccati omnis, & coelestis a deo missus omnes illas sepes, omnes terminos ac limites diruit, & in primam 
illam ac veram naturam hominem reposuit, ut quum ipse esset pater & princeps omnium, effecissetque suo 
sanguine, ut universi homines ad eandem civitatem, ad eandem sacra, ad eandem felicitatem pertinerent, iam 
cessarent humanae distinctiones, nova essemus omnes & una creatura, in qua iam nec discrimen esset nationis, 
nec gentis, nec conditionis, nec status, sed membra unius corporis, una benevolentia, uno sensu coniuncta....”; 
Vives: DC, book 4, DD: “Eorum commodis & bonis tam gaudebit, quam oculus, si per se sensum haberet, utilitate 
manus aut pectoris, non aliter dolebit illorum malis, quam oculus damnis & cruciatu pedis. Quoniamquidem non 
minore harmonia & concentu coliatum coaugmentatumque est corpus Christi, quae est ecclesia, quam corpus 
uniuscuiusque nostrum, fecit enim Christus congregationem hanc & conventum suorum omnium, corpus unum, 
cuius se caput constituit, totumque vivida illa & ardentissima sua charitate animavit.” 
652 Vives: De subventione, Gv: “Denique rectoris Reipublicae officium est, sollicitum non esse quid unus aut alter 
aut certe paucis de legibus & administratione sentiant, modo totius civitatis corpori in comune sit consultum. Leges 
enim etiam malis utiles sunt, vel ut corrigantur, vel ne diu malefaciant.”  
653 Vives: DC, book 4, Y: “...in ingenti regno semper existit pars aliqua, quae corpus totum suo aliquo morbo 
infestet, ac inquietet....” Vives makes the analogy clear in discussing society in the book number 4, see Vives: DC, 
book 4, DD; see also Vives: DC book 3, M: “Quum & aer, & aquae pestilenti sunt aliquo vicio contaminatae, 
corpus quod in illis semper necesse est versari ac vivere, difficile servatur incorruptum & sanum. At quum in ipsis 
ossibus medullisque affixa haeret lues, & saeva morbi vis totum corpus pervasit, potest fortassis remedium 
extrinsecus aliquod adhiberi. Tutus ver nemo est, qui prospiciat oppressa mente, & omnibus corporis sensibus, 
tanta & tam tumultuosa morbi concitatione. Talis est imago externae discordiae & intestinae.” For a union in the 
body of Christ, see Vives: DC, book 3, M: “...unicum agnoscimus patrem Christum illum, qui in similitudinem 
quidem carnis peccati, sed tamen coelestis homo secundum deum formatus est, ut iam non modo unius civitatis 
ecclesiae sumus cives, sed etiam maiori vinculo colligati, nempe unius omnium patris filii, imo vero eiusdem 
capitis & corporis membra, ut nec manus nocere possit pedi suo cum sua utilitate, aut oculus auri.” Cathy Curtis 




On the contrary, the ultimate point is that the harmony of political bodies can only be realized 
as part of the larger body of all Christians, and, referring to the universal dimension of Christ, 
of all mankind.654 This was indeed what a true citizen of the world would have understood.655  
 However, Vives’s point is not merely to describe the world of concord and discord 
through a bodily metaphor, but to discuss their dynamics: the conceptual clusters of discordia 
and concordia do not remain timeless or immovable. Already in the first part of the work 
entitled Liber primus, qui est de originibus concordiae et discordiae Vives presents an 
explanation that is historical but also simultaneously conceptual. He starts by claiming that 
humans, by nature, are inclined to and created for concord, and all their corporeal and mental 
capacities amply testify to this. Thus, discord is nothing more than a separation of man from 
his God-like nature:  
 
“One has to admit plainly and openly; man was not satisfied with his human nature and strove 
for divinity, and therefore lost the humanity he had given up without reaching the divine 
condition he was looking for. Man could have perhaps reached partly that divine condition if 
he had known himself, distrusted of his own forces, and expected to obtain it with the grace 
and beneficence of God whose beneficence he had already experienced. But he did not know 
himself and with the deceit of the cunning Devil he was raised to heights from which he could 
not descend without a serious fall.”656 
 
Here and throughout the work Vives is very clear that it is this initial fall – 
somehow reminiscent of the loss of paradise – that gives rise to destructive passions and most 
importantly, following Augustine, to pride (superbia).657 
It does not play a major role in Vives whether pride is the reason or the 
                                                          
as paternal government in northern humanist discourse, Curtis 2006, 103.  
654 Vives: DC, book 4, Cc2: “...iam cessarent humanae distinctiones, nova essemus omnes & una creatura, in qua 
iam nec discrimen esset nationis, nec gentis, nec conditionis, nec status, sed membra unius corporis, una 
benevolentia, uno sensu coniuncta.”  
655 See Chapter five.  
656 Vives DC, book 1, 1529, C2: “plane ac aperte confitendum est, non fuit homo humanitate contentus, divinitatem 
expetiuit, idcirco & humanitatem, quam relinquebat amisit, nec quam affectarat divinitatem, est consecutus, ad 
quam fortassis divinitatem quadam tenus pertigisset, si se agnoscens & suis diffisus viribus dei se gratia ac 
beneficio adepturum sperasset, cuius in se tam prolixam erat iam benignitatem expertus. Sed se non agnovit & 
diaboli versuta sublatus fraude eo ascendit, unde no posset sine gravissimo casu descendere....”  
657 In Augustine, pride is also the reason. Augustinus: De civitate Dei, xii.xi: “Cum vero causa miseriae malorum 
angelorum quaeritur, ea merito occurrit, quod ab illo, qui summe est, aversi ad se ipsos conversi sunt, qui non 
summe sunt; et hoc vitium quid aliud quam superbia nuncupetur? Initium quippe omins peccati superbia.” Vives 




consequence of the fall, 658 but after the fall, its primacy among concepts never seems to be in 
doubt, since it is from pride that Vives deduces its strongest armor bearers in the world of 
passions:  
 
“Pride attacks using two pointed weapons: envy and wrath. For if someone excels in things 
considered beautiful and eminent, pride immediately sends envy to discredit what is beautiful, 
to sprinkle stains on what is pure; in short, through poor judgement and bad interpretation, it 
leaves nothing sincere and right, and leaves an unjust mark on everything or, when it cannot 
do anything else, a mark of suspicion. If, however, pride tries to take something away from 
us, it mentions offences, and wrath is given the license to revenge. Both envy and wrath are 
equipped with the will to do harm, and when this will turns into a permanent state it is 
hatred.”659 
 
 What is significant here is not only that Vives argues discord back to the 
dysfunction of the soul and the rise of passions, but that all this implies a certain notion of social 
living very strongly, since the rule of passions has burst out invading all aspects of collective 
life.660 The activities and interpretative patterns stemming from the initial discordia create 
models of interpretation that sustain the error, a good example of which is the close relationship 
between the concepts of decorum, adulation, glory and multitude. Since a man pestered by pride 
is naturally dependent on the assessment of others to nourish his sense of superiority, he is 
mainly looking for glory that is based on the opinion of the multitude that makes him vulnerable 
for adulation. This is because the multitude is equated with passion and, consequently, its 
judgement never grasps the right measure of all things.  
As Vives eloquently points out, a world where people seek the judgement of the 
multitude turns into a social competition, a kind of theatre of self-fashioning where each word 
                                                          
658 Augustine discusses this at length coming to the conclusion that the efficient cause of evil will is impossible to 
find. See Augustine: De civitate Dei, xii.vi-xii.vii.   
659 Vives DC, book 1, 1529 (C 5 next): “Impetit superbia duobus iaculis invidia & ira. Nam si quis aliqua rerum 
huiusmodi, quae pulchrae ac praestantes censentur antecedat, continuo a superbia mittitur invidia, quae formosa 
deturpet, et puris labem aspergat, denique male sentiendo & peius omnia interpretando nihil syncerum aut rectum 
praetermittat, omnibus vel apertissimam notam iniurens vel certe suscipionem, quando aliud non potest, sin 
detrahere a nobis tentet, iniuria nominatur, & irae permittitur ultio, utraque & invidentia & ira voluntate 
malefaciendi est armata, quae voluntas, quum inveteravit, sit odium....” Pride is also the reason for man’s fall in 
De subventione, Vives: De subventione, Aiii.  
660 Noreña sees the problems of society primarily as a social extension of problems caused by passions on an 




and gesture is seen as a possibility to demonstrate one’s superiority and worth in the eyes of 
those who are not able to judge correctly. The kind of understanding of the social world points 
to a decorum that is pronouncedly aesthetic, it is about appearing to be something, not actually 
being something under the vigilant eye of one’s pure conscience, men of character and, 
ultimately, God. This model is used for both the critique of luxury and ostentation, and the 
importance of military glory, both of which are sustained by a misinterpretation of glory and 
honour.661 The dichotomy between being something and appearing as something that had been 
functional in questions of true nobility and truthful use of word is in the very heart of both De 
concordia and De pacificatione and seriously hinders the possibilities of the language to build 
a society of concord.662  
 The interplay between appearances and inner self resonated well in Vives’s 
overall oeuvre. Much of his literary production dealt with a specific tension: whereas our entire 
external appearance should mirror character and virtue, what lay behind the exterior could not 
be captured in any simple way. The very starting point of his entire political oeuvre ranging 
from Veritas fucata and De consultatione to De pacificatione and De concordia was that a brake 
had occurred between the transparent world of concord and the actual state of discord and 
corruption. On the one hand, all the external signs of humans testify of his benevolent and 
caring nature extensively described in the first book of De concordia, but on the other, the 
contemporary reality shows how far man has degenerated from his true nature.663 This was 
reflected in Vives’s basic epistemological views: in the very heart of his theory of knowledge 
                                                          
661 Vives: DC, book 1, C3: “Mira dictu res captavit humana superbia & haec praestantiae cupido laudem atque 
admirationem ex re omni, non ea solum, quae speciem videbatur habere aliquam virtutis aut boni, sed ex neutris, 
& quae indifferentes nominantur, ex frivolis, ac ineptis, ex noxiis, ex pudendis, ex viciis. Sedere, stare, iacere, 
ingredi, omnem gestum & motum corporis volumus ita fieri cum dignitate, ut non contenti offensionem 
spectantium defugisse, etiam decus ex iis paremus, nihil sinimus esse natural, omnibus adhibenda est ars honoris 
colligendi.” Vives uses similar logic to explain the rise of military glory: Vives: DC, book 1, E: “Plane ubi affectus 
totam possessionem animorum occuparant, violentissimus quisque tyrannidem invasit. Ita non optimus erat in 
precio ob amorem virtutis, sed promptissimus ad nocendum, quum metuerent omnes iis rebus, quas haberent, quam 
virtutem chariora. Ergo partim, quod interna non viderent, externa tantum suspicerent, partim quod se putarent 
iuvari, partim adulatione, in quam prona est adversum potentes multitudo, omne honorum, decoris, laudum, gloriae 
genus in facinora est militaria congestum....” This same model is functional also in De disciplinis for explaining 
false wisdom based on the opinion of the speactators and not on truth, see for instance Vives: DD, 12: “Caeca est 
arrogantia, & quocuncque intendit per confidentiam, atque impudentiam temere grassatur, ergo nihil dubitat 
quiduis subito intrepide asseverare, etiam de arcanis rebus, & maxime reconditis. In superbia hac alii magna illa 
& admirabilia tenere ipsi sibi persuadent, vel pravae naturae vitio, vel quod quum id vident esse spectatoribus 
persuasum, ipsi iudicio illorum de se acquiescunt.” 
662 Vives: DP, B5: “Quid illa omnis educatio ac disciplina in verbis & gestu, externa quadam specie consumetur? 
nihil ne penetrabit ad animum, qui solus, quum sit hominis praecipua pars ac prope sola, ineducatissimus ac 
barbarissimus remanebit spurco & bruto corpore, ad humanum quendam & civilem habitum apto & conformato?” 




as it was spelled out in the 1531 De disciplinis was the idea that in man’s current state essences 
were not knowable in themselves but ultimately only through their accidents. What is more, in 
his theory of knowledge Vives explicitly made the link to the essence of individuals such as 
Marcus Cato, who are also known only through their accidental attributes and never in 
themselves.664 In a perfect epistemological state man would have no problem in reaching 
knowledge through attributes, but in the theatrical world of discord the corrupted mind has lost 
its capacity to capture those truths – it misjudges the exterior attributing wrong essential 
qualities to wrong accidents. Just like in Veritas fucata where the soldiers of error sustain their 
collective error, the world of appearance is sustained by a social dynamic.  
 This error is truly everywhere: the ties of concord have broken down, and discord 
has penetrated into different layers of human existence – ranging from arts and material culture 
to the kind of exempla that create modes of interpreting actions and words. A dominant strand 
of the treatise approaches the larger social culture and tradition and shows how discordia is in 
fact inherent in and inscribed into the very culture surrounding people. This is closely linked to 
Vives’s analysis of the social dimension of passions and, more specifically, to how a passionate 
interpretation of an individual happening is socialized. According to Vives, humans guided by 
passions tend to take the offenses suffered by other members of the groups they belong to 
(family, city etc.) as their own, and have a tedious tendency of remembering them from 
generation to generation.665 This memory, then, has been one of the driving forces of cultural 
production, the result of which is that people live in the midst of signs inherited from a tradition 
imbued with passion and misguided judgement that nourish faction on all levels of human 
association. Thus, statues, eulogies of military glory, jousts, and pictorial depictions of warfare 
all testify of the socialization and normalization of an ultimately disastrous culture of discord 
                                                          
664 Vives: DD, 519, 520: “...sed quatenus rerum essentiae per se sunt nobis ignotae, quesita sunt per quae illae 
nobis innotescerent, nempe adiuncta: quippe ur intelligentiae nostrae ex sensionibus nascuntur, ita essentiarum 
cognitio, quae est mentis, ex adhaerentium cognitione, quae est sensus....”; “Sed neque singulare habet propriam 
sibi distinctionem essentiae, accidentibus figuratur: ut qui sit M. Cato, qui Bucephalus, quae Portia, aut Lucretia.”  
665 Vives: DC, book 2, G3-G4: “Omnia oportet discordiae servirae, non interna modo, sed externa quoque. 
Sermonem, & lachrymas, & amicitias, quas ad mutuum auxilium ex dei munificentia acceperamus, in mutuam 
perniciem convertimus, amicus amicum, frater fratrem, vicinus vicinum, civis civem non ad opem ferendam 
implorat, ut in commune prosint, sed ut alii noceant, sit manus hominum consentientium in ultionem eius, quam 
illi iniuriam interpretantur, vel quod caussae favent, vel quod homini, aut quod alii alias spes sequuntur.” See also 
Vives: DC, book 2, G2: “...apud quasdam nationes, quae quum ipsae sibi abunde ad humanitatem videantur 
informatae, ihumanissime vivunt, ad reponendam iniuriam non modo authorem requirunt, sed parentes, fratres, 
filios, avos, proavos, nepotes, pronepotes, patrueles, patruos, consobrinos, omnes propinquos, affines, gentiles, 
quacunque sint valetudine, conditione, sexu, aetate, ut etiam pulchre videant sibi functus ultionis munere, qui 




and warfare.666 The idea of inscribing erroneous signs and messages to culture was deeply 
Erasmian. In the part on adulation in his Institutio the famous Dutchman had written, “There is 
a certain implicit flattery in portraits, statues, and inscriptions” enlarging the scope of flattery 
to encompass different signs of collective memory.667 
 This quasi-sociological dimension of De concordia has two important 
consequences. First, it amounts to a far-fetching critique of certain very concrete cultural 
practices the clearest example of which was the strong chivalric ethos of Burgundy that had 
attracted young Charles.668 The kind of discussions of a culture of warfare that is embedded in 
practices such as jousting is a clear reference to the culture of nobility surrounding Charles and 
prominent members of nobility. Persuading Charles or any other prince to seek military glory 
communicated through these signs, and interiorized by people, stands in stark contrast to the 
peaceful and virtuous Christian prince rejoicing in his self-control.669 Thus, the dismantling of 
the culture of chivalric nobility and ostentation, together with the promotion of a culture of 
learning is a central implication of De concordia, although it also fiercely criticises the learned 
circles – especially Italian humanism – for an oratorical culture nurturing discord. However, 
fellow humanists are criticised not for their aspirations to be learned, but for their failure to 
perform the duties as wise doctors of souls. Thus, De concordia takes a stance for the peaceful 
culture of learning found among the educated elite against the theatrical culture of false nobility 
dreaming of military glory – as well as against the growingly aesthetic culture of luxury and 
ostentation more generally.670 In describing how the culture of classical antiquity nurtured 
warfare, Vives himself wrote in a thoroughly satirical manner:  
 
“It is not uncommon that both consider themselves victors, act accordingly, and erect trophies 
against the other in their respective lands like Athenians and Spartans in the Peloponnesian 
wars. It is hard to put into words how much these permanent signs of victory incite the souls 
                                                          
666 Referring to warfare Vives writes in Vives: DC, book 1, E: “...poemata & historiae conscriptae , erecti arcus, 
positae statuae in celeberrimis urbium locis cum praeclaris inscriptionibus, clarum nomen, nobilitas ad filios & 
nepotes.”  
667 Erasmus: Institutio, 70: “Est tacita quaedam adulatio & in picturis, statuis, ac titulis.” (English translation from 
Erasmus: Literary and Educational Writings, vol. 5, Collected Works of Erasmus 27 [ed. Levi], Toronto University 
Press, Toronto 1986, 248). 
668 Blockmans 2002, 14-16. 
669 Even though princely action is fiercely criticised in De concordia, Vives reminds the reader that what nurtures 
and makes their “crazy acts” possible is the hatred reigning among people. Vives: DC, book 1, F: “Sed & nos odiis 
nostris mutuis illorum [principum] furoribus servimus, illi nostris affectibus ad explendam animi sui libidinem 
abutuntur....”  




of both parties revoking and aggravating old and almost forgotten enmities: we know that 
solely for this reason many wars have been renewed in older days and recently.”671 
 
The second and conceptual implication is the magnitude of concord that binds all 
humanist projects together. One thing is to urge for peace by appealing to people in powerful 
positions, but it is even more important to create the kind of cultural conditions where self-
understanding is possible and where passions can be controlled. Political peace might be a 
precondition for this, but all cultural codes such maxims, proverbs, books, material culture and 
range of other issues should be reformed if one wants peace and concord to truly last. 672 In this 
way, De concordia implies the social and political importance of a range of humanist 
educational, political, and theological projects underlining their fundamental union with social 
goals. Simply put, a corruption in mores, learning, and culture, nurtures a corruption in moral 
and political judgement and not just the other way around.673 
 In addition to showing how discord is inscribed into the culture one is living in, 
Vives argues that discord also produced the kind of repercussions the destructive nature of 
which is obvious to everyone. In this way, a life of discord is not only an offence against the 
precepts of honesty but also against the precepts of expediency. To point this out was, of course, 
well in line with rhetorical precepts, and Vives himself in his De disciplinis wrote that the most 
effective way to argue against vice that has the appearance of utility was to show that a 
seemingly advantageous course of action has in fact consequences that cannot be considered 
expedient.674 More concretely in this case, and in order to argue for the utility (utilitas) of a life 
of concord, he traces the most tangible tragedies of the time, namely the seditions of the 
Reformation and wars among princes, back to the dynamics of discord. These, of course, would 
be counted as tragedies even by those who interpret the world through the lenses of discord 
                                                          
671 Vives: DC, book 3, O: “utrique se non raro pro victoribus habent, et gerunt, & tropae in sua quisque regione de 
altero statuit, ut bellis Peloponnesiacis Athenienses et Lacedaemonii, quae signa victoriae ad diutirnitatem 
impressa dici non potest, quantum incitant utrorumque animos, & veteres iam ac prope obliteratas inimicitias 
revocant & exacerbant, unde multa & olim & nuper ea sola de causa reparata esse bella novimus....”  
672 See for instance Vives: DC, book 1, F5 (erroneously E5): “...& quam minus auditores preferant, laudandi, & 
quidem sui, iam simulachra pugnarum praecipuae cuiusdam sunt in spectaculis voluptatis, olim gladiatores in 
harena, venationes, naumachia, athletae, nunc militaria exercitamenta, certamina poetarum vel oratorum, 
disputationes in scholis, quibus homines intersunt litterarum prorsum ignari, iurantque singularem se ex illis 
voluptatem capere, nempe ex pugnae imagine, nam verborum nihil intelligunt....”  
673 This has been argued in the case of More and Erasmus as well, see Baker-Smith 2009, 168-169.  
674 Vives: DD, 371: “Sic fuerit operaepretium mostrare iuveni tristeis exitus, quos voluptates plurimis attulere. 
Eundem in modum sit mihi dictum de iis vitiis, quae cum populari utilitate sunt coniuncta: quod genus habentur 




since, as Vives amply points out, all mundane goods of nobility, wealth, and possessions have 
suffered considerably.675  
 
Path to Concord  
 
Because of the multifaceted nature of the concepts of concord and discord, and their 
omnipresence in all aspects of life, one has to ask about the possibilities of building a path from 
a world of discord to a world of concord. Indeed, Vives discusses in his De concordia a move 
to concord with the fourth part of the work being explicitly dedicated to the description of the 
right path to a state of concord. Thus, the language of virtues around concord and peace is not 
only a criterion of rhetorical assessment of political and social action, but it effectively fixes an 
end or a thelos to which humans individually and collectively should strive.  
 Nevertheless, to break the interpretative circle of discord is not easy, and Vives 
never offers a temporal story that would describe the steps of that move. One of the boldest 
arguments on the temporal element of Vives’s social thinking has strongly emphasized the 
temporal possibilities of man for building an earthly society of bonitas as a gateway to divine 
felicitas. According to this view, Vives rates very hignly human chances of creating a society 
of concord.676 In a similar vein, Noreña’s classical study argued that “the unfinished character 
of earthly perfection and its essential propensity toward the eternal fulfilment is truly a 
fundamental feature of Vives’s moral philosophy.”677 Noreña has strongly argued there lies an 
unresolved tension between the Stoic ideals and Augustinian tenets that emphasize man’s 
sinfulness in a world pestered by original sin claiming, however, that “De concordia [...] lacks 
the truly Augustinian insistence on the powerlessness of man, on the total reliance of man on 
God’s grace and assistance.”678 More generally, a number of interpretations of Vives have 
highlighted the importance of the youthful Fabula de homine as a truly Renaissance text 
                                                          
675 The third book of De concordia is dedicated to this, see Vives: DC, book 3, K: “Incipiam a postremis bonorum, 
quae tamen multi iudiciorum pravitate prima ponunt. Opes hominum aut constant fixis possessionibus, ut agris, 
atque aedificiis, aut iis quae moveri loco possunt, ut metallis, gemmis, vestitu, supellectili, servis, pecore. Bellum 
tanquam vehementissima quaedam procella quaecunque fiunt obvia, proruit, nihilque integrum aut erectum 
praetermittit....”  
676 This is one of the main arguments of Fernánez-Santamaría. See especially Fernández-Santamaría 1998, viii-ix. 
Ferandez-Santamaría’s interpretation has been criticised for turning Vives into a Pelagian and forgetting the 
importance of grace, see Pabel 1999. See also George 1999, 1158. Despite of this, Fernández-Santamaría captures 
the explicitly optimistic and utopian implications of Vivesian framework for social thinking more clearly than his 
predecessors.  
677 Noreña 1970, 201.  




belonging to the tradition of Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio that emphasized the ambivalent 
metaphysical status of man, who by the use of his own free will was capable of good and bad.679 
 Vives, of course, knew well one of the most grandiose treatments dedicated to 
time, Augustine’s De civitate Dei, which famously deprived political and social history of its 
eschatological element. In Augustine’s view, our earthly actions as members of human society 
had little to do with the redemption and salvation of one’s soul, which was ultimately dependent 
on divine grace since the consequences of original sin had made men hopelessly incapable of 
achieving salvation using their own free will. History might have been the stage on which the 
theatre of eschatology is played out, yet the possibilities of the actors to understand the rules of 
the greater logic of the play are limited indeed. Earthly society, thus, could aspire to the more 
modest ends of mundane virtues spearheaded by justice but in numerous occasions; because of 
man’s corrupted nature, earthly kingdom had to focus on putative measures. More recently, 
Luther had denied the existence of free will and the importance of human intentional actions 
for divine grace by arguing that man, utterly incapable of living according to God’s 
commandments, was justified only through faith.680  
 Vives is undoubtedly reacting against these ideas of human powerlessness in all 
of his political, theological, and social writings. As an answer to these problems, however, Vives 
does not offer a systematic philosophy of history that would weave eschatological aspects 
together with the organization of society in any clear manner. As in the case of More’s Utopia 
and Erasmus’s Institutio, the discussion is not overtly temporal in any of Vives’s works. Yet it 
seems clear that the Spaniard is in fact talking about a relative embetterment of man’s earthly 
life – one could even argue that this is the very premise on which De concordia is built. 
However, there were other discussions were human possibilities were heatedly discussed, the 
most important of which was the problem of the free will. Already in his commentaries on 
Augustine, Vives had strongly defended human capacities for choosing their own destiny 
through the free use of one’s own will. In a somewhat Augustinian fashion he emphasized that 
God’s foreknowledge was compatible with free will since God knows or sees human history in 
his timeless existence (nunc stans) yet the history perceived by God is realized through the 
                                                          
679 Colish 1962, 3-20. Fernández-Santamarìa emphasizes that Fabula differs from Pico’s Oratio since he is more 
sceptical about the possibility to have knowledge about God’s plan for man, thus opening up the question of earthly 
society as a possibility to bonitas that is still tied somehow to man’s metaphysical status as Imago Dei. Fernández-
Santamaría 1998, Chapter one. Fantazzi has argued that the works are fundamentally different since Vives does 
not share Pico’s idea of man’s existential freedom, see Fantazzi 2003, 79-87.  
680 See especially the books xviii-xxii of Augustine’s De Civitate Dei; Luther, Martin: De servo Arbitrio ad D. 




voluntary actions of humans. Emphatically, Vives’s commentaries on Augustine’s fifth book 
state that there are “many things that could occur but never occur,” and that “we can freely 
choose between two options.”681 In another passage, shortly later, Vives very unequivocally 
stated, “man does not sin because God foreknows that he is going to sin,” moving on to quote 
Chrysostom who emphasized strongly that it is man who willingly sins.682  
 The defence of free will, however, did not necessarily relate to social and political 
reality as in much of early Renaissance and late medieval thought the discussion was primarily 
about the possibilities of individual salvation, irrespective of the social and political context one 
had to live in. Erasmus’s defence of free will, De libero arbitrio, defined the issue mainly in 
terms of human possibilities of reaching salvation, leaving somewhat aside what exactly those 
possibilities would imply in the earthly world from a social and political point of view.683 
Despite this, one of Erasmus’s central concerns throughout his De libero arbitrio is to point out 
exactly the kind of social consequences the denial of free will would potentially have, making 
explicit the implications the theological question had for collective life in Erasmus’s mind. 
Thus, according to the Dutch scholar it is important to attribute actions to free will, “to allow 
the ungodly, who have deliberately fallen short of the grace of God, to be deservedly 
condemned; to clear God of the false accusation of cruelty and injustice; to free us from despair, 
protect us from complacency, and spur us on to moral endeavour.”684 Following Erasmus, Vives 
rates human potential rather highly even in the postlapsarian world with respect of the 
possibilities of organizing collective life through the free use of human will. More generally, an 
emphasis throughout Vives’s work on liberty as a sign of the God-like nature of man that 
transcends the limitations of nature and body is a pronounced one.685 
 The stress on human liberty rules out discussions of unalterable predestination, 
                                                          
681 Vives: VCA, v.ix: “Creavit deus voluntates nostras liberas, quae ideo liberae sunt, quia ille voluit, & utrumlibet 
possunt facere ex contrariis, aliud tamen facturae non sunt quam quod deus praesciuit, quia aliud haud dubie 
nunquam facient, tam & si possunt. Certum est enim fieri pleraque posse, quae nunquam fient: ita non res future 
ex scientia dei manant, sed scientia potius dei ex illis, quae tamen future non sunt deo, in quo est error multorum 
sed praesentes. Quo circa non recte dicitur praescire, nisi relatu ad actiones nostras dicendus est scire, videre, 
cernere.”  
682 Vives: VCA, v.x: “Quid erat tricis illis & verborum laqueis opus, nisi simpliciter loqui, ut hic Augustinus non 
ideo peccare hominem, quod deus praesciuit eum peccaturum, qui si nolit potest omnino non peccare, idque si 
faciat, hoc praesciuit deus....”  
683 Erasmus: De libero, b2: “Porro liberum arbitrium hoc loco sentimus, vim humanae voluntatis qua se possit 
homo applicare ad ea quae perducunt ad aeternam salutem, aut ab iisdem avertere.” 
684 Erasmus: De libero, third to last page: “Ut sit quod merito imputetur impiis, qui gratiae dei volentes defuerint, 
ut excludatur a deo crudelitatis, & iniusticiae calumnia, ut excludatur a nobis desperatio, ut excludatur securitas, 
ut extimulemur ad conandum.” (English translation from Erasmus – Luther: The Battle over Free Will (ed. Miller), 
Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis 2012, 29). 




and Vives never connects history with providence, eschatology, nor with any prophecies that 
would make an explicit reference to human history and future. But some of the concepts of the 
tradition of classical antiquity used for describing the forces active in human history were 
treated very interestingly by Vives. This was the case of fortuna – used regularly in Stoic 
parlance synonymously with Providence to describe the blind forces of nature and history not 
controlled by human agency.686 In Vives, fortuna could, for instance, be rhetorically employed 
to describe the cause of everything positive achieved through acts of discord – such as warfare. 
The point was that even though acts of dubious moral nature have produced useful outcomes, 
they have done so not because of the utilitas of specific human actions, but merely because of 
the blind forces of fortuna. More generally, and uniting it with our social duties, Vives often 
ascribes all our achievements in the social world to fortuna, ranging from our social position, 
to wealth, which underlines the somewhat random nature of our social fortunes. But even more 
importantly, it is clear that Vives did not understand human life as being merely under the blind 
forces of fortuna, since the concept is throughout put to use to describe precisely the 
unpredictable nature and blindness of the world of discord, whereas the world of concord 
signifies, among other things, a conquering of the world of fortuna.687 
 The most in-depth discussion of these classical concepts could, however, be found 
in Vives’s commentaries on Augustine, where the Valencian had discussed fortuna, fatum and 
necessitas quite extensively – albeit in a somewhat disorganized manner. In the spirit of the 
commentary tradition Vives presented different views inherited from the classical and Christian 
traditions in various parts of the work. In his comments to the very first chapter of the Book V 
Vives, however, offered a more substantial discussion on fatum, fortuna and necessitas, quoting 
the most important authorities on the matter. Following Plato, he argues that necessity is such 
that “no force, no reason, and no art could achieve that what is established is not completed.” 
Destiny, on the other hand, “follows determinate causes and remains fixed,” yet, “it does not 
take away the necessity of choice,” while fortune is reserved to phenomena that is under the 
influence of stars and can at times be “avoided through wisdom, diligence, and work.” These 
last concepts form the very basis of Vives’s educational programme as it is presented in his later 
De disciplinis. Using an Aristotelian language, Vives states that fortune refers to the outcomes 
that do not fall into the teleological design of the agent, giving the example of someone 
                                                          
686 For the two ways of using fortuna in Seneca, see Stacey 2007, 65-72.  
687 Vives: DC, book 3, N: “...nihil est infirmius quam quantacumque potentia in discordia, nusquam magis ludit 




accidentally finding a treasure while working his land for other purposes. In the very last part 
of the section, Vives, in his own voice states that fortuna very often refers to our own fatum and 
that “when fortune evolves in accordance with the desires of the soul, it is called happiness, 
when in the opposite direction, it is called unhappiness.” Happiness, one of the terms most 
frequently used by the Spaniard, referred to a virtuous life according to one’s nature and thelos 
– not to a purely subjective understanding of our own state.688 
 Even more visible is Vives’s distaste for fatum as an unavoidable force when he 
rails against those defending the inalterable nature of fatum: 
 
“For if it was necessary for one to be bad and the other good, why would the bad one 
deserve punishment and the good one praise – since there is no praising and blaming of 
necessities. Thus, it would be of no use to encourage to virtue and to attack vice for nothing 
could happen in a different way. Whose destiny it is to be bad, would be bad.”689 
 
 This paragraph can be understood in the context of his commentaries on 
Augustine and his strong defence of free will. However, simultaneously it points to Vives’s 
larger rhetorical programme; it highlights Vives’s urge to underline the possibilities of language 
and social action for shaping human reality by employing the rhetorical language of praise and 
blame. The point of departure of the fourth book of De concordia, dealing with the path to 
concord, starts effectively from the premise that some kind of concord is indeed attainable. As 
he states in the last part of De concordia, “There is nothing more conform with and akin to 
heavenly happiness than our concord, and nothing that resembles more the disaster of Hell as 
                                                          
688 Vives: VCA, v.i: “Quoniam de fato multa disserit hoc loco Augustinus, repetam paulo altius opiniones aliquot 
veterum ea de re, quo melius omnia faciliusque intelligantur [...] Nulla vi, nulla ratione, aut arte effici posse quo 
minus illa, ut constituta sunt, perficiantur, unde est illu ab ipso [Plato] usurpatum: Necessitati ne deos quidem 
resistere, quae vero ab astris geruntur, talia interdum esse, ut evitari sapientia, industria, labore queant, in quo sita 
est fortuna: quae vero certis causis progrederentur, ac permanerent fixa, id dici fatum, quod tamen necessitate non 
afferat electionis. Est enim multum in nostra manu situm, quid optemus, quid inceptemus: sed ubi incepimus, 
reliqua sunt fati....”; “Aristoteles explicatius secundo libro de naturali auditione, & caeteri peripatetici, inter quos 
Alexander Aphrodisiensis: Fortuita sunt, inquit, quorum finis non est ab agente actioni praestitutus: ut si quid 
fodiens, quo pinguescat humus, reperit thesaurum, fortuna est....”; “Fortuna plerumque pro fato ipso sorteque 
rerum utuntur: quae quum ex animi sententia procedit, nominatur felicitas, quum secus, infelicitas.” It is worth 
mentioning that some of the same vocabulary is evoked in Vives’s understanding of deliberative rhetoric that deals 
with future oriented choices. As he argues in his De consultatione, deliberation is never about necessities since 
there is no point of debating about something that is already settled, Vives: DCO, 238. See also Vives: DD, 191-
193; 422-423.  
689 Vives: VCA, v.x: “Hoc obiiciebatur iis, qui necessario fato dicebant omnia fieri. Quod cum necesse esset hunc 
esse malum, illum bonum cur malus supplicum bonus praemium merebantur, cum necessaria nec vitio dentur, nec 
laudi, tum etiam nec exhortari ad virtutem carpereque vitia prodesset, cum fieri aliter non posset, quin malus esset, 




disagreements and hate” – drawing here on an explicit parallel between eternal and temporal 
concord.690 Thus, if man achieves peace with God in this world, then “peace will be in the 
interior, in the exterior, in public, in private, in each everyone as they relate with others and 
themselves.”691 Vives is not, however, Pelagian. His argument rather emphasizes human action 
as a way of our asking for God’s grace – an asking based on virtuous life, both individual and 
collective. Thus, rather than being very radical, his basic ideas on the possibilities of the social 
body to reach earthly bonitas were in line with traditional Catholic medieval theology that 
always emphasized the mixture of grace and human will as a gateway to heaven.692 
 As Vives argues, God will help those who know how to ask humbly, but the 
problem has been that the way of asking has started from wrong and selfish premises, because 
men are blinded by diabolic passion.693 The premise of the fourth part of his De concordia as 
well as his Introductio ad sapientiam, is that peace is not just a blind gift of God, but that man’s 
actions and effort for earthly goodness and concord are a way of asking for divine help that 
ultimately completes human peace and concord. Thus, humans should strive to build the kind 
of body that knows itself and is guided by reason, a metaphor that refers both to each and every 
person separately and to social bodies as a whole as pictured in De concordia. As Vives 
forcefully states in De concordia: “What else indeed is a Christian than a man restituted to his 
own nature and to the origins from which he was evicted by Devil, as a prisoner of the victory 
of evil.”694  
 
The individual Road to Peace and Concord 
 
In discussing the possibilities for concord Vives, in his De concordia, De pacificatione and in 
Introductio ad sapientiam, continuously addresses the reader in individual separation. Thus, the 
                                                          
690 Vives: DC 1529, book 4, Dd5: “...nihil coelesti beatudini conformius ac confinius, quam nostra concordia, nihil 
infernae calamitati, quam dissidium, quam odium.” 
691 Vives DC 1529, book 4, second to last page: “...pax erit intus, foris, publice, privatim, unicuique cum aliis, 
unicuique secum....” 
692 Tracy 2012, xi-xvi. This idea of asking for God’s grace as a way of life is very present in Vives’s introduction 
to his posthumous De veritate fidei Christianae, see Vives, Juan Luis: De veritate fidei Christianae libri quinque, 
Johann Oporinus, Basel 1543: Praefatio; Vives: “Introductio ad sapientiam”, 202-203. 
693 Vives: DC, book 4, V: “Petat homo a deo, petat Christianus a Christo, si saltem hominem deus agnosceret in 
petente & non diabolum, indubie largiretur rem homini inter caeteras maxime conducibilem ac necessariam, nunc 
sub humanis formis diabolicos spiritus & arrogantiam intuetur, mirandum non est, si iustissimus ac sapientissimus 
dispensator non dat daemonibus, quod est hominum.”  
694 Vives: DC book 1, C: “Quid enim est aliud Christianus quam homo naturae suae redditus ac velut natalibus 




point is to emphasize repeatedly that the right path to concord and peace passes through self-
knowledge and the control of passions presented as a universal demand for everyone – a point 
made emphatically by Erasmus already in his Enchiridion.695 The start of De concordia´s fourth 
book, which according to Vives presents the correct route to concord, discusses the fight 
between passions and reason inside man. It develops into a presentation of a route to reach inner 
peace based on self-knowledge, which sheds some light on the limits of human understanding 
and on the control of the destructive passions in all facets of life. Understanding the precepts 
and demands of a harmonious life according to one’s nature would then lead to constructive 
social action.696 It was, however, in his earlier Introductio ad sapientiam that Vives had most 
clearly spoken to every individual reader in a highly normative tone putting forward much of 
the precepts amplified in the 1529 compendium.  
 Introductio ad sapientiam was one of Vives’s most successful and widely 
published works in the sixteenth century and it usually appeared together with his Satellitium 
animi, a collection of proverbs meant to serve as “the attendant of the soul,” not altogether 
different from Erasmus’s Adagia, and two letters on elementary education entitled De ratione 
studii puerilis.697 Looking at how the work was framed through dedication letters one could get 
the idea that it was destined to form part of the virtuous education of princes and noble men 
since the two letters were targeted to Mary, princess of England, and to the son of Lord 
Mountjoy. Yet, from the start, its printing history suggests other interpretations of its potential 
readers, and González González has indeed characterized the booklet as being one of Vives’s 
works directed to a larger audience.698 More specifically, judging from the works it was printed 
with and from the contents of the book, a context Vives had in mind was elementary education, 
understood very generally as encompassing all young pupils. This added a pronounced 
institutional dimension to questions regarding healthy knowledge and the teaching of wisdom. 
Thus, it is hardly a surprise that in Vives’s main educational opus De disciplinis, Introductio ad 
sapientiam is mentioned exactly as the most basic gateway to virtues for young learners.699  
                                                          
695 Erasmus: Enchiridion, 21-33.  
696 This is a central theme in the book, see especially Vives: DC book 4.  
697 Vives: Introductory letter to “Satellitium sive Symbola”, in Vives, Juan Luis: Introductio ad sapientiam, 
Satellitium sive Symbola, Epistolae duae de ratione studii puerilis, Simon de Colines, Paris 1527, 30: “...satellitium 
[...] animo tuo....”  
698 González González 2007, 70-71.  
699 Vives: DD, 266: “Omnibus initio statim fundamenta sunt tradenda pietatis nostrae, ut noscat se, quam est 
infirmus, & pronitate naturae malus: ut nihil nec sit, nec potest, nec valet nisi ope Dei: illum implorandum crebro 
& bona fide: nec speret se quicquam omnino affecuturum absque eius auxilio. Quanta sit caecitas & fraus in animis 




 Introductio was, furthermore, an example of how Vives thought the young could 
be taught the most basic conceptual framework of Erasmian humanism in short sentences that 
would stick in the mind of the pupil. In some ways the two letters forming De ratione functioned 
as a curriculum and index of materials one should learn in elementary education, and, in a 
typically Erasmian way, turned the use of maxims represented by Introductio and Satellitium to 
one of the cornerstones of character building in elementary schooling.700 The booklet itself 
makes that connection very explicit right from the start: in the very first maxim, what is 
emphasized is the right judgement of the nature of things and the laudatio and vituperatio of 
everything according to real merits.701 A little later in the maxim number 15, Vives names just 
two things that lie under the heading of the soul, which a few lines before is described as of 
Godly origin.702 These two are virtue (virtu) and learning (eruditio), which are contrasted to 
ignorance (ruditas) and vice (vitium). This makes a typically Erasmian union of education, 
knowledge, and virtue integral.703 More generally, Introductio presents all major points of 
Erasmian philosophy, from true nobility and glory to the control of passions and contempt 
towards the opinions of vulgus in a condensed and easily approachable form.  
 Introductio ad sapientiam is a combination of Christian and Stoic viewpoints, two 
traditions that in Vives’s mind possessed no obvious contradiction in his 1520s works such as 
De concordia and De pacificatione. In fact, the Stoic element, and especially Seneca who plays 
a major role as a source of quotations in De pacificatione, was even more pronouncedly present 
                                                          
Dei reconciliatos illi esse per crucem filii eius. Deum tu potentem metuat, ut conscium vereatur, ut datorem ac 
beneficum amet. Nos ad haec exponenda libellum conscripsimus, cui titulum fecimus de introductione 
sapientiam....” 
700 Vives makes the connection to Erasmus’s maxims as an antidote to the world of fortune but Vives’s own 
collection of maxims and proverbs, Satellitium animi, is clearly meant to serve similar ends in elementary 
education. Vives, Juan Luis: “Epistolae duae de ratione studii puerilis”, in Vives, Juan Luis: Introductio ad 
sapientiam satellitium sive symbola, epistolae duae de ratione studii puerilis, Simon de Colines, Paris 1527, 54: 
“...quae omnia eodem libello Erasmus coniunxit, & explicavit. Ediscet ex illis sententiolis aliquot vitae maxime 
utiles, quas habeat in posterum velut antidota adversus venenum, & prosperae fortunae, & iniquae....” Vives: “De 
ratione studii puerilis”, 50: “...versus qui ad imitationem proponuntur, contineant gravem aliquam sententiolam, 
quam iuvet edidicisse, nam toties rescribendo, necesse est retineatur, dabitur opera, ut initio saltem imitando 
castigate scribat.” Other humanist works of the genre include for instance Johannes Murmelius’s De officiis 
discipulorum, sive Enchiridion scholasticorum, printed for the first time in 1505 in Zwolle.  
701 This has an evident link to the perforamance of demonstrative rhetoric based on laudatio and vituperatio. Vives 
“Introductio ad sapientiam”, 1: “Vera sapientia est de rebus incorrupte iudicare, ut talem unamquamque 
existimemus, qualis ipsa est, ne vilia sectemur, tanquam preciosa, aut preciosa tanquam vilia reiiciamus, ne 
vituperemus laudanda, neve laudemus vituperanda.” 
702 Vives: “Introductio ad sapientiam”, 13: “Animum divinitus datum, angelis & deo simile....” 
703 Under the heading of body, the list is much more ample. Vives makes the same connections in De ratione studii 
puerilis, Vives: “De ratione studii puerilis”, 54: “...discatque iam nunc in hac tenera aetate veras & incorruptas 
opiniones, ut ea sola bona putet, quae vere sunt talia, velut virtutes, & eruditionem, ea mala quae re vera mala, ut 




in the latter part of the 1520s when Vives was collecting material for an edition of the famous 
Stoic philosopher.704 Despite the importance of Seneca, the basic examples evoked in 
Introductio and in De pacificatione, are Jesus Christ and Socrates. The path from self-
knowledge to the knowledge of God and the social imperative following from these are 
explicitly spelled out in the section on moral corruption in his De disciplinis. In this Socrates, 
just as in De initiis, is presented as the founder of moral philosophy who understood that all 
natural philosophy would be useless if one did not know oneself. His knowledge of himself and 
of morals was not based on the opinion of the multitude but on a judgement founded on the 
Godly inner light (synderesis). Furthermore, from this knowledge Socrates deduced a social 
imperative, “not only to teach but to stimulate and affect through apt and efficacious eloquence 
for persuasion, that those listening would know what to do and want it.”705 This, in fact, is also 
the core message of Introductio ad sapientiam: self-knowledge is only a step towards a 
realization of the active life in the service of others.706 Stoic philosophy and Seneca in particular 
would have largely agreed on this assessment of the wise man. Thus, in Introductio, one finds 
an emphatic description of a path from self-knowledge to a social imperative of putting one’s 
knowledge to the service of others meant for a school context.  
In addition to Introductio, Vives composed pieces belonging to the traditions of 
meditation and affective prayer that described a different path to inner peace and union in Christ. 
707 Introductio made the connection from its language to the kind of inner spirituality cultivated 
in the practices of prayer and meditation:  
 
“Because all religion resides in the intimacy of the heart, try to understand your prayers and 
take care that you do not do it only with words but when you pray, focus on it with your soul, 
your mind, your thoughts, and your face.”708 
                                                          
704 Vives to Erasmus, Allen 2061, 1-12.  
705 Vives: DD, 188: “...non ut doceret solum, sed ut impelleret atque afficeret. Ut qui audirent, & quid faciendum 
esset scirent, & vellent facere oratione apta ad persuadendum & efficaci....” 
706 Vives makes the point about self-knowledge right in the start but the whole treatise focuses heavily on human 
interaction, see Vives: “Introductio ad sapientiam”, 11. 
707 He composed several works belonging to these traditions. Of these, the most important ones were his 1529 
compendia of orations and meditations (Vives, Juan Luis: Sacrum diurnum de sudore Jesu Christi; concio de 
nostro & Christi sudore; meditatio de passione Christi in psalmum XXXVII, Hubertus de Croock, Brügge 1529) 
especially meant for the inhabitants of Bruges who had to endure yet another sweating-sickness epidemic, and his 
simple prayer book Excitationes from 1535 was one of the more widely printed works of Vives in the sixteenth 
century. It was translated into Spanish in 1537. 
708 Vives: “Introductio ad sapientiam”, 314: “Quandoquidem religio omnis sita est in intimis pectoris, preces da 
operam ut intelligas, & cave ne ore tantum permurmures, sed quum oras, totus & animo & mente, & cogitatione, 





 Moreover, Vives himself, like many other humanists influenced by late medieval 
piety, had been pursuing for years a very private and intimate practice of praying as he explains 
in the dedication letter and preface to a prayer book Excitationes (also printed as Ad animi 
excitationem in Deum commentatiunculae).709 Thus, the claim of self-knowledge obviously 
entailed concrete practices widely known to contemporaries. 
 
Coming to Reason as a Social Body, Perfecting People 
 
Despite the insistence on individual renewal that was strongly incorporated into De concordia 
and De pacificatione, the raison d’être of both works was pronouncedly social.710 Thus, just as 
discordia is sustained by social dynamics, the creation of concord comprises a strong social 
element: social concordia is not just a sequence of individual acts of coming to reason, it is the 
reform of social life itself that can also make inner peace possible. The social dimension is 
indeed the very presupposition of Introductio ad sapientiam: it refers to individuals in 
separation but presupposes that there is a social setting where this is achieved. Both De 
concordia and De pacificatione are abundant in reminding of the fundamentally sociable, 
benevolent, and caring nature of humans. In the first part of De concordia, Vives extensively 
explains how man was created for harmonious communal life by enumerating all the gifts man 
was endowed with for successful social life, ranging from reason, free will, and speech to a 
wonderful description of bodily signs of benevolence such as smiling and tears.711 All the 
natural gifts given to social life should be put into use in the perfecting and teaching of citizens. 
As Vives emphatically stated in the early part of his second book of De concordia,  
 
“I would rather want laws, judges and the customs of cities and people to focus on correcting 
the restless souls of men, and to focus on teaching them how unworthy of humans it is to do 
                                                          
709 Vives, Juan Luis: Ad animi excitationem in deum commentatiunculae. Praeparatio animi ad orandum. 
Commentarius in orationem dominicam. Preces et meditationes quotidianae, Johann I Gymnich, Köln 1539, A3, 
B2: “...hoc opus [Excitationes], quum uni mihi pridem scripsissem....”; “A primo uni mihi haec [Excitationes] 
composueram....” Meditation and prayer were common practices among not only humanists but also larger circles. 
See Bataillon 1991, 598-613.  
710 Stacey has emphasized how the metaphor of the social body in Seneca shifts the attention from the autonomy 
of the individual to the autonomy of the body politic ultimately dependent on the prince alone. Thus, the point of 
departure of Seneca in his De clementia is that individuals in practice are not capable of moral autonomy, see 
Stacey 2007, 48-53.  




an injustice to others or to be eager to return one.”712 
 
 It is, however, in the shorter De pacificatione that Vives most strongly discusses 
the duty of everyone to contribute to the common good. No doubt, there is a pronouncedly 
universal duty found in Christian charity (caritas) that binds everyone, and that is underlined 
by the fact that Vives addresses even those who do not have other instruments than their 
example and speech to contribute to the common good as members of the body of Christ.713 
However, the main point of the work is to remind everyone to perform the social duties 
demanded of their instruments, authority, and social positions. Thus, one should fulfil the social 
duty of a truly wise man in the confines of the social role one has. 714 In a perfect state the right 
use of our possibilities would be nothing else than living according to our nature and natural 
law, “because if each instrument adapts to the specific labour nature gave it, everything will be 
perfect and accomplished.”715 However, despite the plea for the natural function of instruments, 
De pacificatione is very clear that the world in which the project takes place is one of discord 
and erroneous judgement. Thus, even those instruments that hold no sway over the wise are 
harnessed for the cause of peace and concord, such as misattributed honour, possessions, 
money, nobility of linage and other things “to which the people attribute great value.”716 Like 
in De consultatione, the very same things that are despised in Christian humanist discourse are 
employed because of their inherent power in the world of discord. The explanation of the 
specific duties of each social position according to their instruments is the main goal of De 
pacificatione, which uses a pronouncedly Christian language in its description of the fight 
between the children of God and the sons of Devil.717  
                                                          
712 Vives: DC, book 2, G: “Vellem potius ad hoc leges, iudices, mores civitatum populorumque incumberent, ut 
inquietos hominum animos castigarent, docerentque, quam indigna homine faceret, & qui iniuriam alteri inferret, 
& qui studeret referre....” 
713 Vives: DP, B: “Sunt, qui rem nullam habent, isti voluntatem conferant in commune, & votis faustisque 
precationibus, interdum quoque exhortationibus atque incitationibus adiuvent laborantes.”  
714 Both natural talent and the mundane gifts of fortune are mentioned here, Vives: DP, B: “non prodis ipse in 
aciem, quia, vel natura vires tibi ademit, ut opes fortuna, at certe prodeuntes voce, votis, bonis, ominibus victoriam 
adiuva, contribue voluntatem, qui facultatem non potes.”; Vives: DP, B: “Sunt qui aliquid ad pacificationem possint 
adferre opere ac re ipsa. Sunt, qui rem nullam habent, isti voluntatem conferant in commune, et votis faustisque 
precationibus, interdum quoque exhortationibus atque incitationibus adiuvent laborantes.” In Introductio ad 
sapientiam, the first premise of which is to know one self as a yardstick for the evaluation of all other things 
reminds the reader that “Reliqua vel externa, vel corporis si habes, proderunt tibi ad virtutem relata, oberunt ad 
vitia, si non habes, cave ne quaeras vel cum minimo dispendio virtutis.”  
715 Vives: DP, B4: “Quod si quodque instrumentum ei operi accomodatur, cui a natura sua est tributum, omnia 
opera exacta & consumata existent....”  
716 Vives: DP, B2: “multum hisce tribuit vulgus, quod non perinde ad iudicium rationemque res omnes revocat 
atque expendit, ut sensu quodam externo adducitur.” 




 The focus on duties according to social role had two conceptual possibilities that 
were activated in a variety of Vives’s works. First, there is a conservative point against all 
radical movements of the 1520s and 1530s that underlines existing institutional and social 
framework as a suitable context for any reform of society. Thus, Vives wants to remind 
everyone of their subjected role vis-à-vis the mundane, spiritual, and intellectual powers of the 
time, to insist repeatedly on the existing institutional and social framework for solving the 
problems pestering Europe.718 Secondly, the same discourse opens up a number of possibilities 
for criticising those in power, and especially princes for not living up to the standards demanded 
of their social role. Vives himself, of course, had used this critical potential in the 1520s on 
numerous occasions – implying quite clearly that the policies of European princes could be seen 
as tyrannical actions.719 In short, Vives is adamant in arguing that the problems destabilizing 
the Europe of his time are not solved by the Reformation, by revolt of any kind, or by 
questioning authorities, but only through successful performance of one’s duties, be they related 
to the family, the political community or any form of social interaction.  
De pacificatione is structured around an analysis of symmetrical and 
asymmetrical relations and their possible contribution to social concord. Under symmetrical 
relations that should be ruled by concord, Vives situates for example friendship, 
neighbourhoods, and citizenship. Under the heading of superiors, the reader would find kings 
and princes used interchangeably in De pacificatione, magistrates, counsellors, teachers, 
husbands, fathers, and masters. Under the heading of inferiors, one finds citizens or subjects, 
disciplines, wives, sons, and slaves. He also discusses nobles, soldiers, priests and the rich 
demanding that they put their instruments and possessions into social use instead of leading a 
life of theatrical ostentation. Once again, the selection of categories further accentuates that 
Vives is including all social associations from families and the Church to commonwealths and 
kingdoms. The message running through the whole work is simply that the fulfilling of the 
duties of one’s social role contributes to the general concord. 
 However, woven into every page of De pacificatione is the idea of the Stoic or 
                                                          
718 At one point Vives claims that true liberty is living free of passions under existing institutions, see Vives, Juan 
Luis: “Quam misera esset vita christianorum sub Turca liber unus”, in Vives, Juan Luis: De concordia & discordia 
in humano genere libri quattuor. De pacificatione, liber unus: quam misera esset vita christianorum sub Turca 
liber unus, Michael Hillen, Antwerpen 1529, A4-A5. 
719 Cathy Curtis has pointed out Vives’s uncommoncly forceful critique of the tyrannical actions of Henry VIII, 
Curtis 2011, 42-43. Many of Vives’s later works contain barely veiled ctiriques of Henry VIII. In De pacificatione 
he clearly refers to Henry’s divorce, see Vives: DP, D: “non adducaebantur Graeci, ut crederent suas querelas, 





Christian wise, the man of true self-understanding. As Vives wrote in an early part of De 
pacificatione: “This is the true disposition of mind of a great and wise man; to consider himself 
and his own health of secondary importance to the well-being of others and not to hesitate to 
lose something if it protects others.”720 It is in this context that Vives introduces some categories 
that have a complex relation to existing social roles, such as the erudite, the powerful man (vir 
fortis), the good man (vir bonus), and the man of doctrine and prudence (viros doctrini ac 
prudentia excellentes). Some of these categories denote specific groups of people. The erudite 
naturally has a link to schooling.721 Vir fortis for its part points to those vying for military glory 
found in princely courts and in nobility. Under this heading, Vives makes a forceful description 
of how the true virtue of the powerful is not to be shown in external deeds of discord but in the 
true fight that is fought inside one’s soul.722 This is yet another instance were civic glory is 
given Christian form that turns the external fight into an internal one against sin, a point that is 
directed especially to princes and soldiers. Men of doctrine and prudence, for their part, are 
those working in religious offices.  
However, the good man holds the most ambivalent link to all fixed categories; he 
can potentially embody any social role, but whatever he does, he should “lead others to where 
he has arrived.” Little later Vives declares, following Aristotle, that a good man is the yardstick 
of everything. 723 One can interpret that Vives means that to be vir bonus is the goal of every 
person, and allows them to fulfil their role successfully – a point that could be employed as a 
critique of those in the highest echelons of human associations, who fail to fulfil this condition, 
with especially harsh words directed to princes and nobility.724 However, vir bonus can work 
equally well next to those in powerful social roles – to become the yardstick of their social 
actions. In fact the description of the relationship between counsellors and princes as one 
between reason and will, glaringly underlines that those with powerful means and instruments 
are not necessarily good. On the contrary, they should listen to the good; instruments and 
powers should be united in wise counsel. Vives made the point emphatically in his dedication 
letter to De disciplinis destined to the King of Portugal Joâo III in drawing the attention to the 
concord and friendship between princes and men of letters pointing out the importance of 
                                                          
720 Vives: DP, B: “Hic est vere affectus magni & sapientis viri, se & suam salutem aliorum saluti posthabere, seque 
ipsum nihil dubitare perdere ut alii serventur.”  
721 Vives: DP, E.  
722 Vives: DP, D3-D4.  
723 Vives: DP, E: “alios cupiet eodem adducere, quo ipse pervenit.”; “Vir bonus mensura est omnium....”  




counsel offered by the learned.725 
 The kind of social dynamics found in De pacificatione highlights that one could 
advance the cause of concordia through measures that are essentially social. Indeed, one has 
two distinct ways of entering the conceptual circle of concord: on the one hand through acts of 
individual self-control, and, on the other, through social means taken and advanced by the more 
prominent members of the social body in possession of suitable instruments. In a way, these 
represent two ways of talking about the same phenomenon in different contexts and to different 
audiences. Inner peace and concord is something everyone should strive for, but the social 
factor involved means that all, as members of the same body of Christ, should contribute to the 
social aspect of concord according to their differing possibilities and roles. Because of differing 
instruments, the self-control of those in power radiating to constructive social action is of great 
importance. In this way, the duty of the prince to guarantee peace is a precondition for the 
individual peace of other members of the social body, and the right administration of law by 
magistrates makes individual peace and social concord possible on the level of neighbourhoods 
and cities.  
 However, all this presupposes there are some who have reached a level of inner 
peace and concord to be able to enhance social harmony. This is not, however, merely a 
conceptual presupposition backed up by Vives’s optimistic idea of man as capable of relative 
earthly perfection, but it also has a reference in the world in which Vives is operating. The duties 
of counselling and teaching are exactly what Vives and other educated humanists are doing; 
they are already performing the life of social utility demanded of vir bonus. They are the ones 
who should guarantee the communication of true wisdom in a world of discord; they are the 
ones whose critique should become the yardstick for the successful performace of social and 
political duties. Vives’s 1520s literature is nothing less than the systematic guidance to the 
social roles of De pacificatione. He writes to families, to schools and to princes in an effort to 
transmit them wisdom.726 Thus, what Vives is proposing in De pacificatione and De concordia 
can only be understood in the larger framework of the humanist project that was changing 
                                                          
725 Vives: DD, Epistola: “Tum intelligis quanta sit inter principes & eruditos homines munerum consensio: ut non 
sint duo hominum genera, quae amica inter se magis & coniuncta esse conveniat [...] Eruditio quiete indiget, quam 
praestat regia potestas: haec vero consilio ad molem tantarum rerum tractandam, quod praestant docti prudentia 
ex disciplinis collecta....” His dedication letter to Charles V based its demand on a similar union of power and the 
right kind of will, see Vives: Dedication to Charles.  
726 For politics, see Chapter four. For educational contexts, he wrote the aforementioned works of Introductio ad 
sapientiam, De ratione studii puerilis and Satellitium animi. His major contributions to families were his De 




educational patterns, resuscitating classical knowledge, and aspiring to secure a role in 
administration.727 In short, it aspired to renewal in almost all domains of social existence, which 




Despite its social dimension it is clear that the model of De concordia and De pacificatione is 
ethical in the sense that it depends on the ethical qualities of either those in powerful positions 
or of those reminding them of their duties, with no reflection on the structural nature of 
institutional checks. It rather takes existing institutions and ways of exercising power as a given. 
But the language of perfecting of the body did not mean that more institutional means of 
demanding the social utility of the instruments of the rich and powerful could not be evoked. 
The flexibility of the language of the perfecting of the social body was stretched to cover 
institutional issues in De subventione pauperum – Vives’s famous plea for communal welfare 
system destined to the burgomaesters and the city council of his hometown Bruges that was 
printed in 1526.728  
 The work is divided into two parts, the first of which deals with individual pleas 
of caritas, whereas the second part is dedicated to administrative means that are largely based 
on moving the existing framework of poor relief grounded on private and religious hospitals 
under the supervision of civil authorities. In this question, the framework for policies is not the 
central government but the town: Vives is here writing to the city fathers as a citizen of Bruges, 
and hails the republican institutions of the Great town of Flanders without referring to central 
government. This is not incidental: throughout his work, Bruges appears as a civitas – as a 
political community or a body of its citizens – not merely as a town (oppidum, urbs).729 In 
addition to being a practical answer to a local question, this testifies to how much real political 
measures excluding warfare were in Vives’s mind related to local context.730  
 Vives dedicates the first chapter to everyone individually where all both in the 
role of subjects and objects of beneficence are reminded of their duties as members of the social 
                                                          
727 One can think of Thomas More, Juan de Vergara, Guillaume Budé or even Cranevelt as Vive’s humanist friends 
operating very close to power.  
728 For analysis of the work, see especially Matheeussen 1986; Matheeussen 1993; Matheeussen 1998; Fantazzi 
2008.  
729 See especially the dedication letter to De subventione.  




body. Vives is of course not approaching all parties as potential readers of the book, since the 
objects of the policies would hardly have the possibility to familiarize themselves with the 
work. He is merely implying the universal extension of duty that reaches all members of the 
social body. In the first part, entitled De subventione privata quid unumquemque facere oporteat 
Vives’s main move is to turn the specific requirement of alms giving into a general philosophy 
of social caritas by arguing that the Greek word eleemosune refers not to alms but to mercy 
(misericordia) that is supposed to cover the totality of good deeds.731 Thus, Vives is able to 
claim that all actions enhancing virtue and instruction have to be understood as acts of 
beneficence demanded of a true Christian.  
 But the crucial moment comes in the beginning of the second part, when Vives 
states: “Until now I have explained what each and every one should do individually; from now 
on, I will explain what the city as well as the one governing it, who is like the soul of the body, 
should do.” Here he is pointing out two different ways of approaching questions of poor relief, 
only one of which is pronouncedly private.732 The programme of the second part is predicated 
on the breakdown of original concordia and De subventione pauperum. It explicitly delimits 
the burden of actions of those in power to a world, which is already detached from early 
Christian fervour. In the beginning of the sixth part of the second chapter entitled De pecunia 
quae his sumtibus sufficat, Vives describes a short history of poor relief underlying the gradual 
loss of apostolic spirit which, consequently, led to a situation in which those institutionally in 
charge of alms giving did not live up to expectations. As Vives states:  
 
“The fervour of Christ’s blood grew colder and colder, and the Spirit of the Lord was 
communicated to a very few. The Church began to emulate world and to compete with it in 
display, arrogance, and extravagance. Already Jerome complains that the provincial prefects 
eat more sumptuously in monasteries than in palaces – and for those expenses, much money 
was needed. What was meant for the poor was thus transformed into the possession and 
resource of the Bishops and Priests by Bishosps and Priests themselves.” 
                                                          
731 Vives: De subventione, B: “Quisquis ergo aliena ope indiget, pauper est, & ei misericordia est opus, quae graece 
eleemosyna dicitur, non in sola pecuniae erogatione sita, ut vulgus putat, sed in omni opere, quo humana indigentia 
sublevatur.” Fantazzi has also emphasized this, see Fantazzi 2008, 96-97. Fantazzi, like Bataillon, also stresses 
that Vives is careful not to mention mendicant orders at all, see Fantazzi 2008, 104; Bataillon 1952, 143-144. The 
names of the two parts are very revealing indeed. The first part is De subventione privata quid unumquemque 
facere oporteat and the second part De subventione publica, quod civitatem deceat 
732 Vives: De subventione, Eiiii: “Hactenus quid unumquemque deceat, posthac quid civitatem publice, & eius 





 The point is thus to justify the political action taken by civil authorities, since this 
strongly implies the failure of the Church to do what is asked of it. At the same time, however, 
it makes generally clear that it is a corrupted state of affairs one is dealing with – something 
that makes political action necessary more generally.733 
 Moreover, it is for achieving this that the political body needs its head, soul or, 
according to yet another metaphor, doctors – people who understand the dynamic of poor relief. 
It is in the head that both powers and faculties for making decisions for the whole lie and the 
activities of the head, soul, or the doctor of the body should be understood as ways of perfecting 
people rather than in a merely punitive sense.734 Already in one of the last paragraphs of the 
first book, Vives had called for beneficence that would be preventive, not merely a reaction to 
an existing need. If one reads these paragraphs in the context of Vives’s original definition of 
alms as being primarily about the enhancement of virtue the argument seems clear: the 
preventing actions of the political authorities serving as teachers or doctors is the ultimate act 
of mercy (misericordia).735   
 Naturally, this programme of the second book occurs in a very specific situation. 
This was the inadequacy of the old poor relief system based on privately funded hospitals to 
meet the demands of the growing legions of urban poor of Bruges in economic decline, and 
also more generally in the Low Countries and other regions of Germany and France in the early 
sixteenth century.736 The point of departure for all such reforms was in one way or another to 
                                                          
733 Vives: De subventione, Fv: “Postmodum vero refrixit magis ac magis fervor ille cruoris Christi, & spiritus 
domini communicatus est paucioribus, coepit Ecclesia mundum aemulari: & cum eo pompa, fastu, luxu, certare. 
Iam Hieronymus conqueritur praesides provinciarum lautius in monasterio coenare, quam in palatio, ad eos 
sumptus opus erat grandi pecunia. Ita quod pauperum fuerat, in rem & facultates suas Episcopi & Presbyteri 
verterunt.” In the first part of the second book he also states strongly that the city has rebuilt what has been lost. 
Vives: De subventione, Ev-F: “Quid quod quemadmodum renovantur in civitate omnia, quae temporibus aut 
casibus vel mutantur, vel intereunt, muri, fossae: aggeres, rivi, instituta: mores, leges ipsae, sic par esset sucurrere 
primae illi distributione pecuniae, quae variis modis damna accepit.” In the first book on the necessities of man he 
also depicts a familiar story about the corruption of man through vice, namely pride. See the part very first part 
entitled Origo humanae necessitatis ac miseriae. Already in his commentaries on Augustine Vives praises the role 
of censor’s as teachers of good habits, Vives: VCA, ii.ix.   
734 Vives, De subventione, Ev: “Unde nascuntur ea vitia, quae dudum recensui, non tam illis imputanda, quam 
etiam interdum magistratibus, qui non aliter civitati prospiciunt, haud recte de gubernatione populi statuentes, ut 
qui solum se existiment praefectos litibus pecuniae, aut criminibus censendis. Quum contra magis conveniat eos 
in hoc incumbere, quo pacto cives bonos reddant, quam quemadmodum vel puniant malos:”  
735 Vives: De subventione, B: “Precipuum & summum beneficium est, si quis virtutem cuiusquam adiuvet.”  
736 As is well known, the years between 1520 and 1545 witness a remarkable wave of reforms of social systems. 
Before the composition of De subventione in the 1520s, at the least, Strasbourg, Nuremberg, Leisning, Mons and 
Ypres had reorganized their poor relief. See Fantazzi 2008, 95-96; Bataillon 1952, 141. Moreover, Charles V gave 
an edict in 1531 that forbade mendacity handing the responsibility of social welfare to the central government. In 




shift the focus from the medieval notion of alms giving centred around the self-sanctification 
of the one giving alms, to a view focusing on the enhancement of public good through political 
and civic measures. Public good, in all of these reforms, could and should be enforced through 
collective methods that ultimately aimed at incorporating the poor into the life of the body 
politic and, simultaneously, at mobilizing them as potential work force.737 Thus, in making this 
point, most of those proposing reforms had to argue against a centuries-old tradition of alms 
giving – one of the core messages of Jesus, and the cornerstones of mendicant orders.  
In many ways Vives’s more general understanding of caritas as not dealing only with 
acts of almsgiving but with more general measures is, thus, a particular and polemical 
understanding of charity, although Vives most likely deliberately toned down some parts of the 
text in order not to provoke the Catholic Church and especially the mendicant orders.738 It 
should be remembered, however, that Vives’s text does not propose a criminalization of 
mendacity, as Charles V’s famous edict of 1531 would do, and the tone of the text is not 
pronouncedly juridical. Rather, the dominant way of writing in De subventione is ethico-social 
as Matheeussen has argued.739 Vives’s discussion of the poor was to be heatedly debated in the 
Spanish context, starting from the Castilian poor laws of 1540. In the context of this discussion 
Domingo de Soto, a Dominican priest writing on the questions of the poor, strongly defended 
a more traditional view of spiritual and direct charity based on misericordia that was demanded 
of all Christians in a variety of situations.740  
 However, the persuasive force of this argument was amply backed by Vives’s 
laudatio of the pragmatic effects of these kinds of policies. Throughout the work, one of Vives’s 
main points is once again to prove that in addition to being honest and virtuous, these policies 
would effectively be beneficial (utilitas) to the body politic. In doing this, he underlines that 
individual criminal acts should not only be traced back to the corrupted nature of the individual 
soul in charge of the act, but to social reasons that effectively produce necessities for doing this. 
                                                          
41; Matheeussen 1998, 111. For the decadence of Bruges and the rise of Antwerp, see Hunt & Murray 1999, 232-
236.  
737 The question of whether the sixteenth-century developments were about enforcing and disciplining through 
secular top-down political measures, or about institutionalizing and collectivizing medieval notions of religious 
charity, have been hotly debated. See Safley 2003, 1-14; Wandel 2003, 15-25. 
738 However, he was criticised by a Franciscan Friar. See Fantazzi 2008, 94-96, 106-107; Bataillon 1952, 143. See 
also Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 246, 27-35. 
739 Matheeussen 1998, 110-111. Even though Vives’s point is to root out mendacity, he never forbids it outright to 
my understanding. Moreover, as Matheeussen has noted, both vagabondage and mendacity were already before 
considered criminal acts in many existing documents and texts, even though the extent to which the prohibition 
was enforced in different places is not known. 




In his 1525 De bello, & pace, Vives had argued that war created poverty and mendacity, an 
argument that had played a role in English humanism Vives was so familiar with, and that most 
likely had influenced his understanding of poverty around 1525.741 Already in the first book of 
Utopia, Thomas More had claimed by the mouth of Raphael Hythloday that individual 
character, the spring of actions, was greatly shaped by politics.742 As Hythloday claimed, “if 
you allow young folk to be abominably brought up and their characters corrupted, little by little, 
from childhood; and if then you punish them as grown-ups for committing the crimes to which 
the training has consistently inclined them, what else is this, I ask, but first making them thieves 
and then punishing them for it?”743 Hythloday’s lengthy treatment of theft, vagabondage, and 
poverty, approved by Cardinal John Morton acting as an interlocutor in the dialogue, highlights 
the fundamental role of preventive means of educational and economic activity, and is strongly 
suspicious of politics based on strong legal sanctions on something people never really chose 
to do as subjects of their own actions. Likewise, Vives’s De bello, & pace already argued that 
it is the general perfecting of citizens, and the securing of peace and concord that constituted 
the only way to fight poverty.744 
 Echoing this, Vives is clear about the fact that the enhancement of public good 
demands that a significant number of the people are not abandoned. If this is done, these people 
– the poor – will not only be useless, but also harmful for themselves and for others. They would 
rob, women would be forced to prostitution, their children would be badly educated, and 
nobody would know under what precepts and customs they would be brought up. It would also 
                                                          
741 Adams suggests that De subventione is “...a direct outgrowth of the English humanist criticism of man and 
society”, Adams 1962, 250. Vives: “De bello, & pace”, xix: “Postremo multitudo gravata indictionibus & 
tributis, exlusis per bellum terra & mari commerciis, in summa egestate ac miseria vitam trahit, tam exhausta, & 
perdita, ut quiete ac pace deinceps reddita, vires tamen longo etiam tempore recipere non valeat, permulti 
cessante artis quaestu, aut invalidi mendicant, aut latrocinantur validi, praesertim ingenti licentiam atque 
impunitate scelerum, quam belli tempore necesse est contingere, quum quisque ita sanctissimus ac honestissimus 
habetur, ut animus est ei promptissimus flagitiis ac facinoribus patrandis, tanquam in eiusmodi dexteris posita sit 
regnis salus, quae maximam malam perniciem regno adferunt.” Vives made the same point about poverty in his 
De concordia. Vives: DC, book 3, L: “Quid tenuibus relinquitur, quise manuum labore sustentabant, nisi ut boni 
aut invalidi mendicent, aut vitam durissime ac difficillime exigant, fame eos cibos ingerere in ventrem cogente, 
quos alias nequivissent sine nausea attingere aut etiam intueri, mali vero & valentes ad latrocinium egestate 
impellantur, aut manus sanguine et maleficiis, quum suopte ingenio abhorrent tum etiam educatione ac moribus.” 
742 Already Noreña noticed the similarities between Vives’s De subventione and More’s Utopia. See Noreña 
1970, 96. 
743 More: Utopia, 42: “Certe nisi his malis medemini, frustra iactetis exercitam in vindicanda furta iustitiam, 
nempe speciosam magis, quam aut iustam aut utilem. Siquidem quum pessime sinitis educari, & mores paulatim 
ab teneris annis corrumpi, puniendos videlicet, tum demum quum ea flagitia viri designent, quorum spem de se 
perpetuam a pueritia usque praebuerant, quid aliud quaeso quam facitis fures, & iidem plectitis?” (English 
translation from More, Thomas: Utopia [eds. Logan – Adams], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, 
20). 




be hard to know what these people think about religion and manners. The last point makes a 
clear link to education as exactly the kind of way to bring the poor back to a communal life of 
concord. All these suggestions, most of which were reiterated in De concordia, must have 
resonated well with the audience of the time.745 The link from religion to crime had a direct and 
explicit reference to the Reformation, to the peasant war and to the problem of mercenaries, 
who were often seen as armed robbers. Human associations and body politic appear as the 
horizon where peace and concord should be enhanced and secured by countering poverty. 
 
The Breakdown of Reason 
 
It is by now clear that Vives’s metaphor of human association as a body led him to consider the 
possibilities of its salvation not solely as acts of inner concord of individual members, but as 
the coming to reason of the whole body. This coming to reason happens primarily in the head 
of the body, since it is there that the responsibilities for the body and the faculties of the rational 
soul lie. The head can be the supreme authority of any social constellation, meaning that the 
metaphor is applicable to all human associations; but if the supreme authority does not perform 
its duties in a satisfactory manner the head should be reminded of its duties by those taking the 
role of reason. 
 However, the possibility that politics can actually be about something else than 
the perfecting of citizens through different means was to get more attention from Vives as the 
years advanced. The general reaction to the social dimension of the Reformation was more 
generally negative among the humanist circles Vives was familiar. Erasmus had already in his 
Lingua strongly urged for respect for existing authorities.746 More clearly, the Dutch humanist 
argued in his widely published Epistola contra quosdam qui se falso iactant Evangelicos, from 
1529, that heretics, if a threat to civic order, should be punished.747 If the central theme of the 
Vivesian corpus until the late 1520s had been the control of princes as potential and 
                                                          
745 Vives: DC, R. In the margins one could read iustitia and humanitas. 
746 Erasmus, Desiderius: Lingua, Johann I Knobloch, Strasbourg 1525, 135-136: “Tam potentem ac felicem 
linguam precemur episcopis nostris precemur princibus, magistratibus, & populo cordocile, cor tractabile, cor 
carneum, cor auritum, & alatum, nec elingue, auritum, ut pastoribus ad meliora vocantibus libenter auscultent, 
alatum, ut cos strannue praecedentes per viam evangelicam, alacriter sequantur, nec desit lingua qua plebs imperita 
ad episcoporum benedictionem clare respondeat, Amen.” Erasmus’s shifting understanding of the people in the 
early 1520s seems to be clear. To his 1525 edition of the Adagia, he added a line to Scarabeus dealing with tyranny 
that stated, “the cruelty of the Kings is better than the universal confusion of anarchy.” The example is from Adams 
1962, 248.  




unpredictable threats to European peace and Christendom more generally, Vives too was to 
become much more aware of the fact that the body itself, the multitude, can rebel against the 
reason that should guide it. Already in 1531 in his De disciplinis Vives had argued that in the 
absence of love as a glue of political community (civitas), justice, strengthened with power and 
force, has to take its place.748 
 Vives’s interpretation of poor relief and educational ideas were of course closely 
related to the long-term solution of these problems, and to the social ambiance of Reformation 
Low Countries and Europe in the context of which Vives’s 1529 compendium appealed for a 
tolerant solution. In his De communione rerum (1535), an attack against radical Anabaptism, 
the putative aspect of politics becomes a central theme and leads to a strong condemnation of a 
social usage of theology. Radical Anabaptism had diverged from its early non-institutional and 
non-resistance modality by turning the city of Münster into “New Jerusalem,” introducing a 
community of goods and polygamy. This sect had dangerously close connections to some sects 
of northern Low Countries, and some signs of the radicalization of the Melchiorite Anabaptists 
in the Low Countries had manifested in early 1535 when the Oldekloster in Frisia and the city 
hall of Amsterdam were assaulted by Anabaptist groups. The reaction to Radical Anabaptism 
was univocal both in the Protestant and Catholic camps in demanding harsh measures against 
the Anabaptists of Münster who were eventually brutally crushed in 1535.749 Thus, Vives’s call 
for putative measures was firmly in line with the general reaction.  
 The difference of De communione with respect to De subventione has been noted 
by many: the first focuses on criticism of arguments for the community of goods, and the other 
uses superficially similar arguments for the enhancement of its plea for social welfare.750 The 
discrepancy in the focus of the works and in their respective argumentative structures is clear, 
yet much of it can be attributed to the problem and audience at hand. In De subventione, the 
question is about the restructuring of poor relief, and the imagined audience consists of civic 
officers. Whereas in De communione, Vives argues against a rebellious group basing its 
arguments on the community of goods, the more popular element of which explains why De 
communione was published in German already in 1536 under the name of Von der gemeynschaft 
                                                          
748 Vives: DD, 372: “Verum ubi Charitas abest, iustitiae officium in eius locum succedit, non illius blandae ac 
inermis, sed armatae potestate ac viribus, quae frenos concitationi animorum iniiciat.” 
749 Its leaders Jan Matthijs and Jan van Leyden were from the Low Countries, as well as many of the people who 
poured into Münster in spring 1534. Many of the preachers inspiring the events of Münster came also from the 
Low Countries and the Anabaptist sects were very much influenced by the happenings in Münster. See Hillebrand 
2007, 119-123; Duke 1990; 58-59; 85-88; Tracy 1990, 160-167; Stayer 1991, 123-138.  




aller dingen (Strasbourg 1536). According to the principles of rhetoric Vives knew well, it is in 
the confines of particular questions that the construction of argument should be done, always 
bearing in mind the expectations of the audience. In this way, De communione is a realization 
of another possibility lying in the language of social body that does not criticise the head for 
not living up to its standards, but blames the body for a supposed rebellion of the passion.751 
Thus, in no way does De communione break with the overall ethos of his work. 
 Right from the start, Vives makes clear he is discussing current issues, making 
very explicit the idea that social violence has emerged from the divergence of opinions and 
from the questioning of age-old truths.752 He continues by claiming that the kind of Biblical 
arguments some Anabaptists put forward were just a way to mask criminal practices (associated 
with Catiline) with only superficially theological arguments.753 Yet, it is of utmost importance 
to make categorical distinctions in the groups of those participating in social tumults so that the 
correct problems could be discerned, and the right remedies applied. Vives proposes three 
categories, all of which relate to his earlier works. First, one finds real criminals – those who 
apply their malicious rhetoric to others, and who cannot be cured any more than other 
delinquents through rational means. To them, Vives proposes the sword of civic authorities, 
because it is the one of their duties to defend the people.754 There was something tangible and 
concrete about this claim: this was essentially what some of the city fathers of certain Dutch 
towns had not done.755 
 The two other groups, however, would be familiar to any reader of Vives. The 
second group consists of those idle ones who saw in this a possibility to live off the work of 
                                                          
751 This was very much present in De pacificatione, see DP, D.  
752 Vives, Juan Luis: “De communione rerum”, in Vives, Juan Luis: De communione rerum ad Germanos 
inferiores. Eiusdem in psalmum tricesimum septimum meditatio de passione Christi. In psalmum tricesimum 
septimum meditatio de passione Christi, Johann I Gymnich, Köln, 1535, A2-A3: “Olim in Germania res pietatis 
erant ita constitutae, ut firmae ac stabiles gratissima quiete persuerarent, nec quisquam fas esse ducebat de ulla 
earum rerum, quae receptae iam essent ambigere. Inventus est qui primum auderet quaedam in dubium revocare, 
initio modice ac verecunde, mox aperte non solum ut disputaret sed ut negaret, abrogaret, tolleret permulta tanta 
confidentia, quam si de coelo & arcanis divinitatis esset delapsus....”; “Ex dissentione opinionum est ad dissidium 
vitae.” 
753 Vives: “De communione rerum”, A3 (in the absence of page numbers the next signature mark is given). 
754 Vives: “De communione rerum”, A4-A5: “Nam in ho negotio tria hominum genera versari arbitror. Praecipui 
sunt, & aliorum ductores ac magistri vasri quidam, facinorosi, impudentes latrones [...] Alterum genus est 
quorundam, qui vel desidia atque ignavia vel fortuitis casibus vel immoderatis sumptibus, profusis patrimoniis, 
aut laborem defugientes, quo facile parari posset victus, communionem bonorum optant [...] Tertii sunt quos ego 
non tam prava voluntate peccare autumo, quam ignorantia et tarditate mentis....”; “Ex his tribus generibus, primi 
sunt magis sanabiles, quam latrones. Secundorum prava cupiditas cohiberi potest facile. Tertii non multum absunt 
ab innocentia, in quos competit illud Petri [...] Primi relinquuntur potestati civili....”  
755 Only in 1535, harsh measures against the strong Anabaptist community began in some Dutch towns, most 




others for different reasons. A group that still participates in criminal activities willingly was 
very much present in Vives’s De subventione as potential objects of poor relief and, as we have 
seen, as a potentially subversive mob.756 The third group is composed of those who have joined 
the ranks of the Anabaptist movement out of ignorance, and who more than subjects of social 
tumults, had been objects of irresponsible rhetoric. It is to these groups, and especially to the 
third, Vives is talking to, and about. They can potentially be convinced back to virtuous path by 
Vives, whereas the leaders of the movement cannot. Vives does not of course see this third 
group to be within the confines of reason or rationality. Rather, he sees them to be the kind of 
passive multitude that can be the object of successful rhetoric and possibly education, not 
participants in conversation. You could, and should, teach them reason, but not make them 
participants in its production. However, the last group relates closely to Vives’s endless call for 
education and virtue: their lack of virtue is nothing else then lack of learning, and outside the 
confines of this very particular question of Anabaptism, the long term remedy to the problem 
would lie in education – in bringing them back to the Christian flock. 
 Vives sets out to argue both that the Anabaptist case is based on a misreading of 
the Bible, and that was consequently against divine and natural law. In addition to this, he argues 
vehemently that the promise of community of goods in the actual world would be impossible 
to achieve. His main point is to argue that the philosophy of charity the Anabaptists promoted 
turns caritas from a subjective imperative of giving to the violence of asking. Thus, what is 
supposed to be an imperative for every Christian – to share his possessions with those in real 
need – is twisted into a form of political and social argument where everything can be taken 
violently, since it is the duty of the other, not of oneself, that is constantly watched and 
demanded.757 This kind of understanding of charity is close to De concordia and De 
pacificatione, although the emphasis is elsewhere. Yet, already in the 1520s, charity (caritas) is 
used as a critique of existing practices of those in power, or in possession of riches, but it is 
never used as a socially subversive argument against existing institutions and possessions. As 
to the impossibility of community of goods, Vives was forced to argue against radical 
Anabaptist interpretations of the Acts of the Apostles two and four, which described the 
                                                          
756 Vives also reminds the poor in De subventione that they should never cause tumult. See for instance the passage 
under the subchapter De pecuania quae his sumptibus sufficiat. Vives: De subventione, G: “Nec pauperes id debent 
optare, ut tumultus in civitate ullus existat....”  
757 Vives: “De communione rerum”, B: “dicitur vero de duabus tunicis, ut det alteram, non iubetur quis communia 
facere sua omnia, sed dare superflua, retinere necessaria, tu non explorato ac ne consyderato quidem, quae sint 
cuique necessaria, quae superflua, petis, rapis omnia, non animadvertis senex sit an iuvenis, sanus an aeger, maritus 




practices of sharing goods and possessions among early Christians after Christ’s death. Against 
the Anabaptist position, Vives tries to show that the apostolic message was not about possession, 
but about an imperative to use existing possession in the presence of necessities. Furthermore, 
if the kind of communal way of living ever existed it was only possible in a small community 
when the blood of Christ still reigned in the hearts of true Christians.758 The message, thus, is 
clear: in the corrupted world of passions, a life based simply on spontaneous charity and the 
imitation of the apostles is quite impossible, since the Anabaptist attempt to emulate early 
Christianity does not capture and bring to life true apostolic virtue deemed indispensable for 
the community of goods. 759 
 Vives goes to considerable lengths in elaborating how impossible a total 
commodity of all possessions would be. He also predicates possession on use, going on to argue 
that use cannot be separated from necessities. In addition, because these human necessities are 
manifold, no community of use or possession would be possible or desirable. In a phrase that 
sums this all up, Vives wrote, “God created everything for the use of man; necessity created 
their use and ingenium together with wisdom are in charge – just as the captain steers a boat.”760 
Unlike in many other texts, here Vives focuses much more on how people actually are different 
according to their social roles, compared with how they are similar as children of Christ. The 
ultimate point is to defend existing differences in human associations, not to criticise the 
excesses of those differences that make the focus and the development of the argument 
understandable. According to Vives, the Anabaptist case for the community of goods was 
effectively “a rule of the most potent, not of the best” and represented, thus, the rule of violence 
in place of prudence, judgement, and law.761 
 All this was firmly in line with Vives’s general urge to defend concord. It is a 
philosophy of concord that should be strived for in the confines of existing institutions, and 
                                                          
758 Vives: “De communione rerum”, A5-B: “adducitur statim exemplum Apostolorum, quod in ecclesia illa 
nascente & purissima, fervente etiam tum in Christianorum cordibus Christi sanguine, nemo existimabat quicquam 
esse suum, sed omnia illis erant communia & distribuebantur, ut cuique erat opus. Rectissime id quidem factum, 
quis neget, & conveniens Charitati, si probe expendas singula? Sed vis ne tu in nomine Christiano, quod Christo 
gratia, per univesum terrarum orbem pater, fieri, quod tum fiebat inter paucos, in eadem civitate congregatos nempe 
Hierosolymis.” 
759 Vives: “De communione rerum”, B: “Sed revertamur ad exemplum Apostolorum, quo vos uno maxime 
confiditis quasi per omnia similes illorum, quum nihil de prisca illa sanctitate placeat praeter nomina, quibus vos 
ad desidiam & luxum et insolentiam vestram abutimini. Nam si vetera illa tantopere vobis probantur, cur non 
illorum fidem imitamini? patientiam, mansustudinem, clementiam, alacritatem spiritus....” 
760 Vives: “De communione rerum”, C: “Quippe res humanas omnes condidit Deus propter usus hominum, usum 
necessitas peperit, regit autem ingenium, & scientia utendi, tanquam gubernator navem.” 
761 Vives: “De communione rerum”, C2: “...omnia vestra bona, fortunae, possessiones, uxores, liberi, libertas, sacra 




where the wise and the good should guard the actions of the powerful with speech, but where 
the social disobedience of the multitude can never be the answer. As his Introductio ad 
sapientiam reminded the reader “display honour to magistrates, and listen to them even if they 












                                                          
762 Vives: “Introductio ad sapientiam”, 443: “Magistratibus exteriorem honorem exhibe, illisque audiens esto, 





















6. De Disciplinis, Problematizing the trivium  
 
Chapter six looks at Vives’s redefinition of the trivium in his 1531 De disciplinis. The chapter 
argues that Vives’s move to bigger treatises on education, rhetoric, and the soul in the 1530s is 
partly a reaction to and a reflection on the failure of his attempts in the 1520s to turn the tide of 
European affairs as a political actor. Consequently, since De disciplinis, De ratione dicendi and 
De anima problematize the very concepts and instruments Vives was employing in his 1520s 
activities from rhetoric to the judgement of the intellect, they do engage in a rather critical 
dialogue with both classical and humanist traditions. Inside this critique, the chapter focuses on 
Vives’s attempt to redefine the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic in very Agricolan 
terms. In a history of the art of eloquence in De disciplinis, Vives insists strongly on the social 
and civic importance of rhetoric while simultaneously underlining greatly the destabilizing 
powers of rhetoric in cultures that nurture open confrontation. Vives’s historical depiction of 
rhetoric opens up a section where the Valencian humanist wants to restrict rhetoric to only one 
of the traditional duties of classical rhetoric: elocution. This accentuates an instrumental view 
of rhetoric as power of words that speaks to the passions of those who cannot be reached merely 
through reasoning, and it simultaneously transposes the intellectual task of inventing arguments 
to dialectic. Thus, dialectic appears as the art that should provide the orator or writer with 
substantial and general knowledge of arts and sciences, which can then be moulded to meet the 
requirements of the audience through rhetorical elocution. 
 
De disciplinis: Reassessing the Humanist Tradition 
 
In 1531, Vives’s most important contribution to questions of education and pedagogy De 
disciplinis appeared from the printing press of Michael Hillen in Antwerp. De disciplinis is 
undeniably part of the canon of Renaissance intellectual history, as is witnessed by its presence 
in many general works on Renaissance thought – yet the work has received surprisingly little 
detailed scholarly attention.763 Indicative of this omission, the last and only monograph of the 
                                                          
763 Kristeller has argued, “Vives made the attempt to replace the scholastic tradition in all fields of learning with 
ancient and humanist scholarship, and this attempt had considerable influence on later educational theory and 
practice.” Kristeller 1990, 133.The importance of the work as an overall assessment of Western culture is often 




twentieth century dedicated solely to Vives’s grandiose De disciplinis is Valerio del Nero’s 
1991 Linguaggio e filosofia in Vives. L’organizzazione del sapere nel ‘De Disciplinis’ (1531). 
It was also del Nero who tackled the work in the recent Brill’s Companion to Juan Luis Vives 
from 2008 with an article entitled “The De disciplinis as a Model of a Humanistic Text.” Taken 
together, del Nero’s works represent the most far-reaching attempt to analyse De disciplinis in 
its totality.  
 Del Nero’s expertise in the Italian tradition of Renaissance semantics, pedagogy, 
and encyclopaedism, as epitomized by the likes of Eugenio Garin and Cesare Vasoli, has 
guaranteed that the question of language holds a central place in his work. In del Nero, it is 
language, approached from different directions, that appears as the central theme and problem 
of De disciplinis, as well as a nexus that brings together a number of different elements in a 
philosophy of sermo. Del Nero has linked the modifications in the trivium and the semantics of 
usus with a more historically and practically orientated language, as well as grounded Vives’s 
pedagogical thinking in a strong philosophical basis, challenging a long tradition of reading De 
disciplinis in the closed tradition of educational viewpoints.764 Ultimately, according to del 
Nero, in De disciplinis Vives puts forward a constructive proposal that allows man to become 
truly himself within a collective life grounded in language and communication.765 The big story 
of arts and disciplines that arise from the collective judgement and experience of men is also 
present in Fernández-Santamaría’s reading of De disciplinis in his Theater of Man: J.L. Vives 
on Society, which describes man’s journey to earthly and social bonitas. In Fernández-
Santamaría’s interpretation, De disciplinis bridges the gap from man’s capacity for ars vivendi 
based on synderesis, to a social world of happiness realized through the precepts of expedient 
arts.766 In this way, the educational path of De disciplinis would fulfil the project of concord 
called for in Vives’s De concordia, amongst other works.  
 In accordance with the bulk of existing scholarship, both del Nero and Fernández-
                                                          
2013, xi. 
764 The construction of this myth in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is thoroughly analysed in González 
González 2007, 291-309. The tendency not to read De disciplinis in the internal tradition of pedagogy is becoming 
more common. However, indicative of how the pedagogical label as an ultimate framework for understanding the 
work has stuck is the fact that the Spanish name of De disciplinis in the 1992 anthology of Vives’s texts still is 
Tratado de la Enseñanza (Perez i Durá [ed.]: Antologia de texto de Juan Luis Vives, Universitat de València, 1993, 
428-487).  
765 The idea of language as the central question of Vives’s 1530 treatises is becoming increasingly accepted, see 
for instance González González 1999, 53.  
766 Fernández-Santamaría 1998, 83-144. Noreña writes about a Pelagian faith in the perfectibility of the individual, 




Santamaría have emphasized that De disciplinis was primarily a constructive and more practical 
alternative to what can be lumped under the heading of scholasticism.767 No doubt one of the 
central objects of critique throughout the work is the tradition of late-medieval learning, which 
is criticised for its method, contemplative aspirations, excessive focus on disputations, and a 
number of other issues. However, Vives is clear throughout De disciplinis that classical and 
humanist traditions themselves have to be subjected to the same kind of critical judgement, 
since arts and sciences in a postlapsarian world had never reached perfection. This is more than 
a general claim; Vives does indeed engage in a critical dialogue with the classical and humanist 
traditions on a number of points concerning studia humanitatis and the internal composition of 
the trivium.  
 Much of Vives’s critical attitude can be attributed to the traditional attempt to 
harmonize classical culture with Christian standards of piety – a theme that concerned a number 
of major humanist thinkers of the time starting with Erasmus.768 However, Vives’s restructuring 
of the arts of the trivium, and especially his highly ambivalent treatment of rhetoric is only 
partly related to an attempt to unite piety and classical culture. Unlike Erasmus – who in his 
Ecclesiastes (1535) readjusted rhetorical tradition to the art of preaching – Vives’s De 
disciplinis and his other rhetorical works never try to adapt rhetorical theory to ecclesiastical or 
religious contexts.769 What is more, in De disciplinis the selection of authors and the description 
of the places in which rhetorical knowledge could and should be put into use underlines, among 
other things, a deep link of rhetoric to civic issues as already exemplified by De consultatione. 
The link from rhetoric to civic issues was not made only in De disciplinis. It was widely 
acknowledged by all popular works on rhetoric, including Melanchthon’s De rhetorica.770 This 
is of course not to argue that the link to piety has been broken; Erasmus in his Ecclesiastes 
linked profane and sacred rhetoric to one another claiming that they were mutually supportive, 
and Vives most certainly predicates the usefulness of language on the moral condition of vir 
prudens that is never detached from piety.771 In this view, it is the inner peace and concord of 
the virtuous man that makes possible the prudential use of word in a world of profound discord. 
                                                          
767 Del Nero 1991, 40-48; Del Nero 2008, 178-185; Fernández-Santamaría 1998, viii-ix. 
768 See for instance Budé’s: De transitu Hellenismi ad Christianismum libri tres, Robert Estienne, Paris 1535. For 
the importance of pietas, see Del Nero 1991, 32-34. Vives’s critique of Aristotle’s earthly happiness (eudaimonia) 
is an example of a Christian critique, see Vives: DD, 187-193.  
769 Other scholarship has also noticed the absence of preaching, see Mack 2005, 90.  
770 Melanchthon, Philipp: De rhetorica libri tres, Basel, Johann Froben, 1519, 9.  
771 Erasmus, Desiderius: Ecclesiastae sive de ratione concionandi libri quatuor, Merten de Keyser, Antwerpen 
1535, 1-2. Erasmus called for a union between Ciceronian eloquence and Christian piety in other instances as well, 




However, even if Vives’s vir prudens is a Christian orator who transmits wisdom in a world of 
corruption in an Augustinian manner, he is not a religious orator. The world he engages with is 
one in need of a life of negotium and prudent use of language in non-religious contexts. 
Furthermore, the models for his imitation are predominantly classical writers.772 
 However, the moment in which De disciplinis appears is one in which these 
constructive possibilities of language are increasingly questioned in humanist circles. What is 
put into doubt in the latter part of the 1520s is the possibility of language to perform its social 
function as a source of concord. This critique was directed at two very different directions. First, 
Erasmus could criticise fellow humanists for employing a language utterly devoid of rhetorical 
powers. His Ciceronianus was famously critical of a tenet of humanism, mostly Italian, that 
interpreted linguistic imitation very rigorously as concerning the words and phrases of Cicero 
rather than the overall sprit of Tully, in which the power of his language was grounded.773 
Referring to Erasmus’s Ciceronianus, Vives himself had defended Cicero’s eloquence as 
general learning and character, criticising the aestheticizing rhetoric of the already-deceased 
Christoph de Longueil, who according to the Valencian wrote classical Latin without saying 
anything.774 
 But more importantly, it is not merely the frigid and spiritless language of 
scholastics or Ciceronians that is criticised for its incapacity to move people, but also the 
powerful rhetoric of humanists detached from character, spirit, and knowledge of things. 
Nowhere is this more visible than in Erasmus’s widely printed Lingua that appeared for the first 
time in 1525. This focused on the disastrous consequence of loose tongue on all spheres of 
social life, and linked the problem explicitly to contemporary issues. 775 In Lingua, Erasmus 
argued that loquacity and other faults of the tongue stemmed from stupidity and – what was 
worse – from outright wickedness that “brings about the private and public ruin of the human 
race.”776 Throughout the work, Erasmus – who makes frequent references not only to religious 
sedition but also to the use of language in the presence of princes – emphasizes that it is indeed 
possible to be an eloquent master of words with a capacity to persuade yet use them to further 
                                                          
772 For Augustine on rhetoric, see Augustine: De doctrina, Chapter IV. 
773 Fumaroli 1980, 101-106; Margolin 1999, 226-235.  
774 Vives to Galcerano Cepello, DAE 139. 
775 According to the Universal Short Title Catalogue (USTC) the number of editions in the years 1525 and 1526 
was 14. The whole title of the book is in many editions Opus novum, & hisce temporibus aptissimum, see for 
instance the Froben edition of 1525, Opus novum, & hisce temporibus aptissimum, Johann Froben, Basel 1525. 
776 Erasmus: Lingua, 52: “...in privatum ac publicum humani generis exitium.” (English translation from Erasmus: 
Literary and Educational Writings, vol. 7, Collected Works of Erasmus 29 [ed. Fantham – Rummel –Ijsewijn], 




evil. Moreover, Erasmus links these developments to a range of contemporary phenomena 
where discord had come to prevail, ranging from warfare among princes dependent on bad 
counselling, to feuds that are more private. In a striking fashion, the Dutch humanist goes on to 
link all this to the decadence of the seven liberal arts: “the loquacity of the declamatory school 
has ruined eloquence.”777 In another section dedicated to rhetoricians, dialecticians, and 
declaimers, Erasmus further accentuated his criticism, arguing, they “arm tongue with words” 
than “their breasts with moral reasoning.”778 Erasmus’s criticism, although never forgetting the 
barbarisms of scholasticism, is already pointing towards humanist training as an empty shell of 
words, if it is detached from character, spirit, and useful knowledge.  
 Erasmus’s remarks about the destructive side of language reveal a deeper crisis in 
the optimistic educational programme of Erasmian humanism; Erasmus’s union of Philosophia 
Christi with the transformative power of language had been surpassed by the Reformation – 
many representatives of which had roots in humanist training. Basic trust in the responsible use 
of eloquent language by learned humanists to enhance social, spiritual, and political renewal 
was becoming an empty dream in a Europe, where the quantity of printed materials and 
potential audiences actively engaging with books was growing, and where the dynamics of 
discussion had already been affected by an emerging vernacular pamphlet culture.779 The 
vigorous project of peace during the 1510s had been crushed by the warfare of the 1520s. 
Despite the Peace Treaty of Cambrai in 1529, there are no traces of optimism in Vives in the 
1530s concerning the rulers of the time. As Vives made perfectly clear in his De disciplinis, 
they were always vulnerable to flattery and adulation. Lastly, the context in which the peace 
projects of the 1510s were devised was shattered – not only had the relationship between 
Erasmus and Vives cooled, but the relative decay of the Republic of Letters itself as a public 
project in an increasingly conflictual climate was becoming evident.780 In this way, the world 
of men of letters – as a seat of concord in the midst of discord – was greatly threatened. 
                                                          
777 Erasmus: Lingua, 37: “Declamatoria garrulitas corrupit eloquentiam.” (English translation from Erasmus: 
Literary and Educational Writings, vol. 7, Collected Works of Erasmus 29 [ed. Fantham – Rummel –Ijsewijn], 
Toronto University Press, Toronto 1978, 286) 
778 Erasmus: Lingua, 19: “Et in hoc vitium sere incidunt, qui dialecticorum ac rhetorium praeceptis, 
declamatoriisque palaestris, linguam potius armant verbis, quam pectus honestis rationibus.” (English translation 
from Erasmus: Literary and Educational Writings, vol. 7, Collected Works of Erasmus 29 [ed. Fantham – Rummel 
–Ijsewijn], Toronto University Press, Toronto 1978, 276) 
779 By 1530 the number of different pamphlets produced by the Reformation had to be around 10000 meaning that 
different copies had to be counted in the millions, see Blockmans 2002, 42 
780 See Chapter three. Some of Vives’s closer friends in different European courts representing the Erasmian 





 The treatment of artes sermocinales and especially rhetoric in De disciplinis 
mirrors these developments. Vives’s depiction of rhetoric in De disciplinis weaves the art of 
eloquence tightly together with a substantial knowledge of other disciplines and character 
development. On the one hand, De disciplinis aspires to rhetoric that would not be merely of a 
literary nature deprived of social and political importance but, on the other hand, it should not 
become a source of flattery, deceit, or discord. Moreover, the problematic nature of humanist 
rhetoric in De disciplinis is more than an evocation of a Platonic commonplace, since it leads 
to actual transformations; its relationship with the other arts of the trivium and studia 
humanitatis has to be rethought, its internal theory modified, and its place and importance in 
the curriculum altered. In doing this Vives is rethinking a pronouncedly optimistic 
understanding of rhetoric as the true corner stone of studia humanitatis and elementary 
education found in Cicero and Quintilian, in some of the most widely read Italian quattrocento 
pedagogical manuals, and in Agricola’s De formando studio and Erasmus’s De ratione studii. 
Although familiar with the originally Platonic accusation of the deceitful nature of rhetoric, this 
educational tradition did not question the classical ideal of rhetoric as adversity and debate that 
presupposed the possibility to argue each issue on both sides. Vives, on the other hand, takes a 
much more reserved approach to the ambivalent nature of rhetoric, an art he himself had praised 
in his prelection to Ad Herennium in 1514, and used widely throughout the 1520s.  
 Vives’s position vis-à-vis language arts in De disciplinis was, of course, not a 
sudden change in its specific details, but a culmination of a longer assessment of humanist 
educational tradition; his In pseudodialecticos had underlined the central importance of 
dialectic, and his De ratione studii had largely omitted the teaching of truly rhetorical 
knowledge to young pupils. Moreover, some of his actual propositions reflect the wider 
humanist reception of Agricola and humanist dialectic in the 1520s and 1530s. Despite this, 
Vives’s ambivalent feelings and reservations about the art of eloquence – truly expressed and 
elaborated only in De disciplinis – have to be understood in the context of the profound 
experience of political and religious discord in the 1520s. This gradually directs Vives to larger 
educational, rhetorical, cultural and social themes, and ultimately to the treatment of the soul in 
the late 1520s and 1530s. As Vives had pointed out in his De concordia, this discord reigned 
everywhere, producing difference of opinion and a distortion of the whole interpretative culture 
in which men lived, and it is that culture that has to be modified for concord to stand a chance. 
Vives’s move from more practically oriented counselling to the composition of larger treatises 




It is in this context that De disciplinis appears indeed as a promised path to concord through 
education, which, however, is not equated simply with an uncritical admiration of humanism. 
 Even though De disciplinis appeared in 1531, it is evident that it was the product 
of a longer project, which had most likely started at least in the mid-1520s.781 From what is 
known, Vives viewed De disciplinis very much as a personal, and as a monumentally ambitious 
task undertaken in relative isolation.782 As he wrote to Juan de Vergara, he had to rely on his 
own judgement since he could not expect help from Erasmus.783 The way De disciplinis is 
framed also differs from his earlier projects such as In pseudodialecticos and Augustine’s De 
civitate Dei, where Vives’s own production is deliberately portrayed as part of a general 
humanist agenda through introductory and prefatory materials. When one opens De disciplinis 
one does not get the same idea of a common project. Even though the work clearly aspires to 
general levels of analysis – presupposing all traditional battle lines between scholastic and 
humanist thinking – and touches upon a wide range of intellectual themes debated in the 1520s, 
from Ciceronianism and translation to questions around pedagogy and dialectical knowledge, 
one gets the idea that it represents the effort of a relatively isolated intellectual figure.784 Thus, 
it testifies of the larger demise of humanism as a common public project. 
 The monumental work is divided into three parts, each of which comprises 
between six and eight books. The first part, De causis corruptarum artium, presents both an 
account of the possibilities of learning as well as a historical critique and assessment of all 
major arts and sciences. De tradendis disciplinis, the second and most well-known part is 
dedicated to a comprehensive and encyclopaedic treatment of education that covers everything 
from curricula and pedagogical questions to the physical placement of schools. The third section 
composed of eight books with different titles presents Vives’s most comprehensive treatment 
of first philosophy and dialectic. The three sections were printed together in all sixteenth-
century editions, which show that they were understood to form a unity in which the critical 
                                                          
781 Del Nero 1991, 12; Vigliano 2013, lvi-lx; Sinz 1963, 83-86. In his letters to Cranevelt there are some hints at 
the work in the summer and autumn of 1525 (see Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 167) and in a letter to Cranevelt dated 
17.2.1526 he quite clearly refers to De disciplinis, Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 175. In an early 1527 letter to Vives 
Juan de Vergara wants to know more about the project, Vergara to Vives, CHE 10, 254. 
782 His introduction (praefatio) to the work makes claims to originality and presents De disciplinis in most general 
terms as a critical assessment of all learning. In his letter to Cranevelt, he states that he speaks of a daringly 
ambitious project he does not want to explain since he would be considered a lunatic, Vives to Cranevelt, CRA 
137. According to Sinz, this refers to De disciplinis, Sinz 1968, 83.  
783 Sinz 1963, 87; Vives to Vergara, CHE xii, 264. 
784 There are no introductory remarks from any other humanists and the only introductory letter is a dedication to 




first part paved the way for the constructive proposal of the second part.785 The third part would 
then function as an introduction to metaphysics and dialectic – the method of reasoning – the 
core of all arts and sciences.  
 The peculiar and somewhat isolated nature of De disciplinis is further accentuated 
by the fact that it is not connected to an ongoing collective programme to reform an old 
institution or to establish a new one. Thus, unlike the work of other famous pedagogues of the 
time, such as Melanchthon and Johannes Sturm, Vives’s De disciplinis does not present a 
realizable and specific programme of study that should be put into practice in any univocal way, 
but aspires to a more philosophical, general and encyclopaedic level. In doing this, De 
disciplinis blurs all simple readings of the work in one specific genre of literature, and it is 
unique in combining an educational and pedagogical treatise with a thorough critique and 
redefinition of arts and disciplines.786 This is indeed a central point for Vives; in the current 
state of learning, any programme of practical utility should engage critically with all the 
tradition in which collective error still reigned.  
 
History of Arts and Disciplines 
 
The first of the three parts of De disciplinis entitled De causis corruptarum artium is dedicated 
to both a historical and a critical assessment of the arts. The history writing of De causis differs 
greatly from the typical rhetorical histories found in humanist civil science, which aspired to 
cultivate prudence through right kind of selective exempla on the influence of character and a 
range of other issues for historical outcomes.787 De causis rather takes up the challenge posed 
in De concordia about the entrenchment of corruption, misjudgement, and twisted traditions in 
the whole culture surrounding people, by engaging in a purifying and critical dialogue with the 
past understood as a collective memory inside of which contemporary culture still has to 
operate.788 Moreover, as Bejczy has argued, the historical narrative Vives is trying to convey to 
the reader is not of one-dimensional corruption of a perfect classical antiquity, he rather 
                                                          
785 Del Nero 1991, 16-19.  
786 See Vigliano 2013, lxviii, xc.  
787 It could fall under the general categories of history as described in Vives’s De ratione as dealing with narration 
meant for explaining something useful. However, it does not partake in the most common genres of history that in 
Vives’s mind also deal with the influence of individual character in history, since here the focus is on arts not 
persons. See Vives: DR, 181-199.  




emphasizes that the seeds of corruption have been there in all postlapsarian human history.789 
One of Vives’s points in De causis is undeniably targeted against scholastic learning in defence 
of numerous elements drawn from classical wisdom. Yet at the same time, he is very clear about 
the fact that the knowledge of the Greek and the Romans itself contained elements of corrupted 
nature, arguing in the introduction to the work, “I will show that the error in the old writers was 
[...] due to their defects.”790 This effectively opens up another front of critical assessment – 
namely that of the learning of classical antiquity, and ultimately, of humanism itself that has to 
be saved and moulded to the use of a Christian world as an educational paradigm. As Vives 
points out: “Since I want the authority of the ancient writers to be confirmed in matters of the 
teaching of arts [...] I had to reveal the points on which I thought they had erred.”791 
 There are a number of reasons for Vives to do this, but conceptually the most 
important of these is undeniably the discussions taking place around ingenium. As has been 
argued, Vives’s history of the corruption of the arts could be described as a philosophy of 
ingenium – a word of complicated semantic nature regularly employed to denote individual 
talent, but used here to describe more generally the overall force of the mind.792 The first part 
of De disciplinis, historical in its aspirations, is essentially based on the use of the possibilities 
of ingenium understood as the inventive force of human mind to overcome its own state.793 It 
is in the concept of ingenium that one finds a strong commitment in De disciplinis to human 
capacities for shaping their own history – even in postlapsarian reality – something 
presupposing Erasmus’s understanding of free will, as described in his De libero arbitrio, and 
Vives’s own views on the issue exposed in his commentaries on Augustine’s De civitate Dei. 
In his commentaries, Vives had argued in very Augustinian terms that predestination referred 
to God’s foreknowledge of events, brought about by human will.794 As Vives in the very first 
page of De disciplinis emphatically argued, “even though man of his own fault drew to himself 
a great variety of necessities, God gave him instruments, such as a sharp ingenium that acts to 
cover them in one way or another. From this, all human inventions where born – both expedient 
                                                          
789 Bejczy 2003, 69-83. Tracy makes the same observations, Tracy 1996, 65-66.  
790 Vives: DD, Praefatio: “Conatus sum etiam artes ab impiis scrupulis repurgare, at que a gentiliis tenebris ad 
lucem traducere pietatis nostrae: ut quod olim veteres illos scriptores fefellit, non id factum humani ingenii vitio, 
sicut nonnulli arbitrantur, sed illorum ostendam.”  
791 Vives: DD, Praefatio: “Verum quam antiquorum hominum in tradendis artibus confirmata esset autoritas [...] 
declarandum mihi fuit, quibus in rebus lapsos esse illos censerem.”  
792 Quintilian: IO, i.iii.  
793 The importance of ingenium in De disciplinis has also been noted by Hidalgo-Serna, Hodges and Del Nero. See 
Hodges 1996; Del Nero 1991, 28-34; Hidalgo-Serna 1983.  




and harmful, good and bad.”795 However, ingenium does not have Pelagian possibilities; the 
Spanish philosopher emphasizes throughout De causis that the possibilities of ingenium are 
very much related to what is fundamentally an imperfect and corrupted world that effectively 
frames the creative possibilities of ingenium. Thus, even the ancients are subjected to an 
analysis that emphasizes their limits, and Vives explicitly points out some of the corrupted 
elements that actually motivated their reasoning and use of ingenium.796 Moreover, the point of 
critique is not only targeted towards the past; Vives is equally clear that the same limitations 
apply in man’s current state and frame the possibilities of arts and sciences and, ultimately, of 
concord. In some ways, the use of ingenium found in De disciplinis defends the possibilities of 
the human mind to progress against those tenets of the Reformation that put all faith in grace 
while simultaneously showing how this is possible only inside the limits of a postlapsarian 
reality.   
 This postlapsarian reality is flamboyantly present in Vives’s discussion on the 
motivating forces of ingenium and the natural capacities of men. He makes a distinction 
between ingenium as a natural capacity and diligence (diligentia) as attention that can be 
motivated and that heavily directs the use of ingenium. In doing so, Vives is employing terms 
central to the narrower question of education and learning in a more ambitious and general 
analysis of the history of arts; ingenium and diligentia traditionally employed for analysing 
individual learning form the basis of the collective formation of arts and sciences in the first 
part of De disciplinis.797 The possible sources of diligence that draw ingenium are essentially 
the following: necessity, enjoyment (delectatio), contemplation, together with the admiration 
of the greatness of something such as God or truth, and social motifs based on money and 
honour.798 These candidates relate closely to Vives’s earlier social and political thought, and to 
                                                          
795 Vives: DD, 1: “Illa tamen in re, indulgenter homo est a principe, et autore suo habitus, quam cum ipse 
necessitates sibi sua culpa tam varias accersierit, Deus tamen instrumentum ei reliquit ad eas quoquo modo 
propulsandas, ingenii acumen vivax & sua sponte actuosum. Hinc sunt nata inventa hominum omnia utilia, noxia, 
proba, improba.”  
796 Vives: DD, 8: “Non quod ars ulla vel ad absolutionem aliquam sit perducta, vel ita extersa ac expolita, ut nihil 
haberet admistum inutile ac reiiciendum. Non ea sunt humani ingenii vires, clausi mole hac corporis & tenebris, 
ut aliquid excudat perfectum atque absolutum, cui non desint plurima ad cumulum perfectionis, & quasi ad 
fastigium illud naturae cuiusque rei.”  
797 Diligentia and ingenium are employed frequently in humanist literature, see for instance Agricola De formando, 
14; Vergerio: “De ingenuis”, 56. They are employed in this sense in the second part of De disciplinis.  
798 Vives: DD, 7: “Acre ingenium et usui aptum naturae sunt munera: diligentia vel necessitate urgetur, vel 
delectatione allicitur, vel admiratione magnitudinis et pulchritudinis rei capitur: quamvis in hoc quoque tacita inest 
delectatio, postquam assecutus es causam tantae rei. Deinde cupiditate aliqua excitatur decoris aut pecuniae. 
Postremo perficiendi spe alitur & detinetur.” Even though Vives is talking here about the notorious Epicurean 
candidate pleasure, it seems that he is not considering it in the Epicurean sense. Throughout the part he is focusing 




the capacity of men to judge and use words prudently. Out of the four candidates, money and 
glory are, of course, highly susceptible; they are notoriously close to bodily urges and to 
blinding passions, and they are effectively described as belonging to the world of discord in De 
concordia.799 Necessity, inside its own reach, is positively assessed as wonderfully witnessed 
by Vives’s favourable assessment of practical arts and skills in De disciplinis, yet incapable on 
its own to motivate higher arts since wisdom is ultimately detached from the range of bodily 
necessities.800 Truth and the urge to find truth – interpreted as knowledge of the God-like nature 
of one’s self – should, and in an ideal world would motivate our steps in the intellectual path. 
As Vives argued in De disciplinis, Greek philosophy, in its purest form, was motivated by the 
simple yearning for truth.801 However, as De disciplinis makes quite clear this is rather an 
exception than the norm. 
 These motivational principles are also woven into a temporal framework, and in 
discussing different ways of drawing collective ingenium, Vives offers the reader 
simultaneously a historical story. Chronologically the first candidate that gave birth to arts in 
the very beginning was necessity that pushed ingenium to turn isolated, yet somehow similar 
experiences into collective precepts. It is not easy to pin down what necessity exactly is in Vives 
since it can vary from things related to immediate survival to issues far detached from direct 
bodily experience.802 Yet necessity is conceptually tied to the world of body, it deals with the 
short- and long-term possibilities of living. The further away thinking arises from the immediate 
experience, the closer it comes to the world of wisdom – somehow related to necessities yet 
                                                          
799 Vives: DD, 10: “Eruditio, & artes quae compressae & velut coactae talibus fuerint ingeniis, necesse est eadem 
facie & natura prodeant, qua sunt ipsa ingenia, scilicet prava, detorta, vitiosa. Neque enim aliter eruditio ab ingenio 
unde manat vel formam accipit, quam caseus a fiscella: vel naturam resipit ac vinum e dolio, vel utre: quare necesse 
est ut male tradant, quae male acceperunt. Iam affectus omnes animi si non retundunt mentis aciem, certe 
impediunt, ac retardant, & quasi rubigine obducunt: quocunque illi invaserunt, lucem offuscant animi, & 
dispicientiam veri perturbant, non secus ac densae nebulae ante oculos offusae. Supremam & celsissimam illam 
mentis lucem, superbia perstringit, & a recto itinere abducit transversam: haec est eminendi atque excellendi 
cupiditas, ut videatur habere quae nullus alius, aut quae pauci, nempe altissima ac praestantissima, rara, nova, 
plurima, aut omnia.”  
800 Vives: DD, 2. This is not always clear. At some point Vives states that “...quemadmodum videmus in vita 
contingere, ut homines perfuncti domesticis & necessariis negotiis applicent animum ad aliquid altius ac liberalius 
cognoscendum, ita artibus, quae praesenti atque urgenti necessitati opem ferrent rite inventis ac constitutis, visum 
est humano ingenio sensim ad pulchriora sese attollere.”  
801 Vives: DD, 6: “Adduxit ad tractandas atque excolendas artes magnitudo rei, & opus unum excellentia mentis 
nostrae longe dignissimum cupiditas veri inveniendi, qua nihil est praeclarius, nec quod magis deceat hominem: 
sicut ignorari, falli, decipi, turpe ac miserum iudicamus: quae ut evitarent, philosophatos esse priscos illos, nec 
alia causa, aut in alium usum, Aristoteles perhibet gravis imprimis autor.”   
802 Vives: DD, 1-7. In describing the birth of rhetoric, Vives paints a story that moves from necessities to cover 
other objectives. Vives: DD, 135: “Sed ornatius dicendi, & acutius inveniendi ex necessitate fluxit [...] Ex 




separate from them and motivated by things already linked to the soul.803  
 However, throughout Vives’s depiction of the unfolding of the history of thought, 
the Spaniard makes quite clear the importance of glory as one of the primary forces drawing 
diligence both generally and in the case of individual arts and sciences. Sometimes glory links 
closely to necessity, since things considered necessary in a given society bring glory to the 
members excelling in their performance.804 This connection is not, however, always present 
since glory can equally well link to all arts and disciplines, even to those far detached from 
immediate or even socially elaborated conceptions of necessity such as theology.805 Actually, 
Vives raises the search for glory, irrespective of its relation to necessity and wisdom, to the 
main driving force of the history of thought, and insists that it is an irreducible element of arts 
and sciences in the current world.806 By arguing that the search for glory frames human thinking, 
Vives makes very clear that it is difficult to put faith and the destiny of thinking into the hands 
of a simple yearning for truth. Furthermore, the directing of diligence and the social aspirations 
of men is of primary importance for the development of arts in the current ontological condition 
of man. 
 The treatment of ingenium and diligence is full of tension. As Vives elaborated at 
length on numerous occasions, the desire for glory was closely linked to the dynamics of discord 
since it fomented the passions that were socially destructive. Thus, if arts are indeed based on 
the search of honour and glory, because “everyone wants to excel and be honoured,” one is 
again playing with exactly the kind of socially threatening passions that are potentially 
incontrollable and harmful, and that effectively sustain discord.807 The fact that this discord is 
inscribed into the arts inherited from a tradition that was never free from a desire for glory is a 
                                                          
803 Vives: DD, 2: “Tum Mathematice & Philosophia naturalis quaesita, & civitates constitutae, & leges datae, quae 
tametsi vitae magnopere prosunt, tamen non illis necessitatibus consulunt, quibus terrae fossio, aratio, repastinatio 
& alia quae operibus rusticis exercentur....”; “videlicet hominum consensu, id declarante, excellentiora esse 
quaecunquae ad animum pertinerent, quam quae ad corpus....”  
804 Vives: DD, 6: “Invitati sunt complures quos multitudo plurimum valere ingenio arbitrabatur, & allecti maximis 
praemiis, ut artibus in commune necessariis darent operam: laboris praemia fuerunt pecunia, honor, decus, gratia 
& privata & publica. Ea de causa Aegyptii sacerdotes multam in mathematicis posuerunt operam, quod vehementer 
Geometria Aegyptus tota indigeret, confusis per annos agrorum limitibus ab inundante Nilo.”; Vives: DD, 7-8: “In 
Aegypto permagnus mathematicarum usus, quas praemiis & honore afficiebat necessitas....”  
805 Vives: DD, 8: “In Academiis publicis plerique alliciuntur illis honorum nominibus, tum iis quae magno 
aestimantur. Unde Lutetiae tanta Theologorum copia, Aureliae iurisconsultorum: apud Nitiobriges, quem nunc 
montem Pessulanum vocant, medicorum.” 
806 Vives: DD, 8: “Acutissime illud in hominum moribus ac natura deprehendit, qui dixit honore ali artes. Excellere 
enim quisque cupit, & honore affici: quare, ut id consequatur, ei se tradit studio, quod in pretio esse videt. Ita sit, 
quam recte, non disputo: nec solum in magnis civitatibus ac populis, sed in quocunque coetu, in quacunque 
consuetudine & familiaritate hominum, virorum, foeminarum, senum, iuvenum.”  




major trend in De disciplinis. As a matter of fact, in discussing the reasons why arts never in 
their history reached perfection, implying that even in classical antiquity the arts comprised 
elements of corrupted nature, Vives argues that this is mainly due to “the blindness and 
weakness of the arrogant soul,” – something conceptually linked to a desire for glory.808 
Ultimately, De causis starts from the premise that the actual cultivation of the arts has almost 
never been based on an unselfish interest in truth.809 
 If this dynamic in the case of the history of the arts can be turned into a critical 
analysis, the fact that the same logic still applies presents other kinds of problems. The limits 
of ingenium can never be totally overcome but there are some possible ways of managing the 
situation. It is possible to use existing cultural assessments on the importance of studies as a 
source for human glory. As Vives pointed out in De tradendis, echoing classical educational 
paradigms, even though “glory can greatly incite the young to honest actions, it is later the 
cause and origin of many bad things.” He likens this to the entrance of youth into studies.810 
Thus, one would use glory as an incentive to letters, but in the end, the yardstick of truth should 
take its place, implying that the studies covering necessities and leading to truth should enjoy 
popular appreciation that creates an initial push to their study. However, ultimately Vives is 
explicit that complete perfection in the arts and sciences is out of the reach of man’s ingenium 
in his current state.811 Rather what he promises is a continuous struggle under the guidance of 
reason against corrupted impulses for a slow enhancement in arts, a process he describes as 




                                                          
808 Vives: DD, 8: “Nunquam ergo vel perfectae fuerunt artes vel purae, ne in sua quidem origine: ea est superbissimi 
animi caecitas atque imbecillitas.”  
809 Vives: DD, 380-398.  
810 Vives: DD, 385: “...verum quae ut in adolescentia & iuventute maximos subdit stimulos ad honestas actiones, 
ita multorum deinceps est malorum causa & origo.” Vives had made the same point in his letter to Gil Wallop 
where he argued that the social incentives served as entry to learning. Later, however, learning is fomented by a 
yearning for excellence in sciences and in virtue, Vives to Wallop, MA VII, 210. This idea can also be found in 
Quintilian: IO, i.iii.22 and in Vergerio: “De ingenuis”, 8-10.  
811 This is the predominant spirit of the work although there are moments when he expresses a strikingly optimistic 
interpretation of the possibilities of ingenium. See for instance Vives: DD, Praefatio: “ut quod olim veteres illos 
scriptores fefellit, non id factum humani ingenii vitio, sicut nonnulli arbitrantur, sed illorum ostendam.”  
812 In Vives: DD, 9 he writes, referring to the state of arts in classical antiquity: “Haec omnia quasi brachiorum vi 
aliquo usque progressa tanquam adverso flumine....” He also strongly suggests that this continuous fight is the 
ontological position of man in other contexts. See for instance Vives: DD, 367: “haec est eterna in homine militia, 
seu pugna verius: inque eo est perpetuo laborandum, & connitendum, ne dominam superet ancilla, in quam 




Rhetoric as Part of the Trivium 
 
The dynamics of ingenium that are at play in the general part of De causis are also functional 
in the analysis of the corruption of individual arts, albeit in somewhat differing ways. In a 
typically Vivesian and more generally humanist vein De disciplinis blurs distinctions between 
language disciplines, and focuses on showing their interdependencies on a number of fronts. In 
the section dedicated to grammar that opened the critical analysis of different arts, Vives 
underlined their union in the very start by stating, “grammar showed what and on what account, 
rhetoric brought embellishment and refinement, dialectic arguments and probability,” showing 
here how different linguistic arts approach questions related to language from different 
angles.813  
 In the case of grammar, Vives’s analysis is not focused on the history of the art 
and the way of arguing is mostly thematic. The Spaniard makes a comprehensive analysis of 
scholastic interpretations of the role of grammar and the grammarian on one hand and of 
humanist excesses of Ciceronianism depriving language of its historical and creative element 
on the other. What emerges is a typically humanist idea of a grammarian who presents the 
culture of classical antiquity in its wholeness through a historical reading of auctores, which 
are a gateway not only to linguistic questions but also to the basic wisdom of the ancients.814 In 
the case of dialectic, a historical story is much more carefully delineated. One part of the section 
is dedicated to a critical assessment of The Philosopher – Aristotle – the supreme authority on 
the tradition of dialectic. In the he spirit of In pseudodialecticos, Vives aims to demonstrate in 
this section how Aristotle, who in the scholastic culture was usually read only through 
commentary tradition, analysed argumentative patterns as they appear in language. In turning 
Aristotle into a somewhat humanist philosopher, Vives is simultaneously accusing scholastics 
for turning dialectic into an analysis of formal semantics. In this way, Vives is opening a gate 
to the third part of De disciplinis, structurally loosely based on Aristotle’s Organon, where he 
presents his own views on humanist dialectic meant to be an analysis and inventive tool for 
arguments in speaking and writing.815  
                                                          
813 Del Nero has drawn attention to this aspect, Del Nero 1991, 95; Mack 1993, 2. Vives: DD, 65: “Veterum 
scriptorum consensio tres artes de sermone posuit, Grammaticam, quae quid, & qua ratione diceretur, indicaret: 
Rhetoricam, quae ornatum & cultum: Dialecticam, quae argumenta & probabilitatem.”  
814 Vives: DD, 65-94. The importance given to the grammarian in Vives’s writing is widely acknowledged, see Del 
Nero 1991, 106-117.  




 It is, however, in the section on rhetoric where the history of the art and its relation 
to questions of motivating principles is presented in a most interesting fashion, and in a much 
more ambivalent light than in Johannes Sturm’s history of rhetoric (De amissa dicendi ratione), 
which offered a pronouncedly positive assessment of the eloquence of the Ancients.816 In the 
beginning of the section dedicated to the corruption of rhetoric, Vives starts by reaffirming the 
fundamentally social role of the art of eloquence by stating, “two are the things that above all 
bind and keep human associations together, justice and language” moving on to a short 
presentation of the history of rhetoric in classical antiquity.817 Here Vives claims, following a 
commonplace, that rhetoric was born out of the necessity to regain property in Sicily and 
Greece.818 Soon, however, its scope broadened to cover other purposes, the most important of 
which was a political one: 
 
“From the necessity to regain one’s property, this instrument moved also to strive after 
other objectives, so that just like it had moved judges, it would move the souls in popular 
assemblies, the senate in the curia, and finally all those who had influence in the Republic in 
whose hands and control the faith of the whole city was placed.”819 
 
What follows is a presentation of the rhetorical culture of Rome, Athens, Rhodes, 
and Sicily where the orator, in favourable republican circumstances for the cultivation of 
rhetoric, imposed his rule.820 This is contrasted to Crete and Sparta where, due to the general 
character of the audience – presented as the decisive factor – an orator’s space for manoeuvre 
was much more reduced.821 This point, as well as the main outline of this section, could be 
                                                          
816 Sturm, Johannes: De amissa dicendi ratione, ad Franciscum frossium jurisconsultum libri duo, Wendelin 
Rihel, Strasbourg 1538, first six pages. 
817 Vives: DD, 134: “Humanae omnes societates duabus potissimum rebus vinciuntur ac continentur: iustitia, & 
sermone.” This same assertion is repeated in De ratione dicendi. See Vives: DR, 3: “Qui humanae consociationis 
vinculum dixerunt esse iustitiam et sermonem, hi nimirum acute inspexerunt vim ingenii humani....” 
818 Property in Vives is definitely more related to the body than to the soul. Thus, the link to necessity is not 
necessarily a curious one. The story about the birth of rhetoric in Sicily for judicial purposes was a common one 
in classical antiquity, see for instance Cicero: “Brutus”, xii.46.   
819 Vives: DD, 135: “Ex necessitate hac recuperandi sua; ad alia quoque expetenda translatum est instrumentum: 
ut quemadmodum moverant iudices, moverent etiam animos in concione populi, senatus in curia, denique eorum 
omnium, qui plurimum possent in republica, & in quorum manu atque arbitrio fortuna esset omnis posita 
civitatis....”  
820 Vives: DD, 136: “...dominatus est orator, ubi eloquentia invenit turbas acumine ingenii praeditas, inquietas, 
ambitiosas, & libertatis quadam aura tumefactas.” Already in his De subventione Vives reminded the reader of the 
corruptive tendencies of republics where private interest was given precedence over public good. Vives: De 
subventione, Bii: “Quod duae potentissimae gentes declararunt, Romana & Atheniensis, & declarabunt quotcunque 
tales habent cives, qui se, quam suam patriam, magnos & potentes esse malint.”   




found in Tacitus’s Dialogus de Oratoribus, where Crete and Sparta are portrayed as 
commonwealths, where, “very strict discipline and very strict laws prevailed,” and where, 
consequently, oratory did not flourish.822 The well-known fact that Crete and Sparta were 
famous for their mixed constitutions – a point implicit in Tacitus who connects the flourishing 
of oratory to the republican constitution and context – is not mentioned by Vives in this 
paragraph at all.823 Just like Tacitus, he writes about the possibilities of rhetoric, “in well-
governed commonwealths” (in bene constitutis civitatibus), but instead of mentioning laws and 
discipline as Tacitus does, he shifts the focus to the qualities and character of the people.824 
Whatever idea of a mixed constitution Vives might have endorsed in the style of the Burgundian 
Netherlands, it is not openly emphasized in De causis.  
 Already before the historical description Vives had made very clear that rhetoric 
thrives naturally in free republics and is of little use in monarchies where the hands of the orator 
are tied by fear. This is due to the fact that since oratory is of utmost importance and power in 
republics, men, who are drawn by “honours, riches, fortunes, dignity and power,” dedicate their 
time to political oratory.825 There is something very ambivalent about the first paragraph. The 
picture of monarchy where word has ceased to perform its social function, comes very close to 
notions of tyranny which are always characterised by the rule of fear in the humanist 
discourse.826 However, at the same time the description of the republican setting is reminiscent 
of Tacitus’s Dialogus de oratoribus where republican rhetoric – although praised for its 
perfection – is simultaneously tied to anarchistic and potentially destructive tendencies.827 This 
                                                          
widely defended in the classical tradition, see Cicero: De oratore, i.viii.   
822 Tacitus: Dialogus de oratoribus, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts 1913, xl: “quarum civitatum severissima disciplina et severissimae leges traduntur.” 
823 Polybius complains about the fact that their constitutions are said to be similar, see Polybius: Histories (trans. 
Paton), vol. 3, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts/London 1960, 
6.45.  
824 Tacitus: Dialogus, xl: “Non de otiosa et quieta re loquimur et quae probitate et modestia gaudeat, sed est magna 
illa et notabilis eloquentia alumna licentiae, quam stulti libertatem vocitant, comes seditionum, effrenati populi 
incitamentum, sine obsequio, sine severitate, contumax, temeraria, adrogans, quae in bene constitutis civitatibus 
non oritur. Quem enim oratorem Lacedae- monium, quem Cretensem accepimus? Quarum civitatum severissima 
disciplina et severissimae leges traduntur.”; Vives: DD, 135: “Nam in bene constitutis civitatibus quieto & 
moderato, atque etiam paulo hebetiore populo etiam si libero, non tamen magnus relictus est locus facundiae ad 
se iactandum, quemadmodum Cretae, vel Lacedaemone.” 
825 Vives: DD, 135: “In istis [imperium populare] ergo quando homines proclivitate naturae ad honores feruntur, 
ad opes, ad fortunas, dignitatem, potentiam, permulti studuerunt, ut optime ad conciones civium dicerent: quod 
qui faciebant, oratores nominati sunt, & eorum ars oratoria.” 
826 Vives: DC, book 1, E: “an etiam occidere, dirvere, incendere est gubernare? & metu opprimere est consulere? 
vide ne appareat te non tam cupere regere, quam dominari. Non est regnum quod expetis, sed tyrannis, velle multos 
tibi esse dicto audientes, non ut commode vivant, sed ut te metuant, & imperata obedienter faciant.” 




understanding is further enhanced towards the end of the section dedicated to the history of 
eloquence, where Vives describes the corruption of rhetoric as an internal problem of republican 
rhetoric based on glory as a motivating principle. Vives states, echoing his earlier words, 
“consequently, since its exercise was a step to great power, men who desired honour, riches and 
who were dedicated to their business (negotium) strove after this art,” going on to describe how 
this led orators to believe they could talk about anything hastily.828 In Erasmus’s Lingua, for 
instance, the kind of oratory based on envy, ambition and pride is effectively described as a 
disease of tongue, with its harmful repercussions causing discordia. Although the contemporary 
oratory of discord is never mentioned by Vives, the parallels to then-current situations were 
likely noticed by the readers of De disciplinis. Thus, both republics and monarchies are 
problematic from the viewpoint of rhetorical culture. In republics, where the culture is nurturing 
victory in open confrontation together with glory as the ultimate social prize, one can and will 
say too much, whereas in monarchies the use of word has ceased completely.  
 Accentuating his point about monarchies and princely regimes, Vives offers 
another historical depiction of rhetoric later on in De causis. This loosely picks up the history 
of the art of eloquence where the previous story had left it, namely the end of the republican 
period. The point here is clearly to unite the decadence of rhetoric to a change in the political 
outlook of Rome, and not to the internal tensions of rhetoric in the flourishing republican 
context. Thus, Vives argues that in the new political environment of the empirical era, rhetoric 
degenerated in the forum, in the courtroom, and in the senate respectively. In the senate, 
according to Vives, “opinions were not expressed freely as before, but in order to flatter 
established power, they were more eulogies of princes than deliberations on public good.”829 In 
the same vein, rhetoric in other contexts evolved into mere amusement. In short, a new political 
situation brought with it a separation of rhetoric from its social and political role. 
Simultaneously rhetoric as a means to glory sank, and with it the diligence that was put into its 
study. As Vives argues, “eloquence, out of all arts fell down earlier than others, like a delicate 
flower when Boreas blows, when that popular aura so healthy for eloquence was removed and 
the cultivation of language brought down.”830 
                                                          
828 Vives: DD, 136: “Ergo ut erat exercitium hoc gradus ad ingentem potentiam, expetierunt hanc artem homines 
honorum cupidi, opulenti, occupati negotiis....”  
829 Vives: DD, 149: “...in senatu sententiae dicebantur non libere ut antea, sed in adulationem potentiae compositae, 
erantque magis encomia principum, quam deliberationes de publicis utilitatibus.”  
830 Vives: DD, 150: “Quapropter ex bonis studiis maturrime omnium eloquentia est tanquam flos quidam delicatus 




 There can be little doubt that this development in Vives’s mind is an undesirable 
one down to small details. Mere amusement, for instance, is described as the ultimate flaw of 
rhetoric in Vives’s De ratione dicendi, where he proposes that instead of delighting (delectare), 
one should talk about keeping people’s attention (detinere).831 Even more importantly, in many 
of the sentences employed to paint a picture of these changes, there are very explicit references 
to the political language of the time. In describing the move in deliberative rhetoric from 
considerations of public good, to the flattery of existing power, Vives is very consciously using 
a language every reader of Erasmus would have recognized as the ultimate flaw in rhetoric. 832 
Moreover, in portraying the rise of specialist jurists to the throne of the wise in questions related 
to laws and politics, Vives is most certainly describing a development he was pronouncedly 
critical of in the 1520s – and this critique was a commonplace in wider Erasmian circles. 
Furthermore, this historical description quite explicitly introduces a section in which Vives’s 
main concern is to call for rhetoric that would raise to the battlefield, a rhetoric capable of 
reconquering its social and political role.833  
 One option for interpreting the history of rhetoric offered here is provided by Don 
Abbott, who has suggested that De causis is only an analysis of a particular historical situation 
of classical antiquity with little connection to the early sixteenth-century context. This is 
because the rhetoric Vives is proposing in his own De ratione dicendi differs greatly from the 
rhetoric he is describing in the historical assessment of De causis.834 It is true that Vives does 
not write in a language of strict causal relations between constitutional arrangements, habits, 
and rhetorical culture in his De causis. In general, De disciplinis never suggests that the rebirth 
of true eloquence should happen through constitutional arrangements. However, it is equally 
clear that Vives is indeed pointing out some possible connections that can be understood as very 
clear points of critique with clear and explicit links to the questions of language he was dealing 
                                                          
831 Vives: DR, 130-133. He might have been influenced by Augustine’s hesitant exposition of delectare, see 
Augustine De civitate Dei, iiii.xii.  
832 Vives makes the connection very clear in the early part on the corruption of rhetoric. Vives: DD, 134: “Sed non 
omnes congregationes quicquid volunt efficiunt. Nam in aliis unus administrat omnia, vel certe pauci consensu, & 
conspiratione inter se quadam velut fornicati, magnisque viribus & potentia suffulti, si quis imperio repugnet. 
Multitudo nec ad decernendum, exequendumve quae statuerit habet vires [...] In illis prioribus si quis plurimum 
dicendo polleat, vel non auditur: neque enim finitur publice loqui: vel etiam si dicat, et persuadeat multitudini, ea 
tamen & voluntatem habet metu praepeditam, & manus alligatas.” Even more explicitly monarchy is interpreted 
as tyranny in Vives: DD, 149: “Principes raro ipsi loquebantur ad populum, & pauca, plerunque per edicta, haud 
aliter quam ad servos: in senatu sententiae dicebantur non libere ut antea, sed in adulationem potentiae compositae, 
erantque magis encomia principum, quam deliberationes de publicis utilitatibus.”  
833 Vives: DD, 152: “Hactenus nemo declamavit utique in materia argumentosa, & quasi in certamine & palaestra: 
tametsi multi delectarunt se oratiunculis, quae adversarium non haberent....”  




with in the 1520s and 1530s. His texts on rhetorical theory are an attempt to find a middle way 
between a culture of flattery under a prince basing his rule on fear, and a republican culture of 
open confrontation, difference of opinion, and social rewards that breed sedition. The second 
point does not concern merely political communities, and all levels of human association that 
nurture verbal confrontation could be included. 
 
Rhetoric as Elocution 
 
It is of some significance that the history of the republican period performs, among other things, 
a specific function in the chapter on the corruption of rhetoric, since it leads to a redefinition 
and delimitation of the scope of rhetoric. This is shown in a part following the short history on 
the development of the republican deliberative rhetoric, which is suggestively followed by a 
section dedicated to tackling Quintilian and Aristotle, and is precisely on the true subject matter 
of rhetoric. In the tradition discussing the scope of rhetoric, it was common to delimit and define 
its relationship with other subjects that presented knowledge-claims such as philosophy and 
dialectic. After Plato´s attack on rhetoric in his Gorgias, one of the main tasks of the great 
orators of classical antiquity, such as Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian, had been to defend their 
own art by discussing its social usefulness, relation to truth, subject matter, scope, and a range 
of other issues.835 One of the classical and more aggressive answers had been not only to claim 
that responsible and prudent civic rhetoric tied to the wisdom of philosophy would be of great 
use, but also to subject all knowledge to the scope of the universality of rhetoric. In Cicero’s 
De oratore, Crassus flamboyantly defends the omnipotent nature of rhetoric as an art that can 
discuss anything, and in Quintilian, in his desire to create the perfect orator, rhetoric is the art 
that becomes the yardstick and organising tool for all other arts.  
 Yet this was not just a remote discussion of classical antiquity. In the Renaissance 
context, the discussion was present. In the context of his translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, Leonardo Bruni had debated with Alfonso de Cartagena the extent to which rhetoricians 
could treat the subject matter of specific arts and disciplines – the question being precisely the 
interrelation between res and verba – rhetoric, and dialectic.836 Even more importantly, the 
omnipotent nature of rhetoric had been famously defended by Lorenzo Valla, who in his 
                                                          
835 For a more comprehensive description of these discussions, see Vickers 1988, 148-196.  




Repastinatio (also printed with the title Dialectice) – a fierce attack on both classical and 
scholastic dialectical traditions – elaborated largely on why dialectic was merely part of 
rhetorical invention.837 Vives knew Valla’s Repastinatio criticising it in a fierce manner in his 
De disciplinis claiming that Valla, on most points, was wrong.838 The integral union between 
res and verba equated with liberal studies had more generally evolved into a commonplace in 
northern humanism with Erasmus in his De ratione studii reminding the reader of it in the very 
start.839 One of the accusations levied against those orators that spoke hastily in De disciplinis 
was as follows: 
 
“Every day they found a possibility to talk on the Republic, on peace and war, on 
justice, magnanimity, fortitude, riches, fortune, navigation, winds, rains, on the nature of the 
ocean, on sky, gods, men, on passions and opinions, hygiene, plague, food; and they thought 
that all themes belonged to the sphere of this art and that there was nothing that they could not 
talk about on some occasion.”840 
 
 What is clear from this is that the part on rhetoric in Vives’s De causis is 
diametrically opposed to Valla’s and Crassus’s claims about the omnipotent nature of rhetoric, 
and Crassus’s ideas are in fact criticised in De causis.841 More specifically, and arguing 
explicitly against Quintilian, Vives’s intention is to assert the independence of all other arts vis-
à-vis rhetoric instead of bringing their importance back to rhetorical education, thus presenting 
rhetoric in a much more restricted sense. Countering Aristotle’s assertion that rhetoric is “the 
power or faculty to see what is probable in each thing,” Vives aims to show that rhetoric is not 
an art that should decide on the probability of arguments – a task that should preferably be left 
to individual arts and sciences in their respective subject matters, such as medicine, law, moral 
                                                          
837 Valla, Lorenzo: Dialectice libri tres, Josse Bade, Paris 1509, xx.  
838 Vives: DD, 133: “Monet in quibusdam neutiquam prave, etsi ea sunt perpauca, in plerisque labitur, ut fuit vir 
ille vehemens, & ad faciendum iudicium praecipitatus.” 
839 Erasmus: De ratione studii, ii. 
840 Vives: DD, 136: “Videbant usu quotidie venire ut de republica dicerent, de pace, de bello, de iustitia, de 
magnanimitate, fortitudine, opibus, fortuna, de navigatione, de ventis, de hymbribus, de natura Oceani, de coelis, 
diis, hominibus, de affectibus, & opinionibus, de salubritate, de peste, de cibis: putaverunt omnia esse artis huius, 
quoniam nihil erat de quo non aliquando esset dicendum.”  
841 Vives: DD, 138-139: “Vellet omnia subiicere Oratori L. Crassus, M. Antonius non sinit, quorum apud 
Ciceronem disputationes notissimae sunt. Nam Antonio is orator sufficit, qui verbis ad audiendum iucundis, & 
sententiis ad probandum acommodatis uti possit in causis forensibus atque communibus: quique sit praeterea 





philosophy, and so forth. 842 Not even in the case of civil science should rhetoric reign supreme, 
and even Aristotle, according to Vives, made the separation:  
 
“Aristotle does not hide the fact that in his rhetorical works he discusses themes 
related to moral philosophy with very little precision since he adapts them to the capacities of 
the people to whom the orator, born to mob and popular assembly, is exclusively destined 
to.”843 
 
 Furthermore, the particular task of inventing arguments for a given case should 
not happen through rhetorical invention, equated here with the use of scattered commonplaces 
– a practice criticised heavily by Vives – but through dialectic: “the method of searching 
arguments belongs to the dialectician. For this reason Aristotle placed his eight books on topics 
[Topica] among his logical works.”844 In practice, this broadens the set of answers places (loci) 
would imply in invention. Rather than pointing to isolated commonplaces that can be evoked 
for the analysis of particular questions, places should incorporate the general knowledge 
produced by individual arts and sciences to an invention that is general in scope and organized 
through dialectical headings.  
 The picture of rhetoric that arises here is very much a separation of rhetoric from 
its function as an inventive art of logos understood in the Aristotelian sense. It is not rhetoric 
but dialectic, the true art of argumentation and logos, which finds (inventio) arguments for 
particular cases through general topics in close co-operation with individual sciences. Of 
course, this does not mean that Vives would not be in favour of orators as specialists in different 
arts and sciences. On the contrary, any knowledge of these arts is definitely suitable for the 
orator, and a good speaker should additionally possess – just like the ten orators of Athens – 
“sharpness, ingenuity, and skill of ingenium, common prudence, together with elegance and 
                                                          
842 Vives: DD, 137: “Aristoteles Rhetoricen diffiniuit vim seu facultatem videndi quid in quoque sit probabile.” 
After Aristotle’s definition follows Vives’s attack. 
843 Vives: DD, 138: “Nec Aristoteles dissimulat parum exacte tradi sibi in rhetoricis, quae de rebus mortalibus 
disserit, sed ad captum popularem, cui uni debet orator servire turbis & concionibus natus.”  
844 Vives: DD, 143: “Sed ratio inquirendi argumenta dialectici est. Ideo Aristoteles octo libros Topicos inter logicos 
posuit: de ea re quam tenuiter agit in rhetoricis, quam pene nihil.”; Vives: DD, 142: “Quam inepti in his sunt, qui 
collegerunt ratiunculas aliquot, quibus discipuli in singulis vel causarum generibus, vel orationis partibus uterentur, 
& dicta aliquot ex Demosthene, aut Isocrate desumpta: nam in hoc plures sunt Hermogenes, & alii Graecii, quam 
Latini, pro formula nobis obiiciunt dicendi.” Melanchthon made the same point in his Elementa Rhetorices, see 




certain refinement of speech.”845 Yet this is accidental in the sense that rhetoric itself, 
understood as an art of words, cannot claim to teach any of these skills, nor the kind of specialist 
knowledge demanded from a good speaker. Like Erasmus in is Lingua, Vives is indeed hinting 
that verba can be separated from res and yet be beautiful and persuasive in the ears of the 
uneducated people.846 As Vives argues against Cicero’s idea about rhetoric that is not only about 
expression and words but “a method of thinking,” by claiming that the Roman:  
 
“Confuses two very different things and thinks that it is proper to one and the same art 
to think and speak well. This is a sensible and expedient assessment, and I wish it would 
persuade men, but it does not coincide with reality since both tasks are different as to their 
ends, material, and general practice.”847 
 
 Vives, however, is not finished with the separation of the true sphere of rhetoric 
from the expertise of different arts, invention, and logos. In what follows, he attacks the most 
traditional definition of the orator as a good man skilled in speaking most emphatically 
defended by Quintilian.848 This, in Vives’s estimation, is simply wrong and something 
Quintilian himself was not very successful in defending. In going back to Cato, the originator 
of the commonplace regarding the moral nature of oratory according to Vives, the Spanish 
philosopher is more than eager to show that the use of bonus in Cato did not refer to goodness 
in the general moral meaning, as it is applicable to Socrates or the Stoics. Instead it referred in 
a more restricted sense to a good speaker, just as a good farmer is in no way necessarily a 
morally good man, but simply skilled in fulfilling his task as a farmer. Thus, in opening up the 
traditional definition, Vives underlies the separation of rhetoric from ethos: rhetoric as a specific 
art is not necessarily united to ethics since a successful speaker is not necessarily someone 
revealing his ethical nature in any simple way, even though this, of course, is desirable.849 The 
divorce of rhetoric as a merely technical skill of verba from questions of ethics and truth is 
                                                          
845 Vives: DD, 139: “sed ingenii acumine & solertia, usu, prudentia communi, & in sermone elegantia, & cultu 
quodam.”  
846 In his description of the life of an erudite he seriously considered the case where words were separated from 
things, see Vives: DD, 394.  
847 Vives: DD, 139-140: “...confundit quae sunt discretissima: atque eiusdem esse artis retur bene sentire, & bene 
dicere, utiliter sane: atque utinam id hominibus persuaderet, sed non perinde vere quippe quae finibus, materiis, & 
toto usu separantur.”  
848 Vives: DD, 139: “quemadmodum Quintilianus colligit, nec oratorem quidem esse posse nisi virum bonum.”; 
Quintilian: IO, xii.i.  




visible in a description of the highly revered Church fathers who are praised for both their moral 
nature, adherence to truth, and knowledge of things (res). However, the Church fathers are still 
unfavourably compared to the pagan rhetoricians of classical antiquity, who mastered the 
specific subject of rhetoric more skilfully: “the same advantage we [Christian orators] have 
over them [classical orators] in things (res), they have over us in all parts of eloquence.”850  
 Vives’s instrumental redefinition of rhetoric goes hand in hand with social, 
emotional, and stylistic viewpoints. On numerous occasions, Vives stresses that the true context 
of rhetoric is a speech to masses. In the historical section, following Cicero, he calls public 
meetings the theatre of eloquence and moves on to quote Tully, who argued: 
 
“Since the most grandiose stage for an orator was thought to be a popular assembly, 
nature itself raises him to an ornate style: the multitude has such a huge power that just like a 
flute-player cannot play without a flute, an orator cannot be eloquent without a multitude that 
listens to him.”851 
 
This is closely connected to the fact that rhetoric, as Vives makes very clear, is 
essentially about emotion and passion, since the primary focus in a discussion with or to the 
multitude rests on passion.852 The dichotomy of passion and reason has in Vives, and in 
rhetorical tradition more generally, a distinctively social dimension to it since passion is quite 
systematically linked to the multitude, whereas reason goes hand in hand with the wise.853 Thus, 
Vives is simultaneously asserting that rhetoric is essentially about rule over passion, and over 
the multitude – but also potentially over anyone ruled by their passions irrespective of their 
institutional position. In his De consultatione, this category most certainly included those above 
the speaker, and especially the prince.854 This is further supported by the fact that the natural 
habitat of rhetoric is said to be in elocution – in questions of style and words – and not in 
                                                          
850 Vives: DD, 151: “ita sacri concionatores priscis illis oratoribus successere, sed dissimillimo successu: nam 
quanto illos superamus rebus, tanto partibus omnibus eloquentiae, tota vi persuadendi, sententiis, argumentis, 
dispositione, verbis, genere orationis, actione inferiores sumus.”  
851 Vives: DD, 149: “Fit autem ut quia maxima quasi oratori scena videatur concio, natura ipsa ad ornatus dicendi 
genus excitetur: habet enim multitudo vim quandam talem, ut quemadmodum tibicen sine tibiis canere, sic orator 
nisi multitudine audiente, eloquens esse non poterit.” Cicero: De oratore, ii.lxxxiii; see also Cicero: Disputationes, 
ii.i.  
852 Vives: DD, 151: “Qui nunc dicunt, quam dispares, imperiti, ignari vitae, imo etiam communis sensus: qui sint 
affectus, aut quemadmodum vel impellendi, vel revocandi omnino nescii.” 
853 Vives: DD, 150: “ ...illa populari aura eloquantiae saluberrima....”; Cicero: De oratore, ii.lxxxiii.  




invention that traditionally linked rhetoric to argumentation and logos. This elocution is not just 
a question of isolated figures or tropes but of broad questions of style based on the analysis of 
the audience and other contextual phenomena, as Vives underlined in his De disciplinis – paving 
the way to his own De ratione dicendi.855  
Ultimately, one finds a close connection between the three conceptual 
dichotomies: the people – the wise, elocutio – inventio, passion – reason. These are explicative 
of what rhetoric is truly about; it is about moulding arguments to the passions of the audience, 
not about the invention of arguments that appeal to the reason of the wise. In this spirit, Vives’s 
1532 De ratione dicendi effectively starts from the premise that rhetoric deals with elocution 
and style that move the passions of the audience and not with the invention of arguments for 
particular questions. It rather moulds dialectical arguments to meet contextual requirements. In 
uniting the three conceptual pairs, Vives is not doing anything completely new since the 
connection is already visible in classical tradition. Cicero, for instance, argued in De oratore: 
“For this oratory of ours must be adapted to the ears of the multitude, for charming or urging 
their minds to approve of proposals, which are weighed in no goldsmith’s balance, but in what 
I may call common scales.”856 However, unlike in the classical tradition, the idea of rhetoric as 
dealing primarily with the passion of the multitude leads to a strong claim about its purely 
technical nature as an art of elocution.857  
 The instrumental view of rhetoric is visible in Vives’s emphatic defence of 
rhetoric in De tradendis discplinis, the second part of De disciplinis in which he presents his 
own views on a large number of questions related to teaching. In somewhat Augustinian 
fashion, Vives strongly defends the teaching and use of rhetoric precisely in a world in which 
manners are corrupted, since it is of “extraordinary efficiency and power.”858 One of the reasons 
for the promotion of rhetoric that can “be the cause of greatest good and bad” is that it simply 
is necessary in all human interaction and that it, consequently, should not be abandoned by 
prudent men, a point Erasmus had emphasized strongly in his Lingua in 1525.859 Moreover, 
rhetoric is the entry to man’s mind through passions. As Vives reminds the reader, man is 
                                                          
855 Vives: DD, 143-144.  
856 Cicero: De oratore, ii.xxxviii.159: “Haec enim nostra oratio multitudinis est auribus accomodanda, ad 
oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda, quae non aurificis statera, sed populari quadam trutina 
examinatur.” 
857 Monfasani has probably more than any other argued that Vives systematically tried to restrict the scope of 
rhetoric, see Monfasani 1988, 199-200.  
858 Vives: DD, 325: “...quandoquidem efficacissima est ac potentissima & in omnes vitae partes necessaria.” 
Augustine: De doctrina iv.ii; Cicero: “De inventione”, i.iv.  




regulated through will whose counsellors are judgement and reason, but passions are, “like 
torches: indeed, passions of the soul are lit up by the sparkles of words and reason is roused and 
moved.”860 In claiming that the use of language is indispensable, and that it is an essential part 
of all human interaction Vives sustains, following an argument made by Quintilian in his 
Institutio that the use of word and all the problems arising from it precede rhetoric understood 
as an art.861 Thus, by not teaching rhetoric one simply could not solve problems arising from 
bad and irresponsible use of words leading to destruction, although the use of all rhetorical tools 
for wicked ends would potentially worsen the situation. The only solution is to harness the 
power of eloquence to the use of vir prudens so that he can enhance good things.  
 
Rhetoric Tailored to the Battlefield 
 
If the analysis of the republican period led to a reassessment of some basic ideas of rhetorical 
theory, the history of the art of eloquence under Roman emperors and subsequent princes 
introduces a section that strongly calls for a renewal of rhetorical culture. A few themes are 
developed around this general idea. Already before the presentation of the decadence of 
eloquence under the emperors, Vives had made a staunch apology of poetry reaffirming his 
earlier position on a theme more than familiar to him already from his Parisian sojourn. In his 
defence of poetry, Vives focuses on taking on those calling for a universal ban for the use of 
metrical language without any considerations of contextual aspects. To those claiming that 
poetry represents the ultimate instance of dissimulation, and thus of unethical persuasion, Vives 
answers by arguing that it is actually the avoidance of harmony and verse that requires more 
dissimulation since language by its very nature contains poetic elements.862 Thus, poetry does 
not produce dissimulation and twisting of truth at all because there is hardly anything more 
natural in language than a certain kind of harmony. It is, however, the section following the 
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historical analysis that is at the very core of Vives’s critique of current rhetoric. Continuing 
from the argument that rhetoric, after the imperial period, had developed into mere amusement 
deprived of any significant meaning, he proceeds to an analysis of the current state of the art of 
eloquence in the form of a critique that is primarily targeted towards humanism itself, and not 
directed towards scholastic learning. Accordingly, the critique is pointing not to the absence of 
rhetorical skills but to an overwhelmingly literary and ahistorical understanding of rhetoric 
focused on words and epitomized ultimately by Ciceronianism, which was fiercely criticised 
by Erasmus in 1528 in his famous dialogue Ciceronianus.863  
 Vives starts by describing the rediscovery of classical antiquity in Italy, naming a 
number of prominent Italian humanists who spoke Latin, “with more learning than others and 
were called orators.” He then quickly continues to claim, however, that the newly established 
contact with classical antiquity does not mean the recovery of rhetoric in any sense.864 In the 
end he declares emphatically that “thus far, no-one has declaimed or at least not in an 
argumentative matter like in a contest or in palestra, although many have delighted themselves 
with little speeches without an adversary,” proceeding to claim that whenever adversarial 
rhetoric has been practised, it has been done somewhat in the manner of a rabid dog.865 The 
allusion to rabid dogs resonates well in the context of the dynamics of discussions on questions 
of learning, religion, and politics in the 1510s and 1520s, associated with non-argumentative 
feuds by Vives. It is, however, the first idea about the absence of adversarial rhetoric in current 
humanism that is even more important because it criticises humanism harshly for losing its 
social relevance. 
 The point about declamation reconquering is status in De disciplinis resembles 
closely Erasmus’s introduction to Vives’s Declamationes Syllanae from 1520 where Erasmus 
had argued that Vives, with his Declamationes, was the first to revive an ancient genre. Vives 
himself, in the introduction to the Declamationes, had argued for the political significance of 
the genre albeit mostly as an instruction book to princes. However, there can be no doubt that 
the faith of declamation in De disciplinis represents adversarial discussion more generally. It is 
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the rhetorical exercise par excellence, which in the educational context trains people for the 
battlefield, for a committed discussion against an adversary, and for the use of all possibilities 
offered by eloquence.866 Continuing his criticism, and weaving it together with his analysis of 
Ciceronianism and imitation, Vives emphasizes in a typically Erasmian fashion that true 
imitation should not be about specific words or sentences but should focus on imitating 
Cicero’s, “talent of soul, varied erudition and method of treating each thing.”867 In the same 
vein the Valencian humanist writes, 
 
“If therefore they admire his language because he achieved great might and power 
with his discourses targeted at the people and the Roman senate, and they consider him 
worthy of imitation, they should imitate his knowledge of present and past things, his 
examination of the sects of wisdom, his study of human soul, his sharpness in gathering 
information. These are all virtues through which he persuaded the judgement of the senate and 
the people more powerfully than with the faculty of words and expression.”868 
 
 Throughout the part, Vives contrasts the idea of flexible emulation found in 
Cortese and Erasmus that gathers materials from a variety of sources, creating something truly 
original with it, in accordance with his “ingenium, subject matter, place and time.”869 We should 
not be apes imitating slavishly the external appearance of our models, but like sons that capture 
the interior of their fathers.870 Ultimately, Vives wants to argue that only through these 
contextual questions of decorum can the vast knowledge of the tradition of classical antiquity 
be brought to the use of rhetoric in times when all issues related to institutions, religion and 
moral philosophy had changed.871   
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exprimenda, qui Ciceroniani videri affectant....”  
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870 Vives: DD, 156.  
871 Erasmus made the same point in his Ciceronianus. With the mouth of Bulephorus he argued that words have to 
be moulded to themes, not vice versa, since otherwise one could not talk about anything classical writers had not 
treated. See Erasmus, Desiderius: “Ciceronianus”, 84-163 in Erasmus: De recta Latini Graecique sermonis 
pronuntiatione dialogus. Dialogus cui titulus Ciceronianus sive de optimo genere dicendi, cum aliis nonnullis 
quorum nihil non est novum, Simon de Colines, Paris 1528, 99: “Mihi ne oratoris quidem titulo dignus haberetur. 
Si Cicero de quavis re potuit optime dicere: quaemadmodum Apelli simillimus erit, qui & deorum & hominum, & 




 Towards the very end of the section, Vives draws the link from imitation to 
rhetorical persuasion, in arguing that it is the obsession with words that makes not only the 
description of the theme but ultimately the persuasion of the audience impossible:  
 
“And those who did not have any other instruments than rhetorical devices, what could they 
build? When they spoke, they arranged a great mob of words, almost like a battle-line, 
beautiful in appearance but useless and ineffective, and that did not bring anything suitable for 
the theme nor could speak to the minds of the audience.”872 
 
Moreover, they have nothing to say about “public and civic things,” which belong 
especially to rhetoric, as “they do not even know in which commonwealth they live.”873 
Ciceronianism, in short, is the supreme expression of an ahistorical understanding of rhetoric 
where the contextual and particular nature of art of eloquence has been surpassed by an 
essentialisation of a certain language, which simply in a new historical situation had ceased to 
speak to people and to persuade. Rather than speaking to the passions of the people, it was 
aesthetically pleasing but socially useless. Thus, rhetoric starting from the use of appropriate 
words for current situations is called for – a rhetoric that would regain its social and political 
importance. 
 
Making Sense of Rhetoric 
 
Vives’s depiction of rhetoric in his De causis underlines three broad themes: first, it shows 
through historical analysis that in certain republican contexts that nurture open confrontation 
and glory, rhetoric becomes too dominant, and that under bad princes who base their rule on 
fear the civic possibilities of rhetoric are non-existent. Secondly, the excesses of republican 
period inscribed in the books inherited from classical antiquity are countered with a 
demarcation of the proper sphere of rhetoric. Thirdly, Vives calls for a rhetoric that would regain 
its social and civic importance. All of these themes are more than of anecdotal interest, since 
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873 Vives: DD, 159: “Iam Rhetoricam aiunt, quum de rebus aliis omnibus, tum potissimum de publicis, ac civilibus 





they link to actual projects Vives is undertaking in De disciplinis and in other works of the 
1530s. 
 The space between volatile republics and authoritarian princely regimes should 
be occupied by new humanist rhetoric that understands its proper limits, and exercises civic and 
other social importance within existing possibilities. Vives’s persistent insistence on the 
importance of the mores and ingenia of the people suggest that the possibilities of oratorical 
culture, and the limits of a speaker or a writer to appear as ethical persons, are strongly 
conditioned by the audience. This point could be found in classical writers such as Isocrates, 
and something his own interpretation of historical precedents did indeed underline.874 This 
relates to the formation of the prince as well as to the entire educational scheme developed in 
the second part of De disciplinis, De tradendis, where the education of not only future orators, 
but of potential audience and readers is described. Simultaneously, the stress on the liberality 
of speech and the importance and good counselling typical of Vives’s writings is an attempt to 
make space for rhetoric within the confines of existing institutional arrangements.  
The cries for socially and politically important rhetoric that rise to the battlefield 
have an explicit link to De ratione dicendi, De consultatione and De consribendis epistoliis that 
outline a programme where the tradition of adversary deliberative rhetoric and declamation is 
partly transformed from direct confrontation to a gentle curing of the mind. In this new 
constellation, those in power can be guided by wise counsellors exercising prudent use of 
words. In this way, discord is inscribed into a culture that never loses the appearance of concord: 
new genres of writing emerge that adapt the earlier rhetorical tradition to a new and 
predominantly princely context. Even declamation, which should raise to the battlefield, is 
given a distinctive outlook in Vives’s own Declamationes that focus heavily, although not 
exclusively, on the different ways of addressing the ruler in situations where self-concealment 
is necessary. The idea of rhetoric as prudent counselling was strong in Erasmus’s mind also: the 
dedication of his Ciceronianus effectively opens up with a eulogy of the importance of 
counselling, where Erasmus goes on to argue that in these tumultuous times the Greek saying 
that counselling is a sacred thing is truer than ever.875 
 Closely linked to this, in delimiting the scope of rhetoric, Vives does not attack 
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rhetoric but defends it as a prudential art. Vives has at least two reasons for doing this. First, 
when rhetoric is presented only as the elocution of an argument in a form that touches the 
passions and emotions of an audience, the question of the possible responsibility of rhetoric is 
partly circumvented: beautiful words, style, and poetry that speak to people are the most natural 
things in language – and rhetoric is nothing more than a mastery of these. If they are misused, 
it is not strictly speaking a problem in rhetoric, but in ethics and logos, moral philosophy, and 
dialectic. In addition to this, it raises the social and educational question of how not to give 
linguistic skills to those who might use them incorrectly. Quite explicitly, and with emphatic 
tone Vives argues that, despite of the dangers, it is exactly in the corrupted world where this 
kind of rhetoric is relevant; to simply disregard it would not be a solution to the problem at all 
but would leave the field open to those who are corrupted and bad.876 This is essentially a way 
of defending rhetoric as an intellectual and educational paradigm against those attacking it from 
different directions.  
 In the academic context of Louvain, the humanist programme was still often 
linked to mere rhetoric by members of the higher faculties.877 The theological faculty of Paris 
University had asked for the prohibition of Erasmus’s Colloquia that could under the guise of 
eloquence lead men to Lutheranism, linking Erasmian programme intrinsically to flawed 
rhetoric.878 In a somewhat similar vein, the whole Erasmian project had been linked to a 
separation of beautiful words (verba) from substantial knowledge of things (res) and from true 
transformative spirit by the leading reformers. Erasmus himself had been famously criticised 
by Luther for writing words “without Christ, without spirit” – eloquence without deeper 
meaning.879 The Platonic attack on rhetoric was not voiced only by the strongholds of scholastic 
learning that united eloquence with heresy, but they were also more widely known. Cornelius 
Agrippa’s De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum atque artium declamatio invectiva from 
1530 had presented all Platonic stereotypes of rhetoric as deceitful speech alien, and to truth, 
uniting his general argument to current issues of discordia and the Reformation, asking “aren’t 
the authors of these heresies the most articulate men, who possess both verbal eloquence and 
elegant writing style?”880  
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 The second reason for the delimitation of the scope of rhetoric is that it gives 
Vives the possibility to tie rhetorical invention to the substantial knowledge of individual 
sciences, and subdue it conceptually to dialectic. On the surface, this is diametrically opposed 
to the earlier humanist trends that defended the great importance of the art of eloquence in 
detriment of dialectic. This had had an evident social and institutional side to it since rhetorical 
humanists had long defended the rights of teachers of rhetoric to write and comment on the 
most veneered authorities on each subject such as Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics for 
instance.881 But one should remember that this is a much-transformed dialectic indeed, one that 
incorporates rhetorical procedures for arranging the materials of classical learning in a more 
general form. Moreover, the focus is not on the formal qualities of arguments or formal 
semantics as had been the case in the older dialectical tradition. Vives’s point is that new 
dialectic could be the place where the invention of the argument occurs through more general 
categories of reasoning that guarantee the relationship of invention to the knowledge of 
individual arts and sciences, which are, however, in themselves heavily brought to the scope of 
humanist methods. Thus, rather than working through isolated commonplaces, a practice Vives 
strongly criticises throughout De disciplinis, invention should point to the overall knowledge 
of separate arts in a more controlled and organized way.882 Moreover, the incorporation of 
rhetorical procedures into general reasoning was a way of incorporating them into dialectic, 
which continued as the crown jewel of the curricula of Arts Faculties in Europe. Thus, dialectic 
did not necessarily have to be replaced by rhetoric but its theory should be changed.883 
Ultimately, Vives’s answer to problems around rhetoric did not only concern the internal theory 





As is demonstrated previously, the answer to the problem of rhetoric fostered by a culture of 
speaking based on glory, changes the outlook of the problem: since rhetoric is essentially a 
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technique of eloquence and style, it is not for rhetoric to solve its own moral ambivalence as an 
art. Thus, since argumentative practices – be they particular or general – refer back to dialectic, 
it is essential to understand the predominantly Agricolan interpretation of dialectic the Spanish 
philosopher is promoting. The problem seems to be in the very core of De disciplinis, since the 
bulk of the third part, very often left out in later editions of the work, is essentially dedicated to 
different parts of dialectic. 
 This is in stark contrast to Erasmus’s 1512 De ratione studii, where the Dutch 
humanist was, reluctantly, ready to concede that “if someone should decide that dialectic be 
added to all this I shall not gainsay him much.” However, he focused almost exclusively on 
grammar and rhetoric.884 Still in his 1529 De pueris, Erasmus was quite silent about the 
constructive possibilities of dialectic portraying it in very scholastic terms, and juxtaposing it 
to studia humanitatis.885 However, the developments in dialectical literature and the experience 
of the socially, religiously, and politically capricious 1520s had changed the humanist take on 
the possibilities of dialectic. As in the case of Melanchthon – who tried to fix theological 
discussions through a set of commonplaces linked to new humanist dialectic – the experience 
of the volatile and traumatic 1520s must have had an effect in Vives’s choice to underline 
strongly the importance of dialectic as a general method of reasoning – although the theological 
dimension found in Melanchthon is largely absent.886 More generally, the range of De 
disciplinis was effectively much closer to Melanchthon’s ambitious project of constructing a 
new educational system for all levels of learning compared to Erasmus’s more restricted focus 
on liberal arts that rarely covers the entire educational process. Quite unlike any of Erasmus’s 
own works, or anything produced in northern humanism, the third part of Vives’s De disciplinis 
is modelled loosely on Aristotle’s Organon, which moves from categories and predicables, to 
argumentative forms and topics, aspiring to cover themes of great importance at the university 
level. Yet, the connection to grammar and rhetoric, as well as Vives’s insistence on the 
importance of dialectic in more elementary education in De tradendis, shows that he is by no 
means exclusively discussing issues destined for the higher faculties of the universities. 
 In the previous decade after the publication of Vives’s invective In 
pseudodialecticos, the field of dialectic had been in constant turmoil. The authors used and the 
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direction and purpose of dialectical education were changing. Compared to Vives’s late 1519 
polemics, epitomized by In pseudodialecticos, many signs indicate that in the universities 
directly related to Vives’s life, the actual education in the Faculties of Arts had already changed, 
or was undergoing a process of modification.887 In 1530, the theological faculty of Paris 
complained that the Faculty of Arts was teaching more Agricola than Aristotle.888 Louvain, the 
university Vives was so closely connected to especially at the turn of the 1520s, was 
experimenting with the work of Agricola, as witnessed by the 1535 edition of Aristotle’s 
Organon that draws heavily from the Dutch humanist.889 In the English universities, similar 
developments were taking place, as witnessed by the statutes of the Faculty of Arts in 
Cambridge that put forward the names of Aristotle, Agricola, Melanchthon, and Trebizond as 
authorities in dialectic.890 More generally, it has been suggested that by 1530 writing in purely 
scholastic tradition on dialectic had almost completely stopped.891  
 Thus, the emergence of truly humanist dialectic in the years preceding the 
publication of De disciplinis made possible a constructive proposal – something that was not 
put forward in In pseudodialecticos or in Melanchthons’s influential De corrigenis 
aduelscentiae studiis. Melanchthon’s 1518 lecture, held at the university of Wittenberg and 
published under the name of De corrigendis, presented a new understanding of university 
education and curriculum, but just like Vives’s In pseudodialecticos, Melanchthon had very 
little constructive to say about the teaching of dialectic.892 Even though Agricola had gained the 
reputation as the torch bearer of new dialectical learning, other humanist materials had also 
emerged in the field, spearheaded by Melanchthon’s Compendia dialectices ratio and Johannes 
Caesarius’s Dialectica (printed for the first time in 1526), both of which enjoyed great success 
in the printing world.893 Older humanist materials were successful as well. Trebizond’s Isagoge 
dialectica was published 14 times between 1515 and 1530, and Agricola’s classical Inventione 
dialectica had been woven more closely to the emerging humanist tradition through the 
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commentary of Phrissemus, based on his teaching of dialectic at Cologne, and through 
Bartholomeus Latomus’s Epitome, which first appeared in 1530.894 
 Despite their significant differences, all these works share a number of issues with 
Agricola’s proposal. First, they focus heavily on dialectical invention, not judgement, which 
results in a pronounced emphasis on the use of topics for coming up with arguments, and to the 
detriment of the formal procedures of argumentation and semantic analysis of terms employed. 
Secondly and closely connected to this, all of them make close links between dialectical 
learning and other linguistic arts, underlining that the relevance of dialectic is to be judged only 
as far as it can be useful in providing arguments for a number of practical contexts. Vives had 
vehemently made this point clear in In pseudodialecticos, and both Phrissemus and Latomus 
strongly defend this in their editions of Agricola by pointing out the connection of dialectic – 
understood not as an end in itself – to literary studies and a range of practical tasks. In doing 
so, Phrissemus underlies heavily the rhetorical component of dialectic that convinces, and helps 
people use language persuasively in their own lives.895 In some ways, thus, the Aristotelian 
distinction between demonstration aiming at knowledge, dialectic dealing with general 
questions and starting from commonly accepted opinions, and rhetoric aiming at action through 
persuasive language dealing with particular cases, is blurred.  
 If the whole part on the corruption on dialectic in De causis is meant to pave the 
way to a new dialectic of invention and judgement, then the third part of De disciplinis, De 
censura veri, can be read as its constructive counterpart. To make a comprehensive analysis of 
the third part would be a daunting task indeed, since it touches upon a wide range of issues 
somehow related to the themes covered by Aristotle’s Organon, and medieval dialectic. 
However, much of how Vives effectively thought about the trivium together, as he had implied 
already in his In pseudodialecticos, is visible in the presentation of the central category of 
definition.  
His treatment of essences and definitions in the fourth book of part three, entitled 
De explanatione essentiarum, shows how Vives uses his epistemological scepticism for 
achieving a flexible and practical understanding of definitions.896 Already in De causis, he 
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attacked vehemently the basic method of Aristotelian science – demonstration – by arguing 
simply that one cannot find first principles necessary for demonstrative science, since what is 
considered a given – the premises of demonstration – is never certain, as such, but differs from 
one person to another.897 In the section dedicated to definitions in the third part of De disciplinis, 
his aim is to tackle Aristotle’s understanding of essential definitions by complicating the 
question and moving the attention to what he, following Rudolph Agricola and Cicero, dubbed 
“division.” What really is at stake here is more than a question of, “what something is?”, 
understood in an abstract philosophical sense that aspires to capture essences. By arguing that 
unequivocal answers to such a question are not within the reach of human epistemological 
capacities Vives attacks the project of Aristotelian demonstrative science, shifting the focus to 
the epistemological dialogue of probability (verosimilitudo) found in Cicero, among others.898 
In addition to the idea of epistemological discussions, the question for Vives encompasses 
strong rhetorical viewpoints, such as how definitions can be useful in oratory, in the gathering 
of material, or in the composition of an argument for a case.  
 There is no doubt that the history of the concept of definition is a complex one. 
First, it is one of the key concepts in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics – part of his Organon, a set 
of six books on categories and formal thinking that was the primary source of inspiration for 
medieval scholastic logic. In the work, the primary importance of definition is to state what 
something is in its essence. For Aristotle, definition has a particular form, and is always 
composed of a genus showing a general category of sameness, and differentia establishing a 
difference called species in relation to all other substances of a certain genus. The famous 
definition of human beings, for instance, is composed of what is defined (homo), what the genus 
under which it falls (animal) and what the difference (differentia) is that defines its species 
(reason, ratio). Moreover, some of the dialectical materials used in the teaching of dialectic 
were specifically designed to test the essential nature of possible definitions – such as 
Boethius’s Topics.899 In definitions pointing towards categories one sees, thus, the most 
essential way something is something, and how it is related to all other beings through sameness 
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atque hallucinantur. Itaque modus cognitionis lucisque in assequenda veritate, nostrarum est mentium, non rerum.” 
See also Cicero: “Academica”, ii.iii; Cicero: Disputationes, ii.ii-ii.iii.  
897 Vives: DD, 103: “Quod si homines doces, non erit tibi una, & perpetua demonstratio: aliis enim alia sunt 
immediata, & prima....” 
898 Vives: DD, 509-529.  
899 Aristotle: “Posterior analytics” (trans. Treddenick), 2-261 in Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, Topica, Loeb 




and difference.  
 Yet the concept of definition was by no means absent from rhetorical tradition. 
Already in Aristotle’s Topica and Rhetoric definition is said to be one of the topoi that can help 
one to gather material. In the Roman tradition, it is very much present as well: Ad Herennium, 
for instance, uses it as a potential conflict in argument and as a topic through which one can 
come up with material for one’s case.900 The merging of the two ideas of definition – essential 
and rhetorical – is visible in the most widely-read humanist books on dialectic, Agricola’s 
Inventio dialectica, Trebizond’s Isagoge Dialectica, and Caesarius’s Dialectica in decem 
tractatus digesta. Agricola, for instance, opens up space for non-essential definitions by arguing 
that proper differentia are hard to find. This is an assertion that leads him to an exhibition of the 
method of division that can use other properties in its search for suitable definitions.901 
Trebizond, for his part, is very clear about the fact that what he calls a substantial definition is 
just one of four possible genera, and presentes rhetorical possibilities inherent in definition at 
length.902 
 Vives is, thus, part of an emergent tradition of rhetoric and humanist dialectic that 
he most certainly knew very well. He starts with a lengthy presentation of the Aristotelian 
properties of terms, essence, genus, property, and accident, followed with an interesting 
exposition around definition and division where little room for essential definitions is left, and 
thus, distances his whole dialectical programme from Aristotle’s Organon. It is true that he 
admits the existence of authentic essential definitions, but continues to argue that essential 
definitions are, frankly, hard to find: “because of this, essential definitions teach us very little, 
and are of very little uses to us, and for this reason I think they are rare.” He continues to remind 
the reader that individuals do not possess their proper essential differences in the first 
instance.903 The sheer lack and uselessness of essential definitions, and their incapacity to teach, 
(a word that refers to one of the three traditional duties of rhetoric – docere), opens up a door 
for definitions based on interpretation, etymology, metaphor, and analogy – among others.  
 Following this line of thought, Vives’s main constructive point is to show how 
                                                          
900 Aristotle: Rhetoric, ii.xxviii.8; Aristotle: Topics, book 6; Ad Herennium, ii.xii; ii.xxvi.  
901 Agricola: Invetione dialectica, 9-11. For Agricola and definition, see Mack 1993, 151-156.   
902 Trebizond, George: Dialectica, Matthias Schürer, Strasbourg 1509, 133: “Diffinitio est coacte i se atque 
complicate rei, brevis atque absoluta explicatio. Diffintiorum quattuor genera: Substantiale, descibens, per 
partitionem, per divisionem, nam qui plura faciunt, ea connectunt q aut ad hec facile reducunt, aut leviora sunt 
quam ut diffinitones apellari possint.”  
903 Vives: DD, 519-520: “...quo sit ut essentiae diffinitiones parum nos doceant, minimeque sint nobis utiles, ac ea 




one can build or invent definitions using division, which takes as its point of departure an 
appropriate working definition of a thing, drawn naturally from authoritative materials, and 
divides it to a point where its particular nature is revealed.904 By quoting Agricola, Vives works 
through the word ius (law, also right or justice) moving from an initial claim that“ius contains 
certain power of force and order,” to a definition that captures its particular nature, and 
differentiates it from everything else. He wrote, “ius is a decree of a higher power for the 
preservation of the state of the city (civitas), established according to equity and good.”905 After 
the presentation of definition and division Vives describes how, through a number of dialectical 
topics, one can gather material for definitions and divisions. The point here is that if headings 
are used in a flexible manner one can draw from a variety of things when building definitions 
and divisions for a wide range of communicative situations. It is, however, in the very last 
section – a sort of a collection of general precepts for the use of definitions and divisions – that 
Vives’s rhetorical aim is most flamboyantly visible. He begins by explaining the relative merits 
of short and long definitions, uniting them with different ingenia, moving then to an openly 
rhetorical consideration of definition that takes as it point of departure the audience. More 
specifically, Vives reminds the reader that Cicero defines glory in various ways. In speaking to 
the people he does it according to the character of the people; but when he addresses the few in 
his Tusculanae Disputationes, he defines it philosophically pointing to the traditional 
distinction between civic discussions among the wise on the one hand, and a rhetorical speech 
meant for the masses on the other.906 
 In directing the whole discussion from demonstrative science and certain 
knowledge to more rhetorical viewpoints, Vives is thinking predominantly in terms of invention 
in a very Agricolan vein. The possibilities in invention would possibly open up a vast panorama 
of thinkable definitions since their relationship to any fixed list of categories is left open, the 
emphasis being on the usefulness of definitions in a range of communicative situations.907 
                                                          
904 Vives: DD, 521: “Quapropter ad recte diffiniendum, sumendum est de principio non tam genus, quam superius 
quiddam accomodatum experimendae rei, sive id essentiae sit, sive adhaerentis, sive etiam metaphorae: tum 
concinnandum, & coarctandum adiunctione inferiorum, dum illud totum quadret, ac fiat proprium....”  
905 Vives follows Agricola almost word by word here. See Agricola, Rudolph: De inventione dialectica libri tres, 
Johann I Knobloch, Strassbourg 1521, 10-11; Vives: DD, 521-522: “Invenimus primum ius vim quondam in se 
habere cogendi, & iussum [...] est Ius est decretum maioris potestatis ad tuendum civitatis statum ex aequo & bono 
institutum.”   
906 Vives: DD, 528: “aliterque gloriam finit Cicero agens Caesari gratias pro Marcello restituto, nempe ad populum 
populariter, quam in Tusculanis quaestionibus Philosophice differens apud paucos.”  
907 Lisa Jardine has pointed out how John Seton’s Dialectica printed in 1570 for the first time makes the same 




Vives, however, thinks that defining is a serious matter indeed, and that in its performance the 
speaker most clearly exhibits wisdom. Very emphatically, he states that the one going about the 
business of defining should have knowledge both of the thing he is defining and of all other 
issues relevant to its division. If this is not the case, a definition is given ignorantly, and error 
will occur.908  
 Vives’s dismantling of definitions that are more rigorous is not meant to be a 
destabilizing move, but a way to provide the humanist orator with organized access to the 
totality of knowledge. It is worth remembering that in Vives’s mind, the section on definition 
relates to something outside dialectic where the criteria for definitions, and more generally, the 
construction of arguments seem to lie; it is primarily a general method of intertextuality. Thus, 
rather than inventing arguments in a creative vacuum, it points towards existing possibilities of 
argumentation. Throughout De disciplinis, Vives is more than willing to remind the reader that 
even though dialecticians can analyse propositions and arguments as to their formal and less 
formal aspects, their ultimate truth is decided by specialists on the matter.909 There is, however, 
a very specific way in which this should be understood, namely that the truthfulness of a 
definition refers back to all the materials that have an authoritative status on whatever is 
discussed, and they point towards those commonly-accepted opinions by the wise that served 
already in Aristotle’s work as premises for dialectical reasoning. In some ways, the second part 
of De disciplinis, De tradendis, and the entire humanist literature of the early decades of the 
sixteenth century is about showing exactly who the trustful authorities were, with respect to 
classical antiquity, Church fathers, and fifteenth- and sixteenth-century humanists themselves.  
 Taking all of this into consideration, it is in no way surprising that Vives’s third 
part of De disciplinis is not an empty presentation of the categories of invention, but always 
points to specific ways of arguing about these issues since dialectic is supposed to refer back to 
existing authorities, not to a world of endlessly creative relations. But more importantly, the 
third part is imbued with examples drawn from civic philosophy, and often uses exactly the 
kind of examples any reader of humanist social and political thought would recognize as 
                                                          
908 Vives: DD, 528-529: “At vero haec quae a nobis psoita sunt omnia percipere ac tenere, quum sit divisuro & 
diffinituro necessarium, apparet profecto quam sit diffiniendi hoc munus magni viri & excellentis [...] Neque ulla 
nota alia aeque doctum ab indocto, acrem a tardo distinxeris, ut peritia diffiniendi....”   
909 Vives: DD, 529: “Instrumentum examinandae veritatis singulis disciplinarum atque atrium idem accommodatur. 
Nec ullam habet certam materiam rerum, in qua versetur: sicut nec illud alterum de quaerenda probabilitate: 
adhibetur enim a quoque artifice, dum in materia sua inquirit, quam apte enuntiatum sit ad veritatem 
expromendam: aut quam recte veritatem per probabilia investigarit.” This is a very Agricolan argument, see Cogan 




acceptable starting-points for political and social deliberations. All this underlines the 
importance of dialectic and dialectical invention as a place where the knowledge of civil science 
is contained and brought to mind, highlighting that the subject matter of civil science plays an 
important part in dialectical education.  
In a paragraph where Vives shows how to build definitions from causes that have 
nothing to do with traditional Aristotelian definitions, he states, “erudition is acquired through 
exercise, study, and doctrine.” Later, a reader of Vives would find the following definitions 
placed very close to one another: “a city (civitas) without justice is a reservoir of thieves”; “the 
greatness of a commonwealth comprises the dignity and importance of its body of citizens”; 
“honour in the eyes of the people is a place of esteem to which blind chance has elevated some 
without purpose”; and, “a good prince is the one who does not look after his own interests but 
those of the people.”910 Thus, humanist commonplaces are integrated into Vives’s dialectic as 
examples of generally accepted opinions that have a claim to authoritative and prudent opinions 
of the wise on these matters, and that can be evoked in different contexts. Dialectic stands, thus, 
in close relation to everything one has learned in grammar and from the example of good 
authors. It generalizes rhetorical invention, something that is understandable for Vives’s own 
rhetorical theory as well, since the multiplication of genres makes particular rhetorical invention 
grounded in specific genres difficult, and ultimately ineffective. 
The reintegration of the trivium around dialectic has consequences on a number 
of fronts. On the one hand, it ties the invention of arguments more closely to the general 
knowledge of the other sciences, but on the other, this generalization provides the writer more 
literary means for treating his case. His capacity to connect particular questions to general 
themes is an old rhetorical dream found in Cicero, which in fact broadens rhetorical possibilities 
since it allows the writer or the orator to find material and arguments by shifting the focus to 
the general level.911 Simultaneously, invention that occurs through dialectic – the science of 
truth – reaffirms that invention is a realm of truth suitable for the truly wise and prudent, which 
Vives’s curriculum in De disciplinis strongly supports. Thus, dialectic should guarantee that 
wisdom and eloquence truly shake hands. 
                                                          
910 Vives: DD, 524-526: “...eruditio paratur usu, paratur studio, paratur doctrina.”; “honor popularis est locus 
dignitatis, quo caeca sors sine delectu evehit”; “civitas sine iustitia est receptaculum latronum.”; “Maiestas 
reipublicae est in qua continetur dignitas & amplitudo civitatis.”; “bonus princeps est, qui non in cogitatione 
suorum commodorum, sed publicorum est cunctus.”  
911 Cicero: De oratore, iii.xxx.120; Quintilian: Institutio, iii.v.5-18. In his De inventione Cicero did not give 








































7. De disciplinis, Educating men to Concord (and Discord)  
 
Chapter seven looks at De tradendis disciplinis, the second part of Vives’s De disciplinis. The 
focus is on the tension between concord and discord on different ladders of the educational 
path, and especially on the introduction of rhetoric and dialectic into school and university 
context. Vives’s hesitance to nurture discord in education is visible in his unusually reserved 
take on all exercises based on open confrontation, in which the pupil might strive for glory that 
stems from a victory in a debate and not from the truthfulness of his argument. Consequently, 
Vives’s elementary education suppresses all adversity but introduces major Erasmian 
commonplaces on politics and good government in a non-adversary mode. Dialectic and 
rhetoric should be introduced thoroughly only later, possibly at the Faculty of Arts level in 
universities, but even here Vives’s cautiousness vis-à-vis the inherent adversity of the arts 
shines through. The ultimate aim is to educate men of prudence and concord capable of 
performing a life of negotium in a world of deep discord, where the arts and sciences dealing 
with persuasion and adversity were needed. In the last section of De tradendis, Vives paints a 
picture of the prudent man his De disciplinis is forming for an active life. This prudent man has 
a complex relation to the fora in which his active life should be realized. He can be a counsellor 
but has to remain detached from the courtly life in which he is operating. Thus, differently from 
Baldassare Castiglione’s courtier, or even from Thomas Elyot’s gentleman he is not 
interiorizing the codes that would make his closeness to power and court life more 
straightforward, but should remain detached from the corruptive elements of the world of 
discord in order to guarantee the concord and peace of his own mind.  
 
The Teleological Framework of the Arts 
 
It is hardly a coincidence that the second part of De disciplinis, De tradendis disciplinis, kicks 
off with yet another historical analysis of the development of the arts woven together with a 
more formal explanation of their interrelations. Even though much of the presentation is in 
accordance with the historical opening of De causis corruptarum artium, the presence of an 




second part of De disciplinis would not miss Vives’s basic views on the philosophical and 
ontological status of arts. These could be understood only in relation to their ends – as the 
Spanish philosopher argues repeatedly. True, separate arts have their respective ends according 
to which their precepts and utility can be judged, but all arts are ultimately brought together in 
a union with God, a fact that has some fundamental implications to the assessment of individual 
arts and to the concept of utility attributed to them. 912 
 The highest echelon of manly existence is a union with God in love, piety, and 
sacred wisdom, a union that has to be the yardstick for all other arts and disciplines. In an 
emphatic fashion, Vives declares: 
 
“Wisdom should be the canon for the rest of education, just like God is for the spirit, and man 
for other living beings, so that disciplines are considered disciplines in so far as they 
correspond to this norm in their subject-matter, in their – or our – final cause, in their teachers, 
in their teaching method and results.”913 
 
What follows is a list of practices that have a claim to the status of an art, but fail 
to qualify for true disciplines and arts because they stand in contradiction to piety and wisdom. 
This is a major point for Vives since the impiety of the ends posited by different traditions and 
judgements have been the source of the production of harmful and ultimately diverse 
interpretations of the true ends of arts, as he writes with concern. Thus, different traditions have 
understood the utility of an art in relation to pleasure or some other corporeal urge without truly 
grasping the God-like nature of man as the nucleus that fixes all other knowledge. This, 
ultimately, represents the separation of knowledge into schools that can be brought together 
only if men capable of judging rightly and prudently can decide about the true ends of the 
arts.914 All this has some implications for the interpretation of some arts traditionally considered 
branches of civil science, as well as to everything related to warfare. Vives wants to underline 
that even though these arts could provide information and tools within the question posed, the 
mere fact that the question is asked is against the basic finalities of all wisdom. 915 Thus, their 
                                                          
912 Vives: DD, 220-235. 
913 Vives: DD, 232: “Hanc (sapientia) oportet esse reliquarum institutionum canonem, sicut Deum spirituum, & 
hominem animantium: ut tales quaeque censeantur disciplinae, quatenus huic materia, fine suo vel nostro, 
praeceptoribus, discendi ratione, et exitu congruunt, aut non congruunt. Pietati nulla est ex se materies contraria, 
nulla cognitio.”  
914 Vives: DD, 229-231, 235.  




utility simply is not utility at all if it is approached in relation to the ultimate ends of man. 
 Vives’s emphasis here is, however, firmly on the arts of prudence related to human 
interaction on various levels, not on contemplative sciences and disciplines, and the idea that 
wisdom has to be turned into a social imperative to help others is present throughout De 
disciplinis. Moreover, and highlighting the continuum of arts following the logic of thelos, 
Vives argues in a section dedicated to prudence for a close union of practical wisdom and piety. 
Like all Renaissance thought, Vives considered prudence the guiding principle of all human 
interaction. It was a concept in which virtue and knowledge are closely tied together in an 
attempt to assess the right course of thinking and action in each particular case; here wisdom 
(sapientia) rubs shoulders with contextual requirements. In De disciplinis, Vives strongly 
subjugates all prudential action to wisdom or piety that represents the highest form of 
knowledge of the ultimate ends a man can have.916 The message is clear: it makes sense to talk 
about prudential action or prudential judgement only if the contextual elements and the nature 
of the action are considered with respect to the ultimate ends of man, since prudence is 
essentially about moulding and communicating wisdom (sapientia) to the particularities of each 
situation. Thus, even if prudence is indeed the “the skill to accommodate everything we use in 
life for places, times, persons, and human occupations,” in order for it not to turn into guile of 
the flesh, it has to go together with right judgement and appreciation of the thelos of man.917 
Thus, the basic idea of Vives’s first philosophy, a teleological framework of natural harmony 
wounded by original sin is woven into an educational framework in a way that strongly 
emphasizes the union of piety, truth and moral virtues as a gateway back to concord.918 
Sapientia and prudentia are intrinsically tied together, the world of contingency and opinion 
are never disentangled from the fixed world of thelos, and the man of negotium is always 
communicating concord in a world of discord. 
                                                          
quo genere sunt philtra, incantationes, & disciplinae militaris ea pars, quae ad vim hominibus & cladem inferandam 
pertinet: & tota confectio machinarum belli: reliquae etiam artes malae, quia maleficae. Iam fines nostri impii sunt, 
quum ea gratia discimus, ut laedamus.” 
916 Vives: DD, 353: “...in rebus divinis pietas, quae qui sit Deus docet, & quemadmodum nos adversus illum decet 
gerere: eamque unam vere ac maxime proprie sapientiam nominarunt: de qua non est hic dicendi locus, curam sibi 
peculiarem tanta res postulat....” In his De anima Vives argues on numerous occasions that man still has the seeds 
to know what is naturally good. See Vives: DA, 58: “Oblivisci etiam dicimur eorum, quae a natura ipsa accepimus, 
quum de primis illis & naturalibus informationibus dubitamus, quae evidentissimae et certissimae veritates 
nuncupantur, perinde est enim, ac si eas aliquando didicerimus naturae institutione.”  
917 Vives: DD, 353: “Prudentia vero peritia est accomodandi omnia, quis in vita utimur, locis, temporibus, personis, 
negotiis: haec est moderatrix & clavus in affectionum tempestate.” Otherwise it is prudence of the body: Vives: 
DD, 354: “una pars (prudentiae) eo spectat, quum prudentia ad corporis & affectuum libidinem confert omnia, ut 
quicquid sive iudicii paravit, sive usus rerum ad voluptates, honores, opes, potentiam solerter convertat....”  





Education in the early sixteenth Century 
 
Resulting from widespread interest in Renaissance education, the pedagogical and social 
significance of the change in educational structures has been assessed. The central place of 
education in practically all humanist agendas is beyond doubt, and the changes it introduced to 
schools and universities touched upon both internal questions of education and pedagogy, as 
well as its social extension and meaning. For social and political concord, the social extension 
of different forms of education is more than of anecdotal interest since the reach of central 
concepts such as the multitude and the wise is tied to what part of population elementary and 
university education could encompass. What are ultimately at stake are the social and civic 
implications of Vives’s propositions in De disciplinis. 
 Different ways of organizing elementary schooling existed in fifteenth- and 
sixteenth-century Europe, ranging from municipal and private schools based on student fees to 
church organized institutions of elementary learning.919 In addition to these, by the early 
sixteenth century, the amount of private, more practically orientated schools for merchants 
imparting education either in Dutch or in French, was steadily increasing in the Habsburg 
Netherlands.920 The bulk of education happened, however, in Latin schools that were more and 
more frequently publicly administered, although the importance of monasteries as centres of 
education had not completely disappeared.921 The institutions run by the Brethren of Common 
Life, the crown jewels of fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century elementary education, had not 
lost their importance, and in some cases represented locally the most elaborate form of Latin 
teaching in the humanist mould when Vives composed his De disciplinis.922  
 That education was becoming increasingly widespread in the Low Countries in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is beyond all doubt, and the high level of literacy and 
learning was widely recognised even by sixteenth-century contemporaries.923 Moreover, the 
urban and civic setting, combined with economic prosperity, unrivalled in all Europe – with the 
possible exception of Italy – created optimal circumstances, as well as a need for educated 
citizens and merchants who could, in different roles, serve the community. It is hardly surprising 
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922 Post 1968, 553-565.  




then that education in the elementary level was common in the Low Countries, covering a 
significant number of the urban population. Moreover, it is well known that some tendencies of 
humanist learning were creeping into the curricula of grammar and Latin schools – many 
traditional schools run by the Brethren of Common Life being receptive to new influences – 
and also that the process was fostered by local humanist circles.924 The fact that elementary 
education had taken clear steps towards a more humanistically minded curriculum is equally 
perceivable in the development of some of the schools providing towns with elementary 
education.925 The prevalence of schools was, of course, not only a Dutch phenomenon: many 
parts of Europe witnessed a significant increase in elementary education throughout the 
sixteenth century. In England, where Vives had taught in the 1520s, there were about 360 
grammar schools in 1575, and France experienced a rapid expansion of its schooling system in 
the course of the sixteenth century.926 Thus, the proposals of De disciplinis dedicated to the 
King of Portugal were applicable to other European contexts as well. 
 Despite the general nature of Vives’s proposal that do not link a specific scheme 
of studies to a a fixed level or class, many Dutch elementary schools had had fairly structured 
learning paths based on classes. The famous schools in Deventer and Zwolle both had nine 
classes, the first two of which were dedicated to very elementary exercises. From class seven 
to three (the numbering ran downwards), one was educated in Latin through different grammar 
exercises, and introduced to the basics of the quadrivium, dialectic, philosophy, and 
increasingly to ars eloquentiae together with some Greek. In classes two and one, found only 
in the minority of educational institutions, one was further instructed in philosophy, and 
possibly law, geometry, and in some cases even theology. These two higher classes already 
partly coincided with the kind of education one would acquire in the Faculties of Arts at the 
university level.927 Johannes Sturm, one of the most influential reformed educational writers –
who had studied in the Low Countries – based his model of different classes essentially on his 
Dutch experience. In doing this, he gave pronounced importance to the study of classics, and 
especially to the art of rhetoric.928 
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928 Sturm, Johannes: “The Advice of Johann Sturm on What Organization to give to the Gymnasium of Strasbourg”, 
in Spitz, Lewis – Barbara Tinsley: Johannes Sturm on Education, Concordia Pub. House, St Louis, 1995, 61-62. 
The overwhelming importance given to rhetoric happens especially in 1538 De literarum ludis recte aperiendis 




 The fact that the Burgundian Netherlands boasted a single university, Louvain, in 
the first decades of the sixteenth century, should not lead one to believe that Louvain was the 
only institution providing the Burgundian Netherlands with higher education. It is well known 
that both the universities of Cologne and Paris, as well as Orleans in the case of legal studies, 
were regularly used by the inhabitants of the Dutch provinces, and that by the early sixteenth 
century the number of people going to Italian universities had to be counted in hundreds.929 
Although a person with a university education could make a career in a variety of functions 
ranging from the Catholic Church to academic and scholarly settings, many of the people 
employed in the highest echelons of civic life were university graduates, and in regional 
councils for example, people with university education were becoming increasingly numerous. 
In the Council of Brabant, for instance, the number of university-trained people rose from 40 
per cent in the late fifteenth century to practically 100 percent in the later sixteenth century, and 
the same trend is noticeable in the Council of Flanders. What is more, most of the people 
employed by the councils were experts in law – a career that became, in some cases, a formal 
requirement for certain offices.930 Thus, the people in charge of politics, spiritual life, and 
education in the Burgundian Netherlands in central and regional administration were the ones 
university education was catering for.931  
 Consequently, Vives’s idea of an extended educational system – promoted by a 
number of humanists as founders of schools – was not only a humanist dream but also an 
ongoing process that at an increasing pace was turning into reality in different European 
contexts when Vives composed his De disciplinis. The humanist ideal of a large network of 
schools targeted to a significant number of people was shared by many. Already Erasmus, in 
his De pueriis statim ac liberaliter instituendis, was clearly referring to a potentially large 
audience by arguing in the opening sentence, meant as an exhortation for the reader, to adopt 
studies of liberal arts: “if you listen to me [...] you will have your child instructed in 
humanities.”932 Although Erasmus’s De pueris is effectively framed as a treatise for, “a 
philosopher, for the navigator of the commonwealth,” the Dutch humanist still reminds the 
reader that even though not everyone becomes a prince, everyone should be educated for that 
                                                          
929 Tervoort 2005.  
930 Damen 2003, 51-52, 4.297-298; Ridder-Symoens 1981, 293-296; Ridder-Symoens 1996; Zijlstra 2003, 297-
298. 
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purpose.933 Underlying all this was the close connection Erasmus made between vice, 
ignorance, and discord: it was only through education and learning that piety could be 
cultivated, and one’s potentiality for social life realized. Erasmus was not alone in his demand: 
the preceptor of Germany, Melanchthon, also promoted learning as the fundamental antidote to 
ignorance and vice.934 In doing this, both tried to unite the civic and moral philosophy of 
classical knowledge with the Christian education of a relatively large population. The ideal of 
extensive education is at the heart of De disciplinis, which calls for a school to be established 
in every town, and a university to be founded in every province.935 The ideal of raising prudent 
men for political life most certainly had a distinctive meaning in the context of Flanders – with 
its civic traditions – where even guilds representing common workers had played a role in the 
administration of common affairs. They held a strong sense of their own rights and were more 
than willing to make that known.936  
 
Basic Conceptual Framework for Understanding Pedagogy 
 
The conceptual foundation for schooling lay with the claim that education contributed to the 
building of a virtuous character; it was what ultimately turned the pupil into a civilized creature. 
Many northern humanists were capable of linking the call for character to piety. Vives dedicated 
a significant passage to explaining the relationship between piety and studies in De 
disciplinis.937 Johannes Sturm also affirmed that the main goal of study was piety. But the fact 
that many treatises affirmed the importance of piety should by no means be interpreted as a call 
for an education based primarily on religious or pious materials. Vives’s De tradendis 
disciplinis, – just like Erasmus’s De ratione studii – is pronouncedly classical in its outlook, 
and Johannes Sturm even openly admitted that he had written nothing about sacred literature 
before dedicating only a very short section to it.938 The absence of religious materials mirrored 
                                                          
933 Erasmus: De pueris, 28, 38: “Nec enim athletam fingimus, sed philosophum, sed Reipublicae gubernatorem....”; 
“Quid quod non pauci ex humili loco vocantur ad principatum, interdum & ad summum pontificiae dignitatis 
culmen. Non omnes huc euadunt, tamen omnes huc educandi sunt.”  
934 Melanchthon, Philipp: Oratio de philosophia studioso thelogiae necessaria, Helmstedt, Jakob II Lucius, 1600, 
A3. 
935 Vives: DD, 248, 259: “Statuatur in unaquaque provincia Academia communis illius....”; “Constituatur in quaque 
civitate ludus literarius....” 
936 Blockmans – Prevenier 1999, 215; Tracy 1990, 20; Tracy 2002, 70-71; Koenigsberger 2001, 42-72.  
937 Se especially the first book of De Tradendis, Vives: DD, 220-246. 
938 Sturm: De literarum, 25. For the overwhelming importance of classical literature for Sturm, see Spitz – Tinsley 




some of the most widely read Italian educational treatises. A recurrent feature of all the famous 
Italian educational materials of the fifteenth century, with the partial exception of Leonardo 
Bruni’s De studiis destined to a noble woman, was the nearly complete absence of religious 
materials. True, Pier Paolo Vergerio reminded the reader that “it is proper for a well-educated 
youth to respect and practice religion and to be steeped in religious belief from his earliest 
youth.” However, he did not provide much information on how the presence of religion in the 
school context should be arranged.939 
 Moreover, Vives’s De disciplinis was, among other things, a reaction to a certain 
educational paradigm that strove for piety that he was very familiar. As is well known, Vives 
most likely had first-hand experience of the model practiced in Collège de Montaigu, which put 
forward a very particular mode of educating teenagers and youngsters in virtue. On a purely 
conceptual level, the goals of Montaigu, heavily criticised by both Erasmus and Vives, are not 
completely different from Vives’s; ideally both want to educate people to virtue, humility, 
apostolic spirit and inner piety.940 Yet there are almost no traces of any practice of inner piety 
ascribed to Montaigu in any of Vives’s actual pedagogical works. Strict daily routine, organized 
religious exercise, public confessions, students surveying the morality of one another, among 
other pedagogical features of Montaigu, are completely absent from all ladders of Vives’s 
educational programme. This, of course, was firmly in line with the general humanist 
understanding of the shortcomings of late medieval pedagogical models found not only in 
Montaigu, which are described as being based on punishment and fear.941 Moreover, Vives not 
only denounced the method of teaching of Montaigu. The absence of religious materials was 
also a reaction to a pedagogical tradition of not only Montaigu, but also a whole tradition of 
medieval schooling found in the Low Countries. By the early sixteenth century, many schools 
had become receptive to currents of humanist learning, but Erasmus’s teacher Alardus – who 
had studied in the famous school of Deventer influenced by Devotio – was still trained by the 
Bible, the Church fathers, and De imitatione Christi by Thomas Kempis. Both Erasmus and 
Vives, whose understanding of virtue and character is more directed to society and active life, 
explicitly denounced the pedagogical method of this tradition, and cut almost all literature 
nurturing mystical inner spirituality out of their own school curricula.942  
                                                          
939 Vergerio: “De ingenuis”, 24: “Ante omnia vero debet bene institutum adulescentem rei divinae curam 
respecumque non neglegere eaque opinione imbui ab ineunte aetate.” 
940 Godet 1912, 43-51.  
941 Erasmus’s teacher Alardus, for example, complains of this in 1524. See Tilmans 1992, 13-14.  




 However, the materials that had insipired Vives, namely the classical and 
humanist traditions, also widely claimed that they contributed to the development of character 
and virtue. As the well-known pseudo-Plutarchian De liberis educandis (On the Education of 
Children) announced in the very first sentence, “let us consider what may be said of the 
education of free-born children, and what advantages they should enjoy to give them a sound 
character when they grow up.”943 In understanding the kind of a character humanist education 
strove to form, it is important to remember that all pedagogical materials emphasized that the 
right context for exhibiting character was an active life in the service of the community. They 
explicitly aspire to form men capable of uniting wisdom with literary studies and eloquence 
useful for the community at large. As Erasmus’s De ratione studii declared, “a person not 
skilled in the force of languages” is “unbalanced in his judgement of things as well.”944 Thus, 
the character and habits of those educated should be suitable for the performance of the virtues 
needed in human interaction and civic life using language.945 Moreover, all educational 
materials judged optimistically the possibilities of studia humanitatis to mould character and 
judgement to perform the tasks of active life.   
 Despite of the fact that character-formation was possibly present in all aspects of 
education, some subjects were generally acknowledged to be of special importance, and most 
authors agreed that moral philosophy was the basic tool for this task. As one could read in the 
pseudo-Plutarchian De liberis educandis, a child “should honour philosophy above all else,” 
since, “with philosophy it is possible to attain knowledge of what is honourable and what is 
shameful, what is just and what is unjust, what, in brief, is to be chosen and what to be avoided.” 
Vergerio in his De studiis argued that “through philosophy we can acquire correct views.”946 
                                                          
943 Plutarch: “De liberis educandis”, 1. In what follows I will not try to answer the question of to what extent 
Renaissance education was capable of achieving its self-proclaimed ends as to character formation but focus on 
the self-interpretation of the tradition. As Jardine and Grafton claim humanist educational practices, tedious, 
repetitive and technical in nature, could in no way achieve what highly eloquent humanists themselves proclaimed. 
More specifically, they did not have any practical educational theory or tools to cultivate the ideal of a union of 
character and civic wisdom so cried for. This view has been countered by a number of scholars. Brian Vickers saw 
the Renaissance as the period in which the totality of rhetoric as civic practice was regained both in theory, practice 
and education. Recently, Paul F. Grendler has explicitly countered Jardine’s and Grafton’s main thesis by arguing 
that moral sententiae and commonplaces formed an important part of education and that this commonplace method 
did indeed produce men capable of living up to the standards demanded by the society of the time. Vickers 1988, 
254-293; Grendler 1991, 407-408.  
944 Erasmus: De ratione studii, ii: “...qui sermonis vim non calleat, is passim in rerum quoque iudicio caecuciat, 
hallucinetur, deliret necesse est.” (English translation from Erasmus: Literary and Educational Writings, vol. 2, 
Collected Works of Erasmus 24 [ed. Thompson], Toronto University Press, Toronto 1978, 666). 
945 Monfasani 1976, 241-242; Vasoli 1968; Nauert 1990; Jardine 1974. 
946 Plutarch: “De liberis educandis”, 10; Vergerio: “De ingenuis”, 2002, 48: “Pre philosophiam quidem possumus 




How exactly moral philosophy would be taught was not always explicitly spelled out but many 
authors saw a close connection between short moral sentences of different kind and the building 
of character. Quintilian in his Institutio claimed that the development of virtue and character 
should form an integral part of the education of the orator, and connected the idea to aphorisms 
and sentences that served as potential building blocks of a virtuous person.947 Much in the same 
vein, Isocrates in the widely read Epistola ad Demonicum, argued that moral education should 
be about the development and acquisition of good character and virtue and that this should 
primarily be done using moral maxims described as the exercise of the soul.948 One further 
subject that was widely linked to the gathering of worthy examples of virtuous conduct and the 
teaching of prudence was history. As Vergerio argued, history was the place where moral 
philosophy and oratory shook hands, since it taught both correct views as well as how to 
effectively win over the minds of the people.949  
 But character was not formed only through the right combination of selective 
readings of classical tradition in Vives’s De disciplinis. Both Vives and Erasmus were quite 
clear that not only is the modality and context of teaching in which schooling takes place of 
utmost importance, but that the totality of relations in which character is formed plays a role. 
Erasmus’s De pueris and Vives’s De disciplinis both underline heavily the importance of the 
private sphere as a place where the early formation of character, manners, civility and urbanity, 
of utmost important in Erasmus’s thinking, should take place. Moreover, they both highlight 
the importance of creating a certain atmosphere of love, trust, and comfort in the family, school 
and ultimately the whole life, for the character to develop. In the school context, it is the exercise 
of love and understanding not fear and punishment that nurtures the interest and diligence of 
the pupil. Simultaneously, this surrounds the child and youngster prone to imitation, with living 
examples of virtuous conduct. As Vives wrote in his De disciplinis: “with this respect, children 
                                                          
947 Quintilian: IO, xii.ii.1: “Quando igitur orator est vir bonus, is autem citra virtutem intellegi non potest, virtus, 
etiam si quosdam si impetus ex natura sumit, tamen perficienda doctrina est: mores ante omnia oratori studiis erunt 
excolendi atque omnis honesti iustique disciplina pertractanda, sine qua nemo nec vir bonus esse nec dicendi 
peritus potest.” Already in the preface Quintilian underlines the union of character and eloquence, see Quintilian: 
IO.preface.9: “Oratorem autem instituimus illum perfectum, qui esse nis vir bonus non potest, ideoque non dicendi 
modo exmiam in eo facultatem sed omnis animi virtutes exigimus.”; Quintilian: IO, i.i.35: “...ii quoque versus qui 
ad imitationem scribendi proponentur non otiosas velim sententias habeant, sed honestum aliquid monentis. 
Prosequitu haec memoria in senectutem et inpressa animo rudi usque ad mores proficiet.”  
948 Isocrates: “Epistola ad Demonicum”, in Isocrates: Praecepta Isocratis per eruditissimum virum Rudolphum 
agricolam Graeco sermone in Latinum traducta, Johann Rhau-Grunenberg, Wittenberg 1508: the first four pages, 
quote from the last: “...ut animum quispiam taliter formet nisi multi ante honestis praeceptis fuerit expletus. Corpus 
namque moderatis laboribus; animus vero actionibus honestis roboratur.” Vives’s De ratione studii also mentions 
these kinds of short sentences as an antidote to bad things, Vives: “De ratione studii puerilis”, 54.  




are monkeys in nature, they imitate everything at all times, and especially those who have 
authority over them and whom they trust, they consider to be worthy of imitation – such as 
parents, nurses, teachers, and pedagogues.”950 
 Many humanist materials seem to take a strikingly optimistic view on the 
possibilities of combining piety and the kind of character needed in action and in public life. 
Italian quattrocento materials, Erasmus’s De ratione studii and Johannes Sturm’s De literarum 
ludis recte aperiendis, for instance, adopt quite clearly the civic and oratorical ideal of classical 
materials, embracing exercises that introduce the pupil to the treatment of truly rhetorical 
themes. The kind of character developed here is one that thrives in difference of opinion, 
competition, and the kind of glory that follows from a successful performance in a debate. In 
addition to humanist materials, confrontation, dispute, and debate had been in the very heart of 
many of the schools run by Brethren of the Common Life, where advancement was ultimately 
based on competition.951 However, contrary to the bulk of humanist educational materials, 
Vives’s De disciplinis takes a rather ambivalent view on the tradition of humanist education. 
This tradition underlined the fact that education should form men capable of oratory in a world 
of discord and competition – true emperors of men’s minds exemplified by the most explicit 
reference point of De disciplinis, Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria’s Book XII.952  
 There are naturally some obvious conceptual tensions between aiming at self-
governance, the control of passion, and inner peace found throughout Vives’s social and 
political writings on the one hand, and the civic model of educational materials on the other. 
For to embrace passion and conflict is explicitly linked to the kind of dynamics that nurture 
discord in all Vives’s social and political texts. As Vives argued in his De comunione rerum, 
discord in opinion led to social discord in all aspects of life, implying that the cost of 
incontrollable intellectual disagreement was not merely rational or doctrinal error, but 
ultimately social and political violence.953 Consequently, enhancing concord in the school 
context leads to a great distaste for all exercises implying confrontation as Vives made perfectly 
                                                          
950 Vives: DD, 254: “Ad haec sunt pueri naturaliter simii, imitant omnia & semper, eos praecipue quos propter 
autoritatem & quam illis habent fidem dignos imitatione iudicant, ut parentes, nutricios, magistros, paedagogos.” 
Erasmus heavily emphasized this in his De pueris, see for instance Erasmus: De pueris, 15.  
951 Scaglione 1986, 13-14.  
952 Vives knew well and explicitly reflected on the fact that the point of departure of rhetoric and much of dialectic 
was confrontation. See for instance Vives: DD, 324: “Utraque ars & dialectica & rhetorica rixosa ex se est, ad 
contentionem ac pervicaciam proclivis, ideo rixoso & contentioso ingenio neganda: item suspicaci in peius, omnia 
enim illuc detorquebit: affert etiam utramque ars malitiae plurimum, idcirco nec malitiosum ingenium, & ad 
fraudem faciendam paratum instrui illis conveniet.”  




clear not only in De disciplinis but also in a number of other texts.954 Different from earlier 
humanist tradition, one finds a problematization of two interrelated issues in the educational De 
tradendis. First, De tradendis takes a pronouncedly suspicious stance on all exercises based on 
confrontation, such as disputations. This is not merely a critique of formal scholastic 
disputations so typical of all humanist literature, but an attitude that is targeted towards all 
exercises that nurture confrontation. Secondly and closely connected to the first point, Vives’s 
De disciplinis takes a much more cautious attitude towards the side of rhetoric and dialectic 
that creates debate, cutting out the development of truly oratorical themes from elementary 
education. But this world of relative harmony and concord found on the elementary level is 
contrasted to higher education, which, despite all Vives’s hesitance, openly prepares men to an 
active life in a world of discord and strife. If discord was introduced earlier, the delicate balance 
between wisdom and prudence guaranteeing concord would potentially be threatened. Like in 
De causis, this aristocratic tenet, as to the introduction of difference of opinion, is a way of 
defending the union of rhetoric and prudence, eloquence and wisdom. 
 
Elementary Education, Realm of Concord 
 
Even though Vives’s De tradendis rested on classical grounds in its reliance on the ethical 
possibilities of moral aphorisms and proverbs as guardians the soul, his very first advice for the 
school context incorporates the basic ideas of Christianity to this method. Thus, if the 
knowledge of oneself, related to the knowledge of God, was ontologically the first step towards 
good and virtuous education in general, the cognition of this would constitute the very first task 
for a young pupil in his path to learning in the form of Vives’s own Introductio ad sapientiam, 
according to Vives’s precepts for the teacher. When Vives writes that “let the pupil come to the 
lecture of the pagans,” he still reminds them that as an antidote they should remember: 
 
“Through piety man is united to God, it is God who has taught him that what man has 
contrived is full of error, and what goes against piety is borne out of human vanity, and of the 
deceitful nature of the Devil, the most skilful of enemies. In general, these should be 
inculcated without explanations.”955 
                                                          
954 Vives: DP, C5: “Iam ardor ille & impetus iuvenilis animi, non est discordiae stimulus pungendus, id est, quod 
Pythagoras aenigmate inquit, non addendus igni gladius, quam aetatem magis convenit coerceri ac refrenari....” 





Moreover, in another passage, Vives wrote that “whoever the authors explained 
are, the pupils will listen once or twice every week to something about morals, which will cure 
their vices – driving them away – so that they do not invade the pupil and grow more 
powerful.”956 
 Nevertheless, despite the early religious ethos, the syllabus of elementary 
education was overwhelmingly based on the authors of classical antiquity, and focused on the 
arts of prudentia. In a truly humanist fashion, Vives strongly promotes the study of Greek, and 
in a slightly more reserved fashion recommends the study of Hebrew and Arabic to divulge the 
message of Christ. Yet if only one language was to be studied, it certainly had to be Latin. 
Although a thoroughly conventional choice, the fact that there has to be one language that 
preferably brings all nations together is an important point for Vives to whom the multiplicity 
of languages in itself is a postlapsarian fact – a sign of a breakdown of concord. Thus, language, 
and especially Latin is not only the place where wisdom and erudition lie but a fundamental 
instrument of human association and concord that could potentially encompass the entire world, 
or at least the Christian Europe, as the Spaniard points out.957 This strong defence of Latin as 
the language of wisdom happens, of course, in a moment in which the Reformation and the 
nascent vernacular culture were posing a challenge to it. The Latin wisdom presented in De 
disciplinis is pronouncedly classical; the curriculum and materials presented are predominantly 
focused on the classical authors of Latin, and to a lesser extent Greek, and the potential 
theological importance of the Biblical languages for the study of the Bible is not systematically 
pursued.  
 Vives is clear that the first stage of grammar education, covering the years 
between seven and fifteen, would be mainly about the acquisition of language skills so that 
everyone would “engage with those things in life that are common to all [...] and of which no-
                                                          
per pietatem homines iungi Deo: eam esse a Deo traditam, quae homines excogitarint, plena esse erroribus: quae 
contra pietatem sint, ex vanitate hominum orta esse & imposturis diaboli ostis vaferrimi: hoc sufficiet in genere 
absque explicatione.” The path of In sapientiam is visible here Vives: DD, 266: “Omnibus initio statim fundamenta 
sunt tradenda pietatis nostrae, ut noscat se, quam est infirmus, & pronitate naturae malus: ut nihil nec sit, nec 
potest, nec valet nisi ope Dei: illum implorandum crebro & bona fide: nec speret se quicquam omnino assecuturum 
absque eius auxilio. Quanta sit caecitas, & fraus in animis vulgi iudicantis de bonis ac rerum aestimatione. Integrae 
opiniones in vacuum pectus instillindae. Nos inimicos Dei illi esse per crucem filii eius. Deum ut potentem metuat, 
ut conscium vereatur, ut datorem ac beneficum amet.”   
956 Vives: DD, 300: “sed quicunque autores ennarrabuntur, semel atque iterum per hebdomades singulas de moribus 
audient nonnulla, quae vitiis auditorum medeantur, vel ut pellantur, vel ut ne invadant atque invalescant.”  




one is free because of age, condition, or profession.” He rules out explicitly, “the causes of 
natural phenomena, medicine, laws, civil law, and mathematics,” which should be left for later 
stages.958 More specifically, pupils should “start with light things that every age group can 
handle – such as games. Gradually one should advance towards bigger themes, such as the 
home and the whole household, clothes, food, time, horses, boats, temples, skies, animals, 
plants, the city, and the commonwealth.”959 What Vives is describing here is, thus, the 
curriculum of Latin schools. 
 In a concise manner, Vives’s own Schoolboy Dialogues present exercises on just 
these themes. This work, published for the first time in 1538, presented a collection of 25 
dialogues on a variety of themes ranging from everyday situations to questions of princely rule, 
focusing on a conscious development of vocabulary together with the teaching of virtuous 
manners, viewpoints, and sentences. They also present views on the city, the commonwealth, 
and good government more generally, and in the dialogues, Vives weaves very Erasmian 
political insights into the larger framework of the schoolbook. The most glaring examples are 
dialogues 19 (Royal Palace) and 20 (The Prince), which present views on good government, 
counselling, and ethical demands of self-governance of those who rule in the form of very short 
dialogues. In these dialogues, the defence of the sensible and reasonable point is united with 
one of the characters – easily discernible for the most part as embodying the role of a prudent 
counsellor, master, or the wise.960 What is significant though is that all this is incorporated into 
a mode discussion that heavily underlines their consensual nature: all the dialogues aspire and 
lead to concord, even when the subject matter itself might contain polemical elements. Thus, 
the basic tension is that between a moral teacher and the pupil who is learning, not between two 
potentially conflicting opinions.961 The final dialogue on precepts of education between Budé 
                                                          
958 Vives: DD, 297: “...magis versabitur iis, quae sunt vitae communia, quibus nulla aetas, nulla conditio, nulla 
professio eximitur: qualia sunt fere, quae modo connumerabam.”; “...ut de causis rerum naturae, de medicamentis, 
de legibus, & iure civili, de quantitatibus mathematicis: relinquet haec, atque eiusmodi suis quaque artificibus, 
magis versabitur in iis, quae sunt vitae communia, quibus nulla aetas, nulla conditio, nulla professio eximitur....”  
959 Vives: DD, 297: “...quorum primordia erunt a levibus, quaeque aetas illa facile sustineat, utpote a lusionibus: 
sensim ad maiora procedetur de domo, & tota supellectili, de vestimentis, de cibis, de tempore, de equo & navi, 
de templis, de coelis, animantibus, stirpibus, de civitate & republica....” Earlier in referring to the themes of 
elementary education Vives had also made similar remarks, see Vives: DD, 276: “Quibus incipiat aperiri 
philologia, id est cognitio aliqua rerum: nempe temporum, locorum, historiae, fabulae, proverbiorum, 
sententiarum, apophthegmatum, rei domesticae, rei rusticae: gustus etiam quidam civilis ac publicae, quae omnia 
maximam illorum ingeniis lucem inferent.”  
960 In the dialogue 19 it is Sofronius and in the dialogue 20 Sofobolus.  
961 The reception of the dialogues in the sixteenth century underlined their moral nature, see Mahlmann-Bauer 
2008, 356-360. The consensual nature of Vives’s dialogues vis-à-vis Erasmus’s more polemical works is well-




and Grympherantes is quite revealing; Grympherantes embodies what a schoolboy should have 
learnt in school, and is questioned by the famous French humanist. In a serious tone, 
Grympherantes presents the fruits of education, emphasizing greatly manners and obedience to 
authority under Budé’s questions. When the French humanist implies that “unworthy men” 
occupy important offices, and asks if they should be honoured, Grympherantes answers by 
claiming that this was a possibility his teacher did not ignore, but that children of his age were 
not allowed to pronounce judgement on the matter because they had not acquired sufficient 
wisdom.962 Under further inquiry about what happens to obedience, “if laws and customs are 
bad, unjust, and tyrannical,” Grympherantes reiterates his earlier position that schoolboys 
should not judge on the matter.963 Thus, humanist commonplaces are introduced but not 
debated, and strong respect for the opinion of the wise is called for. 
 Firmly in line with the humanist tradition, Vives’s De disciplinis never discusses 
the acquisition of Greek and Latin as a mere question of language, or as a medium of 
communication, but as containing in itself the knowledge, memory, and commonplaces of a 
culture that can incorporate classical and Erasmian wisdom.964 Furthermore, he is always ready 
to emphasize, using a typically humanist commonplace, that an education in languages 
enhances judgement, referring among other things to a more general notion of language as a 
gateway to an ancient and forgotten fountain of knowledge.965 In addition to Vives’s own 
Dialogues, what he had in mind is exemplified by encyclopaedic writers or philologues, “who 
treat simultaneously historical themes, fables, oratory and philosophy.” One example of this 
could be Erasmus’s Adagia, explicitly evoked in De disciplinis. In short, the claim to knowledge 
acquisition and the development of character that runs parallel with linguistic and 
compositional skills emanates partly from the selected readings and materials of the teacher, 
and from the sentences, fables and commonplaces learned and memorized.966  
                                                          
962 Vives, Juan Luis: Familiarium colloquiorum formulae, sive linguae Latinae exercitatio, Guilielmus Montanus, 
Antwerpen 1539, 123: “Sed dic mihi, an non sunt multi ad dignitatem evecti homines indignissimi velut sacerdotes 
non respondentes tanto titulo & magistratus pravi, & senes stulti ac deliri?”  
963 Vives: Exercitatio, 125: “Quid si sunt leges aut mores pravi, iniqui, tyrannici?” 
964 In the case of Greek he emphasizes this heavily, Vives: DD, 274: “Quid quod multa sunt Graecis literis 
memoriae mandata in historia, natura rerum, moribus privatis, & publicis, medicina, pietate, quae de ipsis fontibus 
& facilius hauriuntur & purius.”  
965 Vives: DD, 272 (the page is erroneously numbered as 273): “Facundia in verborum & formularum varietate ac 
copia: quae omnia efficerent ut libenter ea loquerentur homines, & aptissime possent explicare, quae sentirent: 
multumque per eam accresceret iudicii.”  
966 At one point Vives presents his view of how the focus in reading process should be directed. Vives: DD, 277: 
“Sed habeatur in studio delectus, ut prima cura sit circa verborum significatus, & loquendi formulas, proxima circa 
intelligentiam autorum non tam in rebus, quam in sententia dicti: ut assuescat puer illorum sensa eruere, quae 




 In the list of authors and in the general guidelines of how teaching should be 
undertaken Vives focuses on a selection of comedy writers, poetry, and history together with 
other readings that could develop style, vocabulary, and written expression. Vives is very clear 
that the main task here is the development of style that can be achieved with Erasmus, 
Quintilian, Diomedes, Mancinelli, Despauterius, and Mosellanus’ table of figures. Thus, the 
development of style, just like in the educational works of both Erasmus and Italian humanism, 
precedes the treatment of dialectical reasoning, considered the basis of argumentation and 
rhetoric. It is true that a number of traditional authors of the rhetorical tradition are proposed, 
such as Cicero’s familiarly letters and selected discourses, Quintilian’s treatment of elocution 
and Caesar’s work, famous for its mastery of colloquial language. It is also true that the number 
of authors recommended to be read in privacy is quite impressive, containing not only the three 
most famous Roman historians, but also Cicero’s speeches and Quintilian’s Declamations.967 
One, however, should be very careful in analysing what exactly Vives is doing here. The 
problem derives mainly from the fact that in the third book of De tradendis there seems to be 
incompatibility between the first part presenting general pedagogical advices on different 
exercises for different levels, and the second part introducing a comprehensive list of authors. 
The list of authors aspires, clearly, to a more general level of encyclopaedism since it is simply 
far too exhaustive to be covered by any grammar school curricula, and it is not at all connected 
to any specific pedagogic tasks or phases – such as the lists developed in Vives’s De ratione 
studii, which is more reduced in its scope.968 Furthermore, it is hard to see how some of the 
readings Vives includes here could be useful or even compatible with the level of exercises he 
is proposing in the first part. Thus, the suggested readings are primarily a general critical index 
of authors that the teacher or any other reader could draw material.  
 The way the elementary course in Latinity and Greek is structured leaves a lot of 
room of manoeuvring for the teacher with respect to specific literature. As a general guideline, 
Vives underlines the educational responsibilities and the exemplary nature of the teacher 
throughout and he does present a clearly standardized view of educational practices and 
                                                          
dicuntur Graece: tum dicta praeclara, & proverbia: quarta circa historias, postrema & levissima circa fabulas.” On 
another occastion, adressing the teacher Vives reminds him that Vives: DD, 279-280: “Verborum quum significatus 
exponet, adferet de probatis autoribus dictum: in quo potissimum spectabit, ut vim vocis apertissime auditoribus 
declaret, tum si licuerit, ut aliquid habeat cognitione dignum....”  
967 Vives: DD, 296-302.  
968 See also Vives: DD, 241-246. Valerio del Nero has discussed the encyclopaedic dimension of the work, see Del 




materials.969 He, however, does give some more specific instruction to the teacher at the 
elementary level as to how all of this should be undertaken. The very basic tool for a student 
should be a notebook or a commonplace book, where the student collects different types of 
pieces of knowledge gathered from readings. This book supposedly serves as the basis for all 
later studies, both for memorizing what one has learnt, and for producing one’s own material.970  
 Even though Vives brings forward interesting insights into a number of issues, 
such as memory, what really interests us here is what he says on difference ladders of 
production, since it is here that the question of how to turn the pupil into someone capable of 
producing something of his own is treated. In humanist spirit, in De tradendis the importance 
of writing and production is strongly emphasized even in the elementary level.971 According to 
Vives at the very first rung of the ladder, the pupil not only recites what the teacher has read 
aloud but also reformulates it with his own words. Another step is taken with written exercises, 
the first of which should be a translation both from vernacular to Latin, and vice versa. In 
Vives’s presentation this exercise had both grammatical and factual dimensions, as is 
demonstrated by the fact that Vives reminds the reader about the dangers of a non-specialist 
translating Aristotle or Galen. This is not only pointing towards Vives’s understanding of 
translation as an exercise not in words, but in meanings that have to be interpreted, but also 
more generally to the role of a grammarian or elementary teacher as someone whose role 
extends far beyond the limits of specific literary questions to the vast fields of knowledge of 
classical antiquity.972 
 Other exercises include comparison of the reading of authors with prescriptive 
rules, followed by “an elementary letter or a tale.” Moreover, pupils should, “amplify an 
example, an apothegm, a short sentence or a proverb. They should untie and unbend a poem 
tied to metrical rules, expressing it without metrical rhythm.”973 All of this is well in line with 
general humanist precepts and hardly encourages confrontation. Although letter writing is 
                                                          
969 See for instance Vives: DD, 234-235.  
970 The history of commonplace books is presented in Moss 1996. Vives describes a way of collecting material in 
the class, but not how to organize this into a “bigger notebook.” The way this is undertaken is not completely 
structured in De disciplinis. See Vives: DD, 281-282. 
971 Vives: DD, 281, 285: “persuadent sibi, quod revera est, nihil ad amplissimam eruditionem perinde conferre, ut 
& multa & multum scribere, multum atramenti, & chartae perdere.”; “Scribendi exercitation plurimum confert: 
stilus inquit Cicero magister & effector dicendi optimus.”  
972 Vives: DD, 285-286. To translate not according to word but according to meaning was typical of humanists, 
Copenhaver 1990, 86-92.  
973 Vives: DD, 286: “Scribent epistolam facilem, aut fabellam: dilatabunt exemplum, apophthegma, sententiolam, 




mentioned, its civic potentialities are not underlined at all in De tradendis. Vives’s exposition 
of elementary education in no way incorporates his ideas of the more politically important 
genres of letter writing, as presented in his De conscribendis epistolis, into its educational 
precepts. It is true that De conscribendis explicitly places letter writing in the tradition of 
conversation (sermo), not in the category of oratory (oratio).974 It cannot, however, be doubted 
that his De conscribendis epistolis by far exceeds the confines of familiar letters meant for 
everyday life, providing a developed humanist tool box for various situations, including, among 
other things, ways of talking to a superior, and denouncing vice. This is a section where Vives 
is clearly thinking about the prince, but the way these should be included in elementary 
education is completely absent from De disciplinis.975  
 The most in-depth treatment is given to the subject that worried Vives the most – 
the exercise known as disputatio. Out of all exercises where the pupil’s own production is 
treated, disputatio was the only one where direct discussion and confrontation between students 
was the norm. Vives’s description of disputatio in this elementary level has little to do with the 
late medieval disputatio – the highly formalized exercise of question and answer, which was 
not only about familiarizing the pupil with the subject matter of the debate, but that served also 
as an introduction to formal reasoning.976 Yet, disputatio likewise had nothing to do with the 
higher rhetorical exercises of suasoria and controversia – deliberative and judicial declamations 
respectively. Unlike in suasoria and controversia, the themes suggested are not political nor 
judicial, the composition does not aspire to historical specificity, and the adversary element of 
the exercise is downplayed in disputations. Vives is more than eager to remind the reader that 
he is talking about insignificant questions (quaestiunculae) that treat mostly the kind of 
uncontroversial themes suitable for elementary education. They should not be about 
confrontation and victory. More generally, even though Vives hinted that for very young boys, 
                                                          
974 Vives: “De conscribendis epistolis”, 3: “Epistola est sermo absentium per literas....” This was not uncommon, 
Hegendorff’s widely read Methodus conscribendis epistolas makes the same Ciceronian definition yet uses the 
three rhetorical genres in building its larger categorization of genres, see Hegendorff, Christoph: Methodus 
conscribendis epistolas, Johann Setzer, Haguenau 1526, Aii: “Epistola est sermo absentis ad absentem.”  
975 Vives: “De conscribendis epistolis”, 9, 14-20. Some of the most important letter-writing manuals affirmed the 
civic dimension of letter writing, see for instance Despauterius, Johannes: Ars epistolica, Josse Bade, Paris 1513, 
Aii. The importance of letter writing as a civic genre in the sixteenth-century English context is well-known, see 
Peltonen 2012, 43. 
976 See for instance Murphy 2005: xvii, 373. In the Middle Ages, disputatio was practised not only in Universities 
but also in elementary education. See Murphy: 2005, iii, 171. However, in the latter Middle Ages it was mostly 




glory and victory could serve as motivational principles, he always underlined the threats of a 
confrontation aspiring to victory, and not truth.977 
 The very understanding of a disputation was undergoing a significant change at 
the time, dissociating it from the formal aspirations of medieval disputations. Leonard Cox, for 
instance, in his first English book on rhetorical theory meant for grammar schools, discusses 
disputation as a form of rhetorical exercise through which one can gather material for the 
treatment of simple or compound themes. Thus, the connection to logic is completely lost, and 
disputations serve as an exercise for gathering material on a given word through the 
commonplaces of definition, causes, parts, and effects that refer to existing authors.978 In his 
The Arte or crafte of Rhetoryke, he follows closely Melanchthon, who already in the widely 
published De rhetorica libri tres made the connection of logical or dialectical places to this 
rhetorical task integral, without presenting any theory of the traditional elements of 
disputation.979 Johannes Sturm also discussed disputation as the basic exercise at the elementary 
level centred on questions and answers. The picture he gives of disputatio is also freer and 
looser as to the formal elements of disputation than what was common in the medieval 
tradition.980 
 Vives’s disputation disregards rhetorical motives altogether, and shows 
considerable hesitance towards the confrontational aspects of disputatio. It should not be about 
passion, all possible precautions should be undertaken in order to downplay its adversary 
qualities, and the final aim should be about comparing studies, not about passionate conflict 
and victory.981 Moreover, the whole point of the exercise is tied up with grammatical motives 
of clarifying texts, and the selection of themes testifies to this clearly, as they comprise 
questions such as: 
 
                                                          
977 Vives: DD, 322: “Disputationes hic & studiorum quieta collatio potius, quam altercatio, non iam ad victoriam 
pertinebunt & gloriam, quod permittebatur pueris, sed verum intuendum....” 
978 Cox, Leonard: The art or crafte of rhetoryke, Robert Redman, London 1532, 6-9.  
979 Melanchthon: De rhetorica, 12-30. Melanchthon does not use the word disputation but his demonstrative 
rhetoric clearly presents a way of coming up with definitions for things. 
980 Sturm: De literarum, 27-28. In classical tradition disputation, furthermore, could refer to a discussion between 
friends without the rhetorical element of passion. Cicero uses the word disputatio in this way in his de oratore. 
See for instance Cicero: De oratore, ii.v. 
981 Vives: DD, 286-287: “...providebitur tamen ne res longe in odia & rixas abeat: certabunt contente, sed citra 
acerbitatem: paualtim hi conflictus in studiorum collationem vertentur, & motus illi puerilium animorum sensim 




“To what extent do norms coincide with use, the obscure and entangled passages, the 
explanation of sentences, proverbs, apothegms, fables, histories or parables? What is its 
origin, what are the thoughts it entails, what its application. [Other possible questions include] 
The name of men, of a city, of a mountain, of a river, of a fountain, of a province, of an 
animal, of a plant, of a stone, of a metal. The meaning of a word and its etymology, its 
prosody and orthography, the form of an expression, the structure, and law of a poem.”982 
 
 Although Vives takes the existence of disputations for granted – and there is 
nothing revolutionary in his portrayal of their exact content – his hesitance with the exercise is 
in stark contrast to much humanist literature. Moreover, this element surfaces frequently 
throughout De disciplinis in the context of a number of issues, and Vives makes quite clear that 
disputations effectively nurture exactly the kind of confrontational culture his entire social and 
political literature was denouncing. In an earlier section on disputations, Vives likens their logic 
to the general dynamics of discord: in public disputations ingenium, looking for praise, attacks 
truth in search for a victory showing how disputations, despite being deprived of rhetorical 
elements, actually nurture the destructive passions of those involved. Because of all this, Vives 
goes on to argue that it is important that “public disputations are not frequent.”983 Competition 
had been in the very heart of many of the schools run by the Brethren of the Common Life, and 
Johannes Sturm’s take on the Dutch school system greatly emphasized the competitive and 
confrontational dimension. Sturm wrote on disputations that students should “declaim as often 
as possible.”984 Vives’s distaste for competition also greatly differed from the strong vernacular 
poetical and rhetorical culture found in the chambers of rhetoric of Flanders, where adversity 
and competition for glory were the norm.985  
 Equally as importantly, there is nothing in Vives’s elementary education that 
would make room for the treatment of the development of truly rhetorical themes. This is at 
                                                          
982 Vives: DD, 287: “Quae porro inter se conferent grandiusculi, haec erunt fere. Quam conveniat canonibus cum 
usu, de autorum obscure ac intricate dictis, de explanatione sententiae, proverbii, apophthegmatis, fabulae, 
historiae, parabolae: quae origo illorum, quae mens, quae accomodatio: de nomine viri, urbis, montis, fluvii, fontis, 
provinciae, animantis, stirpis, lapidis, metalli: de vi vocabuli, & eius originatione: de prosodia eius, & ortographia, 
de loquendi formula, de sturctura, de lege carminis....”  
983 Vives: DD, 250: “Idcirco rarae sint disputationes publicae, in quibus non eruitur veritas: nam nemo verius 
dicenti assentitur, quaeritur modo laus ingenii, vel peritiae....” He also makes clear that they seriously jeopardize 
the search for truth in moral philosophy, Vives: DD, 199. 
984 Sturm: De literarum, 33, “Haec de declamandi, scribendique consuetudine, sine qua exercitatione nihil 
praeclarum in literis effic potest.”; Scaglione 1986, 13-14.  
985 Dixhoorn 2008, 136-141; Spies 1999, 57-58. It is possible that Vives’s critique of theatrical poetry refers to the 




odds with Erasmus’s pre-Reformation De ratione, written for John Colet’s school in 1512, 
where rhetoric is given a significant role in elementary education, and where the culmination 
of rhetorical exercises is exactly the treatment and development of themes – even rhetorical 
ones – in the classroom. In Erasmus’s De ratione these declamations on a variety of themes 
drawn from classical writers could well incorporate questions of political and social importance 
such as warfare. 986 Whereas the possibilities of adversary rhetoric in elementary education are 
set aside both in Vives’s own De ratione studii puerilis, and in his De tradendis, this is not at 
all the case in Erasmus’s De ratione.987  
 All this underlines that elementary education in De tradendis is primarily about 
the formation of a large pool of people to a world of concord, where language is needed and 
employed in non-adversary environments. They are users of literary skills and applied rhetoric 
in every-day practices – such as non-political letter writing – and they can potentially take part 
in office holding. Yet they are not educated to participate in the production of knowledge as 
specialists of arts, in the use of emotional rhetoric targeted to masses, and in the more 
complicated discussions demanding knowledge of dialectic, judgement, and prudence. Theirs 
should be a world of concord and harmony, not discord and passion. However, it is clear that 
they do have a role to play in Vives’s larger social philosophy. Even though their tools for 
participating as producers of rhetoric are limited, they provide a true orator with an audience 
capable of judging rightly about a range of issues, including political topics, because they 
should be familiar with the basic elements of Erasmian thought. They are the kind of imagined 
Christian audience northern humanists were both trying to educate and speak to in their 1520s 
and 1530s political oeuvre. Thus, they provide a suitable audience for wise and responsible 
rhetorical culture to emerge for a prudent speaker, since they are familiar with the basic 
framework of judging correctly about things.  
 Vives himself describes the kind of education acquired in the grammar school in 
the following words:  
 
“He will be kept away from the reading of authorities, but he will be taught words 
appropriate for human intercourse, unless he is completely mad (furiosus) or foolish in which 
case it is preferable to keep him at a distance from the language of the learned so that he does 
                                                          
986 Erasmus: De ratione studii, vii-viii.  




not understand what is kept secret and confined there and use that knowledge to harm himself 
and other people. Those who are of healthier ingenium and judgement but do not wish to, or 
cannot ascend higher should be satisfied with the knowledge of languages and authors. This 
knowledge is useful for life so that he can be a public scribe, undertake less important office 
holding, or partake in embassies.”988 
 
This is quite far from Johannes Sturm’s claim that elementary schools produced 
eloquent men capable of defending the commonwealth.989 
 
Getting Familiar with Adversity 
 
It is after the elementary stage that liberal arts receive full treatment that reveals their conflictual 
nature. The second stage covered by De tradendis stretches until the youngster is approximately 
25-years old, as Vives laconically states.990 This means that he is describing here a syllabus 
roughly equivalent to the Faculty of Arts in the universities in northern Europe, and 
consequently, one is entering socially a more reduced ambiance. In this part, Vives dedicates 
significant attention to dialectic, rhetoric, physics, first philosophy (metaphysics), and 
mathematical subjects, and it is here that according to Vives, one evidences a move from 
language acquisition to the arts and disciplines.991 It is also in this phase in the chronology of 
the learning of different skills that the integral union of dialectic and rhetoric enters the picture 
since the whole basis of these studies lies on the trivium. 
 In the treatment of dialectic, Vives is all the time referring to the particular idea 
he himself promotes of dialectical reasoning in the third part of De disciplinis, an idea that was 
closely connected to larger developments in the field of dialectic both in Lutheran and Catholic 
universities. The selection of authors promoted by Vives is revealing indeed: the elementary 
stages of dialectical reasoning are covered by Trebizond, Giorgio Valla and Melanchthon – 
some of the most popular humanist introductions to the art of reasoning. Aristotle’s On the 
                                                          
988 Vives: DD, 307-308: “...arcebitur lectionem autorum. Sermonem vero ad commercium humani generis 
didicerit: nisi forte furiosus omnino sit & vaecors, quem praestabit a lingua doctorum summovere, ne quae sub illa 
sunt abdita & conclusa, magno tum suo, tum alieno malo intelligat. Qui saniore ingenio ac iudicio nolet tamen, aut 
non commode poterit altius conscendere, hic erit linguarum & autorum cognitione contentus. Huius porro ad vitam 
usus fuerit, ut sit scriba civitatis publicus, capessat minores magistratus, fungatur legationibus.”  
989 Sturm: De literarum, 3. 
990 Vives: DD, 341: “Hoc est adolescentiae curriculum ad quintum & vicesimum annum, aut eo circiter.”  
991 Vives: DD, 315: “Hactenus cognitioni linguarum vacavimus, quae fores sunt disciplinarum omnium atque 




interpretation is mentioned, although with the qualification that future contingencies should not 
be touched upon. Furthermore, Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, a crown jewel of traditional 
dialectical reasoning, is said to contain knowledge of, “little necessity.”992  
 The treatment of dialectical teaching methods runs parallel to the presentation of 
suitable materials. It is divided accordingly into two sections dealing with judgement and 
invention respectively. As a general rule Vives argues that learning must move from dialectical 
judgement to dialectical invention, and only later to rhetoric, thus underlying a path from res to 
verba. In the part dealing with judgement traditionally related to questions of formal coherence, 
Vives starts by reminding that they should not be “quarrelsome,” because confrontation is in 
the very nature of the subject, and consequently, it should not be encouraged.993 What follows 
is a presentation that in some respects vaguely resembles traditional scholastic disputations. 
Vives goes as far as to mention obligationes – a branch of dialectic closely tied to the practice 
of medieval disputatio – but strongly underlines that it is not an art, not even a part of an art in 
itself, making the distance to scholastic learning apparent. As a basic rule of thumb for 
dialectical disputations, he writes, “in these exercises only two things have to be avoided [...] 
not to accept contradictory positions and not to reject what corresponds with a position.” Thus, 
Vives’s idea seems to be that this method indeed trains the mind to understand the formal nature 
of the argument if it is done in an unemotional way that suppresses the competitive element of 
the treatise. This, together with the inclusion of a number of dialectical elements in the third 
part of De disciplinis – starting from the ample description of syllogism – can be seen as an 
attempt to introduce some training in dialectical judgement into the classroom as a way of 
countering the merely inventive sode of the art of truth.994  
 Yet how exactly Vives’s Socratic questions should operate is not completely clear. 
It is very likely that the method described by Vives is meant to be a modification of the 
traditional disputatio, and the authors suggested by Vives as introductions to dialectical 
argumentation hardly offered any insights to formal disputations. Thus, Vives’s point here 
might well be to argue for a method of question and answer that trains the pupil – in the tradition 
                                                          
992 Vives: DD, 315: “parvum necessaria....” The ambivalent attitude towards Aristotle runs through the treatment: 
on the one hand, he is an authority of primary importance; on the other hand, commentaries on Aristotle, described 
as a difficult author, have not been satisfactory. This points to Vives’s own assessment of Aristotle’s input in the 
part three. Vives: DD, 316: “Graeci in Aristotelem interpretes Psellus, Mangenetus, Ammonius obruunt lectorem 
verbis inanibus, qui prope est mos enarratorum illius gentis. Iacobus Faber tum in Aristotelem scripsit, tum 
Dialecticam ipse composuit: multaque ex receptis suo aevo opinionibus tanquam ex coeno trahit.”  
993 Vives: DD, 316: “Exercitatio erit in his non rixosa....”  
994 Vives: DD, 316: “In his duo sunt solum vitanda, quae modo attigi, non recipere pugnans positis, non respuere 




of division presented in the third part of De disciplinis – to a formally more loose exercise of 
reasoning. In the case of natural philosophy, as well as in moral and civic issues, this could 
point to the kind of Erasmian definitions of key terms described in Vives’s presentation of 
dialectic. With reference to the purposes of the exercise Vives himself states: “little Socratic 
questions that employ not only induction but also draw out the understanding of the adversary 
by using little tricks, divisions and definitions, are very useful for many things: for expressing 
the truth, for sharpening the ingenium, and for refuting the one we are arguing against.”995 
Furthermore, Vives makes very explicit in this part the link to the fifth book of the third part 
dealing with the critique of truth (Censura veri), which also presents patterns of inference and 
the law of contradiction. In short, the exercise Vives is describing here is most likely an 
introduction to the dialectical procedures presented in the third part of De disciplinis. With 
exercises in definitions and divisions, one could introduce the substantial knowledge of 
individual sciences to schoolboys.996  
 After judgement, the gateway to dialectical invention is open. Once again, Vives 
underlines the similarities of dialectic and rhetoric “prone to dispute and obstinacy,” and 
reminds the reader severely about the responsibility of the teacher and about the fact that the 
student should be suitable for this training.997 One really gets the impression that one is entering 
dangerous terrain indeed and one where harmony and concord are potentially threatened. The 
close link between dialectical invention and rhetoric is evident in Vives’s presentation of the 
inventive part of dialectic in a part on the instrument of probability, which deals with dialectical 
topics. Cicero’s Topics, Boece, and especially Agricola, together with explicitly rhetorical 
materials such as Cicero’s De inventione and the fifth book of Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria, 
are presented side by side with Aristotle’s Topica. In a remarkable fashion, Vives suggests that 
one has to treat Aristotle’s literature not for the perfecting of Aristotle’s dialectical system, but 
for, “taking notes on the thoughts and precepts on various themes that have been collected to 
this work, and for having these at one’s disposal whenever the situation demands their use.” 
Not only are the traditional works of classical rhetoric presented side by side with Aristotle, but 
also the Stagirite himself is downgraded merely into a source of abundance that should be suited 
                                                          
995 Vives: DD, 316: “Socraticae interrogatiunculae non modo per inductionem, sed eliciendo paulatim velut actis 
cuniculis adversarii sensu, divisionibus ac diffinitionibus, vehementer sunt ad multa conducibiles, ad verum 
exprimendum, ad exacvendum ingenium, & ad revincendum eum, qui contra tendit.”  
996 There is another paragraph where Vives describes discussions leading to truth that seems to link to the last book 
of De disciplinis on inner and outer disputations. Yet, the methodological way in which these two disputations 
should be imbedded in the curriculum is left open. Vives: DD, 315-323.  




to different situations according to the rules of decorum. In this new constellation, Aristotle 
stands side by side with a range of materials, from which the orator should gather credible 
material that can be useful in dialectical invention. In this spirit, Vives refers to the classical 
metaphor of a bee, which in Aulus Gellius’s Noctes Atticae represented a certain eclectic 
attitude.998  
 After learning the secrets and method of dialectical invention, the pupil should 
finally be ready for rhetoric.999 Vives starts the section with an emphatic defence of the art of 
eloquence characterized in ambiguous terms as “the cause of greatest goods and harms.” The 
reason is simply that in a world in which the use of word and its effect on passions is an 
undeniable fact, the omission of its use by the prudent would be a terrible mistake.1000 Next, he 
proceeds to present some of the more general features of rhetorical theory, such as the tripartite 
duties of the orator, namely, teaching, moving, and delighting, after which the literature that 
focuses on the prescriptive side of rhetoric as a theory is described.1001 Yet Vives, in a typically 
humanist manner, is quite clear that true training in rhetoric happens in the commentary of texts 
and in the practice of writing, and not in precepts themselves, introducing the figure of Cicero 
as someone who did not want to follow any ready-made rules slavishly.1002 The question of 
exercise is, however, a highly delicate matter and Vives would want to avoid “too careful and 
frequent exercises,” so that “such an ambivalent instrument does not stimulate the will to harm 
whenever the occasion presents itself, because then it would produce a tendency to fraud and 
badness.”1003 The first exercises training the youth to the secrets of rhetoric should be 
                                                          
998 Vives’s list of authors in dialectic is thoroughly humanist. See Vives: DD, 324-325: “Ad investigationem 
probabilitatis enarrabit doctor Ciceronis topica additis commentariis Boethi, aut quod mali, Rodolphi Agricolae 
dialecticam voluminibus tribus facundissimae & ingeniosissime expositam. Ciceronem vero & Boethum 
discipulus per se non semel leget, cui M. Tullio totam pene artem hanc debemus, quae ab Aristotele quidem reperta 
rudis adhuc est ostensa, nec utentibus satis habilis. Leget item per se Quintiliani librum quintum, nec non Ciceronis 
duo de inventione volumina, quod opus excidisse sibi dicit iuveni: adiunget Victorini commentarios. Aristoteles 
octo libros topicos attente, ut omnia illius philosophi, iterum atque iterum evolvet, non tam ad expoliendum 
aptandum quam instrumentum hoc credibilium, quam ut sententias & praecepta variarum rerum, quae in opus illud 
sunt congesta, annotet, & ad manum habeat, ubi res poscet. Magister velut diligens apicula per omnia disciplinarum 
viridaria circumvolitans undique decerpet discipulo suo, & colliget observationis huius exempla....”  
999 In the schools of Brethren of the Common Life rhetoric followed dialectic, see Scaglione 1986, 14.  
1000 Vives: DD, 326: “...is est maximorum, & bonorum, & malorum causa [rhetoric]....”  
1001 Vives’s list names most of the more important authorities on rhetorical theory emphasizing, however, that the 
teacher should select some of these materials. The importance of Quintilian, Cicero – whose rhetorical works are 
mentioned – and Aristotle is out of doubt. But Vives also mentions some of the works of the Hermogenean 
tradition, together with some more modern authors such as Melanchthon. Vives: DD, 326-328.  
1002 The idea that oratory was better learned through imitation than prescription was voiced frequently in the 
classics of rhetorical tradition, see for instance Augustine: De doctrina, iv.iii.  
1003 Vives: DD, 327: “Sed neque exercitationes in arte dicendi diligentes admodum & crebras probarim: ne anceps 




uncontroversial and consist of, “short tales, histories, amplification of a closed theme, closing 
[here synthesis] of another dispersed theme.”1004 Most likely in Vives’s mind these exercises 
could be useful not only for the development of style but they also contain a moral function 
since short histories, in addition to maxims and aphorisms, constituted the primary way of 
building a virtuous character.1005 These, then, should be followed by different ways of “teaching 
and delighting” – two of the three duties of rhetorical discourse – and only later should one 
move to controversial themes where adversity is present. The last echelon of the process is 
represented by the third duty of rhetoric: “the moving and exciting of the passions of the 
soul.”1006 Vives’s point is quite clear: of the three rhetorical duties the one dealing with moving 
and the ruling of passion through literary devices should come only in the very end of rhetorical 
training, when, supposedly, the prudent and responsible nature of the speaker should not be in 
doubt anymore.  
 The impression is further strengthened by the fact that Vives also presents a 
chronology of the types of questions one should deal with. Once again, a path from general, 
uncontroversial issues to the governance of passions – represented in its purest form by 
declamation – is visible. One should start with general questions deprived of contextual 
elements, which serve as a propaedeutic entry to the gathering of materials on important terms. 
This trains the pupil to collect all the available material from commonplace books or from his 
own notes on the central themes of any discussion, and the examples mentioned are “fortune, 
cruelty, or the world.”1007 Slowly, then, the pupil should move towards particular themes where 
all the nuances of rhetoric are visible. All along the way, however, Vives never forgets to 
emphatically underline the union of piety and rhetoric, proceeding at one stage to claim that 
“true and authentic rhetoric is eloquent wisdom that cannot be separated under any agreement 
from justice and piety.”1008 Possibly following on from this, Vives takes a strong stance against 
one of the inherent tendencies of rhetorical practice, namely that everything can always be 
argued from both sides (in utramque partem), explicitly stating that we should not argue “for 
pleasure against piety and justice.” Erasmus’s De conscribendis epistolis – destined for a school 
                                                          
1004 Vives: DD, 328: “Fabellis, historiolis, dilatione contractae rationis, conractione dilatae ac susae.”  
1005 Vives: DD, 289: “Subinde admonendi, ut quae de moribus audiunt, ne ita accipiant, ut historiolam quanpiam, 
quam satis est audivisse: hunc esse animorum pastum saluberrimum, concoqui & digeri oportere, et in animi 
substantiam converti....”  
1006 Vives: DD, 328: “Novissime in motu & concitatione affectionum animi.”  
1007 Vives: DD, 328: “...de fortuna, de crudelitate, de seculo....”  





context – had highlighted that it was always possible to come up with arguments on both sides, 
and that nothing was so inherently bad that it could not be defended. Vives, for his part, demands 
that “all eloquence should stand in the battlefield to defend what is good and pious against what 
is shameful and wicked.”1009 
 The kind of rhetorical exercises involving controversy Vives is thinking about are 
declamations, and hardly surprisingly, the selection of materials Vives presents as exemplary 
highlight the importance of Seneca the Elder’s Declamationes and Suasorias.1010 Vives claims 
that the judicial genre is “of no use,” and that all the questions treated in the classroom “should 
be useful in life.”1011 The fact that Vives denies the importance of judicial rhetoric for the 
Christian orator should not be taken literally since all of his own rhetorical production, 
including his Declamationes Syllanae, draw heavily from the tradition of judicial rhetoric. Here 
Vives is not suggesting that the precepts of judicial rhetoric for the treatment of ethos and a 
number of other issues should not be employed, but that judicial litigations and specific legal 
questions as such are not good and present a danger to justice and to truth. This is firmly in line 
with everything Vives had written about law as simplicity of epikeia, rather than open 
confrontation over the technicalities of law in his earlier writings and in De disciplinis. 
 Yet, the explicit omission of judicial cases implies that Vives’s main themes, truly 
important questions, should be suasoria – political issues – since the only two traditional genres 
in which controversy is involved were exactly the judicial and deliberative ones. Yet, one should 
remember that already in De consultatione, printed together with De ratione dicendi in 1532, 
Vives had quite clearly enlarged the definition of deliberation by claiming that it can potentially 
be any theme one is consulted on. Thus, one should not think that Vives, in advising very 
advanced students, is necessarily implying a closed set of themes familiar from the handbooks 
of deliberative rhetoric, but that the questions treated could potentially cover all sorts of issues 
of current relevance. His own Declamationes had brilliantly shown how complex themes could 
activate rhetorical resources from epideictic, judicial, and deliberative traditions in a flexible 
way. This was also well in line with classical tradition that had affirmed the broad and varied 
                                                          
1009 Vives: DD, 328: “Nunquam contra veritatem affuescent dicere..pro voluptate, contra aequum, & pium....”; 
“stet tanquam in acie facundia omnis pro bono, & pio contra flagitium & nefas.” Erasmus: De conscribendis 
epistolis. For discussions on the tradition of speaking on both sides (in utramque partem), see Skinner 1996, 9-10, 
97-98; Peltonen 2012, 62-70  
1010 The part on declamations is introduced by the word declamatio in the margins, Vives: DD, 329. Declamation 
was the most advanced rhetorical exercise in classical tradition, see Quintilian: IO, ii.viii; ii.x.  
1011 Vives: DD, 328-329: “Iudiciali genere nihil omnino indigemus....”; “Declament iuvenes apud magistros de iis 




scope of declamations, which according to Quintilian “embraces in itself all the things 
[exercises] of which we have been speaking, and provides the closest image of reality.”1012 
 Linking to both Vives’s concern about the potentially destructive uses of rhetoric 
and his method of internal discussion, Vives stresses that pupils, taking the example of 
Demosthenes, should meditate the composition of their discourse in a quiet place with time.1013 
This is supposed to be an antidote against the momentous and passionate nature of disputations, 
as perceived by Vives.1014 Furthermore, even though Vives throughout his early 1530s corpus 
emphasized that the proper terrain of rhetoric lies in elocution, one of the main points of his 
presentation here is a balanced treatment of a theme. It is true that a lot of attention is given to 
elocution, yet the main task of the teacher in assessing declamations lies in questions guided by 
prudence and decorum. He argues it is the decorum of the arguments according to all particular 
elements, that should get the special attention in the classroom. Thus, the task of prudence and 
decorum in moulding Christian arguments to a form suited to particular cases, audiences, and 
times is at the core of Vives’s advice here.1015 In short, in this kind of declamation all Vivesian 
treatment of argument, elocution, piety, and everything learnt about dialectic and rhetoric 
should come together into a unified and responsible whole under the guidance of prudence. 
 The importance given over to declamationes as rhetorical exercises dealing with 
passion situates the Vivesian educational scheme firmly in the humanist tradition that strived 
for eloquence and the mastery of words for guiding passion. It underlines how, despite the 
omnipresent reservations of De disciplinis to passion, conflict, and discord, a prudent man 




In the highest echelon of Vives’s De tradendis stands the truly prudent man, the wise who is 
given a section of his own entitled De vita et moribus eruditi (On the Life and Customs of the 
Erudite). Before the description of the erudite, Vives presents opinions on studies related to two 
                                                          
1012 Quintilian: IO, ii.x.2: “...pauca mihi de ipsa declamandi ratione dicenda sunt, quae quidem ut ex omnibus 
novissime inventa, ita multo est utilissima. Nam et cuncta illa de quibus diximus in se fere continet....”  
1013 Vives does not discuss extempore speeches here at all, Vives: DD, 329. Johannes Sturm for instance wrote 
about three kinds of speeches; those that are written, those that are extempore, and those that are composed in the 
mind of the student, see Sturm: De literarum, 23. 
1014 Vives made similar points already in his De consultatione. Vives: DCO, 261.  
1015 This is reiterated in De ratione dicendi, Vives: DR, 106: “Hactenus exposita sunt nobis atque ostensa 




of the three higher faculties – namely the Medical and the Juridical Faculties, omitting the 
Theological one. But the main emphasis in the latter part of De tradendis lies firmly on 
prudence, history, moral philosophy, and on the philosophical subject of justice that 
incorporates legal questions to the arts of prudence. All of this leads to the culmination of De 
tradendis, De vita et moribus eruditi. Despite of the fact that the part on history and moral 
philosophy could provide a teacher at any scholarly level a critical encyclopaedia of all the 
major authorities in the area, Vives’s treatment here is mostly separated from a connection to 
any specific stage in the educational path.1016 However, it is not a mere coincidence that Vives 
has placed the parts on history, justice, and moral philosophy – mostly politics – in a section 
dedicated to prudence, right before the exposition of the ethical demands of the life of an 
erudite. In uniting all these issues to the fifth book of De tradendis, Vives guarantees that the 
close connection of these subjects, cornerstones of active life, to prudence, and to the 
recommended way of living is not lost.  
What is more, the part on the life of an erudite presenting ethical prescription for 
post academic path puts the whole of De tradendis in a larger perspective. What is an 
implication in the structure of arts and sciences – namely an active performance of the arts in 
the service of common good on different levels and functions – is quite openly spelled out and 
given a specific form. The erudite Vives presents the reader is an active humanist working 
potentially on a range of issues, both inside and outside the academia, without ever losing sight 
of the binding social imperative. It is no coincidence that the emphasis is firmly on prudence 
(prudentia) and not wisdom (sapientia), since the social imperative directs the attention to 
active life and to interaction with others and, hence, to the continuous performance of the most 
important of civic virtues: prudentia. Because of the highly important role the prudent man 
plays not only in Vives’s educational schemes but also in his entire social thinking, it is 
justifiable to read the Book five of De disciplinis together with De vita et moribus. They spell 
out Vives’s most elaborate development of the Aristocratic wise man who should possess the 
authority to be the true reason (ratio) of both particular commonwealths and kingdoms, as well 
as Christendom at large. 
                                                          
1016 What is more, the treatment of history and moral philosophy – mostly politics – is clearly not meant for 
elementary education since in the description of the elementary education Vives had already presented his views 
on the main authorities of history. The presentation of history, however, could be suitable for the study of the past 
as part of the trivium in the Faculty of Arts level since Vives explicitly writes about the order (ordo) one should 




 Vives’s most general characterization of prudence refers to it as medicine of the 
mind, creating an opposition to the medicine of the body taught in medical faculties.1017 Because 
of the social nature of prudence, Vives is not primarily writing about the curing of one’s own 
mind but about the social sphere; Vives is evoking the metaphor here in a social sense, referring 
to the curing of the passions of the collective body or some of its individual powerful members. 
More specifically, Vives describes prudence as the ability to, “appropriate everything we make 
use of in life to places, moments, persons and to occupations,” and he is quite clear that its true 
realm is the corrupted world of passion. Referring to this, he states that prudence, “is the director 
and the rudder in the storm of the passions, and it tries to hinder that the ship of humankind is 
not dashed against the shoals and rocks of the violent passions, and is not overpowered by the 
size of the waves.”1018 
 According to Vives, there are mainly two things that contribute to the acquisition 
of prudence, namely judgement and experience. Judgement, of course, holds a close association 
with the natural talent (ingenium) of each man, but it can also be trained through right kind of 
humanistic formation. In claiming that the reading of good authors together with historical 
studies, rhetoric and dialectic train character Vives makes a traditional link from humanist 
curricula to the acquisition of judgement, with the exception that he explicitly names dialectic 
as a factor in this process. Even though the move is quite conventional in the humanist 
discourse, one could argue that if prudence as an intellectual virtue is primarily about the 
understanding of particularities, then training in rhetoric and dialectic is significant. Dialectic – 
understood as a rhetorized theory of generalized argumentation that includes an understanding 
of the audience – teaches the mind to make prudential judgements that take into account all 
contextual phenomena. It simultaneously provides the skills for turning all this into linguistic 
production. The other source of prudence – experience – is further divided into two categories: 
one’s own experience, and the experience of others, which is history. Once again, the 
connection is quite trivial since history, stock of experience and examples had long been the 
source of prudence in the humanist tradition.1019  
                                                          
1017 Vives: DD, 353: “Nunc alteram illam aggredimur, qua tum excoluntur animi, tum sanantur, ut in hac quoque 
sit mentis illustratio, ne morbi invadant, atque ubi invaserint, per rationis imperium depulsio ac restitutio sanitatis.”  
1018 Vives: DD, 353: “Prudentia vero peritia est accomodandi omnia, quis in vita utimur, locis, temporibus, 
personiis, negotiis: haec est moderatrix & clavus in affectionum tempestate, ne hi sua violentia navem totius 
hominis in brevia aut scopulos impingant, vel obruant magnitudine fluctuum.”  




 Vives is eager to argue that history is specifically suited to adults with some 
experience, implying that it could potentially provide the erudite with useful knowledge on 
prudence after his studies inside the walls of academic institutions.1020 In explaining the 
category of history – true art of governing – one can discern two main points Vives wants to 
make. First, he is more than keen to remind the reader, in a very Erasmian vein, of the harmful 
nature of history of violent and warfare. Since the prudence he is promoting is essentially about 
the control and rule of passion, history should set examples of prudent action understood in this 
sense.1021 Another point of importance for Vives is that history should train one to understand 
primarily the unchanged moral character that produces action and response, not only details of 
antiquarian value.1022 He had already tried to highlight this interpretation of history in a plea for 
a war against the Turks in De Europae dissidiis, where he had argued that the unchanged 
character of Europeans and Asians would produce equal outcomes in warfare, irrespective of 
historical particularities.1023 Thus, the real knowledge one learns from history deals with 
character, ingenia, passion, and all dispositions that are active in the production of outcomes. 
Naturally, this is closely connected to prudence since knowledge of all dispositions and ingenia 
is a prerequisite, not only for successful political action, but also for an effective speech aimed 
at teaching and moving people to action. In his eulogy of history, Vives does not forget its 
connection to moral philosophy; the examples of moral philosophy, more useful than precepts, 
are provided by history.1024 All this presupposes an understanding of the workings of human 
judgement and passions from which actions stem, pointing towards the basic thematic of 
Vives’s work on the soul, De anima.  
 If the sources of prudence are clear, Vives similarly leaves little doubt as to the 
fields in which prudence should be performed and used. While it serves as a guiding principle 
in all human interaction, Vives clearly unites prudence with some specific social functions. In 
                                                          
1020 Vives also explicitly states this, Vives: DD, 358: “Verum historia cognita est iam nobis quadam tenus in puerili 
institutione, sed illa modo ad rationem temporum, & nomina praeclarorum hominum noscenda: nunc vero exactius 
est ac plenius versanda, quoniam melius ab adultis iam confirmatisque post rerum usum aliquem intelligitur, ut in 
vitae emolumenta convertatur, iudicio adhibito: tanquam succus naturali calore diffusus per corpus, unde alatur 
homo, & vita produactur.”  
1021 Vives: DD, 358-359.  
1022 Vives: DD, 356: “nimirum negare nemo potest omnia illa esse mutata, & mutari quotidie, nempe quae sunt 
voluntatis nostrae atque industriae. Sed illa tamen nunquam mutantur, quae natura continentur, nempe causae 
affectuum animi, eorumque actiones & effecta, quod est longe conducibilius cognoscere, quam quomodo olim vel 
aedificabant, vel vestiebant homini antiqui.”  
1023 Vives: De Europae, xli: “Dicet vero aliquis, aliae sunt nunc res, alia tempora, alius Asiae stans [...] Nam quam 
Asiam dixi imbellem, hoc sivel inscitia, vel nullo militaris rei usu contingeret, utique mutare posse confiterer, sed 
quia naturae est, non casus corrigi utcunque potest, mutari penitus non potest.” 




the shortest form, prudence is the art of governing (regendi artem), which should be undertaken 
only by those who are naturally up to the task, who are both experienced and capable of sound 
judgement.1025 In a section dedicated to the literature of politics, very Erasmian in its outlook 
and explicitly referring to Utopia and Erasmus’s Institutio principis Christiani, Vives states, 
“this is the art of princes, counsellors, judges and, finally, of those who direct cities and 
people.”1026 In an earlier passage in a section discussing prudence, Vives asks, “What would be 
more important to know for the tutor of a city or for a citizen?”1027 Both passages and the totality 
of De tradendis clearly show that Vives is not referring primarily here to the prince, he is not 
claiming merely that the prince should be prudent, but that those participating in the 
undertakings of common issues in a variety of functions should exhibit prudence. Making a 
union between philosophers and political power, Vives writes: “For what reason do we think 
that our philosophers have not for long been suitable for the guiding of cities (civitas) and 
people?” pointing out that this was mostly because of the lack of knowledge about history.1028 
Part of the demand is naturally a Platonic claim that princes should become philosophers, but 
Vives insists repeatedly that his main point is rather that philosophers should help in the 
governing of the state, a point he had made very strongly in his dedication letter to Joâo III.1029 
More generally, the point of departure of the activities of the prudent man as described in De 
disciplinis is that he “is ready and prepared for a fight” in the world of passion and civic life 
where he has to help others.1030 Thus, it is hardly surprising that Vives, in discussing the 
guidance of the city or commonwealth, often employs words other than princes, such as wise 
(sapiens), tutor (rector), citizen (cives), philosopher (philosophus), counsellors (consiliarius), 
and many others. The philosophical nature of government in a corrupted world is more likely 
guaranteed by wise counsel and the active performance of virtue, not merely by the formation 
of the prince himself, as important as that might be. 
                                                          
1025 Vives: DD, 354-355: “Qui eiusmodi sunt ingeniis tanquam ad prudentiam, id est, regendi artem non facti & 
appositi, ipsi alios non regent, regentur ab iis, quos natura ad prudentiam finxit.” 
1026 Vives: DD, 374: “Haec est ars principum, consiliariorum, iudicum, denique eorum, qui civitates & gentes 
moderantur.” Most of these political works are already mentioned in Vives’s De ratione studii, see Vives: “De 
ratione studii puerilis”, 56.  
1027 Vives: DD, 356: “quid magis vel rectori civitatis, vel civis civium nosse expedit....” 
1028 Vives: DD, 356: “Quid causae esse credimus, cur philosophi nostri regendis civitatibus & populis iam pridem 
idonei non fuerint?”  
1029 Vives: DD, Epistola: “Tum intelligis quanta sit inter principes & eruditos homines munerum consensio: ut non 
sint duo hominum genera, quae amica inter se magis & coniuncta esse conveniat [...] Eruditio quiete indiget, quam 
praestat regia potestas: haec vero consilio ad molem tantarum rerum tractandam, quod praestant docti prudentia 
ex disciplinis collecta....”  
1030 Vives: DD, 388: “Proditurus ad hominum occursus & conspectum vir doctus meditatus & paratus exeat 




 This all links to what Vives has to say about the life of the erudite in the special 
part dedicated to the theme. As to the extension of the ideal erudite, various ideas have been put 
forward: different scholars have suggested that Vives might be educating a new secular ruling 
class, princes, or heads of households, although few works have focused thoroughly on the 
question.1031 Valerio del Nero has put forward an interesting explanation in referring to the 
Vivesian erudite as an “intellectual,” and has emphasized his close connections with power 
focusing on his role as a counsellor.1032 This is no doubt true; university education was the 
primary way of entering the highest echelons of office holding and Vives deliberately focuses 
on justice, prudence, and politics. He is definitely describing the kind of person he would like 
to see steering the commonwealth in a variety of functions at court, at the town level, and in 
undertaking intellectual duties such as teaching. Many of the people participating in the civic 
life, and office-holding on the level of the town in the Low Countries could be catered by 
elementary education, but the truly prudent man mastering all arts should occupy the most 
important offices in towns, in the General Estates, and in the central administration of the 
prince. However, rather than describing this person, Vives paints a persuasive example of how 
this man ought to live and occupy himself, underlining strongly the union of civic life to piety 
and a range of scholarly interests.  
 In this way, the intellectual Vives is describing bears a distinctively Erasmian 
mark in the part on the life of the erudite. De disciplinis paints a strong picture of the true erudite 
that looks suspiciously like an Erasmian scholar or wise man – someone truly capable of taking 
the role demanded from a doctor of the soul. He is able to defend and know truth, to be 
motivated in his intellectual journey by nothing else but truth, to rely in matters of judgement 
on his own conscience, not on the opinion of ordinary people, to be free from both ignorance 
and passion, and to realize the social imperative through his knowledge. Vives makes very clear 
that a true erudite can work in a variety of fields and in a number of ways. First, he can clearly 
take the role of a counsellor or a tutor close to the prince. In a pessimistic vein, and probably 
mirroring his own sentiments in his post-courtier days, Vives states that princes are at times so 
blind that a wise man could do nothing and hence the ruler should be left alone.1033 If this were 
                                                          
1031 Vigliano 2013, xli; Vasoli 1968, 225-226. Noreña is silent about this question mentioning only rulers, women 
and the poor as objects of specific treatises of education, Noreña 1970, 176-199. More generally, humanist 
education has been linked to the rise of a new administrative class, see Padley 1976, 8-9.  
1032 Del Nero makes this point especially in his 2008 article, see Del Nero 2008, 220-226.  
1033 Vives: DD, 384: “Corda vero plerorumque principum adeo sunt corrupta, & magnitudine illa fortunae ebria, 
ut nulla arte refingi queant in melius, medentibus aspera atque insensa. Sinendi sunt valere illi caeci, ut dominus 




the case, all counselling would either be inefficient or worse, flattery that justifies the immoral 
actions of the ruler.1034  
 This is not, however, the only way of contributing actively to the common good 
with the knowledge of the arts. The wise can, following the example of Christ, also turn their 
gaze to the people, who are “more easily managed, and who appear to be easier and more 
compliant in the hands of the one who does the curing.”1035 The problem where the people 
typically assume that anyone who addresses them in Latin is wise was even more attuned than 
in the case of the prince, but this should not lead one to abandon the task of educating them.1036 
Vives is not very precise as to what exactly the medicine of the soul in the case of the people 
would entail, but it would definitely include all the activities of teaching ranging from the 
performing of the specific role of a tutor or an educator to the purification of educational 
materials. Despite his silence on the matter, it would have been quite clear for the reader that 
an ecclesiastical life would also be a way of realizing the duty to educate people. 
 The fact that investigatory motives do play a role in Vives is clearly shown by the 
significant amount of time Vives devotes to the analysis of the components of the right 
performance of investigative practices. It is highly important that Vives does not see a clear-cut 
distinction between an active life at court or teaching in educational contexts on the one hand, 
and contemplative life of a scholar dedicated to the pursuit of arts and sciences on the other. 
Vives is quite explicit on many different levels that the investigative work of the scholar should 
always be undertaken with the ultimate goal of furthering the arts, and the common good – 
something his own investigative projects were aspiring to.1037 These different realms of social 
utility effectively point to different levels of the general reform programme. If actual decision-
making cannot be influenced, one should focus on reforming the general culture, inside of 
which civic and other forms of collective life will be assessed. 
 Vives does give some general guidelines as to how one should go about writing 
and commentating, in a way that does not put right judgement in jeopardy. On the individual 
level, the people undertaking these activities should be of the right kind, provided with studies, 
                                                          
see Castiglione, Baldassare: Il libro del cortegiano, nuovamente con diligenza revisto per Lodovico Dolce 
Girolamo Scoto, Venezia 1556, 384-386. 
1034 This argument could be found in the first part of More’s Utopia, see More: Utopia 62-64. 
1035 Vives: DD, 384: “curam nostram traducamus in populum magis tractabilem, quique se curantis manibus 
faciliorem atque obsequentiorem praebet.”  
1036 Vives: DD, 384.  
1037 The union of these two was not a new idea. In the pseudo-Plutarchian educational manual De liberis educandis 
the connection and interrelation of a life of otium and negotium is made quite explicitly, Plutarch: “De liberis 




prudence, and ingenium. In addition to their qualities, they should always take their time to 
think and to develop judgement before the publication of any text, in order to guarantee the 
absence of an error due to a thought process undertaken hastily or passionately. The error, once 
it is committed, can potentially have disastrous consequences for succeeding judgements and 
investigations, causing eternal disputes as Vives had argued before. Furthermore, it is important 
that those showing judgement in their investigations live “in concord and cordially” as friends, 
and that they help each other collectively before the publication of any text in order to guarantee 
the best possibilities for correct judgement.1038 What Vives is describing here is an idealized 
version of the culture of dialogue in the world of verosimilitudo: the collective procedure used 
by the members of the Republic of Letters around Erasmus who often sent their works to other 
members of the trusted community and cultivated friendly discussions targeted toward truth. 
Thus, independently from the field the wise man chooses to work in, he should always be a 
member of the realm of concord of the Republic of Letters. 
 In all of his functions, the prudent man is throughout compared to a degenerated 
version of the true humanist who bears some external attributes of the wise, but is truly 
corrupted in the inside. A corrupted courtier is a flatterer, and a corrupted erudite is someone 
ruled by his passions, and both cause tumult and eternal dispute. Corruption is not, however, 
something that is treated in opposition to the true nature of prudence, but is also described as a 
reality of the world that surrounds the erudite – indeed – the very world he has to engage. Vives 
insists that it is only with his peers that the erudite can discuss questions of right judgement, 
and the rest of the world –ruled by the passion for glory and fame – should be the object of his 
prudent teaching. Hence, in the very heart of Vives’s notions of reform based on active citizenry 
lies the aristocratic, Stoic, and prudent man, who teaches others both with his example and his 
words – a Socrates or Jesus Christ – two teachers who encapsulate the qualities of a moral orator 
in De disciplinis.1039  
 Although the audience of Vives’s proposal might be the entire ruling class of the 
Low Countries, the way the erudite are portrayed makes a very close link to the scholarly 
pursuits and reformative programmes of the Republic of Letters. The civic dimension of the 
activities of the erudite – although of great importance – is only one way among others of 
                                                          
1038 Vives: DD, 390: “Docti inter se concorditer ac humanae conversentur.”; Vives: DD, 397: “Posteaquam 
scripseris ostende iis opus, a quibus recte admoneri te posse confidas, eorumque sententiam attentus ac patienter 
auscultato, quam tecum aequo animo reputes, ut quae videbuntur corrigas. Quanto satius est ab amico privatim 
admoneri, quam ab inimico publice obiurgari?”  




enhancing common good – an activity that is never completely detached from other scholarly 
aspirations. Moreover, the difference of Vives’s erudite compared to some classical and 
contemporary models is quite glaring. It has been convincingly argued that the example Vives 
is appropriating in his De disciplinis is Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria where in Book XII, the 
Roman orator puts forward a model of the perfect speaker.1040 Quintilian’s orator uses his 
knowledge, “to guide the counsels of the senate, or lead an erring people into better ways,” 
drawing heavily from moral philosophy and dialectic. But Quintilian’s man is performing his 
character primarily in cases of law. He is ever ready to bend truth if the cause requires this. In 
addition, for him the importance of character lies in avoiding shyness and fear through self-
confidence.1041 The difference to the Vivesian orator – who contemplates on death, fears his 
own passions, recognizes the potentially dreadful consequences of eloquence, and sees the 
world as one of profound and threatening discord – is quite striking. Secondly, of course, De 
disciplinis amounts to a systematic condemnation of the kind of specialists of law that use their 
expertise for the advantage of the powerful – a specialist that referred to an existing court culture 
possibly epitomized by Gattinara’s and Wolsey’s use of law for the advantage of their respective 
states, backed also by professional jurists.1042  
 More importantly, the cautious relationship to court culture present throughout De 
disciplinis gives a distinctive framework to the kind of active life Vives is proposing. The Italian 
discourse was beginning to portray the courtier – the man of sprezzatura, and aesthetic 
decorum, capable of securing his place in the court by interiorizing and mastering its manners, 
ways of speaking, and general culture. The Vivesian erudite, by contrast, bases his authority on 
a certain distance from courtly life, which for the Valencian humanist represented a world filled 
with corruption.1043 The aesthetizising trends, and the shaping of the body of the courtier found 
in Castiglione, have strong political implications in creating proximity to the prince, yet they 
are completely absent in Vives. Even where Elyot, in his 1531 The Book named the Governor, 
amply described practices such as hunting, hawking, and dancing, Vives’s intellectual is quite 
removed from these exercises, mentioned only once in the whole De disciplinis, and in very 
                                                          
1040 Vigliano 2013, lxii-lxiii.   
1041 Quintilian: IO, xii.i.26: “...sed maioribus clarius elucebit, cum regenda senatus consilia et popularis error ad 
meliora ducendus.” 
1042 Vives’s condemnation of Wolsey’s use of law in the divorce process of Henry VIII is one of the instances when 
this becomes visible. 
1043 The Renaissance metaphor of the theatre was employed by Vives to describe the social creation of fame deemed 




suspicious terms.1044 But he is not primarily the man of the civic culture of Flanders either: he 
is an erudite who in his civic pursuits should never abandon academic circles of scholarly Latin, 
and not the vernacular chambers of rhetoric of Bruges or town administration. His skills and 
knowledge are put to use primarily in the literary world, not in the oral world of day-to-day 
politics.  
 Thus, Vives’s prudent man has a somewhat schizophrenic relationship to power 
and court life. He wishes to be inside – in close proximity to power – without ever truly 
engaging with all its social codes, and being ever-so afraid for the corruption of his own soul.1045 
Vives’s prudent man obtains his authority from humanist circles and desires to cure the world 
of corruption and passion from a certain distance, not to master its social code in order to 
succeed in it. His prudence and decorum, rather, are meant for an orator assessing, directing, 
and criticising politics – not for the self-fashioning of a courtier or a gentleman. But he does 
have some specific tools at his disposal that make the use of prudence in civic contexts possible, 
and two of these – rhetoric and the knowledge of the soul – where to receive deeper treatment 









                                                          
1044 Elyot, Thomas: The Boke Named the Governor, Thomas Berthelet, London 1531, 70; Castiglione, Il libro del 
cortegiano, 41-45; Kristeller 1988, 291-292. For a comparison between the two although with a particular focus 
on style, see Kennedy 1996. For Castigilione’s sprezzatura see also Rebhorn 1993; Berger 2000; Kolsky 2003.  


























8. Words, Cognition, Ingenium  
 
The educational path described in De tradendis disciplinis ends with an affirmation of the 
importance of a life of negotium and social utility for a prudent man. The life of social utility 
can be undertaken through various kinds of activities related to the use of language in teaching, 
counselling, and a range of scholarly pursuits. Much of Vives’s 1530s writings elucidated 
specific problems linked to these activities, with De epistolis consribendis (1536) focusing on 
the art of letter writing, De ratione dicendi (1532) on the use of rhetoric in a variety of situations, 
Exercitatio linguae latinae (1538) on elementary education, and De anima et vita (1538) on the 
study of mental dispositions, intellect, and passions.1046 In what follows, I will focus on the two 
works that were most explicitly connected to De disciplinis, with a series of intertextual 
allusions to it – De ratione dicendi and De anima. Both works offer an analysis of the effects 
of language on the human mind that could be of useful to the life of negotium of a prudent man. 
Moreover, both partake in the basic tension running through Vives’s social and political 
reflections that lingers between the perfecting and formation of a virtuous character, and on the 
use of existing dispositions in a more instrumental way. I will argue that this tension remains 
throughout Vives’s 1530s reflection, and that the idea of the inevitability of twisted characters 
and false judgements on truth grows ever stronger. Thus, social and political life cannot simply 
be based on the formation of virtuous character through various educational means, but the 
activities of the prudent have to find ways to subsist in a world where individual difference, 
passion, and conflict will be present in some form. In the world of discord, De ratione provides 
ways of incorporating the basic duties of oratory in new contexts. De anima, for its part, offers 
the most in-depth look into the functioning of mental procedures – a knowledge that can be of 
enormous help for Vives’s prudent orator or teacher in any quest to understand the mental 




                                                          
1046 In the chapter, I will use both passion and emotion in order to express what Vives means by affectus, affectio 
and perturbatio. Although Vives subscribes to a distinction between ethical emotions and harmful passions, he 
does not systematically employ different words to make the distinction. When Vives employs affectus in clearly 




Finding Ways to Persuade, De ratione dicendi 
 
Considering the scope and quality of Vives’s rhetorical writings, it is surprising that his main 
rhetorical work De ratione dicendi has not been the subject of any large-scale scholarly 
interest.1047 What has been pointed out in the few excellent analyses of the work is Vives’s 
yearning for originality, his insistence on the importance of the general notion of decorum to 
detriment of more specific advice, his expansion of the category of elocution to cover more 
than tropes and figures, his categorization of a large number of styles – replacing the three 
traditional ones – and finally, his attempt to set aside the three classical genres of judicial, 
deliberative, and demonstrative rhetoric.1048 Peter Mack has also emphasized Vives’s general 
urge to adapt rhetorical theory for a new context – something clearly visible in the expansion of 
the category of genre in the Part three where a number of non-traditional rhetorical genres – led 
by history – get their own treatment.1049 On a different note, Hidalgo-Serna has argued that De 
ratione dicendi is, “the inevitable answer to the linguistic and cognitive necessity to 
conceptualize artfully [with ingenium] what is relative and indiscernible for the eye of reason,” 
placing the work more in the tradition of the creative philosophy of ingenium than in the 
discourse of classical rhetoric of the time.1050 In what follows, I will not assess the place of De 
ratione primarily in the internal history of rhetoric, but I will discuss it together with Vives’s 
social and political thought. I will show that some of the modifications in rhetorical theory 
described by Mack can be seen as a continuum of Vives’s larger programme of adapting 
rhetorical theory to new circumstances, where persuasion should be undertaken through various 
measures by the prudent orator. I do not claim that this is the only feature of De ratione, and I 
do not want to sustain that Vives’s presentation is systematic, or particularly clear or successful. 
However, I do argue that one feature of De ratione dicendi is it presents all the traditional duties 
of oratory dealing with persuasion, but claims that they should be incorporated into new, more 
contemporary, and less adversarial genres, and in relatively flexible ways. In this way, adversity 
and discord can be built into genres and modes of writing and talking that never break the public 
image of concord. Thus, De ratione can be read as a counterpart to the problem over the use of 
                                                          
1047 The only larger study focusing on De ratione dicendi is Cooney’s dissertation defended in 1966 and entitled 
De ratione dicendi: a Treatise on rhetoric by Juan Luis Vives. Recently the most significant contributions have 
been George 1992; Rodríquez Peregrina 1996; Mack 2005; Mack 2008. 
1048 He strongly defends the development of new styles in his De disciplinis as well. See Vives: DD, 140-141.  
1049 Mack 2008, 263, 274; George 1992, 166-171.  




rhetoric as it was presented in De disciplinis. 
 All the developments described by Mack, and the partial lack of specific examples 
in De ratione turn it into a somewhat strange rhetorical work because of its complex structure 
and differences vis-à-vis the existing corpus, which might explain its rather modest successes 
in the market for rhetorical handbooks.1051 Consequently, Vives’s De ratione cannot be situated 
in the long tradition of simplification and visualization of rhetorical theory, described famously 
by Walter Ong in his Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse 
to the Art of Reason. Unlike the tradition culminating in Petrus Ramus that aspired to clear 
organization, Vives has very little faith in a closed and manageable set of categories for realizing 
the duties of rhetoric, which in truth led to a complication of some basic points of rhetorical 
theory.1052 The fact that the work is pronouncedly non-practical and unsuitable for elementary 
education, however, might have a distinctive reason in Vives’s own mind. Already Mayans y 
Siscar noticed that Vives’s De ratione was meant for those acquainted with the arts and 
sciences, and not for elementary education – something that is picked up by Bonilla.1053 If one 
takes into account that in De disciplinis a knowledge of things guaranteed by dialectical learning 
actually precedes rhetorical education, and that Vives’s De disciplinis heavily criticises 
rhetorical invention based on a collection of commonplaces, it might be inferred that Vives’s 
aim is not to write a simple handbook on the art of eloquence in the first place. Despite the 
presence of certain genres related to school exercises in Part three, Vives’s De ratione 
effectively represents a glaring complication of rhetorical theory, something that should be 
avoided in any practical handbook of rhetoric where it would be important to keep the 
categorization relatively simple. Thus, De ratione does not provide a clear-cut entry through a 
few easily approachable categories to rhetoric for young schoolboys because it is not meant to 
do that in the first place. Rather, De ratione’s more general focus on decorum heavily suggests 
that it aspires to advice those already familiar with the traditional framework of rhetoric found 
in Roman handbooks, who know their dialectical invention, and who can already be considered 
experienced and prudent – one of the preconditions for an entry to the secrets of persuasion 
already in De disciplinis. 
  But one does not have to interpret all the implications of De ratione in the light 
                                                          
1051 It was printed three times in the 1530s. In 1533 in Louvain, in 1536 in Basel, and in 1537 in Cologne. The 
existing scholarship agrees that the work was not very successful, Mack 2008, 275; González González 2007, 98-
99.  
1052 Existing scholarship has often noticed this, see Noreña 1986; George 1992, 157.  




of Vives’s other works in order to claim that De ratione is not meant for elementary education, 
since the Spaniard himself explicitly argues this in the preface. Once again, he starts by claiming 
that two things form the bonds of societies, justice and language, and that language is the 
stronger and more influential for humans, since it draws the minds of all men unto itself, and 
dominates the passions. Thus, whereas justice appeals only to those of appropriate minds, 
language can potentially cover all men with its immense power.1054 After presenting the 
capacities of rhetoric for good and bad, Vives proceeds to criticise heavily those who believe 
that rhetoric should be taught straight after grammar in the educational ladder, by arguing that 
this would be a way of disassociating rhetoric from a substantial knowledge of res. After making 
the link to dialectical argumentation, he finishes by claiming that if one wants to get something 
useful out of rhetoric, it should not be studied by young boys, and adults who are ignorant of, 
“all arts, customs, laws, passions of the soul, experience of all civil and human life.”1055 In short, 
Vives reaffirms the position taken in De disciplinis that rhetoric is meant for the experienced 
and prudent – not for elementary education. 
 The treatise is divided into three parts, the first of which is dedicated to the 
abundance of style and knowledge of words, the second to further questions of style and 
elocution, duties of the orator, decorum, and disposition, with the third part being organized 
around different genres. Out of the three books, it is mainly in the Parts two and three that Vives 
focuses on the aspects of rhetorical theory that truly deal with the persuasive possibilities of 
rhetoric in a relevant manner. In Part three, organized around the genres of eloquence, Vives 
introduces rather drastic modifications into the very core of rhetorical theory, doing away with 
the three traditional genres of the art of eloquence – namely judicial, deliberative, and 
demonstrative. Their place in Vives’s treatment is taken by genres that either teach about things 
(res) – namely description, probable narration, history, apologues, fables, and poetic fictions, – 
or teach about words (verba) – including paraphrase, epitome, explication, commentary, and 
                                                          
1054 Vives: DR, 3: “Qui humanae consociotationis vinculum dixerunt esse iustitiam et sermonem, hi nimirum acute 
inspexerunt vim ingenii humani, quorum duorum sermo certe fortiori est ac validior inter homines, propterea quod 
iustitia, ut mitis & blanda, in solis mentibus recte ac probe instutis aliquid impetrat iuris; sermo autem & mentes 
ad se allicit, & in affectibus dominatur, quorum in totum hominem impotens est regnum, & praegrave.” Vives’s 
use of justice here refers to it more in the general spirit of aequitas and natural law than positive law since he 
underlines the fact that it binds only men who already judge rightly. Moreover, it is described as soft whereas 
coercive positive law in De disciplinis is portrayed as strong.  
1055 Vives: DR, 7: “His iactis fundamentis discenda est Rhetorice, si quem illius exercitationis fructum cupimus, 
non in pueritia vel adolescentia, in ruditate illa artium omnium, morum, legum, affectuum animi, consuetudinis 





 There are certainly a number of rather diverse reasons for opting for these genres. 
Description and narration in themselves do not necessarily constitute fully-fledged genres, but 
offer insight into one of the basic duties of the orator, which is to create static and temporal 
mental pictures in a way that can be applied to almost all other genres mentioned here. Some 
other genres, such as fables, reflect closely the kind of exercises a pupil would face in an 
educational context, and are thus of practical use since their connection to progymnasmata and 
rhetorical tasks proposed by Vives himself in De disciplinis is quite evident – although they 
could potentially be activated for other purposes as well.1057 Others, moreover, reflect a 
transformation in the use of rhetoric and writing in an exceedingly literary world. Thus, the 
sections on commentary and translation, to take an example, describe the basic humanist tools 
of the philological project of regaining and adapting the tradition of classical antiquity to 
Renaissance context. Furthermore, the seminal importance given to history as an ethical genre 
of teaching through exempla, constituted a key humanist genre in the early sixteenth-century 
princely context, as epitomized by Thomas More’s History of Richard III – a critique of tyranny 
written in the form of a history. Unsurprisingly, Vives’s depiction of history underlines, among 
other things, its potentially moral nature and describes the kind of oration included in histories 
as being political.1058  
 Since Vives’s description in the Part three disregards traditional genres of 
eloquence as cornerstones of rhetorical theory, what is effectively missing in De ratione is the 
presence of deliberative or adversarial rhetoric as a distinctive genre of the art of elocution. 
When assessing this, it should however be borne in mind that Vives’s De consultatione, printed 
in 1533 together with De ratione, is indeed partly based on deliberative rhetoric traditionally 
centred on considerations of the good (honestum) and the useful (utile). De consultatione is 
essentially a handbook for counselling that tries to incorporate theory from deliberative rhetoric 
into a context that is pronouncedly different.1059 Moreover, Vives’s Declamationes syllanae had 
already witnessed a remarkable understanding of how to place precepts drawn from different 
rhetorical genres – judicial, deliberative, and demonstrative – into a coherent whole in a manner 
                                                          
1056 For a similar categorization of different genres, see George 1992, 166.  
1057 In De consultatione, Vives discusses the use of fictional fables as a non-adversary genre that can be useful for 
the counsellor in approaching the prince, see Chapter four.   
1058 Vives: DR, 192: “Oratio, atque orationis sensa erunt plane politica: cuiusmodi esse solent senum, in republica 
prudentum.”  




that effectively blurs the strict lines between the three. Vives’s letter writing manual De 
conscribendis epistolis too incorporated some of the theory of epideictic rhetoric into its overall 
structure in order to be able to denounce vice, and praise virtue in those who are superior to 
oneself.1060 More generally, one of Vives’s main points about rhetoric throughout his work is 
that the duties and precepts of oratory can be very flexibly realized in a number of genres, and 
adversity is indeed present in De ratione despite the absence of explicit adversarial genres. 
What Vives is essentially doing throughout De ratione is incorporating the theory of persuasion 
found in classical tradition into circumstances that do not necessarily favour open and 
symmetric confrontation – so crucial to deliberative and judicial genres. It is indicative of this 
that in his later De anima – openly meant to be in an intertextual dialogue with his other works 
– Vives writes, “we give our consent more easily to a simple fable than to arguments prepared 
for a fight and for competition. And for this reason rhetoric is more useful than dialectic for 
inspiring confidence in the people, as we have shown elsewhere.”1061 This, however, does not 
mean that adversity and conflict are absent from Vives’s understanding of discussion and 
rhetoric – quite on the contrary.  
 This is glaringly visible in the second part of De ratione where the duties of an 
orator (offici) are thoroughly treated. The second part starts with an extensive description of a 
number of issues related to the selection of correct style built around the classical metaphor of 
discourse as human body found in Cicero.1062 This metaphor aspires to explain the elements of 
a beautiful oration as to its body and soul.1063 A decisive turn takes place, however, in the Part 
11 of the second book dedicated to the dignity of an oration (dignitas), where Vives informs the 
reader that henceforth the focus will not be on the separate instruments of a discourse, but on 
the adaptation of these to different tasks under the guidance of prudence.1064 What follows, 
before Vives moves on to the different duties (officium) of rhetoric, is yet another staunch 
defence of the necessity of persuasion. Once again, Vives argues that language was given to 
men in order to communicate one’s thoughts transparently to others, and that this would have 
                                                          
1060 Vives: “De conscribendis epistolis”, 16-17.  
1061 Vives: DA, 77: “Quocirca promptius fabellae consentimus simpliciter narratae, quam argumentis ex praeparato 
ad pugna, certamenque instructis: eoque ad fidem vulgo faciendam utilior est rhetorica, quam dialectica, uti est a 
nobis alio loco demonstratum.” Dialectic refers here to disputatio.  
1062 Cicero: De oratore, iii, lii.199. 
1063 Vives: DR, 66-103. This part describes an abundance of qualities of oration discussing their suitability to 
different persons, times, subjects and persons. 
1064 Vives: DR, 106: “Hactenus exposita sunt nobis atque ostensa instrumenta artis. Iam deinceps operi accomodari 




indeed been enough in a world of pure and simple communication where everyone could have 
expressed their minds directly and nobody would have suspected that they lied.1065 But in the 
world of sin, this harmony and trust of concord ceased to work, and instruments of persuasion 
where searched for instead. Thus, in the current state there are two modes of persuasion: one 
appeals to reason whereas the other speaks to the immensely powerful passions that must be 
activated when reason is not enough.1066 It is the second mode of persuasion he is dealing with 
in De ratione dicendi, which is dedicated to rhetoric. 
 After the dignity of the discourse, Vives moves on to the goals of the discourse 
and the orator, which he thinks are four. The first of these is teaching (docere), and it belongs 
to the discourse itself, whereas the three others are strictly speaking the duties of the orator. 
These three are: persuading or proving, moving, and what he prefers to call retaining 
(detinendi), and not delighting. This last points emphasizes the fact that rhetoric should never 
be only about pleasure but that retaining should only serve the duty to teach.1067 After presenting 
his basic view on teaching, which describes ways of making oneself understood, Vives moves 
on to a large presentation of persuasion, dealing with ways, “of making the other believe what 
we want him to believe.”1068 The Valencian starts by affirming, very much in the vein of De 
consultatione, that there are things that persuade without words – the most important being the 
integrity of life.  
As to the persuasive elements of the discourse (oratio) itself, Vives moves quickly 
to the presentation of the stasis theory, strong in the Greek and Byzantine traditions, through 
which the exact point of disagreement in a question can be reconstructed.1069 This is of some 
importance since the finality of each persuasive task can only be fixed in relation to the main 
status of the question – the point on which the disagreement depends. What is presupposed in 
the exposition of question is adversity, whether it is a real disagreement with an existing 
adversary or with an imagined opponent, against whom we argue in our own head, as Vives 
writes.1070 Thus, under the treatment of status, he situates questions explicitly dealing with 
                                                          
1065 Vives: DR, 106: “Hoc solum suffecisset in natura illa integra, & qualis e manibus artificis sui prodiit, scilicet 
in claritate illa ingeniorum, & quisque facile esset, quacunque voluisset, elocutus, & audiens liquido intellexisset, 
tum in tanta animorum probitate ac simplicitate, et dicens recta exprompsisset, quae sentiebat, & audiens habuisset 
fidem ei quem suspicatus non esset mentiri.” 
1066 Vives: DR, 107.  
1067 Vives: DR, 108-109, 130.  
1068 Vives: DR, 111: “Persuadere, est efficere, ut credat quis, id quod volumus.”  
1069 Vives: DR, 112-114. For stasis theory in the Byzantine tradition, see Monfasani 1976, 250-252. 
1070 Vives: DR, 112: “Quam enim rem duo contra dicentes ambiguam faciunt, ea est quaestio, & velut scopus, sive 




deliberative, forensic, and even demonstrative rhetoric, which often, according to Vives, can be 
something more than a mere exposition of facts if the ultimate goal of the discourse is to 
persuade.1071 The inclusion of the demonstrative genre as a place where debatable questions can 
be found is very revealing: the question at stake is not necessarily an explicitly stated one, but 
can be based on one’s assessment of the point on which the possibilities of persuasion hang. 
Thus, even in seemingly non-adversarial genres there might be a hidden question related to the 
hearer´s world of ideas, and to what the speaker is aiming to achieve with his discourse. 
 After the presentation of the status of the question, Vives moves on to persons, 
arguing that one has to consider, “who you are arguing against, and who you yourself are,” and 
progresses to discuss different kinds of asymmetrical situations.1072 What follows is a 
description of the different strategies for refuting adversaries’ arguments, depending on their 
quality. From the analysis of the adversary, Vives moves on to the different ways in which the 
hearer can be persuaded, underlining heavily the advantages of speaking in a manner that hides 
the adversarial nature of one’s rhetoric. True, those who do not mind being beaten in an 
argument, like students, can be openly attacked, but to “those who resist” one has to speak in a 
manner that “does not create the impression that we fight them.”1073 Vives discusses more open 
strategies where fighting is not suppressed, and argues that this can be especially useful when, 
“we are not persuading the one we are arguing against, but those who are present,” but much of 
the emphasis is on the different ways of hiding confrontation.1074 Throughout the section on 
persuasion, Vives never forgets to stress that the words we are using should also be adapted to 
the understanding of the one we are persuading.  
 In this section much of the key issues of adversary rhetoric are explicitly treated, 
and although the part is detached from the traditional genres of adversary rhetoric, some theory 
for treating deliberative and judicial questions is presented. Despite of this, De ratione dicendi 
gives the reader the impression that whenever there is a question of any sort in which differing 
opinions can be presented explicitly or in the mind of the audience, then all the precepts offered 
can be activated in a flexible manner. One can thus imagine that highly debatable opinions can 
be introduced in a veiled form into a variety of genres that avoid open confrontation, yet aspire 
to achieve persuasion. All this plays a role in what Vives says about passions and emotions in 
                                                          
1071 Vives: DR, 111-114.   
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1073 Vives: DR, 116: “ad eos, qui repugnant, ita dicendum, ut nihil videare minus quam praeliari...."  
1074 Vives: DR, 118: “licebit etiam aperte adhiberi artem contra adversarium, si non tam illi persuadere quippiam 




De ratione.  
 The section on passions and emotions entitled, De movendis affectibus, presents 
a dual categorization of emotions as good ones, borne out of love, and bad ones stemming from 
hatred, and, despite some ethical ethos and deep reservations about destructive passions, 
presents ways of dealing with both. Vives argues that since original sin men begin to love 
themselves so much that they are unjust judges of their own qualities, and consequently 
extremely prone to destructive passions vis-à-vis others – a reason for which it is easy to activate 
harmful passions born out of hatred (odium).1075 The use of constructive emotions, born of love, 
for its part, demands more skill and art in the current corrupted state of man. The most general 
and the most important advice Vives gives to the reader is that one should analyse as thoroughly 
as possible the mind of the one we are persuading, and, if possible, “find out his mentality and 
character,” while considering the question and arranging the material. In analysing thoroughly 
the passionate dispositions of the audience towards different objects, one can reconstruct the 
basic attitudes one is using or potentially changing through one’s own discourse. Moreover, one 
should consider the kind of things that would raise the hearer’s passion or emotion in concrete 
cases.1076  
 Passions hold an intermediate position between the mind and the body. Since they 
are, however, slightly closer to the corporeal, they are better stimulated through “singular cases” 
than universal ones, since the particular is closer to one’s immediate senses.1077 This kind of a 
truly emotional speech has to draw from a great abundance of places, proceeding very swiftly 
through the discourse, and it does not lead to great harm if the arguments presented are 
somewhat mixed and confused. Vives is adamant in his demand that the use of passion and 
emotion he is talking about should hide this art cleverly, since one does not have to fight with 
a passion openly, but draw it from its hiding place and use it with skill and artfulness.1078 The 
whole section underlines the duty of the one using passions to be a true master of them, to play 
them with a subtlety that goes unnoticed by the one used, and that circumvents open 
confrontation. 
 After a short treatment on the art of holding the hearer’s attention, Vives moves 
                                                          
1075 Vives: DR, 119-121.  
1076 Vives: DR, 121: “Invenda mens illorum, & totum ingenium, tantisper, dum quae ad rem nostram faciant, 
excogitamus....” The verb used here is invenio referring to rhetorical inventio. What is suggested here is exactly 
what Vives’s De consultatione had realized in its precepts for deliberations. 
1077 Vives: DR, 123: “...ideoque rebus singularibus celerius, quam universalibus....”  




on to the last and by far the most extensive part of the second book dedicated to decorum. It is 
in the treatment of decorum that all the separate parts of rhetorical theory come together. This 
is because decorum decides the correct balance of viewpoints in particular cases – taking into 
consideration a number of contextual elements. As Mack has argued, Vives’s treatment of 
decorum is rare, and by the far the most extensive since classical antiquity.1079 Among other 
things, it testifies to a typically Vivesian attitude to a simplistic theory of rhetoric where separate 
elements could be used for producing certain specific outcomes. This is essentially the ultimate 
message Vives wants to convey, irrespective of all individual elements: “every active action 
has what puts it in motion, and every passive action has its goal; all instruments of rhetoric have 
to be adapted to these.”1080 More concretely, decorum could be seen as the guiding principle for 
the arrangement and proper use of all the material of elocution, style, sentences, words, 
arguments, and a number of other issues treated in other parts of the work, and it is only partially 
united to the traditional exposition of the right arrangement of oration (dispositio). This very 
general notion of decorum has visible links to a number of issues in De ratione.  
 First, the whole section on decorum is closely tied to the concept of prudence, 
which links to all questions of practical wisdom, moral philosophy and the hierarchy of the 
trivium as they were presented in De disciplinis. The close intertextuality with De disciplinis is 
perceivable on a number of occasions; in relation to the adaptation of arguments into different 
contexts Vives argues for instance,“these things have been exposed in the treatments on 
probability and first philosophy.” accentuating the link between dialectic and rhetoric.1081 With 
this respect, the more specifically rhetorical virtue of decorum is ultimately subjected to the 
more general ethical virtue of prudentia – practical wisdom. Prudentia should guide what the 
ultimate balance of decorum can be. As a matter of fact, and witnessing the integral union 
between the two, Vives argued explicitly in his De conscribendis that all invention, not only 
epistolary, ultimately stems from prudence even though the overall treatment could be said to 
fall under notions of decorum.1082 More generally, the humanist urge to unite decorum, 
prudence and the duty of docere, has been noted by scholarship. Victoria Kahn has argued for 
                                                          
1079 Mack 2005, 84.  
1080 Vives: DR, 134: “Porro actio quaecunque agens habet, a quo, & patiens, in quod proficiscitur; istis aptanda 
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1081 Vives: DR, 134-135: “Quum ergo dicimus, haec sunt cogitanda omnia, dicens, audiens, locus, tempus & 
materia, seu res, de quibus dicitur. In his sunt illa omnia, qua exposita sunt in tractatu probabilitatis, & prima 
philosophia....”  
1082 Vives: “De conscribendis epistolis”, 4: “Initio illud praefandum est, inventionem omnem non solum epistolae, 
verum cuiuscunque alterius generis sermonis orationisve, ut etiam in his quae loquimur, haud penitus artis esse, 




a very close connection of oratorical decorum to some standard of ethical prudence. According 
to Kahn, inborn disposition or innate ideas found in the classical tradition were invoked in order 
to highlight the close of connection of ethics, prudence, and decorum in Aristotle and Cicero – 
as well as in Erasmus’s practices of writing and reading. Cicero, in his Orator, drew an analogy 
between prudence in life and decorum in oratory, arguing that they shared the same general rule 
that consisted in considering propriety, and discussed decorum together with moral goodness 
in his De officiis.1083  
 Yet, decorum itself clearly refers to the specific use of prudence in the domain of 
rhetoric in De ratione. Very generally, in classical rhetoric decorum could refer to the organic 
unity of an oration, to a beauty derived from the right proportions of all its constitutive parts in 
relation to the duties of oratory, audience, and the matter at hand – something taken up by Vives 
in De ratione.1084 Many of Vives’s conceptual distinctions in this part draw from the most 
exhaustive classical treatment of decorum found in Quintilian’s Institutio’s eleventh book 
starting with the most general categorization of decorum as dealing with the speaker, the 
recipient, the place, and the time.1085 In Institutio, Quintilian had also made the point about the 
centrality of decorum as a general guiding principle for the selection of rhetorical 
instruments.1086 What is lacking in Vives, however, is the specific stress on judicial cases that 
covers the last part of Quintilian’s treatment, giving Vives’s account an even stronger 
appearance of generality detached from a particular style or genre of rhetoric. Despite this, what 
he shares with the Roman orator is an understanding of decorum that always points towards 
fulfilling the duties of oratory, ultimately facilitating persuasion. In fact, the organization of 
Vives’s earlier De consultatione could be read as an example of applied rhetoric where most of 
the issues described under the heading of decorum were given a more specific form in the genre 
of counselling. Thus, just like in Quintilian, decorum is a way to think about the particularities 
of situations, but only insofar as it helps the speaker perform his tasks of moving, delighting, 
teaching, and ultimately, of persuading. Rather than forming part of the tradition of later 
sixteenth-century civilized discussion where conflict and adversity is played down, decorum is 
the most general tool through which right tone, arguments, and style for the purposes set are 
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chosen.1087 Inside these parameters, it might be of utmost importance to hide adversity but only 
because it provides the most effective way to achieve one’s ends. Vives’s decorum is, thus, a 
form of prudence that is intrinsically bound up with the most classical duties of rhetoric that 
cannot be confined in a closed set of precepts – a point Erasmus also made in his most extensive 
discussion on decorum in his Ecclesiastes.1088 
 This kind of adversity can of course be interpreted in various ways in different 
texts. The most general idea is that there is an adversity to overcome whenever there is a 
possible counter argument explicitly stated, or merely imagined. The adversity described in De 
ratione has at some points connotations that go way beyond rhetoric understood as a 
confrontation between merely two or more conflicting opinions. Vives’s emphasis on prudent 
men as doctors of the soul throughout his written work underline often that this is an adversity 
between truth and error, cure and disease, good and bad, reason and passion, or even piety and 
sin. The point is simply that non-adversarial-genres and modes can often get things done in a 
more effective way.1089 What is more, the change in genres can link to the upholding of concord 
in further fruitful ways. When the duties of oratory are embedded in pronouncedly non-
adversarial genres, rhetoric combines a claim for concord with a strong call for persuasive 
speech. This is because non-adversary genres both recognize and reproduce existing hierarchies 
and status quo while simultaneously offering possibilities of persuasion inside that 
framework.1090 This is an important point indeed in Vives’s mind, and presents a partial answer 
to the problem of rhetoric in republics and monarchies in De disciplinis. Republics were highly 
susceptible because they presented a culture nurturing discord, whereas in monarchies language 
had ceased to be of any importance. In De ratione discord functions largely inside concord: it 
is only under the surface of concord that questions of discord are negotiated. Here one has to 
remember that one of Vives’s main points throughout De disciplinis and De ratione – clearly 
visible in the selection of genres – is that rhetorical persuasion is not merely directed to action 
in contexts where decision making is involved; rhetoric is present in most language uses some 
of which frame expectations on a much more general level.1091 One can also think of Erasmian 
dialogues that do not necessarily lead to action, but are staged as curing the mind, a great 
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example of which is Ciceronianus, where the position defended by Nosoponus – the 
spokesperson for strict Ciceronian imitation – is systematically described as sickness. More 
generally, one can think of all Erasmian literature in general that aims at transformation. But as 
De consultatione, printed together with De ratione three times in the 1530s clearly shows, one 
crucial aspect of rhetorical theory deals with deliberations in the court context where open 
discourse should also be avoided. 
 What is more, unlike in discussions (sermo), in rhetoric (oratio), the negotiation 
is predominantly one-way traffic. The prudent man harnesses all his knowledge on the question 
and dispositions of the audience to achieve what he has set as his goal. In fact, despite the 
presence of some stasis theory, De ratione is not very helpful for inventing arguments or 
analysing particular questions. It rather focuses on elocution as a place where arguments can be 
given a persuasive form starting from the analysis of a range of contextual phenomena and 
especially the qualities of the audience. The prudent man employing the selection of genres and 
strategies of De ratione for the communication of truth is a humanist scholar of Vives’s mould, 
drawing from a variety of literary – even academic – genres in his rhetorical activities. It is true 
that while the treatment of emotions draws heavily from oral rhetoric, no thorough distinction 
between the emotional possibilities of oral and literary rhetoric is ever made in De ratione. 
However, the classification of genres reveals a deep interest in the possibilities of literary 
rhetoric and De ratione could indeed be more useful for a scholar writing in non-adversarial 
genres who aims at persuasion than to an oral speaker in the institutional context of the court 
or the General Estates. 
 One of the main trends of Vives’s De ratione is an emphasis on the general nature 
of rhetoric stemming from prudence, and decorum that cannot be condensed into any set of 
closed precepts. The notion of prudence, however, was often intrinsically linked to an 
understanding of the mind of the audience, and on taking their world of ideas as the point of 
departure in the selection of style and arguments. But ultimately the understanding of the 
audience for the successful performance of the duties of oratory was an interpretation of the 
mental processes of his mind – of the ways in which judgements were made and the will moved. 
This strong emphasis on the mind of the recipient was one of the reasons why De ratione 
explicitly referred back to the knowledge of De anima, to an understanding of how the mental 
procedures of human mind worked, and how judgements came about.1092  
                                                          





Studying the Mind in De anima. Reason, Judgement, and the Will 
 
If De ratione dicendi is a somewhat understudied text, this most certainly is not the case with 
De anima, which has been claimed to be the precursor of modern psychology in a number of 
twentieth-century interpretations.1093 More recently, its significance for western thought and 
empirical psychology has been praised, but some more historically minded studies have 
emerged. In these, the focus has not been on understanding the work primarily as a precursor 
of later developments on the study of the soul and psychology, but on placing De anima in the 
context of some form of contemporary intellectual discourse. The scholarship of Mario 
Sancipriano, Carlos Noreña, Valerio del Nero and Lorenzo Casini has shed light on the 
connections of De anima to the traditional discussion on the soul – in its medieval and classical 
forms – with all four agreeing on the fundamental principle that we should read De anima in 
relation to its historical precedents. There is some divergence, however, about what exactly the 
right context for reading Vives should be.1094  
 All four have insisted in one way or another on the traditional point that Vives’s 
De anima participates in the timeless questions of the soul from the point of view of a moralist 
and educational writer.1095 As all scholars have noticed, throughout the work one can perceive 
a strong urge to guide the discussion away from metaphysical considerations of the soul to a 
                                                          
161: “Caeterum quae sunt attentions et benevolentiae, ea vero non sunt loci huius, sed tractationis de anima.” In 
the part on the moving of emotions and passions Vives also writes that proper treatment of emotions belongs to a 
treatment of the soul (De anima), Vives: DR, 119, “Quorum omnium exactior tractatio, non est loci huius, sed 
propria librorum de Anima.” Even though De anima was printed only in 1538, the allusions to a book on the soul 
in De ratione and De disciplinis indicate that Vives was already working on De anima at the turn of the 1530s.  
1093 The idea was possibly coined by Foster Watson in his article entitled “The Father of Modern Psychology” 
published in 1915. Sancipriano also underlines the the originality of the work Sancipriano 1957, 5-7, 87. Noreña 
has also supported this idea to a certain extent, Noreña 1970, 290-291. Abellán calls this interpretation “totally 
justified”, Abellán 1986, 114. Ijsewijn also reproduces the idea, see Ijsewijn 1988, 196.  
1094 Casini has emphasized the continuum from Middle Ages to the Renaissance whereas Noreña and Del Nero 
have focused more although not exclusively on its classical and humanist context, see Casini 2006,11-12; Noreña 
1989, 71-80, 99-100; Del Nero 2008b, 279-280. Sancipriano also argues that Vives should not be read only as a 
precursor of later philosophy, but as an innovative reader of Aristotle and Galen who is compared to Amerbach 
and Melanchthon among other sixteenth century writers on the soul, see Sanciprianio 1957, 125. 
1095 Casini 2006, 16 “In order to emphasize the complexities of our intellectual and emotional life, he avoided the 
systematic rigidity of scholastic philosophy, preferring a looser descriptive approach, which, in the opinion of 
William Dilthey, marks the transition from metaphysical to descriptive and analytic psychology.” 19 “It is also in 
light of this fact that Vives’s constant effort to understand human nature not as a metaphysician but as a moralist 
and a pedagogue should be understood.”; Noreña 1970, 255; Noreña 1989, 93: “Here, as on other occasions, the 
reader has the overwhelming impression that Vives was much more interested in those operations of the soul that 
are directly or indirectly related to the study of man’s emotional and moral life than in those operations that are 
more relevant to a speculative theory of knowledge.” Del Nero 2008b, 284-285. Dilthey saw the work as a major 
contribution to analytic and empirical psychology, Dilthey 1977, 423-429. The practical dimension of the work is 




more descriptive and humanist approach. Yet, even though there are numerous links to 
questions of ethics, politics and, the private sphere, how exactly the connection from the 
problematic around the soul to moral and social thought works is not always spelled out. Here, 
as usual, Vives himself can partly be blamed, since despite the numerous and almost 
omnipresent hints at the importance of the analysis of the soul for prudence, education, 
judgement and ethics – the way in which this connection is supposed to function – is never 
explicitly expounded. Moreover, the eclectic nature of the work should never be forgotten: it 
does indeed partake in discussions that are of purely metaphysical nature, and somewhat 
eclectically moves across traditions that have seemingly little to do with one another. Some of 
this is because a treatment of the soul was supposed to cover all issues relevant to a set of 
questions as they appeared in the tradition. Thus, rather than being a book built around one 
overarching argument, it is a work based on constant discussion with the existing tradition on a 
variety of points that are at times only loosely related to each other. It is symptomatic that under 
the heading of a single emotion, one can move from a definition of an emotion to its physiology 
and to a description of its empirical manifestations in a relatively loose and unorganized way. 
 The presence of very traditional elements, stemming from the medieval 
developments around Aristotle’s corpus as well as from some sixteenth-century metaphysical 
discussions has been acknowledged by modern scholarship.1096 The Aristotelian framework of 
the work is quite evident: the basic tripartite division of the soul into vegetative, nutritive, and 
intellectual corresponds to Aristotle’s categorization in his De anima, and much of the 
vocabulary employed is from the toolbox of the Aristotelian tradition. Moreover, Aristotle’s De 
anima – embedded in the institutional framework and especially in the curricula of the Faculties 
of Arts throughout Europe – had given the initial push to various problems regarding the soul 
that could not be easily circumvented.1097 In Aristotle’s treatise, the soul was defined as the 
formal cause of all animated beings – blurring any clear-cut distinctions between psychology 
and biology. This made the emergence of all kinds of conceptual problems related in different 
ways to the relationship of the body and the soul possible. These problems were discussed in 
the Middle Ages, and in the Renaissance, and is a feature not absent from Vives either.1098  
 Not all questions on the soul were investigated in a theological and metaphysical 
vacuum. The problem of intellect and intellection contributed to the theory of knowledge in the 
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late medieval context, and the discussion arising from the material basis of human soul so much 
emphasized by Aristotle lead to a number of specific problems. The most pressing one was that 
of the immortality of the soul – widely discussed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries – a 
problem that could be linked both to the possible material extension and to the individual nature 
of the soul. At the heart of the problem, there lay a potential conflict between two roles of the 
intellect soul. It could be the individual form of a man on the one hand, but it simultaneously 
had to partake in universal knowledge that was of general nature. How to account for the unity 
of intellection and the individuality of the soul was a pressing question indeed, and in 1513 the 
Fifth Lateran Council gave a declaration according to which the soul was immortal yet infused 
individually – a position that could be proven philosophically and that should be defended by 
everyone. In the aftermath of the Council, Pietro Pomonazzi famously argued – initiating a 
heated debate – that the immortality of the soul was a purely revealed truth by sustaining that 
all intellection was intrinsically linked to matter and physiology, and that, hence, there was no 
rational basis to believe that the soul does not die with the body.1099 In addition to the theological 
and metaphysical debates arising from the soul, much discussion was also dedicated to 
questions detached from immediate metaphysical connotations in the language of Aristotelian 
natural philosophy. Thus, sense perception and its relation to the body and the intellect had long 
been debated in purely philosophical terms in the scholastic tradition.1100 The questions around 
the Pomponazzi affair are at the heart of Vives’s longest section of the first part entitled, “what 
is the Soul?” Drawing eclectically from different traditions, Vives strongly argues against 
Pomponazzi’s duality of reason, and vehemently defends the immortality of the soul – although 
he never goes in depth to the conceptual problems involved in the discussion.1101 However, 
despite the presence of a number of traditional problems on the metaphysical status of the soul, 
on intellection, free will, and individuality, a clear move towards the language of moral and 
educational treatises is perceivable in Vives leading, among other things, to a strong inter-
textuality with both his De ratione and his De disciplinis. Thus, the work should also be read 
as a reflection on some of the basic educational, moral, and pedagogical problems Vives was 
tackling in his earlier works. 
 The ethical and political dimension of the book is flamboyantly visible right from 
the start. The most general idea of the usefulness of the treatise is spelled out in the dedication 
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letter to the duke of Béjar, in which Vives announces that he wants to purge the soul – “the 
fountain and origin of all our good and bad things” – so that the streams of our actions would 
“run pure.” He united this claim in the paragraph to self-knowledge.1102 In discussing the 
significance of the Book three dedicated to emotions and passions Vives, however, emphasizes 
that knowledge of them constitutes, “the foundation of all moral disciplines, both public and 
private,” and that no other art or discipline would be more useful, “for a prince to govern 
himself, his subjects, and all people.”1103 Furthermore, already in his De disciplinis – which 
refers to De anima – Vives had made very similar points emphasizing the importance of the 
knowledge of the soul and passions for everyone as a form of self-knowledge. This knowledge 
functioned as a continuum of the precept “know thyself,” but also as an introduction to how 
passions and emotions could be evoked, stimulated, and tempered linking all this to moral and 
political philosophy.1104  
 Thus, Vives is arguing both that self-knowledge and the knowledge of others is 
ultimately based on our understanding of the soul and passions, and that the social point is 
extremely important for those in need of moral philosophy as doctors of the social body, a 
category that can supposedly comprise not only the prince but anyone dealing with these 
matters. The social dimension can potentially refer to a range of activities undertaken by the 
doctor of the social body who has to purify the source of human activities. He could use the 
information in pedagogical tasks as a teacher in assessing the ingenia of the pupils, but also in 
all of his work as a writer or a speaker since the information provided by De anima can 
potentially help him to select the right tone to both address the emotions in an edifying way and 
to educate them.1105 The ultimate goal is to purify the soul and the rational faculty so that, free 
                                                          
1102 Vives: DA, praefatio: “Est quoque ipsa tam admirabilium vitae totius operum inventrix & artifex, ut spectari 
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from internal impediments, it could cultivate emotions rightly and partake in truth in a simple 
way, a point Vives stressed in his later De veritate fidei Christianae as well.1106 Understood in 
this sense, De anima provides the best possible tool for a statesman or a humanist to act as a 
doctor of the social and individual bodies, it makes possible the realization of an old Greek 
ideal.1107 Moreover, it provides a partial answer to Vives’s own analysis of social and political 
discord as passional disorders that hinder right judgement, and Vives effectively tells the reader 
that he has written about the multiplicity of judgements elsewhere.1108 
 In the introduction to the third book of De anima on passions, Vives criticises 
Aristotle on presenting passions and emotions only insofar as they are useful for the “political 
orator” implying that a purely technical understanding of emotions that can be mastered by the 
orator is not called for.1109 Vives’s presentation of single emotions in Book three most definitely 
does not rule this out; the exact context in which emotions and passions take place could also 
be employed for these purposes, and the explicit references in the rhetorical De ratione dicendi 
to the knowledge of De anima rather strengthens the ties between rhetoric and knowledge of 
passions.1110 Even though the general ethos of the work stresses, far more, the therapeutic ideal 
of teaching and learning how to cultivate emotions in an edifying way, its contents could well 
be evoked for the understanding of the mind of the people in order to use their mental 
dispositions and beliefs in different oratorical tasks.  
The idea that passions and emotions should not only be cured and restituted to 
their original and natural state, but effectively used or countered had been the presupposition of 
both De consultatione and De ratione dicendi, and it was the centrality of the audience that led 
Vives to argue in his De ratione dicendi that one should adopt its mind-set.1111 Among other 
things, the third book of De anima provides information on just these issues; how value-
judgements are affected by emotions and passions, what triggers them, and what calms them. 
In addition to De ratione openly referring to De anima in the part on passions, De disciplinis 
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had made the connection of rhetoric and passion integral; what vir prudens should do in a 
postlapsarian world comprises the need to be able to speak to emotions and passions, even those 
that are not necessarily edifying and good. These two uses of De anima could point to two 
different projects: the long-term humanist reform programme gets its culmination in the right 
cultivation of man’s cognitive and emotional dispositions, whereas rhetoric striving for 
immediate action could draw from De anima in ways that are more instrumental. 
 How to cultivate, educate, and use the possibilities of emotions of oneself and 
others is intrinsically linked to the functioning of the soul. The one central theme uniting De 
anima to all Vivesian social and moral philosophy can be described as the problematic around 
prudent judgement – the key point of all political and social thought, since human judgement is 
quite simply the origin of all moral actions. Since all Vivesian political and social reflection 
refers back to virtuous conduct dependent on the actions of the mind, the possibilities of prudent 
judgement to occur conceptually condition Vives’s educational and rhetorical reflections.1112 
Moreover, it frames the possibilities of Vives’s social concordia, since social concord is 
predicated on inner peace and virtuous judgement. Thus, in the following I will focus on 
describing the possibilities and hindrances of prudent v as they appear in De anima. 
 
Prudence, Judgement, Reason, and the Will 
  
The teleological element of De anima guarantees that all human faculties, in a prelapsarian 
state, would perfectly perform the duty they were created for, something heavily emphasized 
by the Valencian throughout the work. Thus, in perfect harmony, all the faculties would fulfil 
simply the task they were meant for, reason would know what is true and what is good, and the 
will would embrace the judgement of the reason. The emotions too would be in a harmonious 
relationship with the ends they were destined for – they would be felt at right times for right 
reasons under the guidance of reason and judgement.1113 But after the fall, the actions of our 
soul do not run pure, a number of complications and internal strives have risen that make the 
harmonious relationship between different parts of the soul difficult.1114 Yet, even though all 
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our faculties have become less perfect for achieving their respected ends, Vives emphasizes 
throughout the work that man still possesses in the postlapsian world the seeds of goodness and 
truth – synderesis – that can be perfected through “practice, experience, instruction and 
meditation” opening thus a door to at least a relative earthly perfection.1115  
 These complications affect a number of procedures on different levels but the 
focus lies firmly on rational soul, and more concretely on the relationship between the 
composite intelligence, memory, and the will – with the output of passions interfering in 
manifold ways. Vives does of course present a system of internal senses preceding rational 
procedures, a feature of the sensitive soul shared with animals that played a crucial part in the 
tradition of faculty psychology by building a bridge from sense perception to reason.1116 All the 
five traditional internal senses, imagination, common sense, fantasy, estimation, and memory 
are present in Vives’s account on the soul, and all participate in different ways in the process of 
constructing objects based on sense perception for the use of reason. All five internal senses 
that had delimited, although very much interrelated functions come under the heading of simple 
intelligence (simplex intelligentia), because their operations were tied to sense perception, and 
they lacked the capacity to produce and handle propositional structure. Simple intelligence, 
responsible for the first understanding of the objects presented to the mind without engaging in 
a reasoning process, does have some internal and external impediments because of disturbances 
of attention, or because of a problem in the bodily composition. Yet, the main error in human 
understanding does not lie there. By far the most severe threats to understanding are posed on 
the level of the complicated procedures of reasoning, judging and willing, that take place on the 
highest echelon of the intellective soul. 
 The first of the procedures dealing with mental objects in a truly compositional 
way is reason (ratio) that operates with the kind of mental objects prepared by the simple 
intelligence, and is directed to truth and good in its speculative and practical forms respectively. 
The basic structure of reason is discursive. It can vary as to its penetration to the nature of 
things, the procedures it employs in its analysis, and in the way in which it advances through 
the mental pictures presented to it by the internal sense of fantasy, but throughout it employs 
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syncategorematic terms constructing propositions and arguments out of the material it has at its 
disposal.1117 One more hint as to what Vives has in mind can be found in the part on judgement 
where the Spaniard underlines the similarities between reason and the part of dialectic dealing 
with the invention of arguments.1118 Invention in dialectic is primarily a procedure for analysing 
a term using places (loci), so that its connections to surrounding terms can be mapped in depth. 
In the construction of propositions, reason, just like dialectical invention, will skip certain steps 
or places underlining its intuitive and unorganized dimension. All this is highly accentuated by 
the fact that the activities of reason take place in a close and potentially threatening connection 
to the most ambivalent of all internal senses – fantasy. 
 Fantasy appears in Vives’s De anima on various occasions from the last part of 
the first book all the way to the part on emotions. As opposed to the passive imagination, fantasy 
is always described in creative terms: even though its range is defined by what is perceived 
through senses, it nevertheless produces its objects, phantasms, in a wonderfully creative and 
free manner for the use of reason.1119 Typical examples of the creation of phantasma would be 
objects that are not directly perceived, yet are produced from perceivable elements, such as God 
or places one has not seen, but its creative touch is present in all objects produced for the 
reason.1120 Predictably, Vives highlights its importance for rational discourse, greatly 
underlining simultaneously that it is of utmost importance that reason is not entangled with 
phantasms taking the example of drunken and crazy people.1121 If fantasy takes over thinking, 
imposing its pictures on reason, understanding descends towards the mental world of animals 
ultimately lacking composite intelligence and reason that frees them from immediate 
experience, and makes serious deliberation about future impossible.1122  
 Vives tells much about fantasy, something possessive of a strong corporeal 
element, which lacks propositional structure, and is ultimately based on mental images that can 
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be composed of larger units than simple words, such as entire discourses.1123 Thus, the kind of 
objects or images fantasy can potentially bring to the consideration of reason can be clusters of 
things understood not necessarily as clear propositions but as pictures that present what is 
captured in the form of an image. What is potentially so threatening here is that Vives considers 
situations where what is presented to the next mental procedure – judgement – never truly passes 
through reason, but is a mere creation of fantasy. He states that this kind of judgement is “more 
frequent,” and based solely on fantasy that “draws violently to itself a certain kind of an opinion 
and judgement on what is good and bad.”1124 Moreover, even if a stereotypical situation for 
describing fantasy were a context in which, in the absence of sensible objects, one creates an 
emotion through the mere activity of fantasy – as in dreams – Vives is not referring merely to 
the subset of mental procedures that have a place in all of us; it is indeed possible that fantasy 
becomes dominant in some people. Actually, in a short part dedicated to composite intelligence, 
Vives argues that fantasy skips even copula, just lumping things together, and that this 
domination of fantasy is revealed in the language of, “children, and unwrought and dull 
men.”1125 
 This problem has, however, two links to Vives’s larger social thought since the 
question of how reason and judgement function is crucial for the possibilities of word to have 
an effect in the first place. First, it links closely to what he says about fantasy and description 
in his rhetorical De ratione dicendi. Even though Vives’s description of fantasy underlines its 
unpredictable nature, he emphasizes that it can be moved and the kind of material it has at its 
disposal can be affected. As Vives writes in his De anima, “men agitate each other’s fantasy 
and minds with words, consent, gestures, writings, signs that surpass the cognition of the 
brutes,” implying heavily the social dimension of fantasy.1126 In De ratione dicendi one could 
                                                          
1123 There is a moment where Vives likens the images of simple intelligence to simple words and fantasy to 
combined words, but in other moments, he is very clear that the objects of simple intelligence and fantasy can be 
comprised of bigger entities such as discourses. See Vives: DA, 83, 52: “...tanquam ex fonte fluit sermo: & 
simplicia verba, ex simplici intelligentia, composita ex phantasia, apta vero et connexa ex ratione coniungente & 
separante, sermo integer ex ratione discurrente, & iudicio aptante clausulas.”; “Neque vero simplex nominatur 
ideo, quod simplicia tantum cognoscat, hoc est singular rerum, ut sensus: sed quod nihil aliud quam comprehendit, 
ac velut intuetur, quae offeruntur, ea vero quantumlibet varia, composita, connexa: ut ratiocinationes, sermones 
longos, & multiplices, visa confusissima.”  
1124 Vives: DA, 147: “illud sufficit, & est frequentius, quod imaginationis movetur visis. Itaque sola phantasia 
trahente ad se tumultu suo specie quandam opinionis & iudicii, quod bonum sit, aut malum quod est ei obiectum, 
in omnes animi perturbationes versamur....”  
1125 Vives: DA, 63-64: “Phantasia nihil coniungit, aut separat per copulam, velut hoc est tale, aut non est tale, sic 
agens aut non agens; sed sic coaceruat hoc tale non tale, hoc vel illud agens, hoc modo aut illo, vel e contrario, 
quod ostendit puerorum & rudium & crassorum hominum sermo....”  
1126 Vives: DA, 33: “nam quemadmodum homines alii aliorum & phantasiam commovent, & mentem, verbis, 




read how descriptions should “present something to gaze upon for the soul,” focusing not on 
the essences of things but on portraying them through accidents created by energeia in the 
footsteps of poets uniting all this to the creation of fantasy.1127 Vives makes a distinction 
between a philosophical description reminiscent of what he had proposed in De disciplinis, and 
a more poetical one deriving form poetry and pictorial language. The concept of philosophy for 
instance can be described propositionally as accurately as possible using the more refined 
understanding of description based on definitions and divisions. However, description should 
take into account the level of the audience, and those, “who do not have mental force, need 
sensible things,” and for this reason, spiritual things, “are dressed with a sort of mask.”1128 
Following this, Vives moves on to a description not based on the enumeration of attributes, but 
on painting a picture. Philosophy for instance could be described as “a woman of saintly and 
respectable face, honourable thinness, decorous paleness – of such extended stature that it rises 
above skies and stars, of eyes that do not close in the face of the threats and roars of fortune.”1129 
These descriptions, destined to vulgus, are frequent and allowed for poets and, “not unusual in 
orators and philosophers.”1130 Thus, as Quintilian had eloquently pointed out, the most powerful 
way of talking to passions happened through the creation of energeia, a vision that made things 
present and tangible.1131 Some of Vives’s own production gets a distinctive interpretation as 
well; his Veritas fucata conducted in common language not only discussed literary studies and 
truth, but created strong energeia around the theme.1132 Vives’s presentation in De ratione 
dicendi is essentially a way of uniting different ways of speaking to not only dialogue and 
rhetoric destined to different audiences, but all this clearly addresses different faculties of the 
mind – fantasy and reason – that are dominant in these respective audiences. 
 Secondly, the highly important role given to the pictures of fantasy links closely 
to what has been called the sociological tenet of Erasmian humanism that highlighted the 
importance of signs. Thus, the call to rewrite the external signs surrounding humans referring 
                                                          
same argument, Vives: DA, 251: “causa est, quod verba movent necessario intelligentiam, & phantasiam 
audientis.”  
1127 Vives: DR, 172-181. The quote is from the page 172: “Finis eius [descriptio] est, aliquid animo intuendum 
proponere, quod quum fit adeo exacte, ut prope oculis videamur id cernere....”  
1128 Vives: DR, 175: “Nam qui non perinde valet mente, huic sensilibus est opus. Idcirco spiritalia haec persona 
quadam induuntur, ut pictura: & habent venustatis plurimum, ad vulgi quoque intelligentiam efficacitatis non 
parum.”  
1129 Vives: DR, 175: “foeminam sancto et reverendo vultu, venerabili macie, pallore decoro, statura adeo procera, 
ut caelos et sydera superet, oculis ad fortunae minas et fremitus inconniventibus, et aliis in hunc modum....”  
1130 Vives: DR, 175: “sed & oratoribus non insueta, etiam philosophis.”  
1131 Quintilian: IO, vi.ii.29-36.  




to everything from statues to proverbs, important in Erasmus’s Institutio and Vives’s De 
concordia gets a specific explanation in Vives’s faculty psychology. Since the images of simple 
intelligence and the material of fantasy are based on the images arising from sense experience, 
what kind of examples and signs surround the mind is relevant. True, fantasy can never be 
totally controlled because of the unpredictable nature of its compositional activity, but the 
images it is surrounded with still have an importance for its functioning since they create models 
where good and bad are assessed in a visual form. Moreover, as Vives writes, fantasy works 
somewhat in the manner of memory that uses places which means that if some objects have 
been presented to it together, the presence of one of the objects implies the other. In fact, the 
portrayal of the functioning of recollection explicitly points to fantasy, and makes very clear 
that the structure of one’s memory, what things are lumped together, is of utmost importance 
here.1133 Overall, this is ultimately the best way to try to frame the judgement of those not 
capable of true reasoning, since any argument based merely on propositional structure would 
be destined to fail. Thus, truth needs the pictures of poetry, rhetoric, literature, statues and 
paintings in order to triumph. 
 After reason, the next intellectual process is that of judgement the activity of 
which starts only after reason has prepared its discourse. Judgement’s role consists simply in 
accepting or rejecting what reason proposes. Its activity can be likened to a dialectical 
judgement, and Vives emphasizes its formal aspects when arguing that if it accepts the 
discourse, it has to accept conclusions, although proceeding to argue that if the conclusion is in 
contradiction with what the mind has earlier thought about the matter, the judgement suspects 
error, and postpones its final verdict. This additional aspect guarantees that the activity of 
judgement is not only formal, but also that substantial content matters a great deal; even though 
what rational discourse has prepared would be formally valid, good judgement can also assess 
the propositions that serve as premises for reason. However, the best way to persuade judgement 
in a healthy mind is argumentation and probable reason.1134   
 Just like reason, judgement, however, has its problems. One of them is that since 
part of its activity consists in comparing what is true and what is good, as well as uniting general 
rules provided by synderesis with particular situations, its task is simply something very 
                                                          
1133 Vives: DA, 59-61. In 59: “Nam quae simul sunt a phantasia comprehensa, si alterutrum occurrat, solet secum 
alterum repraesentare....”  
1134 Vives: DA, 74: “Itaque dum ratio est in actione sua, quiescit iudicium: ea ubi functa est suo, munere, exurgit 




difficult in the postlapsarian state – a point Vives insists on over and over again.1135 Its main 
nemesis is the passions, although the exact relationship between passions, emotions, and 
judgement is not always easy to pin down. In line with Stoicism, Vives’s starting point is that 
passions and emotions do indeed follow judgement but that certain “movements of the soul” 
anticipate any kind of act of judging.1136 Yet in accordance with Stoic tradition, these first 
physical movements of the body are not genuine emotions or passions, and are not described as 
such.1137 It is, however, very clear that Vives’s intention here is not to defend a purely 
rationalistic understanding of emotions as beliefs or judgements that one finds in the orthodox 
Stoic tradition as it was presented and criticised by Plutarch in his De virtute morali (On Moral 
Virtue), and he discusses at length the interference of passions in judgement.1138  
 There are different ways of talking about this process. At one point Vives writes 
about fantasy that imposes itself not only to reason but also to judgement leading not only to 
natural impulses but also to true emotions, so that “we are afraid, we are happy, we cry, and we 
get sad.”1139 It is, however, in the treatment of anger that Vives most clearly refers to the 
relationship between judgement and emotions, as Lorenzo Casini has pointed out.1140 Vives 
writes that “there is a natural motion of irritation” as “we find among wild animals,” but 
immediately moves on to present the kind of irritation not based on “sudden judgement” but on 
a firmly established conviction. This firmly established conviction refers to the judgement one 
has of one’s own worth, which is to the believe that “we are good, educated, generous, 
hardworking, and distinguished, and that we ought to be honoured and revered rather than 
despised,” and it is in relation to these preceding judgements that our irritation and anger bursts 
out.1141 What Vives has in mind was visible in De concordia: the existence of bad judgement, 
                                                          
1135 See for instance Vives: DA, 67: “Sed menti nostrae magnas & densissimas nebulas scelus offudit, itaque 
depravati sunt recte illi canones.”  
1136 Vives: DA, 146: “Sunt quidam animorum motus, seu impetus verius naturales, qui ex affecto corpore 
consurgunt....” 
1137 Vives: DA, 146; Casini 2006, 139. 
1138 Plutarch: “De virtute morali” (trans. Helmbold), 16-89 in Plutarch: Moralia, vol. 6, Loeb Classical Library, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1957, 3. 
1139 Vives: DA, 147: “Itaque sola phantasia trahente ad se tumultu suo speciem quandam opinionis & iudicii, quod 
bonum sit, aut malum, quod est ei obiectum, in omnes animi perturbationes versamur, timemus, laetamur, flemus, 
tristamur....”  
1140 Casini 2006, 155-159.  
1141 Vives: DA, 211: “Est motus quidam offensionis naturalis, adversus eum qui laesit corpus, qualis est in feris, 
est alter, qui subito quidem existit, & quasi sine tempore ad primum tactum contemptus, ita ut nonnulli naturalem 
esse ducant, & iudicio antevertere, is nonnunquam fit ex bile immodice inflammata, alias vero non ex iudicio a 
contemptu orto subito, sed ex illo quod in animo habemus praeceptum, & confirmatum, bonos esse nos, doctos, 
generosos, industrios, praestantes, oportere nobis honorem exhiberi, & reverentiam, non oportere nos contemni, 
ex hoc iudicio informato intus atque infixo subito ira incalescit, ubi primum contemptus vel procul sese protulit, 




stemming from pride (superbia), affects the way in which particular situations are assessed 
since the existing judgement creates a framework, inside of which separate situations can be 
interpreted.1142 
 Against Stoics, Vives argues that anger does not burst suddenly sweeping over us 
but, following Plutarch, argues, “it grows from its causes.” Plutarch’s treatise De cohibenda ira 
(On the Control of Anger) seems to be an influence here on Vives, and the work heavily 
emphasized the possibilities of right judgement and temper to counter the attacks of anger that 
does not just simply run us over.1143 Vives’s treatment of anger organized around places (loci), 
such as definition, causes, effects, time, place, and a number of others, attempts to analyse as 
exhaustively as possible all contexts in which anger grows. It is true that the analysis mixes 
physiological viewpoints with a meticulous analysis of all contextual elements such as 
professions, and specific relations to the possibilities of anger. But ultimately much of the 
analysis comes to be understood through the kind of judgements one typically holds. For 
example, philosophers tend to get angry if philosophy is scorned, but only because what is 
scorned seems “extremely dear” to them.1144 Likewise, all the different contexts that tend to 
give birth to anger are united to the kind of judgements that usually go together with the 
situation portrayed.  
 The social dimension of the interpretations influencing judgement is also 
perceivable throughout the work. Very generally, habitus that is presented in the Part two of De 
anima refer to the inclination of our soul to produce certain acts and suffer certain passions in 
the right way because of the process of habituation. Habitus, understood as disposition, does 
not equal the mental process of judgement but encompasses all the mental operations leading 
to action. Even though habitus is not natural, but gradually formed, it becomes sort of a second 
nature that makes easier the performance of good actions, since it turns into a disposition or 
inclination to judge and feel correctly in different situations.1145 The language employed in the 
                                                          
1142 See Chapter five.  
1143 Vives: DA, 213: “Seneca totam iram subito dicit existere, cui merito Plutarchus refragatur, crescit enim ex suis 
causis, ut ignis fomento subiecto”; Plutarch: “De cohibenda ira” (trans. Helmbold), 90-162 in Plutarch: Moralia, 
vol. 6, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1957, 3.1. “But if judgement 
at once opposes the fits of anger and represses them, it not only cures them for the present, but for the future also 
it renders the soul firm and difficult for the passion to attack.”  
1144 Vives: DA, 215: “Incandescimus, si parvi pendatur id, quod nos plurmi facimus, sive in nobis, sive in aliis, & 
de quo volumus aestimari magni vel nos, vel chari nostri: ut philosophus, si philosophia vituperetur....”  
1145 Vives: DA, 116-118. The importance of habitus as a formed and educated source of moral action is central in 
Aristotle’s ethics, see Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, ii.i. 
1145 Vives: DA, 116-118. The importance of habitus as a formed and educated source of moral action is central in 




section on habitus that refers to one’s capacity to endure disturbing images is taken up in the 
section dedicated to shame, one of the most socially loaded of all emotions in the treatise, and 
one that is defined, following Aristotle, as “fear of disgrace.”1146 Much of the early passages 
dedicated to shame describe the kind of natural feelings of shame attached to those bodily parts 
that in the postlapsarian state are not under the guidance of reason.1147 Moreover, shame related 
to the natural violence of the senses is portrayed. 
 There is, however, a moment in which Vives’s treatment dissociates itself from 
natural bodily shame, moving to all possible vices that provoke shame, and, what is more, to 
“all allegories, images, signs that in themselves are vices; everything that is done against piety, 
divine law, equity, justice, laws, the institutions of the ancients, the customs of the fatherland, 
precept of the wise and the counsel of the prudent.”1148 He writes explicitly that from the natural 
forms of shame and decorum are born those others, “based on the customs and opinions of 
men,” and that it is very important to know how we assess the world as well as to be aware, 
“how those whose judgement moves us” judge these things.1149 Even if judgement is used here 
in an extended sense not referring merely to a mental faculty but to a general opinion, Vives’s 
point throughout is that the judgements one makes are deeply embedded in the general 
interpretative framework of a culture that offers general patterns of assessment through which 
things can be understood. Thus, passionate judgements that are not mere reactions refer to the 
kind of preceding general opinions we hold on the matter that are activated in particular cases. 
Moreover, these general opinions are largely present in the whole culture surrounding us, and, 
consequently, in our habitus.1150 Simply put, the kind of examples, actions and signs we are 
surrounded with interfere in the judgements we make of the world.  
 But even if judgement could be cultivated through education, one would still face 
the task of convincing the will to act on the advice and counsel provided by reason and 
                                                          
1146 Vives: DA, 117: “Fit porro interdum, ut genus actionis naturale sit: species vero vel adiectum, aut circumstantia 
sit exercitationis, velut sensus quidem naturae sponte accepimus, videre, audire, gustare, olfacere, tangere....”; 
Vives: DA, 250: “Pudor est metus dedecoris....”; Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, iv.ix.  
1147 Vives: DA, 250-252.  
1148 Vives: DA, 252: “In universum autem, quoniam nihil est virtute formosius, vitia omnia incutiunt pudorem, 
quin & eorum similitudines, imagines, signa, vitia sunt: quae fiunt contra pium et fas, contra aequum, contra ius, 
& leges, contra maiorum instituta, contra mores patrios, contra praecepta sapientum, & prudentum consilia....”  
1149 Vives: DA, 252: “Ex hisce foeditatis & decoris generibus nascuntur illa, quae hominum moribus atque 
opinionibus nituntur, plurimum interest, quemadmodum vel nos ipsi de rebus sentiamus, vel alii, quorum iudicio 
movemur.”  
1150 In general, the link from a passional reaction to ignorance in judging is extremely close in Vives. See for 
instance Vives: DA, 150: “Nam ingentes illae agitationes & praeturbidae ab ignorantia sunt, & inconsideratione, 




judgement. The will: “the faculty of the soul that looks after what is good and turns away from 
evil under the guidance of reason,” is the last mental act needed for action.1151 As Casini has 
convincingly shown, Vives’s understanding of the will is heavily influenced by medieval 
discussions on the matter, and especially by Jean Buridan’s intermediate position between the 
intellectualist and voluntarist traditions.1152 Vives’s discussion on the will focuses 
overwhelmingly on deciding its exact relation to the mental processes of reason and judgement 
with the discussion on the freedom of will and providence being of secondary importance. Vives 
merely confirms his earlier position that free will is compatible with God’s foreknowledge 
happening in his nunc-stans.1153 What interests Vives here is, however, the relationship of the 
will to composite intelligence – mostly reason and judgement – and his starting point is that will 
is indeed free yet capable of choosing only an alternative that has in some way being judged 
good by the intelligence. Despite the close link to the judgement of the intellect, Vives leaves a 
lot of room for the will to manoeuvre and his description here underlines the ultimately 
unpredictable nature of the will likened to a monarch who has numerous ways at its disposal 
for ignoring the advice of reason and judgement, its supposed advisors.1154 
 In a section on love, Vives writes that only God in his perfection does not contain 
any elements of wickedness, and hence, it is not in our power to resist him, but that all other 
things contain aspects by which they can be judged good or bad.1155 He gives detailed 
descriptions of the ways in which the will works. At the heart of the will lies the activities of 
approval (approbatio) and disapproval (reprobatio), as well as privation or deferment of the act 
of willing.1156 Approval and disapproval are guided by reason and judgement, so that the will 
cannot want something that has not been judged good in some way, and it cannot hate what 
judgement presents as good – the only possible act of resistance being the deferment of willing. 
Thus, the will cannot do against what is judged good, but it can decide not to will it and defer 
its judgement.  
 The ways in which the will can work its way out of the judgement of the goodness 
and badness of a given thing, are elaborately depicted and contain almost all possible cases 
                                                          
1151 Vives: DA, 98: “Est igitur voluntas, facultas seu visa nimi, qua bonum expetimus, malum aversamur, duce 
ratione, nam mutae animantes duce natura, quae sensus extimulat.”  
1152 Casini 2006, 117-130. See also Casini 2006b.  
1153 Vives: DA, 102-103.  
1154 Vives: DA, 99-100. 
1155 Vives: DA, 170.  
1156 These are purely internal processes. Action needs a further decision on the possibilities of executing what is 




since the only thing it cannot not will is the love of God. First, the will is free to put or not put 
any given object under the deliberation of reason and judgement. Moreover, during the 
deliberation, “it can impose silence” moving the attention of the mind to consider other 
objects.1157 After the deliberation, the will can furthermore decide not to act on the assessment 
of the object and it can impose another deliberation looking for something potentially better, or 
more adequate. Finally, the will can put aside and reject what has been presented to it as good 
or bad with strong reasons by judgement, and focus on something that has the smallest of 
appearances of goodness, and here it is of great help that “everything is a mixture of good and 
bad.”1158 Most flamboyantly, and making the connection to social deliberations very explicit, 
Vives argues that “often the will even rejects and spurns everything in order to demonstrate its 
rule, like a prince who excludes and rejects the healthy warnings of his counsellors so that it 
does not look like he is ruled by another. He acts like the person in the satire: this is what I want, 
this is what I order: arbitrariness takes the place of reason.”1159 Vives’s description of the actions 
of will – praised for its freedom – is highly ambivalent to say the least, and it almost seems like 
the passions work inside the will directing its activities.1160  
 
Concord, Discord, and Ingenium 
 
From the point of view of social and political concord, the general theory on the functioning of 
the soul gets a distinctive interpretation with the strong presence of the concept of ingenium 
that underlines individual differences in both De anima and De disciplinis. Ingenium had an 
unusually complex semantic history with varying meanings in different genres of writing. The 
complexity of the concept makes it very difficult to give it a clear definition that would be 
applicable to all its uses in De anima and De disciplinis. Depending on the context, it could 
refer both to the innate qualities and potentiality of individuals, or to a formed disposition of 
character to produce prudential judgements and moral acts.1161 The varying ways in which it is 
talked about makes quite impossible its interpretation through strict dichotomies such as nature 
and culture, or potentiality and actuality.  
                                                          
1157 Vives: DA, 99: “ ...silentium indicere....” 
1158 Vives: DA, 99: “...quod res nostrae omnes mistae sunt bonis ac malis....” 
1159 Vives: DA, 99-100: “Saepe etiam ut se ostendat voluntas esse dominam, reiicit ac spernit omnia, haud aliter 
quam princeps, qui ne videatur a quoquam regi, salutaria omnia consiliariorum suorum monita excludit & respuit, 
fitque (quod dicit ille in satyra) Sic volo, sic iubeo, sit pro ratione libido.”  
1160 Casini 2006, 146.  




 Despite its complexities, Vives’s most in-depth treatments of ingenium in De 
disciplinis and De anima draw from recognizable traditions. Vives’s interest in ingenium in De 
disciplinis is heavily indebted to the educational discourse where the concept had been present 
ever since Quintilian’s Institutio, which underlined the examination of ingenium and natura as 
the basic method through which individual talent and capacities of each student could be found 
out. Quintilian emphasized, above all, that memory and the ability to imitate are crucial for a 
potential pupil. His idea that the ingenium of the child had to be taken into consideration in 
determining his possibilities in the educational path remained a commonplace in different forms 
in most fifteenth-century educational literature from Agricola’s De formando studio to 
Vergerio’s De ingenuis moribus ac liberalibus studiis.1162  
Erasmus’s educational literature too referred ingenium although sometimes 
employing the word natura in referring to the traditional discussions on individual talent. First 
of these was the question of nature and ingenium. In his extensive De pueris, Erasmus claimed, 
in line with the pseudo-Plutarchian De liberis educandis, that three things contributed to human 
happiness: nature, reason and exercise, and argued that ideally reason should guide nature and 
be helped by exercise understood as formation.1163 For Erasmus, a life under the guidance of 
reason was what differentiated man from beasts and made him truly human, and the Dutch 
thinker exhibits great optimism towards character formation for achieving just that. He did 
make a distinction between general nature shared by all humans, and an individual nature that 
made some people more suitable for, “mathematical sciences, some to theology, others to 
rhetoric and poetry, still others for military career.”1164 However, he was keen to argue that “the 
power of discipline” is such that if it is helped with “precepts and exercise,” it is capable of 
guiding nature almost everywhere.1165 The general ethos of Erasmus’s treatise heavily 
emphasized the almost-endless malleability of human nature, which made theoretically possible 
the perfecting of man through education, character formation, and the building of habitus. 1166  
Although Vives’s De disciplinis reflects the educational tradition in its portrayal 
of ingenium, it makes at least two nuanced additions to the existing tradition. First, it 
                                                          
1162 Quintilian: IO, i.iii; Vergerio: “De ingenuis”, 15-29; Agricola: De formando, 4-6.  
1163 Erasmus: De pueris, 17: “Tota vero ratio felicitatis humanae tribus potissimum rebus constat, natura, ratione 
& exercitatione.” In Plutarch these three are nature, reason and habit. Plutarch: “De liberis educandis”, 4. 
1164 Erasmus: De pueris, 21: “Sed est natura huic aut illi peculiaris, veluti quosdam Mathematicis disciplinis, alios 
Theologiae, hos Rhetoricae aut Poeticae, illos militae natos dicas.”   
1165 Erasmus: De pueris, 22: “Tametsi meo quidem iuditio, vix ulla est disciplina, ad quam hominis ingenium non 
docile nascatur, si praectoribus & exercitatione institerimus.”  




accentuates the importance of the surveillance of ingenium to a degree uncommon in the 
humanist tradition, and most certainly not found in major northern humanist educational 
treatises.1167 As Vives argues, the examination of one’s ingenium corresponds to the 
examination of one’s soul, and that its parts are “acuteness of consideration, capacity to 
understand, comparison for judging” making a close union to the key mental operations 
described in De anima.1168 After presenting a large and varied categorization of different 
ingenia, he goes on to argue that children reveal their ingenium in games because in playful 
activities they show all their “natural qualities since disputes draw out and show ingenium, just 
like heating draws out the smell and natural force of herbs, roots and fruits.” Ingenium does 
potentially develop; the surveillance of the development of ingenium is something that should 
be undertaken throughout the educational path every two or three months, and if this is done, 
“an enormous utility will follow for all mankind.”1169 Although the surveillance of the 
development of students was the norm, Vives’s emphasis on it is quite rare.  
The second transformation is that side by side with the educational tradition, 
Vives’s De disciplinis also points to a predominantly Galenic discourse where different ingenia 
could be analysed through a physiological language based on a typology of standard human 
temperaments dependent on the combinations of four bodily fluids. This language was 
extensively appropriated by Vives in De anima to discuss the physiological states that go 
together with mental operations and passions.1170 Thus, in De disciplinis some of the concepts 
employed in the categorization such as furiosus (frantic) appear again in De anima in an 
analysis conducted in the language of physiology, although the connection is far from 
systematic.1171 Moreover, Vives himself was more than willing to make the link from education 
to an analysis of the soul evident in his De anima in arguing: “from these humours and breaths 
of life not only the great variety and diversity of ingenia is borne but also the great opposition 
                                                          
1167 The exceptional importance of ingenium in Vives has been largely acknowledged, see Noreña 1970, 268-269; 
Noreña 1989, 108-112.  
1168 Vives: DD, 260: “ingenii partes sunt acies ad intuendum, capacitas ad comprehendendum, collatio ad 
iudicium.”  
1169 Vives: DD, 265: “...sed omnia exibunt naturalia: quippe concertatio omnis ingenium educit, ac ostendit, haud 
secus quam excalfactio herbae, aut radicis, aut fructus odorem, vel vim naturae.”; “Incredibilis per totum hominum 
genus utilitas sequetur, si id fiat.”  
1170 Vives’s treatment is purely conceptual and speculative and far from the late sixteenth-century anatomical 
theory of Juan de Huarte explained in the 1575 Examen de ingenios para las sciencias. For Juan de Huarte, see 
Noreña 1975, 210-263. Casini has written more extensively on Vives’s relation to what he calls early modern 
dualism dealing with the relation of the sensitive and intellective soul. However, he does not come to any definite 
conclusion and it does seem that Vives is never very clear about how exactly the relation works, see Casini 2006, 
76-82.  




that exists in the external appearances of men. I have spoken of these issues something in the 
work De tradendis disiplinis.”1172  
In De anima, the reader is told that ingenium “is the whole power of our mind” 
that it is revealed and manifested in the use of its instruments, and that it operates primarily in 
the body.1173 In De anima, one could also read that the mind would like to enjoy “great and 
exquisite thoughts,” its bodily organs more suitable for “amusement, absurdities, and most 
superficial things” prevent it.1174 The organs of rational functions are very thin and luminous 
spirits situated in the brain, and it is towards them that the blood of the heart, origin of all actions 
and thinking processes, exhales. Taken together, these are “the organs of all cognition.”1175 This 
framework of four bodily fluids together with the heat of blood originating from the heart 
provides a framework for an analysis of different character traits that, as it is well known, is 
exceptionally rich. 
However, in addition to physiological and educational discourses, ingenium could 
well point to the performance of virtuous deeds. In Roman history writing, ingenium could refer 
very generally to character as it was revealed in the moral actions of subjects, not merely to the 
innate abilities for learning or to the categorization of temperaments according to the theory of 
humours.1176 In Vives too, ingenium appears frequently in his 1530s oeuvre as a key concept 
that explains the capacity to produce correct judgements. In a section dedicated to judgement 
in De anima Vives forcefully claims: 
 
“It is only by the qualities of judgement that men of greatest and most 
extraordinary ingenium stand apart from lower and mediocre ones; not on account of 
experience, of the knowledge of many varied things, of sharpness, of erudition, of the 
familiarity of science, disciplines, and arts.” 
 
                                                          
1172 Vives: DA, 80: “Ex hisce humoribus atque spiritibus, nascitur ingeniorum non varietas solum ac diversitas, 
sed adversitas quoque tanta, quanta est inter hominum facies, de quo sum locutus nonnulla in opere De tradendis 
disciplinis.”  
1173 Vives: DA, 77: “Universam mentis nostrae vim, de qua sumus hactenus locuti, ingenium nominari placuit, 
quod se instrumentorum ministerio exerit & patefacit, mens enim est in hoc corpore, sicut qui clausus in cubiculo, 
non aliam habet fenestram, per quam foras prospiciat, quam vitream....” 
1174 Vives: DA, 78: “Cuperet quidem mens plerunque optimis ac praeclarissimis cogitationibus se oblectare: sed 
impediunt eam organa, avertuntque invitam ac repugnantem, & traducunt ab excellentibus contemplationibus ad 
lusus, ad ineptias, & res levissimas., quibus facilia se & tractabilia exhibent instrumenta.” 
1175 Vives: DA, 78: “Sed functionis rationalis organa sunt in cerebro, spiritus quidam tenuissimi & lucidissimi, 
quos illuc exhalat sanguis cordis, ii sunt organa intima cognitionum omnium.” 




This contrasts ingenium explicitly with all aspects of character formation.1177 In 
the same passage, the importance of judgement is greatly hailed for all arts and disciplines and 
the totality of life.1178 All prudential behaviour is ultimately produced by good judgement, 
turning the ability to judge correctly necessary for the performance of virtuous and morally 
correct actions, and not all this is completely detached from one’s ingenium.  
It has frequently been noted that Vives’s ingenium is a plastic one, and that it is 
influenced by one’s age, environment, and a range of other contextual matters.1179 The fact that 
ingenium does not exclusively denote a stable bodily condition is a key point in De disciplinis, 
and much of the advice in the second part of the monumental work on the physical placement 
of schools, nutrition and health can be viewed as a way of cultivating the possibilities of 
ingenium. Moreover, Vives’s understanding of habitus as a second nature formed through 
culture shows how highly he ranked the possibilities of moulding the basic dispositions and 
forces of the mind that get a specific form only in the complex interaction of physical, moral, 
and natural contexts. Furthermore, the discourse of bodily liquids could easily incorporate 
viewpoints that underlined how they could be influenced through different human means, and 
Vives at one point suggests, “the pneuma of those who have it very thick should be fattened by 
moving to another place or by changing the way of life.”1180 
But it is equally clear that in no way is ingenium endlessly malleable. Vives makes 
this point explicit on numerous occasions. Emphatically in his De disciplinis, he reminded the 
reader in the section dedicated to the erudite that “erudition consists of four things; ingenium, 
judgement, memory, study. Tell me, from whom do you possess the first three ones? Are they 
not from God?”1181 Even more explicitly in his De anima, Vives wrote under De discendi 
ratione – largely dedicated to ingenium – that “great and eminent ingenia versed in all 
disciplines and cognition are so by the privilege of nature”.1182 Now, in the tradition haling 
Vives as the founder of modern pedagogy, the theory of ingenium has been linked to a certain 
                                                          
1177 Vives: DA, 75: “Non usu, non cognitione rerum multarum & variarum, non acumine, non eruditione & scientia 
disciplinarum atque artium, sed hoc solo [right judgement] distant maxima & praestantissima ingenia ab infimis, 
aut mediae notae.”   
1178 Vives: DA, 75. 
1179 Noreña 1989, 111. 
1180 Vives: DA, 82: “Expedit iis, qui tenuissimos habent spiritus, incrassari a loco, vel victus ratione: qua de causa 
melancholiam biliosis & sanguines utilem diximus.”  
1181 Vives: DD, 382: “Quatuor rebus constat eruditio, ingenio, iudicio, memoria, studio: tria prima cedo unde 
habes? nunquid non ex Deo?”  





sensibility to individual differences that could then be turned into a tailored educational 
guidance.1183 In this view, the pronounced focus on ingenium could be seen as one of the basic 
tenets of Vives’s modern pedagogy that moved from general precepts to embrace individual 
and particular differences based on acute observations of students’ capacities. However, the 
focus on ingenium could also be understood in a different light inside Vives’s educational and 
social work. It was simultaneously a way to set certain limits inside of which individual 
perfection and malleability could be discussed and Vives’s De disciplinis explicitly does just 
that in its focus on classifying the kind of ingenia unsuitable for certain studies.1184 
Vives wishes to convey to the reader that all this is of enormous social importance, 
since it is ultimately the setting of all people to the educational path, and social role suitable for 
their ingenium, that guarantees social and political harmony and concord. Reflecting this 
general attitude, Vives, before moving to the presentation of rhetoric and dialectic in De 
disciplinis, reminds the reader emphatically, “rhetoric and dialectic should be denied for those 
ingenia who are contentious, and prone to dispute [...] It should not be taught to evil ingenia 
prone to fraud.”1185 Within this scheme, those of great ingenium hold a special place, they are 
the ones capable of judging rightly, and moulding truth to others according to the possibilities 
set by the ingenia of the audience. They are the ones in possession of all wisdom, and capable 
of transmitting it to others with a deep knowledge of all rhetorical and dialectical tools. They 
are the true doctors of the soul, exhibiting great ingenium, and understanding the ingenia of 
others as Vives explained in his De disciplinis:  
 
“Like a doctor speaks of bodies with some experience, so does a prudent man 
speak of souls equipped with ingenium, judgement and doctrine required for this. To these 
faculties of having a well-founded opinion he adds some experience. We will contribute to 
these issues by the explanation of ingenia.”1186 
                                                          
1183 Noreña for example mentions this in his classic study, Noreña 1970, 193.  
1184 Vives’s De disciplinis introduces a section entitled Quae ingenia inepta literis, Vives: DD, 267. Aristotle was 
also very clear that the limits of habituation were set by the natural abilities of the individual, Aristotle: 
Nicomachean Ethics, x.ix.  
1185 Vives: DD, 324: “Utraque ars & dialectica & rhetorica rixosa ex se est [...] ideo rixoso & contentioso ingenio 
neganda [...] idcirco nec malitiosum ingenium, & ad fraudem faciendam paratum instrui illis convenient....”  
1186 Vives: DD, 235: “At vero ut sit quisque affectus, quomodo contemplandus, ut cui rei sit idoneus, iudicetur, a 
qua illi abstinendum, sicut de corporibus dicet peritus medicus post usum cum illi aliquem, ita de animis vir 
prudens excellentia ingenii, iudicii, doctrinae, ad tantum munus ascitus: quibus tantis ad arbitrandum facultatibus 






This is a condition on which every possibility of earthly concord is ultimately 
predicated, and all of his 1530s main works from De ratione dicendi, De disciplinis and De 
anima take the diversity of ingenia and all problems and possibilities related to it as their 
starting point. Social and political concord cannot be based on the coming to reason of each 
individual, since in the postlapsarian state of a multiplicity of ingenia the unity of reason is 
never seriously considered as an attainable possibility without Divine intervention. Vives 
explicitly argues in his De anima that the diversity of judgement and reason, the main problem 
of all social concord, is due to differences in ingenium.1187 Mirroring his more realistic 
understanding of social concord, Vives already in his De disciplinis argued that Plato’s Republic 
and More’s Utopia would be possible in a world “inhabited only by wise,” and although Vives 
praised both works, he suggested the reading of Aristotle’s Politics more suitable for ingenia 
and manners.1188 The differences in ingenium guarantee that all the possible threats in the mental 
process will always be made by some, since the acuteness of mind is simply not attainable for 
everyone. Man’s epistemological, intellectual, and moral capacities are just too diverse to be 
moulded to the understanding of one harmonious reason. What one is left with is a world where 
the only way of asking humbly for God’s grace – the main point of De concordia – is an 
organization that underlines the importance of the wise and the prudent in guarding and 
transmitting truth through various means. They have to serve as doctors of the soul who cure 
passional disorders through formation but they also have to use the powers of language and 
rhetoric to talk to the fantasy of those who cannot be reached through abstract reasoning. 
Finally, they have to communicate concord and wisdom to those in power employing self-
concealment and a more instrumental use of language if needed. In this way, the educated elite 
– men of letters – have to strive for social and political renewal and critique, but only inside the 




                                                          
1187 Vives explicitly argues in his De anima that the diversity of judgement and reason, the main problem of all 
social concord is due to differences in ingenia.Vives: DA, 206: “Sequitur enim quisque affectum, aut ingenium 
suum, non rectum examen rationis. Idcirco in iudicando tanta diversitas: quippe ratio vel unica est, vel non 
admodum multifaria: ingenia autem infinita, diversissima, difformia.” Already Thomas More in his Utopia 
argued that not everyone can be made good, More: Utopia, 62: “Nam ut omnia bene sint, fieri non potest, nis 
omnes boni sint, quod ad aliquot abhinc annos adhuc non expecto.” 
1188 Vives: DD, 373: “De republica scripserunt olim Plato primus: secundum cuius institutionem tum demum 


























































In my concluding remarks, I will not present the main content of different chapters separately, 
but will focus on presenting a synthesis of the central arguments of the thesis that deal with the 
importance of language to social and civic life in Vive’s oeuvre.1189 I will first discuss the main 
conclusions of this dissertation putting them into a larger context of political thought, and then 
proceed to an assessment of the possible importance of Vives’s work to some later 
developments of early modern thought. After presenting the general framework of political and 
social thought, I move on to a discussion of the ways in which language and rhetoric modifies 
this generally accepted picture of the basic elements of Vives’s political thought. In the latter 
part of my conclusions, I will not analyse the historical reception of Vives in depth, and the 
attention will be on larger conceptual issues. Throughout, I will emphasize the intimate 
connection between language and political or social thought by arguing that it is language and 
questions concerning it that reveal deeper dynamics of concord and discord in Vives’s treatment 
of these themes.  
 In Chapters four and five, the basic assumptions of Vives’s social reflection have 
been described. In a traditional Christian vein, the point of departure for all Vivesian reflections 
on political associations is that they are always predicated conceptually and temporally on the 
social possibilities of man. Despite political communities being man-made and pertaining to a 
postlapsarian reality, their basic reason of being is to facilitate the betterment of man – to 
restitute man to his God-like nature within the possibilities allowed in light of his fallen nature. 
Although some forms of coercion and force are expected of political and other authorities, this 
is a thoroughly Erasmian understanding of society where human associations are primarily 
reformative, and not coercive, as was the case in different Augustinian traditions.1190 Indeed, a 
predominantly optimistic view on the possibilities of collective life is an explicit rebuttal of 
different traditions of the Reformation drawing from Augustine, and above all, from Martin 
Luther.  
 Understanding different forms of political communities, be they cities, republics, 
princely regimes, or kingdoms, as manifestations of human social nature is of some importance. 
Political associations are not primarily discussed as autonomous realms of civic prudence; 
                                                          
1189 A reader will find a presentation of the main arguments of separate chapters at the beginning of each of them.  




rather, they are part of a larger story of Erasmian or northern humanist social reform leading to 
peace and concord that incorporates all social associations in its scope. All these social 
associations should help man to become truly man – to regain his godly nature. Even though 
man becoming himself is predicated on individual self-government, the peaceful and 
concordant nature of social and political communities contributes to the possibilities of 
individual renewal in a number of ways. Not only do they create peaceful circumstances and 
the right kind of material conditions for man to live free from warfare and poverty, but they also 
provide a collective framework that educates man as to the right direction. In addition to 
schooling, which was central to Erasmian tradition, education succeeds through the right kind 
of example set by the powerful, and through the kind of culture where all external signs testify 
to human glory not that is not tied to warfare and violence, but rather to constructive intellectual, 
peaceful, and paternal practices.  
 Despite the understanding of some social dynamics for the formation of character 
and judgement, this deeply ethical philosophy puts forward a strong moral demand to all those 
in possession of power and social instruments. This is especially the case with princes and 
monarchs, true lawgivers whose capacity for prudential judgement is predicated on their self-
governance and freedom from passions. Their duty to be just and to govern virtuously is largely 
echoed in Vives’s ideas on civic prudence and law. To govern prudentially, and in accordance 
with law, can never be discussed merely in the context of positive law, since the interpretation 
of law and justice always happens in the context of Aristotelian aequitas and Stoic natural law. 
Thus, an action can be lawful and just only if the laws are promulgated in accordance with 
natural law – and if they are interpreted in the right spirit. But the ability to achieve this is a 
thoroughly ethical practice. Only someone in control of his or her passions can partake in 
natural law, and interpret it in the correct reformative spirit with the common good as a guiding 
principle – and certainly not in accordance with his own personal private interest. A central way 
of bringing this about is the larger Erasmian yearn to educate princes in virtue, to mould their 
character to produce prudent judgements.  
 Despite a somewhat eclectic use of sources, the basic framework for Vives’s 
social and political reflections has some obvious conceptual links to existing traditions. First, 
the concrete intellectual context inside of which it is devised is that of ethical Erasmian 
humanism. It is through Erasmian humanism that politics becomes understood as a continuum 
of positive Christian ideals of general social renewal, under the powerful example of Jesus 




political thought – such as concord and discord – never lose their reference to a Christian ethical 
framework. Side by side with this, Vives’s admiration from the late 1510s for Greek philosophy 
of wisdom and for Thomas More’s Utopia – together with a strong link of civic prudence to 
wisdom – is also indebted to the originally Platonic ideal of philosophical and wise rule.1191 
However, the connection of the ideal of the rule of the wise with the ethical self-governance of 
the one ruling is predominantly Christian and Stoic in its strong emphasis on freedom from 
passions or sin. The Senecan tradition present in the medieval and Renaissance mirror-of-
princes genre, which posited that self-governance was at the very centre of legitimate rule. 
Ultimately, it was only the ethical nature of the ruler that justified his use of power, since only 
his self-cure made the curing of the social body possible. It allowed him to translate universal 
precepts into actual political communities.1192 This Senecan prince, in control of himself, was 
in many ways a secular version of Erasmus’s Christian prince, whose self-governance made 
possible his paternal and shepherd-like activities towards his people who should not be ruled 
by fear, but through love and other virtues. All these ethical ideas of wise paternal rule in 
accordance with common good resonated, furthermore, well with the longer tradition of Dutch 
political thought, although they are not employed primarily as a defence of princely rule, but as 
a remainder of its limitations.1193 
 This general framework reconstructed in Chapters four and five is, however, 
modified and nuanced with the introduction of the social and political importance of language 
that forms the main thesis of this dissertation. The general claim is that Vives’s interest in 
language and rhetoric shows how he tried to incorporate what might be called a Ciceronian 
ideal of socialization of wisdom to a princely context. As Vives argued, it was the wisdom of 
the counsellor that sustained the ethical nature of government – although this claim is never 
linked to a republican understanding of justice.1194 This affects a number of issues surrounding 
political thought: not only are political instruments separated from political reason, but also 
those in power can be conceptualized as objects of persuasion – ruled by their passions. 
Moreover, educational patterns deliberately socialize political commonplaces, as well as form 
prudent men to deliberate on common issues, and to cure the social body as doctors of the soul. 
Rhetorical works and studies of the soul, furthermore, provide a theoretical and practical corpus 
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of knowledge for the prudent man to get things done with words. As will become clear, while 
Vives’s version of the importance of rhetoric and language drew predominantly from Roman 
sources such as Cicero and Quintilian, it diverged from Roman republican theorists on a number 
of points.  
 Chapter two argued that Vives encounters humanism in the context of the debate 
between scholasticism and humanism that developed from a relatively non-conflictual 
transformation in language teaching into an outright confrontation on the limits of humanist 
philological methods and linguistic tools. In this debate, Vives’s In pseudodialecticos can be 
read as an attempt to turn dialectic into the central tool of humanist linguistic production, which 
aimed at use in the service of one’s political community and Christendom. Vives’s first contacts 
with humanist rhetoric and linguistic paradigms already interpreted rhetoric primarily as a 
persuasive means to exercise responsible social influence and power, and this view runs 
throughout Vives’s career. In Chapter three, Vives’s membership in the Republic of Letters is 
discussed as a source of his authority and ethos, as well as a space where discussions (sermo) 
could be conducted with learned men of letters. This is contrasted to counselling, where some 
ideas of the rhetorical (oratio) tradition are incorporated into asymmetrical political discussions 
with the prince, whose mental dispositions the counsellor should master.  
 While much of Erasmian humanism took a positive approach to rhetoric in 
educational works in the 1510s and 1520s, and gave it a central place in their educational 
schemes, Vives’s attitude towards rhetoric in his 1530s writings – especially De disciplinis and 
De ratione dicendi – is decidedly ambivalent as Chapters six and seven made clear. In line with 
a certain humanist tradition originating from Agricola, Vives delimits the scope of rhetoric 
primarily to elocution that speaks to the passions of those ruled by them. Simultaneously, he 
turns dialectic into the central humanist intellectual tool for argumentation that can connect 
general precepts to particular cases in a relatively flexible way. Ultimately, De disciplinis and 
De ratione underline greatly the social power of rhetoric, but attempts to unite it with the 
dialectical knowledge of prudent man (vir prudens), who should use the power of rhetoric – so 
decisive for the world of discord – in a manner that does not necessarily break the appearance 
of concord. In doing this, he should also use his knowledge of the soul, and understanding of 
how different ingenia make judgements about things. Ultimately, Vives’s De anima can be seen 
as a reflection on the possibilities of language to produce an Erasmian reform, since the curing 
of the social body is related to a correct diagnosis of how passions interfere in judgement. De 




dispositions of those ruled by their passions. But it also shows ways of using harmful passions 
for the advancement of social and civic concord through linguistic means. Ultimately, it paints 
a picture of a world where the only possible concord attainable for man is based on a 
combination of curing and managing passions by those capable of wisdom and prudence.  
 These developments in Vives’s attitude to rhetoric – to its function, and internal 
theory – greatly underline its value and decisive importance for collective life. This has a 
number of crucial consequences for assessing the general framework of social and political 
thought found in Vives and in Erasmian humanism more generally. The rhetorical tradition that 
is incorporated and adapted to social and political thought is essentially classical and 
predominantly Roman that explicitly treats civic and ethical matters – a point that is never lost 
in Vives’s rhetorical works. However, most of the central points of the larger Ciceronian 
understanding of the importance of rhetoric that were incorporated into Italian humanism are 
lost or altered. In the Ciceronian model, rhetoric is understood as an element of a republican 
tradition that emphasized the importance of political self-government as the only way to 
guarantee that a political community was governed according to its own will and common good. 
Faction and discord should be avoided through the right kind of institutional and constitutional 
arrangements, but ultimately the faith of the commonwealth was dependent on the capacity and 
will of its citizens to partake in the management of common issues through the performance of 
a virtuous life of negotium. In this constellation, rhetoric is the main tool available to a free 
citizen to participate in political deliberations on common issues. Its performance is crucial for 
the proper functioning of a republic or a mixed republic ruled by its citizens.1195 
 This model is not adopted as such in Vives. While Vives endorses the political 
culture of the Low Countries, based on a consensus between the General Estates and the 
Habsburg princes, he does not theorize on the active performance of citizenship guaranteed by 
a political system, he does not discuss liberty primarily in the context of political self-
government, and he most certainly does not connect the active life with the military duties of 
citizens. Rather, his citizens are Stoic citizens of the cosmic and universal republic of reason, 
whose liberty is ethical self-governance – a precondition for understanding true wisdom. They 
transmit universal wisdom to civic prudence, turn general precepts into particular suggestions, 
moulding them to different ingenia. Moreover, they bring concord, aequitas, and natural law to 
                                                          





a world of discord through the use of language. Theirs is a life of negotium in the service of the 
common good as doctors of souls. While the activities of these doctors of the social and 
individual bodies comprise a range of activities that are not tied to civic practices, it is very 
clear that one central arena in which wisdom should be brought to the world was political and 
civic life. 
 True, these doctors of social bodies do not necessarily participate in symmetrical 
civic deliberations in Vives’s work, but they are well equipped rhetorically to speak about 
common issues from the position of the citizen of the world. In fact, Vives is very clear, and 
notably so towards the end of his career that the reason of political communities is separate 
from their will and instruments equated often with the prince. This reason resides in the 
counsellor, in the vir prudens, whose ethical self-government and capacity to prudential 
judgement is crucial for the well-being of political communities. In this way, the ethical demand 
is transposed to these prudential men from the sources of institutional power and the prince. It 
is their ethical self-governance that guarantees the well-being of political communities, and 
they should turn these ethical languages into a source of exhortation or critique of actual 
decisions. Firmly in accordance with this view, the vir prudens as described in De disciplinis is 
very capable of doing just this – he is educated to a life of negotium that comprises the 
possibility of guiding political communities to the common good through a prudential use of 
language. Moreover, his knowledge of rhetoric, passions, and different ingenia, enable the 
teaching of wisdom to a world of discord. 
 But if reason resides with the prudent, then one must ask who they are, where they 
should make a difference, and how. The immediate context of Vives’s political and social 
thought is that of England and, most importantly, the Low Countries. In the Dutch debate, it is 
evident that most of Vives’s interventions for peace can be understood in the context of the 
Dutch system of mixed government as a way of defending Dutch towns from the international 
military politics of Habsburgs – many issues, from the importance of light taxation, and a 
general appraisal of the civic culture of the towns, support this reading. However, while Vives’s 
thought presupposes and supports the consensual system of Dutch politics, it does not present 
a systematic theorisation of its dynamics. Contrary to later developments where the relationship 
grew increasingly antagonistic, leading to the final breakdown in the form of the Dutch revolt, 
Vives rather defends the simplicity of the system that should never nurture any kind of discord 
or open distrust. As is well known, in the course of the latter part of the sixteenth century the 




political community guarded not only by the virtue of its citizens but also by representative 
institutions and a constitutional framework inherited from the late Middle Ages. Moreover, 
based on freedom of conscience, the Dutch emphasized the right to disobedience, and 
developed a strong language of resistance, highlighting the fact that the prince was a magistrate 
instituted by the people.1196 While many later developments – such as freedom of conscience, 
the idea of princes as magistrates instituted for the common good, and Grotius’s insistence on 
the primacy of the philosophical nature of natural law – bear a visible Erasmian and Vivesian 
mark – the clear demarcation of the rights and duties of towns and Habsburgian princes is not 
Vives’s central concern.  
 Closely linked to this, Vives’s rhetorical writings, depiction of educational 
schemes, and ideas on the life of the vir prudens do not portray the ideal man primarily as a 
citizen of the civic life of towns. Although almost all classical civic knowledge is present in De 
disciplinis and the objects of Vives’s educational schemes are definitely the primary office 
holders of the Low Countries, they are not described primarily as men of day-to-day politics. 
They are not specialists of positive law, they should not emphasize the legal possibilities of 
action, they should not participate in open confrontations, and their rhetoric incorporates 
deliberations into less-controversial genres. They are rather portrayed as academic doctors of 
the soul, who perform the duties of the citizen of the world, and cure the social body from a 
certain intellectual distance while simultaneously being close to power. Thus, even though the 
vir prudens could well in practice be someone defending the civic culture of the towns, Vives’s 
description of the prudent man in De disciplinis and the portrayal of his linguistic skills in De 
ratione and De consultatione, denote a humanist working close to the prince rather than 
someone defying him openly.  
 If the vir prudens approaches power, it does not happen in open confrontation 
with the prince but by working close with him. Not only does Vives underline the importance 
of being a friend of the prince, but also many activities of humanists actually take place in close 
proximity to power as tutors and counsellors, with Vives himself being an example of this. This 
vir prudens has at his disposal all the knowledge of the art of persuasion for moulding Erasmian 
political commonplaces to the ears of the prince, as De consultatione made clear. Moreover, he 
should employ political languages and commonplaces in order to point to those in power in the 
right direction. However, the vir prudens is not a courtier, his hesitance to adopt the rules of the 
                                                          




world he is curing, portrayed in More’s Utopia, is blatantly clear. He should not interiorize the 
manners and ways of the court, but keep himself distant from its corruptive elements, while 
simultaneously trying to teach virtue and civic prudence within the reach of the possibilities 
and the limitations set by the people he is trying to convince. 
 However, this thesis has argued there is a further element to the system in which 
language transmits civic prudence to those in power. This is because the vir prudens is not only 
a man whose ethical nature to perform the duties of the citizen of the world is presupposed, but 
who is incorporated into the supposed world of concord of the men of letters, understood as an 
actual historical process. In more restricted Erasmian circles the Republic of Letters created a 
framework inside of which ethical qualities can be mirrored, and where politics and other social 
matters can be discussed on terms that are equal in a circle of friends who help each other to 
create possibilities for counselling and to print political texts. This idealized world of friendship 
and symmetrical discussion (sermo) is contrasted to the engagement with the rest of the world 
ruled by emotion and discord, where passionate rhetoric is the only way to get things done. 
More generally, the ethical nature of Vives’s vir prudens is contrasted to the false virtue 
attributed to nobility by the multitude utterly incapable of understanding that the performance 
of true virtue should constitute the only source of nobility. In this more general interpretation, 
Vives is portraying a world where wisdom and prudence lie with the men of letters, not with 
the traditional nobility who still held an important place in decision-making procedures. This 
creates a close link between learning and education on one hand, and self-governance that is 
the presupposition for a participation in wisdom on the other. But it equally shows that the 
possibilities of concord in Vives’s thought presuppose the process in which men of letters in 
fact become socially important, and conquer important positions reserved for the aristocracy of 
the soul.  
 The activities of the Republic of Letters add a further dimension to counselling. 
Whereas counselling in the General Estates or in the court belongs to the oral world of face-to-
face rhetoric, the literary element of counselling further changes the dynamics. A crucial 
dimension of Erasmian humanism, be it More’s Utopia, Erasmus’s Institutio principis 
Christiani or Vives’s 1520s political writings, is that they are printed and thus incorporated a 
larger audience to the sphere of political deliberations. This is not incidental; Vivesian and 
Erasmian educational materials, from Erasmus’s Adagia to Vives’s Dialogues, socialize the 
basic commonplaces and pacifist ideas through which political action can be understood. In 




civic tradition, into an audience of political deliberations and other texts. What is more, there is 
an awareness that the possibilities of political action are framed by the expectations of the 
people, and by the general culture in which politics is assessed. As Erasmus had made clear, 
only a part of counselling was to deliberate on a given course of action; equally as important 
was to explain and change the general culture inside of which certain courses of action are 
assessed. If the culture surrounding the prince and the audience Vives and Erasmus are 
addressing expects peaceful and virtuous action from the ruler, then his glory is tied to these 
conditions.  
 The description of the vir prudens who has to uphold concord happens in a critical 
moment of European history. There are three developments closely linked to one another that 
form the background of Vives’s thought. First, warfare among main European princes was 
continuous during the 1520s. Secondly, this warfare conditioned the relationship between Dutch 
towns and Charles V in the Low Countries, since the warfare of the Emperor required the fiscal 
participation of the towns. Thirdly, the Reformation represented a possible threat to the unity 
of European concord, and in Vives’s mind showed how theology in the hands of the multitude 
led to politically radical action. In this situation Vives’s own work creates an example of the 
life of a wise man who strives for a critique of the powerful – but only inside the existing 
institutional framework (both religious and secular) which itself should not be endangered. This 
is, furthermore, a way of enhancing separate causes simultaneously, since to work in the context 
of the international Republic of Letters for European peace and concord, is directly to enhance 
the cause of the Dutch towns in the wider European context. Moreover, Vives’s move to a more 
hesitant and exclusive understanding of the teaching of rhetoric at the turn of the 1530s is a 
reaction to the more optimistic rhetorical programme of earlier humanism in a situation where 
only the educated few should be familiar with the linguistic tools of persuasion.  
 The Vivesian project as it is developed in the 1530s is, thus, a clear elaboration or 
amplification of some of the classical northern humanist themes of ethical civic action based 
on the use of language. The general Socratic and Ciceronian trust in the power of words is 
realized as part of a scholarly life, but the cautiousness and ambivalence with the forces of 
language contrasts to the 1510s playful, witty, and optimistic understanding on the possibilities 
of language found among Erasmian humanists. Moreover, the problematization of the abilities 
of language to bring about good judgement through an appropriate use of emotion and passion 
in De disciplinis, De ratione, and De anima, is to my knowledge unique in the northern 




 Vives’s, and more generally an Erasmian defence of status quo that incorporated 
a critical point to itself in the face of the problems of princely warfare and the Reformation was, 
as we know well, a failure. While the rhetorical and transformative capacities of language are 
adopted by Vives precisely in order to realize a life of social and political utility, his classical 
Latin proved inadequate to compete with the more popular vernacular answer of the different 
branches of the Reformation. Moreover, the highly ambivalent relation to power that 
characterizes his rhetorical programme guaranteed that the Vivesian scholar could hardly 
compete with the legal expertise of the jurists, or with the emerging courtier. But the evocation 
of freedom of speech and the importance of counselling, the attempt to turn the linguistic and 
material culture into an advice for those in power, and Vives’s investigations into language and 
cognition, had more lasting echoes. 
 The reception of Vives has been tackled in the thorough studies of Enrique 
González González, and Valentín Moreno Gallego both of whom have engaged systematically 
with different aspects of the transmission and reading of Vives’s work. As is always the case, 
the reception of Vives never happens as a systematic engagement with his overall work, but in 
a confrontation with separate treatises that are woven together and printed with a variety of 
materials from various traditions, in a process that dynamically created new meaning in Vives’s 
writings. Different works have different receptions in different traditions, and the close 
intertextuality between Vives’s separate 1530s works is quite naturally lost or modified in the 
process. I have little to add to the material process of transmission and the reception of Vives’s 
separate works in this study. However, I would like to discuss briefly certain conceptual 
possibilities in Vives’s social thought, the importance of which on later developments would 
need further research.  
 The union of rhetoric with the ideal of vir prudens has some clear links with the 
more institutional and religious Jesuit proposals. Despite his suspicious connections to 
Erasmian humanism, Vives did have a material reception in the Jesuit order, but mostly, 
although not exclusively, in the form of the schoolboy dialogues: Exercitatio.1197 Furthermore, 
some central Jesuit developments are clearly detached, or even opposed to Vives’s core ideas, 
starting from the development of casuistry for a categorization of moral and legal cases, which 
broke with Vives’s general trust in aequitas. The focus on preaching is, furthermore, quite 
absent from Vives. But the general idea of educating pious men in internal harmony and 
                                                          




concord, who could engage with the world of discord with all the knowledge of humanist 
learning, is Erasmian and Vivesian. The Jesuit developments present an even more religious 
and organized way of reaching that union.1198 What is more, the Jesuit understanding of the 
close links of language and power led them to appreciate pronouncedly asymmetrical genres of 
rhetorical production, which facilitated the persuasion of one’s superiors.1199 On a different 
note, the conceptual importance of Erasmus’s and Vives’s humanism for the development of 
different traditions outside Low Countries has been emphasized to varying degrees.1200 
 However, if one wants to attribute Vives a role in a longer history of the 
development of political thought, one must think of the intertextual links that Vives created 
between politics, rhetoric, education, and passions, which frame the possibilities of all social 
and political reforms. This is not a well-constructed architectural philosophy, but rather an 
attempt to think of these issues together in a critical moment of European history. If one of the 
crucial developments of seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries political thought is the 
incorporation of man’s cognitive, social, and emotional possibilities to the centre of political 
theories, then Vives’s attempt to think of how prudential judgements are formed, and how 
passions work both individually and collectively, point in this direction.  
 It is well known that Vives’s major 1530s works, De disciplinis and De anima, 
had a large reception in sixteenth-century Europe; but how exactly they were conceptually 
incorporated into different areas of study has not been systematically investigated.1201 
Moreover, even if already a classical tradition of studies of Vives has noted some links to Bacon, 
Descartes, and a range of later thinkers, the potential conceptual points of contact have rarely 
been studied in depth.1202 But even more important would be to pursue a line of research that 
does not try to interpret Vives as an originator or precursor of any tradition or strand of thought, 
but simply as one of the most philosophically reflective representatives of northern humanism, 
whose engagement with classical tradition lead to an acute interest on the social importance of 
                                                          
1198 Fumaroli 1999b, 101; Höpfl 2004, 12-22. 
1199 Höpfl 2004, 80. 
1200 Vives played a role in the development of the civic education of England, see Skinner 1996; Peltonen 2012, 
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1201 González González 2007, 90-98, 109. 
1202 See Moreno Gallego 2006, 107-121; Noreña 1970, 275-299. For a presentation as well as a critical assessment 




language together with the ethical, passionate, and civic problems that arose with it. In this 
respect, one could try to understand the role that Vives’s synthesis of Stoic-Christian framework 
(with an awareness of rhetoric and passions) played in the larger developments of decorum into 
manners and politeness; rhetoric into conversation; civic culture into sociability; ingenium into 
an anatomical concept; and the literary culture of the Republic of Letters into a more public, 
and even popular form of civic and scientific debate.1203 More generally, one could give Vives 
a place in a story of early modern thought, where the study of passions and the natural 










                                                          
1203 Some of these have been partially addressed. For the civic dimension, see Skinner 1996. For Vives, ingenium 
and anatomy, see Noreña 1972, 75. 
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